Over the weekend R.J. Anderson, Zach Sanders and others tweeted about Tommy Hunter’s curveball. R.J. noted that Hunter’s curve was way up in the zone during Hunter’s start on Saturday. I was not watching the game, but I thought it was an interesting observation. I pulled up the pitchf/x data for the start and they were right:

His curveballs were very high: most in the upper half of or above the zone. Those curves got him a good number of called strikes, a handful of whiffs, and a couple balls in play (all outs).

Next I wanted to see whether his curves were always that high and how they compared curves as a whole. So I plotted a histogram of the height of all of his curves (his one start in 2010, a couple from 2008 and 19 from last year) and those for all curves in the pitchf/x data.

Hunter’s curves are, on average, a good six inches higher than the average pitcher’s. While curves as a whole peak in the bottom third of the zone and there are a good fraction below the zone, Hunter’s curves peak above the middle of the zone and a good number spill out above the zone.

Do all these high curves hurt Hunter? It doesn’t seem so. He throws the curve a lot, over 25% of the time, and by linear weights the pitch it is a very good pitch. Digging into why that is we can compare some of its components to Harry Pavlidis’ benchmarks for the curve:
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We often say on draft day and the days following, as a precursor, that you can’t judge a draft class until two or three years down the road. However, today you’ll find outlets across the interwebs – including this one at 7 p.m. EST– willing to judge immediately. I don’t know if tonight’s top 10 picks will have a surprise that throws off the mock drafters, but like every year, it will have a pick that we, the “experts”, question. As a review of how that usually turns out, here’s a look at six players over the last three years that have baffled the collective minds.

2007 Draft

Pittsburgh Pirates select Dan Moskos, lhp, Clemson. (Fourth Overall)
We wondered why he went before: Ross Detwiler, lhp, Missouri State. (Matt Wieters, too).

The Pirates wrote off Wieters early in the spring, so while we wonder in hindsight how they could have passed on him, the narrative on draft day was why you’d lean Moskos over Detwiler. Pittsburgh did so intending to keep Moskos in the rotation – he’d had an up-and-down junior season as a starter after starring as a sophomore (and on Team USA) in a relief role. In two years as a starter, Moskos had a walk rate of 3.5, uninspiring strikeout rates, and was generally ineffective. But this year, in a return to the bullpen, he’s been really good: allowing just one earned run in four of his 21 Double-A outings. Time will tell on Moskos vs. Detwiler, but for the first time since he was drafted, I’m really starting to believe in the idea of Moskos the Major Leaguer.

Milwaukee Brewers select Matt LaPorta, LF (?), Florida. (Seventh Overall)
We wondered why he went before: Quoting myself, minutes after the pick, “They must have some belief that LaPorta can play left, but here’s my question: if you want an outfielder with plus power, does LaPorta really project better than Jason Heyward?”

This was an even stranger pick at the time than Moskos, as the draft day buzz around LaPorta was more focused on the late first round. It would be unfair to limit LaPorta’s analysis to comparing him to Jason Heyward, though obviously that decision still baffles today. However, LaPorta is a big league player that was twice ranked among Baseball America’s top 30 prospects, so, he was probably undervalued by media outlets on draft day 2007. Still, it seemed clear even then that the Brewers may have taken LaPorta just to inevitably trade him, which they did in acquiring C.C. Sabathia in 2008. We should also mention that he’s been a mess this season, negating the value he provided last year (0.5 WAR) in a decent rookie cup of coffee.

2008 Draft

Houston Astros select Jason Castro, c, Stanford. (Tenth Overall)
We wondered why he went before: Justin Smoak, Brett Wallace, 1Bs.

This was Bobby Heck’s first draft in Houston, so unlike when a revered scouting director like Tim Wilken drafts Tyler Colvin, we didn’t give him the benefit of the doubt. Castro was a guy that a lot of people liked, but he was also one without a track record: he’d hit .167 as a sophomore. I’m sure the Astros didn’t go into the draft thinking Smoak would even be available, but there he was — and no one had Castro ranked ahead of Smoak. That analysis still seems correct, but Castro has quieted a lot of critics, especially after a good 2009. He struggled early this season, his OPS at .603 on May 6, but he’s since hit .330/.422/.404. The power doesn’t look to be there, but Castro should make good on the expectations of a tenth overall pick.

2009 Draft

Pittsburgh Pirates select Tony Sanchez, c, Boston College (fourth overall)
We Wondered Why He Went Before: A lot of pitchers and Grant Green, ss, USC.

This was problematic for a couple reasons. First, Pirates fans are particularly sensitive nowadays about going the inexpensive route. Second, Sanchez wasn’t being talked about as a top-5 overall player. Third, he didn’t really have a discernible plus tool. It was just puzzling across the board. But now, the catcher is batting a robust .318/.423/.460 in the Florida State League, showing patience and gap power. However, his defense – at times praised more than his bat entering last year’s draft – has really lagged behind. Sanchez has thrown out just 7 runners in 50 basestealing attempts, and leads the league with seven errors. I think the pick looks good right now, but I still have questions about his ultimate success. And why the Pirates made that pick.

Baltimore Orioles select Matt Hobgood, rhp, California HS (Fifth Overall)
We Wondered Why He Went Before: Jake Turner, Matt Purke, Tyler Matzek.

With the next pick after Sanchez, the Baltimore Orioles made Matt Hobgood the first high school pitcher taken in the draft, a spot where no media outlet had him ranked. The Orioles, even more than the Pirates, were adamant that Hobgood was ranked higher on their boards than the other high school talents. Given this position by the Orioles, I wrote last year that Scouting Director Joe Jordan was “ballsy to not blame ownership and stand behind your scouting.” So far, the big right-hander has had a decidedly up and down first professional season. Hobgood has a 4.40 ERA in the Sally League, with a not-so-solid 39/26 K/BB ratio through 59.1 innings. However, he is showing a heavy fastball, given the 1.91 GO/AO ratio, and has showed brilliance at times. And given how seldom Turner and Matzek have pitched this spring, it’s not as if his peers are particularly outpacing him.

Atlanta Braves select Mike Minor, lhp, Vanderbilt (Seventh Overall)
We wondered why he went before: Mike Leake, Aaron Crow, Alex White.

Considered the most egregious of the three 2009 surprises, I think this quote from Kevin Goldstein managed to put a finger on the complaints behind the pick: “It’s a horrible pick FOR ME, but I think early picks should be all about upside. Minor has a better shot of reaching [the] big leagues than anyone other than Strasburg in this thing, but his ceiling is a fourth starter.” But I suppose it’s only fitting that last year’s weirdest selection is this year’s biggest enigma. Minor seems a different pitcher in the Braves organization than he was in college, then lauded for his command and pitchability. Now, he’s among the minor league leaders with 91 strikeouts in 63.2 innings, but he’s been walking people, with 28 free passes handed out. Apparently, the Braves were keen on Minor’s development of his third pitch (curveball), and believed his change-up would play better in pro ball. Now, it just seems foolish we ever questioned the Braves fantastic scouting department.

Few baseball players do everything. Some can consistently field balls at spots their peers have trouble reaching. Some can beat out a slow chopper to short. Some display a keen batting eye that keeps pitchers honest. Some possess a preternatural ability to hit the ball where they ain’t. A few accomplish this by hitting the the ball so far that outfielders run out of room long before it lands. Only a small smattering of players do all these things. The ones who can do one or two of those things usually find themselves in a starting lineup, or at least play on a regular basis.

When it comes to Adam Dunn, the focus seems to be on what he can’t do rather than what he does well. Since his full-season debut at age 22 in 2002, Dunn has done two things at an elite level. He has kept pitchers honest by taking the pitches he can’t hit. If the pitcher does deliver a hittable pitch, Dunn tends to hit it far beyond the reach of fielders. From 2004 through 2008 Dunn hit at least 40 home runs, and fell only two short of that mark in 2009. Yet when it comes to mainstream evaluation, the focus is not on these strong points, but rather on his weaknesses. That is, his ability to make consistent contact and his poor performance in the outfield.

Dunn understands the criticism he receives, but given a comment he made in spring 2007, he also knows the value he provides with his approach. “I’m going to be Ichiro,” he said. “I’m going to have 216 hits, 177 of them singles, six homers and steal 77 bags.” He did later make some more serious comments about improving his contact skills, though not much came of it. His 70.4 percent contact rate from 2006 does remain the lowest of his career, but he hasn’t improved on it significantly in the past three and a third seasons. His rate consistently sits well below league average.

Even so, he had his two strengths to fall back on. From 2007 through 2009 Dunn hit 118 homers and 79 doubles, which have accounted for nearly 49 percent of his total hits. He has also drawn 339 walks which, while not quite as valuable as hits, are far, far more valuable than outs. Plenty of major leaguers have hit for a higher average than Dunn, but few have matched his other skills. This shows up in his wOBA, which hasn’t fallen below .383 since 2006, that .234 BA year. That mark sits at .386 this season, but the composition has changed. Something is quite different about Adam Dunn in 2010.

The aspect that stands out the most is Dunn’s OBP, just .371 this year. That mark usually comes across a bit higher, in the mid-.380s. Last year, on the power of a 17.4 percent walk rate, Dunn got it all the way up to .398. He also raised his batting average to .267, by the slimmest of margins the highest mark of his career. That batting average sits around the same mark this year, .271, but his walk rate has slipped to 12.7 percent. Dunn has never experienced a rate so low, not even during his short stint as a 21-year-old in 2001. It made me wonder whether this is a blip on the radar or a complete change for Dunn.

Seeking an explanation of some sort, I turned to his plate discipline data, which, as expected, yielded an oddity. While Dunn has established a reputation of not doing the pitcher any favors, this year it appears he has, swinging at 26.2 percent of pitches outside the zone. For the first time in his career he approaches the league average mark. From 2002 through 2009 he swung at just 17.5 percent of pitches outside the zone, always falling a good deal below the average. But this year he’s close. Closer than he’s ever been. These extra hacks at bad pitches also show up in his swinging strike rate, 12.7 percent, another career high.

Where have all these walks gone? It appears that two of Dunn’s teammates have compensated a bit. Ryan Zimmerman, scorcher of baseballs, has added over four percentage points to his walk rate from last year, which had added almost four percentage points from the previous year. Josh Willingham, also in the midst of a career year, has added more than five percentage points to his walk rate from last year, which, as with Zimmerman, was then a career high. I’m not sure if those two have to do with Dunn, but it is curious that those two are drawing far more walks while Dunn draws far fewer.

There might be a solution in this. For most of the season Jim Riggleman has penciled in a 3-4-5 of Zimmerman, Dunn, and Willingham. Those are his three best hitters, and since they go righty-lefty-righty it fits perfectly with baseball conventions. The problem does not lie in those three, but instead at the top of the Nats’ order. Nyjer Morgan, Christian Guzman, and Adam Kennedy have seen most of the time in the top two spots, and none of those three sports an OBP that screams leadoff hitter. That means fewer men on base for the heart of the order.

Might it be better for the Nats’ offense if Riggleman spared the convention and started condensing his better hitters closer to the top of the order? Lead off with either Guzman or Morgan, and then go right to Zimmerman, followed by Willingham and then Dunn, or Dunn and then Willingham if the right-lefty-righty combo is so important. That means not only more at-bats for the best hitters in the lineup, but also that they can hit with more men on base. Might Dunn get more hittable pitches if he has two .400+ on-base guys hitting in front of him? It seems at least worth a try.

Chances are that we’ll see this run its course without any tweaks. Two relatively weak hitters will continue to hit atop the order, creating more outs ahead of Zimmerman, Dunn, and Willingham. That gives them fewer opportunities to knock in runs. That’s convention, though, and it will take more than an article centering on a few data points to change that. Still, it seems like that might at least slightly boost the Nats’ production. As for Dunn, I’m not sure that a lineup change will help his newfound propensity to swing at pitches outside the zone. At this point, though, isn’t it worth a shot?

Beyond that parting question, I’d like to ask something of Nats fans. Dunn is seeing more pitches than ever outside the zone, 56.9 percent against league average of 52.6 percent and Dunn’s career average of 52.4 percent. At the same time he’s seeing more first-pitch strikes than ever, 57.8 percent. We’re dealing with just 237 PA, so it’s difficult to draw any conclusions. Have you noticed pitchers attacking him in a deliberate manner? Is there a pattern for how pitchers work him that might throw off his game plan? This won’t show up in composite numbers, so I’m looking to Nats fans for a take on the question.

There is a player in this draft, you may have heard of him, that has already shown scouts an ability to catch, but may become an outfielder in professional baseball to expedite his timetable to the Major Leagues. The guy swings a big stick, after all, and despite good arm strength, is pretty raw behind the plate. The catcher vs. outfield question will surround him for the definite future. That guy is University of Minnesota right fielder Mike Kvasnicka. What? Not who you thought I was talking about?

What’s important to understand is Dave’s analysis that Bryce Harper should be moved to the outfield does not apply to most players. You don’t need me to tell you that Harper is a special breed, and that he should be treated like the odd-duck he is. I agree with Dave’s analysis, but want to point out that it does not apply to all bat-first, maybe-catchers, and Kvasnicka offers us a concrete example. The Golden Gopher slugger has been rumored as a back-up plan for teams drafting as high as the top 10, and shouldn’t go to bed tonight without knowing where his future lies. But his destination will only be with an organization that believes he can catch — and it only should be. Kvasnicka is a first rounder behind the plate, and a fifth rounder (at best) in the outfield.

Because Minnesota has a defense-first catcher named Kyle Knudson, Kvasnicka hasn’t caught much in three seasons, as scouts have just 38 attempted steals in three seasons to work off. Kvasnicka threw out just 10 of those runners, but you certainly can’t blame him for being raw. He didn’t even catch in the Northwoods League last summer, so scouts are left to really project how he’ll catch based on athleticism, arm strength, body type and more. But they will see it through rose-colored glasses, because they understand what we do: that over a full season, the positional adjustment difference between a catcher and a right fielder is 20 runs, or two wins.

The PNR Scouting Report for Kvasnicka reads thusly about his defense in right field: “[C]ould be an average defender at a corner with enough arm for right.” Let’s say, for illustration purposes, he is a league average right fielder, playing in 600 plate appearances per season. Or, given that he’s raw defensively, let’s say as a catcher that he’s minus-5 over 500 plate appearances. To be worth 3 WAR in RF, he would need to be +17.5 with the bat, or one of the best 60 hitters in any given season. At catcher, that bat would need to be worth just +5.8 to hit the three-win threshold, a far more achievable feat.

When you draft a player like Harper at first overall, and pay him what will be an eight-figure bonus, your worry is how to best set him up for prolonged Major League success. Dave is talking about 10,000 Major League plate appearances. For a draftee like Kvasnicka, your worry is getting him to the big leagues at all. We’re talking about a guy with gap power, who, in his first two seasons at Minnesota, posted a walk-to-strikeout ratio of 25-to-103. It was a much healthier 46/28 this season, but at a sink or swim position like right field, where you need a plus bat just to get an opportunity, his resume looks a little more dicey.

In prospect analysis, there is not one philosophy that can guide you through decision-making, instead, decisions have to be made on a case-by-case basis. For Harper, the right move is the outfield. For Kvasnicka, his only chance is probably behind the plate.

In approximately seven hours, the Washington Nationals will select Bryce Harper with the first overall pick in the 2010 draft. In a couple of months, they’ll sign Harper to a lucrative contract, and he’ll begin his professional career – most likely, as an outfielder.

A catcher by trade, the Nationals are said to be leaning towards moving Harper to the outfield on a full-time basis. As is usually the case when a premium prospect is moved down the defensive spectrum, the reaction from the sabermetric community that I have read has been mostly negative. It is quite common to read comments to the effect that Harper’s value is diminished as an outfielder, because his bat is so much more valuable behind the plate, where premium bats are a rare breed.

However, there’s a presumption in these statements that I don’t believe holds true – that Harper’s projected offensive value is a constant regardless of his defensive position. Put simply, that isn’t supported by years of history of Major League Baseball.

Catching is hard work. It takes a toll on the human body, wearing players down and requiring frequent days of rest. Knees and backs routinely decide to give out from the stress that crouching behind the plate puts on them. Even the players who avoid the disabled list have to deal with the fatigue that just comes with the job.

There’s a reason why no catcher in Major League history has eclipsed 10,000 career plate appearances. By comparison, 33 outfielders have racked up at least 10,000 plate appearances, with the leader (Carl Yastrzemski) almost reaching 14,000. It is simply a statement of fact that Harper would be expected to have a longer career in MLB as an outfielder than he would as a catcher. The quantity of time that he would be able to add value on the field is larger, even if the potential quality of that production is lower.

So, simply applying a position adjustment and claiming its a bad move to make Harper an outfielder doesn’t cut it. If we want to really know whether this move makes sense, we’d have to explore whether the increase expectation in playing time outweighs the decreased value from not having Harper’s bat at a position of low offensive output. Beyond that, we’d also have to determine the effect that playing catcher could have on stagnating Harper’s offensive growth.

94 catchers in Major League history have accumulated at least 3,000 plate appearances. You know how many have posted a career OPS over .900? One – Mike Piazza. Okay, fine, a career .900 OPS is a pretty high bar (63 players at other positions have done it, but it’s still a pretty impressive feat), so lets lower it to .800 – 11 catchers in Major League history have a career OPS over .800 (and at least 3,000 PA), but four of those are active and haven’t had their numbers suppressed by end of career decline yet. Another one of those, Mickey Tettleton, spent 20 percent of his major league career playing positions other than catcher.

Perhaps we’ve all been spoiled by the presence of Piazza, Joe Mauer, and Jorge Posada over the last 20 years, but in reality, there are just a handful of big league catchers in the history of the game who have been able to both endure a career behind the plate and wield an impact bat at the same time.

By all accounts, Harper’s bat has a chance to be extremely special. If he makes it to stardom, it will be his offense that carries him there, not his work behind the plate. Moving him to the outfield will not be a waste of his value any more than it was when the Blue Jays moved Carlos Delgado to first base, the Astros moved Craig Biggio to second base, or the Braves moved Dale Murphy to center field. Harper can be plenty valuable as a power hitting athletic outfielder, and he can play until he’s 40 out there.

While the Nationals will be criticized by some for forfeiting some potential value, in the long run, it will probably be in his best interests, and I don’t blame the team for making that decision now, rather than wasting years of development trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.

When it comes to righty/lefty matchups, my nerdy senses start tingling. I think it is one of the most fascinating subjects in baseball, mostly because it’s a cool combination of game theory, statistics, and psychology. Although Ryan Howard’s name is in the title, this isn’t really about him (I promise my time at Fangraphs won’t be spent solely on Ryan Howard and philosophy).

As a baseball fan, I watch a lot of games. As a follower of advanced analysis, I know this can be both helpful and hurtful. When it comes to righties and lefties, I sometimes let my gut take over, and to be honest, I feel a little guilty. From watching games, my gut tells me that Ryan Howard stinks against lefties. The numbers back it up. For his career, Howard is hitting .226/.304/.441 against southpaws in 1144 plate appearnces. But a few months ago, the incredibly wise Mitchel Lichtman (MGL) wrote the following:

IOW, how a batter does against RH pitchers informs us on how he will likely do against LH pitchers and vice versa. Why? Because there is not much of a spread in true platoon splits among ML baseball players yet there is a large spread in overall true hitting talent among ML baseball players. So if we see a large platoon split, like for a player like Howard, it is likely a fluke. If a player does really well versus RH pitchers but terrible against LH pitchers, both the “really well” and the “terrible” numbers are likely fluky and the “truth” is somewhere in between…

…First we’ll estimate his overall true OPS. In his career, it is .966. We’ll regress that and call it .930, which is a typical projection for him. Now we have to take his observed platoon ratio (I like to use ratio – some people use a differential) and regress that. His observed platoon ratio for those 4 years is 1.052/.719, or 1.46. For the average lefty, it is 1.20 and we just don’t see that much variation among players in their true platoon splits. IOW, that 1.46 is likely very (but not completely) flukey. We might regress that 1.46 80% toward the league average of 1.20, to get 1.25. That is Howard’s “true” estimated platoon split.

Now we simply apply that to his overall estimated true OPS of .930 and the fact that he faced 62% RHP. That gives us an OPS of .805 versus LHP and 1.006 versus RHP.

Matt Swartz of Baseball Prospectus also looked at the numbers before the start of the 2009 season and concluded, “…a mixture of an inability to avoid comparing Howard’s skills versus lefties from his skills versus righties, and unwillingness to actually look up the numbers has led the sabermetric community to be just as inaccurate and groupthinking as the mainstream media.”

Maybe I should just stop right there when two really smart guys like Litchman and Swartz are agreeing on an issue. However, my main area of contention is the argument that because Howard is good at hitting righties, it shows he is a good hitter and that his performance versus lefties is a “fluke.” I understand the argument, but what about the possibility that Howard is just bad against lefties and very, very good against righties? From watching games, this seems to be the case. This is what my “baseball mind” is telling me. The issues with resting on that gut feeling are obvious and many, but that doesn’t mean the conclusion is necessarily wrong.

I guess I should also clarify what I mean by “bad.” He’s not 2010 Aramis Ramirez bad against lefties, just more like 2007 Jason Bay bad. His immense success against righties also makes things relative.

Below are Howard’s wRC+ from 2005-2010, going from overall to versus lefties and then versus righties:

2005: 135, 4, 169
2006: 166, 133, 182
2007: 140, 110, 159
2008: 123, 91, 143
2009: 141, 71, 178
2010: 109, 75, 129

Using the splits section, we can also see that the quality of balls hit by Howard against lefties is much worse than against righties (fewer line drives, more infield flies, etc). Am I saying that Howard should be sat versus lefties? No. I also think that MGL is right, that Howard is more likely to be better than his career OPS versus lefties than worse. The question is how much. Howard’s career walk rate against lefties is 9.4%. This year it’s 3.6%. As we discussed the other day, Howard is having a rough year. The question I want to pose to everyone is, how long do we need to wait until we can “tell” that someone is just not very good against lefties? Is this an instance where we need our gut to take over a bit because the sample size needed for this platoon is big enough to take many years to get to? You tell me, because I still haven’t figured this one out.

Regrettably, I began my series both reviewing draft history and previewing the 2010 draft position-by-position too late in the draft season. So, since we haven’t covered outfielders and pitchers — and because there’s no way I could cover all of them in one post — I’m not going to try. Instead, I’ll just post a bit about one unique story at each position.

Mike Leake was drafted in the top 10 last year not because of overwhelming stuff, but because the Reds believed he offered present value — and they have been proven right. There is something to be said for the guy that makes, and sticks, in the Major Leagues first. A win today is cheaper than it’s going to be next year (in theory), and Leake already has 1.6 WAR in 11 starts. This year, many have compared Ohio State RHP Alex Wimmers to Leake, because Wimmers is going to move fast.

I saw and wrote about Wimmers earlier in the spring — and came away from the start most intrigued by his change up. “The best development for the right-hander was the strength of his change up,” I wrote. “He struck out three LHHs with the pitch, and he showed plus feel throughout the game.” It seemed that I had mostly heard about the curveball prior to this season, though, so I became intrigued at how far this pitch has come.

“His first year, he came mostly out of the bullpen learning to command that curveball,” Ohio State pitching coach Eric Parker told me. As a freshman, Wimmers appeared in 25 games in relief, posting a 4.50 ERA, with a 51/31 K/BB ratio in 40 innings. “I had talked to him about adding a third pitch, but his curve was so good, he didn’t need it in relief. I blame myself — we didn’t talk about the change up much.”

Parker credited the work Wimmers put in that next summer, in the Valley League, as where he began the development of the pitch. Baseball America ranked him the #2 prospect in the league after that summer, highlighting his “excellent curveball with hard, late break.” But for the change-up, they were less complimentary: “His circle changeup is still a work in progress and is clearly his third-best pitch.”

The next spring was where Wimmers broke out, winning 9 games, finding a spot on the Division I leaderboard in strikeouts with 136 in 104.2 innings. The pitch had evolved, been turned from a weapon in the Valley League to a plus pitch, probably during fall practices with the Buckeyes. According to CollegeSplits, in 2009, he struck out 56 left-handed batters in 147 at-bats. Overall, lefties hit .231/.372/.299 against him. He had a new weapon in his arsenal.

Next was a stop in the Cape Cod League, where regular Cape attendee and blogger Greg Schimmel ranked him as the league’s seventh-best pitching prospect, behind likely first-rounders Chris Sale and Brandon Workman, among others. Schimmel wrote, “[H]is best pitch was definitely his 74-75 mph curveball…Wimmers also has a good 76-78 mph changeup with good downward movement.” The pitch seemed undervalued even then.

However, his Cape Cod League manager remembered it more fondly in a recent conversation. Bourne manager Harvey Shapiro hasn’t seen Wimmers this spring, so his scouting report dates back to last summer. But the praise for the changeup is bold. “I think his changeup is a plus-plus pitch,” Shapiro said. “Whether you’re a lefty or a righty, his is so good he can throw it to either.” That, in fact, is one thing that his OSU pitching coach Eric Parker referenced was a focal point this spring.

And, of course, the pitch has taken a life of its own this spring. The Baseball America scouting report for him now references that one scout has called the pitch the most advanced change he’s seen from an amateur. Lefties, against whom Parker called the changeup “unbelievably effective,” hit a rather unbelievable .110/.168/.120 off him this spring, with 43 strikeouts in 100 at-bats.

The key to the pitch came from both coaches, as Parker credited Wimmers for having “such great arm speed” on the pitch, and said he “maintains the same arm slot.” Shapiro, in a separate conversation, said: “He throws all three pitches from the same arm slot, and with the same arm speed.” Scouts often believe that college pitchers with changeups might be even better in pro ball, as they will have more confidence to throw the pitch against same side hitters when they are facing wood bats rather than aluminum. The team that thinks this applies to Wimmers will draft him very highly today. They will think that his three plus pitchers are good enough that he’ll move quickly, potentially contributing at the Major League level by 2012. I do, too.

Boston’s bullpen is struggling this season. Collectively, Red Sox relievers have a 4.68 xFIP, besting just the Indians, Royals and Angels among American League clubs. The only Sox reliever with a sub-four xFIP is Daniel Bard, at 3.29.

You may be surprised to learn that Jonathan Papelbon, he of 2.6 Wins Above Replacement per season as a full-time reliever from 2006-2009, is among the most egregious offenders.

In 24 innings pitched, the famed river dancer is walking a tight rope — his 3.00 ERA doesn’t look so bad, but his xFIP sits at 5.02. With -0.3 WAR, Papelbon has arguably been the least effective of Boston’s bullpen options.

Papelbon has a career-low 7.13 K/9 and a career-high 4.5 BB/9. He’s getting swinging strikes 11.1 percent, still above the 9.3 percent average for MLB relievers but below his 13.3 percent career average. The 29-year-old is also putting fewer pitches within the strike zone — 48.2 percent, compared to a career 53.6 percent average. When Papelbon does throw a pitch in the zone, batters are putting the bat on the ball more often. His in-zone contact rate is 89 percent, well north of his 81.9 percent figure as a major leaguer. If Papelbon’s batting average on balls in play were closer to his career .275 mark than his current .198, his struggles would be more apparent.

Sample size caveats apply, but 2010 continues a clear downward trend in the effectiveness of Papelbon’s fastball. During his career, Papelbon’s heater has been one of the best offerings in the game. His mid-90s gas has been worth +2.07 runs per 100 pitches. However, that fastball hasn’t been near as dominating lately:

Papelbon’s Run Value Per 100 pitches with the fastball, by year

2005: +0.69
2006: +3.24
2007: +3.29
2008: +2.21
2009: +1.49
2010: -0.34

Papelbon had the highest fastball run value/100 pitches among relievers in 2006. He placed second in 2007 and fifth in 2008. Last year, he still managed to sneak into the top 20. But this season, his fastball has been about as valuable as those of Danys Baez and Kanekoa Texeira.

Trip Somers’ texasleaguers site has three years of Pitch F/X data on Papelbon. There aren’t any large changes in terms of velocity or movement, but the strike, swing and whiff rates on Papelbon’s fastball are heading in the wrong direction:

2008: 71.3 Strike%, 56.3 Swing%, 11.5 Whiff%
2009: 67.5 Strike%, 51.8 Swing%, 10.4 Whiff%
2010: 67.0 Strike%, 49.7 Swing%, 10.0 Whiff%

It’s dangerous to infer too much from a few months of poor pitching from a reliever. But Papelbon’s performance as Boston’s closer has gone from awesome (2.78 xFIP from ’06 to ’08) to acceptable (3.98 xFIP in ’09) to replacement-level.

The odds that he continues to at this pace are very low — Papelbon has a long track record as one of the best relievers in the majors. But if the Red Sox are going to overcome New York or Tampa and snag a playoff spot, they’ll need their stopper to pick up the pace.

Note: The title of this post makes almost no sense in the context of what follows — and, yet, it feels so right.

If you’re the sort of person who has to “work tomorrow,” then maybe tonight’s game isn’t for you.

If that’s the case, however, you might wanna ask your doctor if you’re suffering from a really serious condition known as Being a Giant Puss.

I’m just saying.

Atlanta at Arizona | Monday, June 07 | 9:40pm ET
Starting Pitchers
Braves: Derek Lowe (NERD: 5)
71.0 IP, 5.32 K/9, 3.80 BB/9, .288 BABIP, 59.1% GB, 9.8% HR/FB, 4.21 xFIP

D-Backs: Dan Haren (NERD: 10)
82.0 IP, 9.11 K/9, 1.65 BB/9, .342 BABIP, 43.9% GB, 17.0% HR/FB, 3.22 xFIP

A Question You’re Asking, Stat
Carson, fess up: did you just pick this game because it came first alphabetically?

The Answer I’m Answering
That’s ridiculous. I don’t even know the alphabet.

Watch For
• Dan Haren. Haren is of supreme interest to the baseball nerd at the moment. While posting an xFIP (3.22) completely in line with his performances of the previous two seasons, the righty currently sports his highest ERA (4.83) since 2003. If you like to watch regression in action — and because you’re a nerd, you almost definitely do like to watch regression in action — you can watch it tonight in Phoenix.
• Jason Heyward. I says to my friend Danny the other day, I says: “Danny, would you watch an Atlanta Braves game just to see Jason Heyward?” As he was currently drinking like his 17th beer, his answer was mostly a kinda frightening combination of grunts and snarls, but what I gathered from him is that, yes, he would do that kind of thing.
• Kelly Johnson. True or false: He’s better than Bad News Bear Kelly Leak. You decide, America!

Did You Know That
Dan Haren’s strikeout rate has increased literally every year he’s been in the league? Check it, 2003-10: 5.33, 6.26, 6.76, 7.10, 7.76, 8.58, 8.75, and this year’s 9.11. If my calculations are correct, Dan Haren will strike out more batters than is even possible to face in the year 2017.

Also, Did You Know That
Jason Heyward is like 60 or a hundred feet tall? At least that’s how big he looks from the comfort of my own living room.

If I Had My Druthers
• Dan Haren would strike out all 27 Braves in order.
• Jason Heyward would still somehow manage four homers.
• My wife wouldn’t make us (i.e. me and her) shop at Whole Foods all the time. (No, not relevant at all to the present game, but still a druther I’d really like to have.)

With clubs set to infuse more talent into their systems next week, and now being two months into the minor league season, it’s a great time to take a quick look at how the Top 10 prospects are doing in each system. Today, we’ll take a look at the American League West. So far we’ve looked at the AL East, the NL East, the AL Central, and the NL Central.

*The Top 10 lists originally appeared in FanGraphs’ Second Opinion fantasy guide published in March.

Carter and Taylor have been mild disappointments in triple-A so far this season. Cardenas’ bat has completely disappeared and he’s got an OPS of .595 in triple-A right now. Weeks, though, has picked things up and has looked good. He’s doing a little bit of everything right now in double-A. His future double-play partner, Green, is also performing well one level down. The shortstop, though, has 56 strikeouts in 54 games despite modest power potential. Stassi has shown some pop in his bat with seven homers, but he too is struggling with the Ks: 62 in 47 games.

Trout continues to tear apart low-A ball and has a BABIP-fueled .371 batting average. He’s also nabbed 30 bases in 34 tries; he’s even showing some patience at the plate. For interest’s sake, fellow ’09 draft pick Grichuk (who’s not on the Top 10 list) has had a rougher go in low-A ball and he’s currently on the disabled list. Their teammate Martinez has 79 strikeouts in 54.1 innings pitched, but he’s also walked 41 batters. Similarly, and one level up, Chatwood has 58 strikeouts and an outstanding ground-ball rate but he’s walked 32 batters in 60.1 innings. Conger has hit pretty well in triple-A, although his power numbers are down and he’s batting just .175 as a right-handed hitter.

Feliz has asserted himself as one of the top closers in the American League despite his youth. You could look at this as a negative, if you’re like me and think he should be getting stretched out in triple-A right about now with an eye on becoming a starter. Smoak has had less success in Majors but the club appears committed to him at first base. The bottom half of the Top 10 list is treading water right now, with the exception of Ross. The young lefty is showing a respectable strikeout rate along with a very good ground-ball rate; he has yet to give up a homer this season in 64.1 innings of work. It’s not outside the realm of possibility that Scheppers could see some MLB action in 2010.

After a very slow start, Ackley is back. The infielder rebounded from a terrible April when he hit just .147. He bumped his average up to .303 in May and is hitting .444 in his last 10 games with 13 walks and just two strikeouts. The overall Top 10 list has been pretty uninspiring to this point, outside of Franklin and Pineda. The shortstop is enjoying his first taste of full-season ball with an unexpected power outburst (12 homers) and a .959 OPS in low-A ball. Pineda is giving up more fly balls than usual but he also has 63 strikeouts in 57.1 innings of work. He’s allowed more than two runs in a start just once this season in 10 games.