There are few pitchers in baseball as interesting (or, if you’re a Marlins fan, frustrating) as Ricky Nolasco. Consider this fluky little statistic, for instance:

2008, K/BB ratio: 4.43
2009, K/BB ratio: 4.43
2010, K/BB ratio: 4.43

Based on that, we’d like to call him Mr. Consistency. Except, if you’ve watched him pitch, he’s been anything but. In 2008, he was pretty darn good, throwing 212 innings and posting a 3.52 ERA in a breakout season. While he sustained most of his underlying performance last year, his ERA shot up to 5.06, as his BABIP rose to .336 and his LOB% was a crazy low 61%. Most of us had him pegged for a bounceback year, as his luck was bound to improve, but it hasn’t been the full return to form we expected. His BABIP is still .324 and now he’s giving up more HR/FB too, so his ERA (4.66) once again doesn’t come close to his xFIP (3.73).

Despite having good stuff and strong peripherals, he’s more Javier Vazquez than Roy Oswalt at this point. Like Vazquez, Nolasco simply allows more runs to score than we’d expect based on his numbers.

Five years ago, Dave Studemund introduced a formula to predict LOB% from a pitcher’s xFIP. As you can see in the chart, there’s a pretty strong correlation between the quality of a pitcher and how many runners he leaves on base.

Nolasco, a good pitcher, should have posted a LOB% of about 74.2 percent over the last three years, based on Studes’ formula. In fact, if you look at the average LOB% for all pitchers with a K/BB ratio of 3.00 or higher in that time frame, the average is 74.6%, and Nolasco has the fourth highest K/BB ratio of that entire group.

Instead, his actual LOB% since 2008 is 69.1%, the second lowest in baseball among qualified starting pitchers. He’s ahead of only Brian Bannister, and he’s stranded about the same amount of runners as Livan Hernandez and Nick Blackburn. Clearly, he’s better than those guys.

What’s the deal? Well, his high BABIP is almost entirely concentrated in situations with runners on base. With the bases empty, his career BABIP is .290, but if you put a runner on, its .326. Most pitchers are better from the wind-up, but this is an extreme split. The league average BABIP with the bases empty is .295 versus .304 with a man on base.

The sample is too small to say this is evidence of Nolasco doing something wrong, as we’re still just dealing with 600 innings of data, but it’s something to keep an eye on. Vazquez has almost 2,600 innings in the big leagues and has a career LOB% of just 70.9%, significantly lower than the 73.8% that is predicted based by his xFIP. It is at least within the realm of possibility that these two share a common trait that cause them to perform worse out of the stretch.

Only time will tell, but it’s an area worth looking into.

Part of the reason that the Cardinals signed Matt Holliday to a seven-year, $120 million contract this winter is that they needed help in the outfield. While there was plenty of promise out there, the team couldn’t exactly count on results for 2010. Ryan Ludwick had just posted a disappointing follow-up season to his 2008 career year, and Colby Rasmus was still an unseasoned 23-year-old. They needed solidity out there, and that’s why they retained Holliday. When they then got superior production from Rasmus and a rebound from Ludwick, the Cardinals boasted one of the top outfield units in the league.

All three outfielders have produced numbers that are well above league average. Holliday unsurprisingly leads the bunch with a .397 wOBA, though Rasmus isn’t far behind at .381. Ludwick, after seeing his wOBA drop from .406 in 2008 to .336 in 2009, is back up to .352. Those three have covered the easy majority of the season at their positions; no other Cardinal has more than 72 PA as an outfielder. It came as a disappointment, then, that Ludwick hit the DL retroactive to June 26 with a strained left calf. But given his primary replacement, the Cardinals aren’t missing his production very much.

Jon Jay was having a reasonably successful season after the Cardinals called him up in late April, hitting .302/.302/.442 in 45 PA. The obvious weakness is that he drew zero walks in that span. His .364 BABIP suggested that he’d hit considerably below that level if given an extended look. Apparently they saw that, too, and decided to sign Randy Winn, whom the Yankees had released in May. Jay was the roster casualty, sent back to AAA so he could continue his hitting display against PCL pitchers. But when Ludwick hit the DL in early July, the Cardinals called Jay’s number again.

The Chief Justice has gone on a tear in Ludwick’s stead, producing a .539 wOBA since his recall. That brings his season wOBA to .429, though in a mere 86 PA. Of those, 41 have come since July 3, which seems like a low number. That’s because Tony LaRussa has kept him in a pretty strict platoon. Only six of his PA this season have come against righties. Under normal circumstances a platoon would work to Jay’s advantage once Ludwick returns, and since LaRussa has said that Jay will get enough at-bats later in the season, a platoon might seem likely for a lefty-righty outfield combo. But given Ludwick’s performance, that might not be the best idea.

Ludwick is one of a rare breed, along with Cody Ross and Rickey Henderson, who bats righty but throws lefty. But while the other two perform like typical RHB in that they hit LHP far better than same-handed pitchers, Ludwick has a reverse platoon split. The difference is pretty stark in 2010, a .374 wOBA against righties and a .300 mark against lefties, but it has been that way for his entire career. In 1293 PA against righties he has a .369 wOBA, while in 634 PA against lefties he has a .333 wOBA. He is not, then, an ideal player to platoon with Jay, who possesses a typical lefty split. In the minors he had roughly a .311 wOBA against lefties and a .364 mark against righties.

In fact, creating any type of platoon with Jay and another outfielder probably wouldn’t work, as they all hit righties exceedingly well. Rasmus, also a lefty, has crushed RHP this season, a .266 ISO that factors heavily into his .388 wOBA against them. Even last year, when he hit relatively weakly overall, he produced a .341 wOBA against righties while managing just a .218 wOBA against lefties. Holliday hits everyone well, though against righties this year he’s faring slightly better, a .395 wOBA vs. a .391 mark against lefties. That split, too, holds up over his career, as he’s produced a .402 wOBA against righties and a .378 wOBA against lefties.

(Not that either would face a platoon anyway.)

Jay has been a useful player since his recall, filling in for Ludwick better than anyone could have reasonably expected. When, then, will LaRussa find playing time for him when Ludwick returns this weekend? It might not actually be that big an issue. After all, it’s not as though Jay was some superstar prospect waiting for a spot to open. Baseball America did rate him as the Cardinals’ best minor league hitter for average, but did not rank him in their top 10. Nor did Marc Hulet. We’ve seen this plenty from young players before. They come up and mash for a while before reverting to their expected forms. Thankfully for the Cardinals, Jay’s hot streak comes as he fills in for an injured player. You can’t ask for much more than that.

The Cardinals do have a few options to face LHP, Winn and Nick Stavinoha, though Winn has been stronger against RHP in his career and Savinoha hasn’t hit very well in general. Somehow I don’t think that will become much of an issue. The Cardinals get plenty of production out of Holliday and Albert Pujols against LHP, so I’m sure they’re perfectly content with their righty-mashing outfield trio. Jay has been the perfect fill-in, and will remain a solid reserve and pinch-hitting option for the remainder of the season. As for finding regular playing time, though, I’m not sure it’s in the cards. The current starters can do what Jay does plenty well. It sounds like a pretty favorable situation in St. Louis.

Mets starting pitcher Mike Pelfrey is currently going through a rough stretch in his last four starts. Since throwing six innings of two-earned-run baseball against the Twins on June 25th, Pelfrey has been a disaster on the mound. He hasn’t gotten out of the fifth inning in any start, and last night gave up 6 earned runs in just 1.1 innings pitched. Pelfrey, however, is in the midst of his best season in the majors after a hot start. His FIP stands at 3.87 and he has a groundball rate of 48.6%. For all of 2010, Pelfrey has been a solid starting pitcher. But he has been a nightmare of late.

Most people are looking for everything they can to figure out what’s wrong with Pelfrey, from pitch selection to mental weakness to arm fatigue. But what may be eating at Pelfrey is his inability to have batters hit the ball fair. For Pelf, batters hitting the ball in play is generally a good thing with a groundball rate as low as his (as well as a career HR/FB% of just 7.6% in 593.1 career innings). But it seems as though he just isn’t able to put batters away lately. Here are Pelfrey’s stats through the first 15 games of the season:

Strike%: 64.8%
K/9: 6.28
BB/9: 3.05

Through Pelfrey’s first 15 starts of the season, he was throwing strikes (just the basic strike totals accumulated at the end of the game that includes balls hit) 64.8% of the time and had a decent K:BB ratio for a heavy groundball pitcher. Now his last four starts:

Strike%: 62.1
K/9: 4.667
BB/9: 6.667

Yeah, Pelfrey has been terrible. But the most fascinating part is that his total number of strikes per pitches is barely lower, and no kinds of a drop so as to be statistically significant. He is, however, walking over twice as many batters as well as striking out a significantly smaller portion, as well. So what gives?

Basically, Pelfrey is having a tough time putting away hitters, leading to more foul balls, which has driven his Strike% up. Although it’s only been four starts from Pelfrey, and that in and of itself can’t tell us much, we do have 367 pitches worth of data from which to glean something. Baseball information doesn’t have to be measured just in innings or at-bats; each pitch can tell us a whole lot (just ask Dave Allen or Jeremy Greenhouse).

We do know that, over the course of more innings, an inability to generate swings and misses can be quite costly for a pitcher. The more interesting question is how much of that is due to luck? What is the difference between a player hitting a ball three feet foul of first base and three feet fair into the first baseman’s glove? It seems, conceptually, to not be a lot, although it may take a whole bunch more of physics and math to figure it out. For Pelfrey, a player hitting a ball backward rather than forward can be quite costly if it happens too much and at inopportune times. Over the past four starts, Pelfrey’s foul ball issues have been tragic, and when you combine that with an unlucky BABIP and too many walks you get a recipe for immediate disaster. The question is whether or not the difference between a foul ball and fair ball is a matter of Pelf’s bad luck or an underlying issue (i.e. pitching poorly). The Mets sure would like to know.

As a 26-year-old slugger signed through the 2015 season for a total of $40 million, Milwaukee Brewers left fielder Ryan Braun is one of the most valuable assets in the game. The former Miami Hurricane recently placed twelfth on Dave Cameron’s Top 50 Trade Value list. But, while noting Braun’s bargain contract and history of crushing the ball, Cameron pointed out a downward trend in Braun’s power output:

Braun was a monster in his rookie 2007 season, but he has never been able to repeat those kinds of power numbers. In fact, his isolated slugging has declined in each of the four years he has been in the big leagues, moving in tandem with his strikeout rate, which has also fallen each year. Braun has apparently made the opposite choice that [Colby] Rasmus made, and unfortunately, it hasn’t helped Braun. The skills are still there for him to be a star, but Braun is going the wrong way.

While Braun’s pop remains well above the major league average, his Isolated Power has declined considerably since his rookie year:

The fifth overall pick in the 2005 draft has seen his ISO dip from .310 in 2007 to .268 in 2008, .231 in 2009 and .186 this season. Prior to 2010, both CHONE and ZiPS projected a .259 ISO from Braun.

As Cameron noted, Braun’s making more contact, perhaps at the expense of hitting with as much authority. His overall contact rate has increased each season — 76.3% in ’07, 79.2% in ’08, 80.8% in ’09 and 81.9% in 2010 (81% MLB average). Braun’s K rate has gone from 24.8% in ’07 to 21.1% in ’08, 19.1% in ’09 and 17.3% this year.

Braun’s also hitting more ground balls and fewer fly balls:

He hit a ground ball 38.8% of the time as a rookie and 38.7% as a sophomore. But in 2009, that ground ball rate rose to 46.5%, and this season, it sits at 48.2%. Braun’s fly ball rate was 44.9% in 2007 and 44.1% in 2008. In 2009, his FB% fell to 34.1%, and it’s 36.7% in 2010.

So, Braun has been putting the ball in play more, but that extra contact hasn’t been forceful. Has anything changed in terms of where he’s hitting the ball? Not really. Braun’s spray numbers are right in line with his previous seasons:

His performance on those balls put in play, however, has certainly changed. In particular, he’s not pulling the ball with near the same might as in years past:

Braun displayed jaw-dropping power to the pull side in 2007 and 2008, and remained well above-average last season despite a sharp increase in ground balls hit. This season, Braun has actually been worse than the average righty batter on pitches hit to left field.

On pitches hit to the middle field, Braun is still a beast:

When punching pitches to the opposite field, Braun has typically displayed excellent pop. In 2010, he’s not faring near as well:

Though he’s bashing fewer homers this year, Braun is hitting tape-measure shots when he does go yard. Hit Tracker Online shows the average “Standard Distance” on home runs hit. Stand Distance homers are defined as:

The estimated distance in feet the home run would have traveled if it flew uninterrupted all the way down to field level, and if the home run had been hit with no wind, in 70 degree air at sea level. Standard distance factors out the influence of wind, temperature and altitude, and is thus the best way of comparing home runs hit under a variety of different conditions.

Here are Braun’s average standard Distance numbers over the years, as well as the 2010 MLB average:

Whether it’s a conscious decision or not, Ryan Braun is putting the bat on the ball more often while splitting the gaps and clearing the fence less frequently, a combination that has led to a career-worst .362 wOBA — still a quality mark, but well below his pre-season projections of .393 from ZiPS and .404 from CHONE. Braun seems plenty capable of once again hitting for prodigious power, with both ZiPS (.243 rest-of-season ISO) and CHONE (.238) predicting more slides for Bernie Brewer from here on out. To recapture his previous form, Braun might want to let ‘er rip at the plate more often — the extra thump would be well worth a few additional whiffs.

Overview

Not too many expected much of a race in the NL Central this season, but lo and behold, on July 20th, the St. Louis Cardinals have only a half game lead over the Cincinnati Reds, and it’s taken a six game winning streak to claim the lead. The Cardinals are still probably the most talented team in the division and arguably in the entire National League, but they’re in for a fight down the stretch, especially given how easy (warning: ESPN insider link) the Reds schedule is in the second half.

Buy or Sell

The Cardinals are clearly buyers, and there are a few clear positions to upgrade: starting pitching, shorstop, and depending on the timetable for David Freese’s return from the DL, second base, as Freese’s return would allow Felipe Lopez to shift from third base to second base.

The most obvious and the most pressing need is at starting pitcher, as the Cardinals rotation currently contains Blake Hawksworth and Jeff Suppan, who have combined for a total of -0.3 WAR this season, and neither is projected to reach replacement level.

Essentially any starting pitcher on the market fits the Cardinals roster, ranging from Fausto Carmona and Jake Westbrook to Roy Oswalt and Dan Haren. Haren and Oswalt are both highly unlikely, but the addition of Carmona or Westbrook would be an improvement over Hawksworth or Suppan, and if the price is right, the Cardinals should move to add any of the available starting pitchers on the market.

The needs in the middle infield aren’t quite as pressing, as Skip Schumaker‘s performance at second base is likely to improve (.323 projected wOBA), as is Brendan Ryan’s. Still, neither are more than an average player at this point, and the addition of Stephen Drew or a similar shortstop – if one is available – would both provide a big improvement to the starting lineup as well as the bench.

The Cardinals needs aren’t huge, though, as the additions of Ryan Ludwick, David Freese, and Brad Penny could be all the boost that St. Louis needs. I would still recommend the addition of another starting pitcher, but between Albert Pujols, Colby Rasmus, Matt Holliday, Adam Wainwright, and Chris Carpenter, there’s plenty of elite talent to go around on this team.

On The Farm

The Cardinals farm system is, quite frankly, pretty weak. The Cardinals ranked 30th in Beyond The Boxscore’s preseason farm system rankings, with only one prospect ranking in the top 95. That prospect is Shelby Miller, a right handed starter currently running 11.96 K/9 in A ball. 3B Zach Cox, the Cardinals first round pick, should be a huge addition to the farm system.

Budget

The Cardinals are going to need all the money they can have on hand in 2011, when Albert Pujols’s contract expires. As such, don’t expect the Cardinals to take on the contracts of Dan Haren or Roy Oswalt, or any other big time, multi-year contract. But the Cardinals don’t have any real albatrosses on hand and only four players due for arbitration raises in 2010 according to Cot’s Contracts, so one would assume that they could take on some cash for at least the 2011 season.

If you’re a more or less normal, sensitive American male like myself, you were shocked and/or awed by the revelation — courtesy of R.J. Frigging Anderson’s article of last week in re Jay Bruce — that Baseball-Reference is currently in the business of keeping a stat called XBT%, or Extra Base Taken Percentage. What this stat tells all of us normal, sensitive American male-types is the — and I quote — “percentage of times the runner advanced more than one base on a single or more than two bases on a double, when possible.” In other words, the stat seeks to represent the frequency with which a player takes an extra base. Also, in other words: it’s awesome.

And not only that, but B-R also records Stolen Base Opportunities (SBOs) — i.e. “the plate appearances through which a runner was on first or second with the next base open.” I feel no shame in not having formerly realized this — I mean, I’m a pretty important guy with a lot on my figurative plate — but I give thanks and praise now for having discovered it when I did.

In any case, here’s why I bring up all this junk: if one were in the business of attempting to adjudge the aesthetic pleasure provided by certain players, then one would very likely be curious about the baserunning skills of those players. As I, Carson Cistulli, am such a “one,” then it follows logically that I would be interested in such a thing.

Though baserunning is, admittedly, a rather minor part of a player’s overall contribution, it’s also a contribution which is rather easy to isolate. In what follows, I’ve attempted to do just that.

So, what makes an interesting baserunner? Well, I’m sure we could have all sorts of fist fights about that (and might soon at the FanGraphs Live Event). In this case, however, I allowed my enthusiasm to guide me unapologetically.

Much like with pitcher NERD, I utilized z-scores (i.e. standard deviations from the mean) to arrive at baserunning NERD (rNERD). In this case, I used a sample of players who’ve recorded at least 100 plate appearances. For each player, I found the sum of three different z-scores: XBT%, SBO% (that is, stolen base attempts as a percentage of opportunities), and stolen base success rate (SB%).

From there, all I did was cap the lowest possible SB% z-score at -1.1 (to mirror the highest z-score) and then add a constant (in this case, 4.91) to put all the scores on a 0-10 scale.

Using this method, here are the Top 25 baserunners (from a sample of 350 qualified players):

I like this list, because there are very few surprises. I mean, Michael Bourn, B.J. Upton, Rajai Davis: we know those are fast guys. The pleasure from such an exercise, however, frequently comes from the players who surprise us. In this case, Kyle Blanks has to be that guy. Surprisingly, Blanks is among the league leaders in taking the extra base. Why that is exactly — maybe batting ahead of lefties, or something? — is unclear, but it makes for something to think about when Blanks makes his retun to the field in August sometime.

As for the 25 laggards, here they are:

I don’t know that there are too many surprises here. Mostly, it’s a list of first basemen and catchers, which is probably to be expected. The presence of Mitch Maier might be of some concern to Royal fans — although, truth be told, they have enough on their plates. Nick Swisher, like Maier, has been seen roaming centerfield more recently than not. He’s never been a speed demon, but it’s surprising to see him on this list.

If you’re interested in seeing the full spreadsheet of 350 baserunners, it’s available just by clicking here.

Padres’ beat writer Corey Brock tweeted yesterday afternoon that the team has interest in Miguel Tejada. Truthfully it’s hard to understand why. Tejada could potentially take third base or maybe shortstop. Right now, the Pads are using Chase Headley and Evereth Cabrera at those positions with a sprinkle of Jerry Hairston Jr. at shortstop. In name value alone, Tejada reigns supreme. Name value isn’t helping to solidify the Padres’ playoff chances though.

Tejada turned 36 in late May and his wOBA is bordering the .300 mark. He does not walk much (nor does he fan constantly) but his power seems to be on the heavy decline, making him a pretty limited offensive contributor. Headley has a park unadjusted wOBA of .321. ZiPS projects their bats to play about equal from here forward, but you have to assume the upside is higher with the player a decade younger. Even if the two are equal at the dish – and there is reason to believe they are not – Headley is a superior baserunner and a better fielder too.

Cabrera is having a rough season. He’s hitting .207/.268/.297 with a decent – if below modest expectations – batting average on balls in play. His walk rate is down and his strikeout rate is up. Even still, it is hard to imagine the Padres replacing him with Tejada. The Orioles are as void of shortstop talent as Keanu Reeves’ jean pockets and even they can’t be bothered to play him there and call up Joshua Bell on a permanent basis. Maybe Baltimore is simply clueless when it comes to evaluating defense, or maybe Tejada’s time as a big league shortstop has passed.

Acquiring a righty with pop and a more reliable shortstop makes sense for San Diego. Realistically Tejada can no longer be counted on to fill either of those holes. Consider it a minor upset if the Padres trade for Tejada at anything but closeout prices. Even then, the Friars’ time could be more wisely spent asking Baltimore about Luke Scott and Ty Wigginton.

The White Sox are certainly a surprising team this year. I do not think many gave much thought to the AL Central under the assumption that the Twins were clear favorites there and that the Wild Card was assured to come out of the AL East. Instead, the White Sox are holding the divisional lead and they are doing it with little help from their position players.

It has been the pitchers where Chicago has made up ground on the better teams in baseball and the success on the mound has come from some unexpected sources. Mark Buehrle is having a typical Mark Buehrle season and Jake Peavy was a bit of a disappointment in both performance and durability, though neither should have come as too big a shock. To counter the letdowns and exactly-as-predicteds, three pitchers have exceeded expectations enough to propel the White Sox up the divisional leader board.

J.J. Putz came into 2010 on the heels of an injurious and all around disastrous 2009 season with the Mets. Having thrown just 29.1 innings, Putz’s strikeout rate fell from a three year average close to 11 per 9 to just 5.8. His walk rate also stayed at his 2008 level in the mid to upper 5s, which left him with an equal number of walks as strikeouts in 2009.

The projection systems did see much improvement for Putz in 2010. CHONE and ZiPS put him at a 4.29 and 4.24 FIP respectively. FanGraphs readers were a lot more optimistic with a 3.49 predicted FIP, but even they are being blown out of the water by Putz’s actual performance that is right out of his 2006 model of success. The strikeouts are back to 10.6, the walks are back down to 1.5 and the high ground ball rates are back as well, keeping the home runs infrequent. In total, Putz has already thrown 35.2 innings with just a 2.00 FIP. He’s been one of the very best relievers in baseball.

John Danks ended up in Chicago with a reputation as a big time fly ball pitcher, a reputation well deserved. His ground ball rate in his rookie 2007 season was just under 35%. It has steadily risen each season since up to 43% in 2008, 44% last year and now up to 47% in 2010. Interestingly, the cause might be because of his drastically reducing the use of his breaking ball. During that transformation, Danks has managed to hold onto his strikeouts and cut down on his walks by a smidge. His continued improvement has once again bested the average projections.

Gavin Floyd took a sizable step forward last season, upping his strikeout rate by about one per nine without any additional walks. Largely, the projection systems did not expect Floyd to hold onto those gains as well as he has in 2010. The other part that nobody expected was Floyd’s ground ball rate going from a well-established rate in the low 40s to 51% this season. Floyd’s 6.4% home run per fly ball rate is unsustainably low, but even adjusting for that, Floyd has held onto his 2009 improvement and is establishing a new baseline for performance as a high-3 xFIP pitcher as opposed to the mid-4 range that was working in previously.

There are obviously many reasons for Chicago’s success to date in 2010, but the above three pitchers are both some of the biggest and some of the least expected.

The Seattle Mariners’ inability to score runs is no secret. Entering Sunday’s affair with the Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, the club had played 91 games and scored 309 runs; a 3.4 runs per game average. The Mariners scored two runs (and won) but it took extra innings. So much attention has been paid (and rightfully so) to how Seattle prevents runs and not enough on how they score them – or rather, how they could increase their scoring without resorting to sinning such as rosterbation or promoting Dustin Ackley before he’s ready.

One of those ways is taking more risks on the basepaths. Not just stealing bases but the other aspects of risk in baserunning; namely attempting to take extra bases on hits. Take one of the most common situations in the game: a single with a runner on second base. As the runner runs the 90 foot path between second and third, the third base coach must make a quick calculation on ball placement, runner speed, the fielder’s arm strength and accuracy, the score, and the base-out state before deciding to put on the brakes or send the runner barreling home.

One of the ways we analyze when (or if) the Mariners should be taking risks on the basepaths is by looking at run expectancy charts and empirical data. Using a Markov Chain to generate a run expectancy table we can then figure out the break-even points for various out states surrounding the aforementioned situation. The Markov Chain gives us a BaseRuns estimated 3.9 runs per game figure for Seattle, one that actually happens to be on the high side when faced with reality. That’s because the Markov Chain doesn’t account for outs on the bases – it’s just not designed to do so. This is not a projection and there are no regression or adjustments made to the team’s numbers. Here is the generated RE chart for the Mariners to date:

They’re a low scoring team in a low scoring environment. Simply put: that means that making an out isn’t as taboo as it would be in a higher run scoring environment (almost anywhere else in baseball) because it would be unlikely that the runner scored anyways. On one hand, this means the break-even point for going second to home is lower than it would be for almost any other team in baseball. On the other, well, they aren’t scoring many runs. That’s a problem.
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Sifting through trade rumors this season, one thing has been constant: the Oakland Athletics seemingly have no desire to trade Ben Sheets. Sheets signed a one year contract with $10 million prior to the season and there are no options on the contract. The Athletics are currently seven games behind Texas and 3.5 behind Los Angeles in the AL West; if they weren’t already sellers, one would think that Texas’s acquisition of Cliff Lee would push Oakland over the edge.

There are two stipulations in the contract that make the A’s reluctance to deal Sheets so confusing. First off, Sheets receives $0.5M if he reaches 165 innings pitched and another $0.5M for 175, 185, and 195 as well. He sits at 112 IP so far and, although he has a pretty major injury history, probably only needs to make 10-11 more starts to reach the first level of incentives. Given how frugal the Athletics organization has been, it would be surprising for them to allow Sheets to reach these incentives.

The second is a stipulation that wouldn’t allow the Athletics to offer Sheets arbitration if he were to reach type A status (Source: Cot’s Contracts). This isn’t going to be an issue as long as the Elias rankings reverse engineered over at MLB Trade Rumors are even approaching accurate, as Sheets isn’t even close to a Type B at this point. Still, one potential reason for not trading Sheets would be free agent compensation, and that just doesn’t seem like an issue here, nor could it be even if Sheets were to be a Type A.

Of course, you can only draw so many conclusions from what a general manager allows to reach the press. Still, the Athletics just don’t appear to be geared up for a playoff run and should be looking for financial relief as well as young talent for the future. That seemed to be the entire basis of the Sheets signing: if the A’s are in it at the deadline, great, but if not, flip him for some prospects. Maybe the offers for Sheets just aren’t what Billy Beane likes right now, given that his player is having the worst season of his life, as the strikeouts are down and the walks and home runs are up. It’s not terribly surprising that Sheets is having such a poor season at age 31 (he turned 31 yesterday) and coming off a full season of injury rehab. Despite the struggles, the promise of the ace-level performance from 2002-2008 might be enough to draw some suitors, and it would be remiss of the Athletics not to cash in on their asset while they still can.