The beauty behind the philosophy of advanced analysis is that it seeks to eliminate as much variance as possible. As simple of a thought as this may be, it is one that still eludes the majority of the baseball world, and most of society in a variety of other areas. Our metrics here at Fangraphs do seek to base value on much more that raw numbers. We can not only adjust for league, but also park and era, among other variables.

Unfortunately, there seems to be a limit to this. As much as we know Dan Haren gets unlucky for pitching at Chase Field (or the opposite for Dante Bichette at Coors), or that pitchers in the late 60s were helped by a higher mound (or the opposite thanks to steroids in the late 90s), we still haven’t found a way to, somewhat literally, level the playing field in terms of whom a pitcher or hitter faces. Here’s an example:

Tim Lincecum: 6.4%
Bronson Arroyo: 7.4%
Jonathan Sanchez: 5.3%
Wade LeBlanc: 6.0%
Mike Leake: 8.2%

Those are the HR/FB rates of the pitchers in baseball who have faced the worst opponents in baseball sorted by OPS. Here are some more:

Josh Beckett: 13.0%
Joel Pineiro: 10.9%
Jeremy Guthrie: 8.6%
David Huff: 10.1%
Mitch Talbot: 7.8%
Ben Sheets: 12.0%

Those are the starting pitchers who have faced the best hitters based on OPS this year. I didn’t run a full study, but I would think that the correlation between HR/FB and the OPS of opposing batters is decently high. This is logical and intuitive: better hitters in baseball have better HR/FB rates, so if you face more of them you’re likely to feel the effects (and vice versa). When you see a pitcher have a bunch of years of giving up HR/FB rates either above or below average, you may want to believe it is more of a “skill” than a “trend.” But said pitcher may have just been facing competition the whole time that would dictate the results, and with a little bit of luck added in, it looks like a trend.

But what does it mean? It means we shouldn’t just think of things like HR/FB and BABIP as a pitcher getting “lucky” or “unlucky” based on the quality of the balls in play, but also by the quality of the opponents. Tim Lincecum‘s opponents have an OPS of .675 this year. For reference, that’s about 2009 Randy Winn, who had a wOBA of .302. Josh Beckett’s opponents have an OPS of .767 this year. That’s roughly 2010 Chipper Jones, who has a .349 wOBA.

Luckily, that’s as big of a difference as you’ll generally find. However, sorting out even the most minor differences has some significant value. I don’t have a panacea, but it’s something we should keep in the back of our minds when analyzing players. It often goes overlooked.

Over the winter, both New York clubs made some big acquisitions – the Mets splurged for slugging outfielder Jason Bay, while the Yankees gave up some young talent to acquire the final year of Javier Vazquez’s contract to solidify their rotation. So far, neither have lived up to expectations, as Bay’s power is MIA and Vazquez has struggled with more things than I have time to list here.

Any time a player struggles in the Big Apple, they always run the risk of getting labeled as a guy who just can’t handle the pressure. Vazquez, in fact, already carries that label, considering that he flopped with the Yankees back in 2004, the first time Brian Cashman traded for him. That he was so bad in April didn’t do anything to dispel the notion that he simply lacked the necessary personality to play well in New York.

Now some people – including one unnamed former GM who thinks trading Stephen Strasburg for Roy Oswalt is a good idea – are attaching that same label to Bay, suggesting that his lack of production is a direct result of the home fans expressing their frustration with his lack of power. There is  just one slight problem with these labels – both Bay and Vazquez have played better at home than on the road, and in Bay’s case, the difference is enormous.

Bay is hitting .308/.406/.508 at Citi Field, but just .246/.333/.333 on the road. He has twice as many extra base hits in front of those frustrated fans as he does in front of ambivalent road crowds. If he was hitting as well away from New York as he was at home, we wouldn’t be having this discussion.

The same is true of Vazquez, though not to the same extent. He is posting a  4.48 xFIP at home versus 4.72 on the road, with neither number representing his previous abilities. The same was true in 2004, when Vazquez pitched better in Yankee Stadium than he did away from the Bronx.

Sometimes a slump is just a slump. Guys slump in New York just like they do in Milwaukee, San Diego, or St. Louis. Perhaps we should avoid slagging a guy’s intestinal fortitude when he is performing better in front of the same fans and media that are supposed to be scaring him into a slump.

If starting pitchers are more valuable than relievers, then why do we frequently see teams place some of their best young pitchers in the bullpen? We’ve seen it so many times during the past few years. The Yankees brought up Joba Chamberlain, just a year after drafting him, to solidify a shaky bullpen. The Mariners moved Brandon Morrow there. The Braves brought up Kris Medlen in a relief role before moving him to the rotation. The Mets brought 20-year-old Jenrry Mejia to Queens with them — though they have finally sent him to the minors to start.

This week we heard of another such case. On Wednesday John Fay reported that the Reds would “look at [the] bullpen” for their $30 million man, Aroldis Chapman. Sure enough, Chapman pitched his first game in relief that night, allowing one run in two innings against Toledo, striking out three to one walk and two hits. The Reds will likely keep him in this role, giving him multi-inning appearances in the minors before possibly calling him up to fortify the major league bullpen. The question we’re always asking is of whether the switch is a prudent move.

The main issue here is development. The Reds invested heavily in Chapman knowing that he was a raw pitcher who would need plenty of seasoning before becoming a finished product. Hence, he did not break camp with the team, but instead was assigned to Louisville of the International League, whrer he could work on repeating his delivery.  But, as Keith Law observed in spring training, his mechanics seem in order. Before the season started it sounded like Chapman would be starting for the Reds at some point this season.

His results, however, have not exactly impressed. While he’s been able to, unsurprisingly, strike out plenty of AAA hitters — 79 in 67.2 innings — he has had plenty of trouble with his control. His walk rate, 5.45 per nine, certainly needs improvement. Again, it’s one of the reasons the Reds assigned him to a minor league affiliate. The problem hasn’t improved recently, either, as he has walked 29 in his last 10 appearances, which cover 46.2 innings. The wildness is something he is going to have to continue to work on, and the Reds apparently believe that could happen in the bullpen.

How will the new role affect his development? Opinions abound. Craig Calcaterra thinks that turning him into a one-inning reliever will “do his development a serious disservice.” The Reds want him to be a starter long-term, and therefore they should keep him in that role and allow him to learn to be a starter by starting, where he can aclimate himself to the schedule, to the pace, and to using all of his pitches. On the other side, both Chad and Bill from Redleg Nation love the move. Chad calls it, “a stroke of genius,” noting that it serves the dual purpose of limiting his innings and getting him experience against major league hitters. Both cases have merit, and I’m not sure there is any one objectively correct move. The team has to decide for itself which is the best path for its player.

While there are certainly developmental concerns, I do buy into the notion that breaking young pitchers into the league as relievers is a sound strategy. As we’ve heard so often, Earl Weaver did this with many pitchers and with success. We have also seen many current players spend time in the bullpen before entering the rotation. Chad Billingsley started the 2007 season in the bullpen and made his first 23 appearances there. He then moved to the rotation and was successful. The Yankees moved Phil Hughes to the bullpen last year after he produced mediocre results as a starter. He returned to the rotation this year and has been quite the success himself.

There are two advantages of using young pitchers in the bullpen. First is the obvious, that they gain experience facing major league hitters. Many young pitchers are just too good for the minors and need to test their mettle against elite hitters. Why not, then, put them in the major league rotation? That brings us to the second point. By pitching in the bullpen they receive constant feedback. Relievers pitch in games more often than starters, which means more opportunities to gain feedback on their performances. You can read a few academic articles on feedback here, here, and here. If the pitcher can put this feedback to good use, then he might be ripe for the rotation in the following year, or even perhaps later in the same year.

The one place where I get hung up on this issue relates to innings. Young pitchers need to build up their innings from year to year, just like runners must ramp up their distances when training for a marathon. No one goes from the couch to a 26.2 mile run, just like no one goes from high school to 200 innings. Chapman’s case becomes a bit more difficult because he pitched in Cuba, which is a different baseball environment than America. He did throw 118.1 innings in 2008 for Holguin, but how much do we really know about those innings? There is also the question of how many innings he pitched internationally. By the sheer numbers it looks like Chapman could pitch around 150 innings this year. Since he is at 67 now and has moved to the bullpen, though, it looks like he won’t get even close to that mark.

Developing young pitchers is as subjective as it gets in baseball. Each pitcher requires different tactics to help spur growth. Teams have to determine, on a case-by-case basis, which will work best. The Reds have chosen the bullpen path for Chapman, and they certainly have their reasons. I’m not sure if it’s right or wrong; I don’t think anyone can be wrong. But I think the arguments in favor of the move are compelling enough to justify it. Long-term, Chapman’s value lies in his ability to work out the kinks in his control and become a top-end starter. But for now, a move to the bullpen might be what he needs to achieve success as a starting pitcher.

Heading into the 2010 season, Wade Davis looked poised to shoulder a full season’s workload and join the Tampa Bay Rays’ cavalcade of impressive young starting pitchers. Selected out of a Florida high school in the third round of the 2004 draft, Davis struck out 8.7 batters per nine innings and issued 3.3 BB/9 in the minors. According to Minor League Splits, the 6-foot-5, 220 pound right-hander posted a 3.52 FIP on the farm from 2005 to 2009, including a 3.81 FIP at the Triple-A level over the 2008 and 2009 seasons. Baseball America ranked Davis as the 17th-best prospect prior to ’08 and 32nd-best before ’09, and he was dominant during his first foray in the majors last September and early October. In six starts, spanning 36.1 innings, Davis owned an 8.92 K/9, 3.22 BB/9, and a 3.54 xFIP.

It’s surprising, then, that Davis currently sports a 4.90 ERA. And he hasn’t been unlucky — his xFIP sits at 5.10. Davis’ pre-season ZiPS projection called for 6.75 K/9, 3.01 BB/9, and a 4.13 FIP. CHONE’s forecast had 6.91 K/9, 4.08 BB/9, and a 4.71 FIP. With 6.21 K/9 and 4.18 BB/9 in 75.1 frames, Davis is falling short of those predicted whiff and walk totals. Home runs have been a problem as well, as he has surrendered 1.43 round-trippers per nine innings. The high number of home runs is not the product of an inflated home run per fly ball rate (Davis’ HR/FB% is 11.7), but rather a function of batters putting the ball in the air often (his ground ball rate is 40.3 percent).

In its 2009 Prospect Handbook, Baseball America dubbed Davis “one of the premier power pitching prospects in the game.” But he is having difficulty missing bats this season. His swinging strike rate is just 5.7 percent, well below the 8.3 percent MLB average. Opponents are connecting 91.2 percent of the time on pitches swung at within the strike zone, compared to the 88.1 percent MLB average.

Batters aren’t chasing many of Davis’ pitches off the plate (25.5 percent, 28.3 percent MLB average), either. When they do chase, they areputting the bat on the ball 76 percent of the time (66.5 percent MLB average). Davis’ overall contact rate is 86.8 percent (81 percent MLB average), which places him in the same company as Joe Saunders, Jamie Moyer, and Aaron Cook. Power pitchers they are not.

Davis is going to his fastball a little more than 72 percent in 2010, the fourth-highest rate among qualified MLB starters. According to Pitch F/X data from TexasLeaguers.com, Davis is doing a good job of throwing both his four-seamer and two-seamer for strikes — the four-seamer is inducing strikes 67.2 percent (64.4 percent MLB average) and the two-seamer 58.5 percent (57.2 percent MLB average). The two-seamer produces a decent whiff rate (5.4 percent, 5 percent MLB average), but the oft-utilized four-seamer producess a 5.1 percent whiff rate that ranks below the six percent big league average.

When Davis does break off a mid-80’s slider or an upper-70’s curveball, hitters are rarely fooled. The slider is yielding a swing and a miss 11.4 percent (13.6 percent MLB average), while the curve owns a paltry 4.2 percent whiff rate (11.6 percent MLB average). Davis’ curve has a strike rate (58.7 percent) close to the 58 percent MLB average, but the slider is missing the mark (57.6 percent, 63.4 percent MLB average). He also mixes in the occasional low-80’s changeup, but it’s a negligible part of his repertoire.

While he’s getting ahead in the count rather well, tossing a first pitch strike 60.1 percent (58.5 percent MLB average), Davis is having a hard time sealing the deal. When Davis is ahead in the count, opponents have managed a .237/.250/.381 line. For comparison, the AL average in such situations is .207/.214/.302. In two-strike counts, batters have a .205/.311/.291 triple-slash. The AL average is .184/.257/.278.

Save for 1-2 counts, Davis uses his fastball more than most in two-strike situations:

So, he goes to his heater (the pitch with the lowest whiff rate) quite often in situations where the K is in play, and when he does throw a breaking ball, hitters aren’t coming up empty.

All of this sounds very pessimistic, but it’s important to keep in mind that Davis has logged 111.2 innings at the major league level. He could certainly make adjustments to his game in the coming months that lead to improved results. But to earn back that power pitcher label, Davis needs to re-discover his breaking stuff.

There were a pair of exciting games in last night’s MLB action. Seattle and Chicago produced an extra innings pitcher’s duel behind Felix Hernandez and Ted Lilly. The most exciting game in a NL park had to be this 13-11 thriller from the Red Sox and Rockies.

It certainly didn’t seem like it would be a slugfest from the early going. Daisuke Matsuzaka loaded the bases in the first and allowed two runs to score on a Brad Hawpe single, but that would be the only scoring Matsuzaka would allow in the game and the only runs to score until the 4th inning. The 2-0 lead held by the Rockies held their win expectancy above 70% for the majority of the first three innings, the first of three distinct peaks for the Rockies in the game.

The Red Sox hitters took over in the middle third of the game. Dustin Pedroia hit what would be the first of his three home runs in the game; Mike Cameron doubled; Matsuzaka managed an RBI hit; and Adrian Beltre ended the barrage in the 5th with another home run. By this point, the Red Sox led 6-2, their win expectancy topping out at 90.3% after five innings.

Of course, a lot can happen in four (plus) innings. And happen it did, with the victim being Red Sox reliever Hideki Okajima, who was brought in to clean up the bases loaded mess left by Manny Delcarmen. Okajima’s performance wasn’t much better. Todd Helton immediately brought in two runs, and then two out singles from Miguel Olivo, Ian Stewart, and Clint Barmes brought in four more runs to put the Rockies ahead 8-6. The big inning put the Rockies in relative control of the game for the second time; their win expectancy at the end of the inning was 79.6%, topping out at 83.1% after the Barmes single.

The combination of Joe Beimel and Manny Corpas wasn’t enough to stop Boston’s hit parade in the seventh. The left-handed Beimel allowed Pedroia and David Ortiz to reach base before Manny Corpas, in an attempt to stop the bleeding, allowed an RBI single to Beltre and then a two run double by Jason Varitek. The Sox would extend this 9-8 lead to 11-8 in the 8th, as Pedroia hit his second homer of the game, this time off Rafael Betancourt. The Red Sox once again possessed the driver’s seat, this time with a win expectancy of 89.6% after the top of the 8th. Even though Jason Giambi had a pinch hit RBI to bring the score to 11-9 in favor of the Red Sox in the home half of the inning, the Red Sox’s win expectancy was up to 91.3% entering the final frame.

Jonathan Papelbon’s struggles would continue, however, against the meat of the Rockies lineup. Papelbon allowed three straight singles to Todd Helton, Carlos Gonzalez, and Brad Hawpe, allowing two runs to score and the game to tie at 11-11. After Hawpe’s one out RBI single, the Rockies held a 64.8% win expectancy. It would climb no higher, as Papelbon worked through Seth Smith and Miguel Olivo to end the inning.

It was in the top of the tenth that Dustin Pedroia made last night his own. Already 4 for4 including two home runs, Pedroia took to the plate against Huston Street, who has been lights out in his career but was making only his second appearance of the season due to an injury. Pedroia would homer for the third time, putting the Red Sox up 13-11. The home run added another .478 to his already lofty .421 WPA. His final total of .899 ranks third among hitters in 2010, only behind Lance Berkman on June 1st and Jason Heyward on April 18th.

Papelbon would return for the 10th and retire Ian Stewart, Chris Iannetta, and Melvin Mora in order to finish the game, earning the “win.” Papelbon was the 11th of 12 relievers to enter the game; only Scott Atchieson recorded a shutdown, and Papelbon was among the four Red Sox and five Rockies to record meltdowns. As much as this game may be remembered for Dustin Pedroia’s display of power, it should also be remembered as one of the most inept displays of relief pitching possible. Still, there’s no denying the excitement of this game, as it exemplified the ups and downs that can be encountered in the game of baseball.

Overview

For a little while, it seemed the Oakland Athletics could emerge as the victors from 2010’s AL West survivor pool. At the close of May, the A’s were 28-24 and led the division. They have gone 6-16 since and now sit over ten games back and without the sort of talent advantage that would allow them to make up such a deficit.

Buy or Sell?

The answer then is to sell, though Billy Beane has long been anything but predictable. The next question is what to sell, and, like the Mariners, the A’s lack a plethora of sought-after assets. After the seemingly obvious Ben Sheets, nearly all the players that would be interesting to other teams for performance reasons are cherished by Oakland for their youth and contractual status in addition to their solid stats, thus they seem unlikely to go anywhere.

Daric Barton might find himself theoretically expendable thanks to Chris Carter, but Oakland shouldn’t ditch Barton for Carter unless Beane finds himself a steal. Barton is still under a mammoth amount of team control and there is also the DH spot if Oakland wants to get Carter out of Sacramento.

On the Farm

Where Oakland dips into its farm system might depend more on which players are kept around from the 2010 team than on any elite prospects pushing their way onto the scene. Tyson Ross was a name to keep an eye on, but he’s been with the big team all season. 2011 might see him return to the rotation after Ben Sheets’ turn is up. Shawn Haviland might be on the scene sooner than previously expected, but his numbers in the upper minors are still too small to judge.

Chris Carter should be called up sometime soon, but he still needs to provide more value from his bat given his defensive shortcomings. Josh Donaldson could make a similarly valuable, but perhaps underwhelming addition behind the plate for Kurt Suzuki.

Budget

Sticking to a budget of around $60 million each year, the Athletics have an unholy amount of payroll space freed up in the future. Eric Chavez will have his option declined and be paid $3 million for the privilege, which is currently the highest expense on the books for Oakland in 2011. Michael Wuertz is signed for $2.8 million, Brett Anderson for $1.25 million, and there are club options on Mark Ellis and Coco Crisp which both carry half million buyouts but that is it as far as guaranteed expenditures go.

Many of their players are arbitration eligible and therefore will see some raises but it’s difficult to see that adding more than $20 million to the books which still leaves Oakland with something in the vicinity of $25 million to spend in this coming offseason assuming the same budget room. The A’s were never built to run away in 2010, but rather to take a stab at a winnable division but bide their time for the future. They are going to miss the brass ring, but the future still looks intact.

Entering today’s game against the San Diego Padres the Rays had somehow managed to keep outfielder Matt Joyce in the minors in spite of carrying three catchers and the ever fruitless Hank Blalock hanging on the 25 man roster. In more than 155 minor league plate appearances Joyce this year Joyce had a line of .314/.458/.545. Simply put: there nothing left for him to prove.

Almost as if a sign from a higher power, Carl Crawford left the game early with shoulder soreness; hours later Dioner Navarro would be optioned down and Joyce promoted. Obviously Crawford isn’t the player the Rays would like Joyce to replace, but the brevity between Crawford’s removal and Navarro’s demotion seems like a pretty clear indication that they aren’t too worried about the injury, otherwise they could’ve used Sean Rodriguez and Blalock in the outfield through the weekend before placing Crawford on the disabled list if the injury worsened. That didn’t happen, which suggests Crawford won’t miss but a game or two at most.

Joyce himself was placed on the disabled list on opening day and the chief concern with him right now is whether he can throw or not. Of course that worry is alleviated as a designated hitter; and to be clear: Joyce is going to outhit Blalock. He immediately becomes the Rays’ best option for right field or DH against right-handed pitching. This could lead to an interesting conflict with Sean Rodriguez though. Most days against righties the Rays will field Ben Zobrist, John Jaso (at catcher or DH), Reid Brignac, and Jason Bartlett; that can’t happen now without Joyce being the DH, and it means that Rodriguez won’t find his way onto the field unless Bartlett sits.

Another interesting development is what this means for Blalock. Reserve outfield Gabe Kapler’s time on the disabled list is drawing to a close. With Rodriguez making strides, both Blalock and Kapler fall into the redundancy zone, yet Kapler is the better player; the one who offers defensive value and is capable of pinch running. There was little buzz about Blalock this off-season (he chose between minor league offers from the two teams within the state of Florida) and the buzz for Blalock around his opt-out date never evolved into a trade. With the way he’s struggled in the majors, it seems unlikely he’s going to find himself in a better position anytime soon.

It all started with a comeback win over the Indians. Heading into that Sunday matinee the White Sox, after dropping the first two games of the series, were 23-32, 9.5 games behind the Twins and only 1.5 games ahead of the last-place Indians. They drew Jake Westbrook and managed to score six runs before the end of the fifth. Unfortunately for them, the Indians had managed six in three innings off of Mark Buehrle. That tie continued until the bottom of the seventh, when two Indians relievers managed to load the bases and a third allowed two of them to score. Matt Thornton and Bobby Jenks held the lead, and the White Sox avoided going 10 games under .500.

Since then the White Sox are 14-2, having outscored their opponents 84-46. The streak has improved their season record to 37-34. With Minnesota’s loss to the Brewers today the White Sox find themselves just 2.5 games out of first. They were 9.5 games back as recently as June 9. That makes the AL Central look like a three-team race — the Tigers are 38-32, though they have a nearly even run differential. Could this present an opportunity for the White Sox to change the landscape of the division?

In the aggregate the White Sox are still pretty terrible. While the Tigers have a +1 run differential, Chicago’s still sits at -9. Before today’s 2-0 win over the Braves the Sox had scored just 4.39 runs per game, which will obviously go down, which ranks 10th in the American League. They’re not doing a great job of preventing runs either, allowing 4.54 runs per game, 9th in the AL. Only two of their hitters sport a wOBA over .350, and only one of their starters has an xFIP below 4.00. That doesn’t sound like a team rallying towards first place.

Of course, much of that has changed during the streak. They’ve had a number of players fall short of expectations during the season’s first two months, and those players have stepped up in the past two-plus weeks. It’s doubtful that they keep up their current pace, but if they revert to expectations, rather than the poor performances they realized earlier in the season, perhaps the White Sox can finish the season with a respectable record.

All stats prior to today.

A.J. Pierzynski:

Season: .254/.290/.380
Streak: .327/.400/.558

Alexei Ramirez:

Season: .261/.298/.392
Streak: .293/.339/.414

Omar Vizquel:

Season: .269/.333/.346
Streak: .308/.378/.436

Carlos Quentin:

Season: .227/.315/.441
Streak: .308/.321/.596

Mark Kotsay:

Season: .210/.311/.371
Streak: .276/.364/.448

And then there’s Paul Konerko, who is hitting .415/.484/.528 during the streak. Alex Rios has actually underperformed his season numbers during the streak, as has Juan Pierre (yet he continues to hit leadoff). Gordon Beckham and Andruw Jones have continued to hit poorly despite their teammates’ excellence.

Pitching, of course, plays a big role in the streak as well. Jake Peavy has allowed just four runs, one home run, in his last 23 IP, striking out 15 to four walks. John Danks, the Sox best starter this year, has allowed just five runs in 22 IP in his last three starts. Buehrle, a huge disappointment early in the season, has allowed just four runs and has struck out 17 to just two walks in his last 20 IP. Gavin Floyd might be the best of them all right now. He has allowed just three runs in his last 29 IP, striking out 31 to seven walks. That includes his seven-inning start today, in which he allowed no runs while striking out nine. Even Freddy Garcia is in on the action, eating 19.2 innings in three starts during the streak, allowing 10 runs along the way.

Some of these guys are going to come down to earth. Floyd and Pierzynski seem the most obvious culprits. Neither is exactly bad, but nor are they as good as they have been in the past 18 days. If Vizquel finishes with his current season numbers the Sox should be happy. Ditto Ramirez. Quentin is a tough case. He’s certainly better than his season numbers, but I wonder how close to his streak numbers he can remain.

There is no doubt that the White Sox have talent. For the most part that talent underperformed expectations in the first two months, but in the past 18 days they’ve surged. It probably won’t lead them on a miraculous run to the playoffs — the Twins are just too good, and the Wild Card is certainly coming from the AL East. But, as the Sox have shown, they’re not as bad as they were early in the season. They’re just a little too good for that.

Last night, the Red Sox handed a one run lead to Jonathan Papelbon. He managed to record just one out while giving up a pair of home runs, losing the game for Boston in the process. It was his fourth loss of the season. He’s now allowed six home runs on the season, more than he’s given up in any prior season, and it’s not even July yet. His striekout rate has fallen from 10.06 last year to 7.58 this year. Given his problems, it’s only natural that people are suggesting that perhaps its time to give Daniel Bard a shot to close games.

I don’t think that’s a great idea, however.

While Papelbon has certainly struggled, we’re still dealing with a sample of just 125 batters facced, and his underlying skills don’t seem to have changed much. His velocity is the same as always. His swinging strike rate, generally a more accurate predictor of future strikeout rate than actual strikeouts, is right at his career average. His first strike percentage is nearly a career high, so he’s not falling behind hitters and having to serve up gopher balls.

And yet, it hasn’t translated into success. Whether its a location issue or just small sample noise, it would appear that the issues he’s having should be fixable with a little bit of patience.

Some would argue that perhaps Papelbon shouldn’t be working through these problems in the ninth inning, and I would be more sympathetic to that argument if they had a good alternative. However, Bard is not one – not yet.

One of the keys to being a shut down closer is to be able to retire hitters from both sides of the plate. You don’t get to selectively use your closer when the match-ups are in his favor, as you can with middle relievers. As such, if three left-handed hitters were due up in the 9th inning of a one run game, and Bard was the closer, he’d be on the mound. Except, you don’t really want Daniel Bard on the mound against left-handed hitters in a high leverage situation.

This year, Bard has faced 78 lefties and posted a 4.56 xFIP against them. He has struck out just 12 while walking 8 (plus hitting another batter), which pales in comparison to the 27/4 K/BB ratio that he’s running against righties. He was better at blowing lefties away a year ago, but still struggled to throw strikes against them, and now sports a career 4.13 xFIP vs left-handed hitters.

Bard has good enough stuff to get lefties out, and in time, he could indeed be a quality ninth inning guy. But right now, the Red Sox are better off letting Papelbon work through his issues.

Yesterday, Fredi Gonzalez became the second third managerial casualty of the year, following Trey Hillman’s ouster in Kansas City (update: and Dave Trembley in Baltimore. Thanks, Rob Stratmeyer). But while the Hillman layoff was understandable — three days before he was axed, Joe Posnanski wrote, “I don’t think Hillman will survive. And, things being what they are, I’m certainly not saying Hillman should survive” — the Gonzalez firing was a bit more head-scratching. As Buster Olney wrote yesterday:

Gonzalez as manager of the Marlins has been a dead man walking since the end of last season, when folks in the team’s baseball operations had to talk owner Jeffrey Loria out of firing him, and then going into this season, Loria indicated he expected the low-budget Marlins to contend for a championship, a goal that was probably unrealistic given the lack of depth in the team’s roster at the major league level.

GM Larry Beinfest has assembled some strong teams for owner Jeffrey Loria, but though they’ve often contended for the Wild Card, they’ve never been viewed as serious playoff threats — and no wonder, because their payroll is so low that they were criticized by Major League Baseball at the beginning of the year for not using enough of the revenue sharing money they received to actually pay players. Considering all those constraints, it’s rather remarkable that Gonzalez managed a 276-279 record in three-plus years in his first managing job.

Of course, whenever you want to know why something happened in baseball, you should usually listen to the denials. Fredi Gonzalez attracted a great deal of attention earlier for the Hanley Ramirez incident, when Hanley dogged it after kicking a pop-up and Fredi pulled him from the game. And so, of course, in a statement after his firing, Fredi Gonzalez announced: “This is something that I want to make very clear: My exit from the Marlins had nothing to do with Hanley.” So it’s a fair bet that his exit from the Marlins had a lot do to with Hanley. Every baseball person, and every Marlin who spoke to the media, supported Fredi’s behavior during the run-in — but, as a number of wags have pointed out, it’s a lot easier for the Marlins to get themselves a new manager than a new Hanley Ramirez.

Ultimately, the Marlins didn’t do much harm to Fredi’s image. Right now, he’s perceived as a martyr who made the most of a bad situation with an unrealistic, penny-pinching owner, who doesn’t kowtow to superstars, and who is the likeliest successor to Bobby Cox in Atlanta, one of the most coveted manager’s seats in baseball since the last manager Jeffrey Loria fired, Joe Girardi, took over for Joe Torre in the Bronx. Being fired doesn’t hurt Fredi. And if Loria hires Bobby Valentine, as seems likely, the team probably won’t see much difference in the won-loss column: though Valentine’s style is very different from the methodical Gonzalez (Chris Jaffe has compared Valentine to Dodger overtinkerer Charlie Dressen), Bobby V is an above-average skipper.

But Valentine should take care to get an ironclad prenup. After all, his two predecessors were fired unfairly. If Bobby actually wants to manage in Miami, rather than just put himself in position for a future plum, he should make sure that Loria gives him a better guarantee of payroll than either Gonzalez or Girardi received.