Today, Alex Gonzalez and prospects were traded for Yunel Escobar. Maybe that doesn’t seem too insane today, but if this news had broke last offseason, nobody would believe that Alex Gonzalez could bring in a player worth 10.1 WAR from 2007-2009 and yet to reach arbitration. Obviously, a large part of this deal is Yunel Escobar’s offensive struggles in 2010, but perhaps an even larger part is Alex Gonzalez’s power surge.

Alex Gonzalez has hit 17 home runs in 348 PAs this season, only six fewer than his career high from 2004 (a 599 PA season). He’s on pace to hit 29 this season if he reaches 600 plate appearances. Thanks to that, Gonzalez’s ISO is a career high .238, allowing him to wOBA .341 despite only reaching base at a .296 clip.

Jose Bautista is having a similar season. After posting ISOs between .160 and .185 for the last four seasons, his ISO is now up to .306, earning him a position on the AL All-Star team. Bautista’s 24 home runs in only 366 PA is already a career high, as his previous high was 16 (in 469 PA) in 2006. With the Blue Jays swiftly falling out of the race, it wouldn’t be surprising to see Bautista included in a trade down the road.

Since so much of their value is tied up in their ability to hit home runs, let’s take a look at how far they’ve hit their home runs this year, courtesy of the ever excellent HitTracker Online

Both Bautista (red) and Gonzalez (blue) are right-handed and extremely pull-happy home run hitters. Bautista’s home runs, overall, tend to go farther, but there is one cluster in particular that both share in common. Gonzalez and Bautista have eight combined home runs in the area between 130 degrees and 125 degrees and less than 375 feet, and Gonzalez has an additional five in the area between 135 and 130 degrees and less than 355 feet.

The rather unimpressive spread of home runs is confirmed when we look at the classifications that HitTracker uses for home runs. This is the HitTracker definition of a “Just Enough” home run:

“Just Enough” home run – Means the ball cleared the fence by less than 10 vertical feet, OR that it landed less than one fence height past the fence. These are the ones that barely made it over the fence.

Alex Gonzalez is currently the NL Leader in Just Enoughs with ten. Jose Bautista is second with eight. Both have HR/FB rates that eclipse their career averages. Even though the park factor for overall runs in Toronto favors the pitcher, the factor for home runs largely favors hitters. According to StatCorner, the RHB HR park factor in Toronto is 110, heavily favoring the hitters. This is balanced out by a 92 park factor for singles for both hands, which is why we see pitchers seemingly favored at the Rogers Centre.

All of the factors for a heavy decline in the second half are there, particularly for Alex Gonzalez, who moves to Turner Field and its 90 park factor for RHB HRs. These players are getting lucky in almost every possible sense with home runs. The Braves are likely to fall victim to a drop in power from Alex Gonzalez, and any team, particularly without a RH-friendly ball park, would likely see the same out of Jose Bautista.

Introduction
#50-#46
#45-#41
#40-#36
#35-#31

#30 – Ian Kinsler, 2B, Texas

The Rangers second baseman is not just one of the better all around players at his position, but he’s also one of the best bargains. He’s got three years left on his original long-term contract with the Rangers, and will be paid just $23 million over the remainder of that deal. He’s been a +4 to +5 win player in each of the last two years and is well on his way to matching that total again this year, making him an All-Star being paid like an average player. That’s tremendously valuable, and he’s one of the main reasons why Texas is the team to beat in the AL West.

#29 – David Price, SP, Tampa Bay

The starter in yesterday’s All-Star Game, Price’s improvements over last year are more incremental than his ERA may lead you to believe. His walks are down slightly and his strikeout and groundball rates are up slightly, so he is pitching better, but he’s not yet an ace. He may still become one, and given his stuff, every team in baseball would gladly wait for him to develop into one of the game’s best pitchers, but he’s not there yet. He is, however, a quality starter making very little money and under team control for another five years. He doesn’t have to be an ace yet to be highly coveted.

#28 – Shin-Soo Choo, OF, Cleveland

Over the last three years, Choo has posted wOBAs of .402, .389, and .382. He’s been consistently above average at every facet of the game, and yet he flies under the radar because his teammates haven’t performed up to his level. An thumb injury has derailed his 2010 season, but his long-term future is still very bright. He’d rank higher if he wasn’t headed for arbitration with Scott Boras as his agent, making a long term, team friendly deal less likely. Still, the Indians should be able to get three years of reduced rates out of a high-quality player before Boras takes him elsewhere, and every team in baseball would love to have him.

#27 – Clayton Kershaw, SP, Los Angeles

Like Price, he’s not yet what he could be, but he’s shown signs of getting there, and the leap may not be that far away. His stuff is legitimately top shelf, and as a 22-year-old lefty, few arms in the game were anywhere near where he is at this age. The command is still a bit of a concern, however, as is his ability to keep right-handers off base, but even with those issues, he’s a terrific arm. If he gets them straightened out, he’ll be among the game’s best. The Dodgers control his rights for four more years, and I wouldn’t be surprised if they tried to buy out his arbitration years before he started earning any real money.

#26 – Brian McCann, C, Atlanta

Yet another catcher with some power, McCann is probably the most polished of the young slugging backstops. He doesn’t make quite as much contact as he did a few years ago, but the walks are up and the power hasn’t gone anywhere. He is, clearly, one of the elite catchers in baseball, and at 26, he should remain a quality player through the remainder of his ridiculous contract. There are three years remaining on his deal, and he’ll earn just over $27 million during that time, less than half of what he’s actually worth. He’s the foundation of the Braves roster, and quite a piece to build around.

Pretty much everyone loves Joe Posnanski, including me. But while “Poz” has been perhaps the most prominent advocate of objective analysis among “mainstream” sportswriters, few would call him a “radical.” His blog post today, in the aftermath of a series of Tweets and counter-Tweets regarding Matt Thornton’s appearance in last night’s All-Star Game, however, paints a different picture. While he doesn’t explicitly say so, Posnanski implicitly has a pretty radical idea about what sort of pitcher belongs (and does not belong) in the All-Star Game.

While acknowledging that Matt Thornton is a good middle reliever, Posnanski does

not want to see a middle reliever, no matter how good, pitch with the game on the line in the All-Star Game. I just don’t. I’m not necessarily overjoyed by the way managers use their staffs, but I know the realities of the game — managers put their best pitchers in the rotation, and they put their best reliever in the closer role, and they take the best of the rest (or the young pitchers they are trying to break in) and put them in middle relief. Some thrive in that role. And their value tends to be undervalued by everyone … including me.* But that doesn’t make it interesting in any way.

This is set up by this perfectly reasonable point:

Middle relief is a specialty position. It’s extremely important in day-to-day baseball, but, to me at least, the All-Star Game is not day-to-day baseball. It’s a game for the best. And in a league that has Lee, Liriano, Lester, King Felix, Verlander, Price, Greinke, Weaver, Sabathia, Pettitte and many other great, great starting pitchers, I’m sorry, I don’t want Matt Thornton pitching in the most important moment of the game. I don’t buy that having that “experience” of pitching the seventh inning with runners on is of great value, not in this kind of game. Give me the best pitcher.

Poz is right: we want to see the best pitcher out there, and we know that relief pitchers are generally relievers because they aren’t good enough to start. Yes, most fans would rather see Zack Greinke or Jon Lester than Matt Thornton — they are better pitchers than Thornton.

The “experience” point is also excellent, and pushes this idea over into the “radical” category. After all, if the “‘experience’ of pitching the seventh inning with runners on” isn’t important in the All-Star Game, then really, why would “experience of pitching in the ninth” be any different? The “experience” issue is a major part of the basis for modern closer “position,” one of the myths that sabermetric analysis has been debunking for a while. Closers do what they do because, just like every other reliever, most of them couldn’t handle starting for some reason or another. This gets at the heart of Posnanski’s implicit radicality: if we want to see the best pitchers, why should any relief pitchers make the All-Star Game?

If we agree with Posnanski that Matt Thornton isn’t good enough to pitch in the All-Star Game, which relievers are left? Among qualified relievers 2008-present, only two had a better FIP than All-Star Scourge Matt Thornton (2.50): Jonathan Broxton (2.13) and Mariano Rivera (2.36). Has Thornton been lucky on home runs? Here is an exhaustive list of qualified relievers with a better xFIP than Thornton (2.84) 2008-present: Broxton (2.32) and Rivera (2.57).

Of course, Rivera and Broxton are both “proven closers,” but even if you buy that load of “clutch” nonsense (you shouldn’t), as Posnanski pointed out, that kind of “experience” shouldn’t matter in the All-Star Game. In any case, leverage accounts for just how important the situations in which the pitcher has been placed in have been. Wins Above Replacement (WAR) helps us properly value “mere specialists” by incorporating leverage into their valuation as well as how much they’ve pitched. Since 2008, Matt Thornton has accumulated 5.9 WAR. Which relievers are ahead of him? You guessed it: Jonathan Broxton (6.9) and Mariano Rivera (6.4).

Maybe guys like Rivera and Broxton could make an appearance in the All-Star Game, if all the starters were used up or something, but hey, if we don’t want to see Matt Thornton, one of the most valuable relievers (middle or otherwise) in the game over the last few seasons, what’s the point of having relievers on the roster at all? Heck yeah, I’d rather see King Felix pitch than Matt Thornton. I hope Posnanski uses his prominent position to advocate for the position logically implied by his arguments.

However, I suppose in one way Posnanski should probably be happy that Matt Thornton was the reliever inserted into the game. Can you imagine the backlash Posnanski would have endured from Royals fans in his hometown of Kansas City if he’d tweeted about the silliness of Joe Girardi putting in Joakim Soria, someone Thornton has clearly outpitched the last several years?

While it’s fun to evaluate Alex Gonzalez vs. Yunel Escobar in a vacuum — and, inevitably, come out favoring Escobar — there were three minor league players involved in today’s Blue Jays-Braves trade. R.J. Anderson and Joe Pawlikowski have already tackled the deal from the perspective of each team, but I’m here to detail the analysis on the three players currently in the minor leagues: Jo-Jo Reyes, Tim Collins and Tyler Pastornicky.

Reyes, so far as I can tell, is the only player that has ranked as a top 10 prospect (BA #8 pre-2007). He is also the only one that no longer qualifies as a prospect, and the only one with a failed Major League track record. That came in 2008, when Reyes’ 3-11, 5.81 stats actually appeared far worse than his 4.61 xFIP. In his 194 inning career (where he’s nearing in on 2 years of service time completed), Reyes has consistently had a lower xFIP than ERA, thanks to a 15.5 HR/FB%.

Home runs weren’t always a problem for Reyes in the minor leagues, but between his Major League stints and his current run at Triple-A (5.70 ERA, 1.5 HR/9, 17.0 HR/FB%), it’s an important indicator going forward. His long-time bugaboo, command, is improving: 2010 is currently his fourth-straight minor league season improving his BB/9 ratio. He’s pretty much a power pitcher without the power: strikeouts, home runs, and walks all come at high rates, with his ultimate success hinging on command.

In terms of pedigree, it’s outrageous to think that 5-foot-7, 155-pound Tim Collins could rank ahead of Reyes, a big-bodied former second-round pick. This is the type of thinking that Collins has long been susceptible to, and the thinking he’s consistently outpaced. In 130 games at the minor league level over four years, Collins has a 2.40 ERA, 13.6 K/9 ratio and 5.9 H/9 ratio. He lives in the strike zone, and brings deception and sneaky velocity everytime he touches the mound.

I suppose it’s possible that Collins touches the Majors this season — he’s maxed out at what he’s going to become, so it would be defensible — but the Braves bullpen is so good, I sort of doubt it. Instead, he should get the opportunity to replace Reyes at Triple-A Gwinnett, because he’s passed the Double-A test (currently riding a streak of 17 consecutive scoreless innings). It’s hard to think that Collins has a long career ahead of him, but naysaying this guy has essentially become pointless.

The least visible part of this trade is Tyler Pastornicky — he has neither a Major League record nor a freakish pedigree. But I doubt the Braves make this trade without him; we know how good that scouting department operates, and they wouldn’t be the first to fancy Pastornicky as a sleeper. A fifth round pick out of a Florida high school in 2008 (drafted one pick before the Braves), Pastornicky has great bat control, sporting a career strikeout rate of just 13.8%. However, his average is just .264 and his ISO just .089 for his career, so he clearly has a ways to go in developing strength and power.

At just 20 years old in the Florida State League, a .258/.348/.376 batting line is more than defensible. He’s upped his walk rate this season (11.8 BB%) and he’s still been a nuisance on the basepaths, following last year’s 57-steal season with a 24-for-31 mark this year. Pastornicky is problem a second baseman down the road, but he’s improved enough at shortstop to maintain some believers about his future there.

Because of their starting pitching depth, Jo-Jo Reyes doesn’t mean a lot to the Braves — they would have traded him in for future reliever Tim Collins without the other pieces involved. But to add a potential long-term replacement for Escobar (on top of the short-term replacement that Alex Gonzalez offers), there’s a chance the Braves don’t think this is as short-sighted as many analysts do.

Earlier this afternoon Toronto and Atlanta consummated a trade that, at first glance, looks like a head-scratcher. Atlanta, ahead in the NL East by four games, traded their starting shortstop, Yunel Escobar, to the Blue Jays for a direct replacement, Alex Gonzalez, and two prospects. It’s easy to see Toronto’s perspective on this one, since they acquired a 27-year-old established MLB shortstop who has three more years until he reaches free agency. But why would the Braves trade away such a player for a 33-year-old in the midst of a career year that could come tumbling back to earth at any second?

Escobar established himself as a one of the league’s better shortstops last year, producing 4.3 WAR, fifth among shortstops in the majors. He accomplished that with a .357 wOBA, also fifth among MLB shortstops, and a slightly above average UZR. This year his defensive numbers have improved, a 4.4 UZR, but his offense has dropped off considerably. His wOBA has fallen all the way to .291, mostly because of his complete power outage. Of the 62 hits he’s collected this season just 12 have gone for extra bases, all doubles. That leaves his ISO at .046, sixth lowest among qualified major leaguers. The Braves just haven’t been realizing the production they expected from him.

Even so, it doesn’t seem likely that the Braves would trade a 27-year-old merely because he underperformed for half a season. They’re certainly playing to win this year, but that doesn’t mean they need to jettison a player who not only can help them in the future, but who might recover to produce a quality second half. From many accounts, the Braves based their decision on more than Escobar’s poor performance. There have been rumblings that the Braves don’t like Escobar’s demeanor and attitude, so perhaps they thought that his time had run its course in Atlanta. It wouldn’t be the first time it happened.

The Braves have a history of trading or otherwise getting rid of useful players with whom they became dissatisfied for one reason or another. For instance, a 22-year-old Tim Spooneybarger pitched very well for them in the bullpen in 2002, but they traded him in the off-season to Florida for Mike Hampton, who had pitched horribly in the first two years of his mega contract. Spooneybarger pitched 33 innings for the Marlins before requiring two Tommy John surgeries. Hampton went on to be a useful starter for Atlanta from 2003 and 2004.

Marcus Giles is another example of the Braves moving a player before his value bottomed out. From 2003 through 2005 he provided excellent value at the plate and in the field, producing 6.7, 2.9, and 5.3 WAR seasons. But in 2006 his production fell off from both ends, a .323 wOBA and a -5.6 UZR. The Braves non-tendered him rather than grant him a pay raise in his final year of arbitration. He signed on to play with his brother in San Diego, but was again horrible, a .283 wOBA and -4.7 UZR, producing -0.1 WAR. He hasn’t played in the majors since.

(And who could forget John Rocker, who was terrible from the second the Braves traded him in 2001?)

In terms of the present, Gonzalez provides the Braves with an instant fill-in at shortstop. He is in the midst of a career year, a .341 wOBA that rests mostly on the power of his .238 ISO. Power seems to be the only positive aspect of his offensive performance right now, as his OBP sits at .296. He still plays an excellent shortstop, a 3.1 UZR to this point, and he’s likely to continue providing the Braves with quality defense. On offense, however, chances are he’ll start hitting more like his .299 career wOBA.

The Braves did receive a couple of prospects in the deal, though neither ranked among the Blue Jays’ top 10. Marc Hulet mentioned that the two players, Tyler Pastornicky and Tim Collins, could have hit his Blue Jays top 10, but instead just missed the cut. Baseball America ranked Pastornicky 17th and Collins 19th in the organization. Pastornicky might have been the key to the trade, since he now profiles as a player who can eventually take over at shortstop. He’s just in A+ ball right now, but he’s just 20 and could move through the ranks to join the Braves in 2012. Here’s what BA says about him:

An athletic infielder, Pastornicky doesn’t have flashy tools but gets the most out of what he has. He has good instincts at shortstop, along with plus range and an average arm. He’s an above-average runner and basestealer, which opposing catchers quickly figured out as he swiped 57 bases between two Class A stops in 2009. Pastornicky has a line-drive stroke and projects as .275 hitter in the big leagues. The only thing he lacks is power, as he has hit just two homers in 636 pro at-bats. But as a potential top-of-the-order hitter who provides sound defense, he may not need it.

Tim Collins was an undrafted free agent when former Jays GM J.P. Ricciardi saw him play at Rhode Island CC. Chances are he fell out of the draft because of his frame — he’s listed at 5’7″ and 155 pounds — but he has done nothing but dominate in the minors. He walked a few too many hitters in 2008 and 2009, but he kept his strikeout rate remarkably high. This year, at AA New Hampshire, he has struck out 73 in 43 inning while walking just 16. Again, BA has a scouting report:

He gets outs with a solid fastball that tops out at 93 mph and a true 12-to-6 curveball that he spins really well. His quirky delivery helps him as well. He has a high three-quarters arm slot and does an especially good job of staying on top of the ball and driving down despite his height. He has a high leg kick and stands as far to the third-base side of the rubber as possible.

Scouts always have worries about the durability of smaller players, which probably hurts Collins’s stock now, just like it did in the 2007 draft. Still, he seems like a nice get for the Braves, who have already assembled a good bullpen. Like Pastornicky, Collins probably won’t crack the big league roster until 2012 at the earliest, though a mid-year call-up next year doesn’t seem all that outlandish a proposition.

After further examination, this trade doesn’t seem nearly as bad for the Braves as it did at first glance. Toronto still won their end, but that doesn’t preclude the Braves from claiming victory as well. They’ve gotten rid of a player whom they clearly do not like, and replaced him with a player who, if nothing else, will provide value on defense. The prospects also help out, and while neither projects as a future star both can be useful pieces in a year or two. Maybe it’s a win, though I wouldn’t go so far as to say that. But it doesn’t look like the clear loss I had imagined when digging into the topic.

Let’s get this out of the way: On paper, this deal appears to be a victory for the Jays.

Yunel Escobar is 27 years old. He has three years of team control remaining. He contributed 10 wins in his first three seasons. He’s a good player and he may only get better. In exchange, the Braves acquire Alex Gonzalez and two players who did not make the Jays’ top 10 prospects list per Marc Hulet, but have some interesting upside — particularly Tim Collins, a short lefty with ridiculous strikeout rates (in Double-A) and a funky delivery to boot. The Jays also receive Jo-Jo Reyes, who, while he’s no prized pig, would’ve been in the majors with most teams that lack Atlanta’s pitching surplus.

On to the cream of the deal: Escobar is only available for such a return because the Braves lost faith in him. Not his playing abilities, mind you, but his makeup and work ethic. The tumultuous relationship between Escobar and manager Bobby Cox is no secret and when Atlanta loses faith in you, then it’s only a matter of time before they ship you out. Just ask Marcus Giles.

The Braves are smart enough to realize this deal isn’t a slam dunk by any means. They also meddle in sabermetrics enough to realize that Escobar’s offensive struggles aren’t completely a loss in skill. His batting average on balls in play is .270 (versus a career mark of .316) and while that .291 wOBA is disgusting, he’s still walking at a career-best clip (over 12%) while maintaining a static strikeout rate. The most concerning thing about Escobar’s skill set from a performance standpoint is his vanishing power. That speaks to what they think of Escobar’s makeup. Ostensibly, Toronto’s scouts watched Escobar a few times in the recent weeks and talked with enough people around him to get the impression he’s manageable.

The Jays are banking that Escobar will respond to this move with a newfound passion and fire or that a continued apathy will still bank results, no matter how nuts he drives whoever manages the Jays after Cito Gaston’s retirement. In some ways, this is similar to the Edwin Encarnacion deal, only Escobar’s track record is about a million times better than Encarnacion’s ever was.

It’s been a whirlwind eight months for Jays’ general manager Alex Anthopoulos. He lost their previous starting shortstop, Marco Scutaro, to Boston, and replaced him with Boston’s old shortstop, Gonzalez, only to send him packing three-fourths of a year later for a younger player at the same position with recent history (and likely the future) on his side. Even if this deal doesn’t entirely work out in the Jays’ favor, and Escobar bombs out of the league before reaching free agency, this has to be looked upon as a pretty worthwhile risk for the Jays, who haven’t had a consistent shortstop for ages.

Despite not being named to the All-Star team, Zack Greinke is still having another successful season. His FIP stands at 3.49, his xFIP at 3.69, and his tERA at 3.45. However, while those numbers are certainly impressive, they are nowhere near his insane 2009 season, where his 2.33 FIP netted him 9.4 WAR and his 2.58 tERA brought his ERA to 2.16.

Amazingly, Greinke probably knows all this stuff as well. From The New York Times last year:

To that end, Bannister introduced Greinke to FIP, or Fielding Independent Pitching, the statistic Greinke named Tuesday as his favorite. It is a formula that measures how well a pitcher performed, regardless of his fielders. According to fangraphs.com, Greinke had the best FIP in the majors.

“That’s pretty much how I pitch, to try to keep my FIP as low as possible,” Greinke said.

Because he’s such a smart pitcher, I wanted to see if Greinke has made any adjustments from last season, specifically to his fastball. Despite being only 26, Zack has lost some life on his fastball over the past few years. Here are his average four-seam and two-seam fastball velocities since 2007:

2007: 94.4, N/A
2008: 93.4, 90.4
2009: 93.7, 89.1
2010: 92.9, 93.1

Something weird is going on here. His two-seam fastball jumped 4 MPH this year and is somehow now faster than his four-seamer? This looks to be a classification error, as BAM has had issues with their two-seam classification in the past. Our own Dave Allen also says that Greinke’s two-seamer is usually close to the velocity of his four-seamer (now that’s a nasty weapon). Pitchf/x guru Harry Pavlidis did say however that, “A little more tail on the four-seam fastball, too. Seems like 2007’s version lacked some of the downward tilt he’s had more recently.” His wFB was -3.8 in 2008, but had a monstrous 2009 at 25.8 and is on track for a very good, but not 09-esque, 2010. However, Greinke is also getting more ground balls, meaning he could be trying to fine-tune his game even moreso. Here are his career groundball rates:

2004: 34.6%
2005: 39.2%
2006: 35.0%
2007: 32.1%
2008: 42.7%
2009: 40.0%
2010: 44.0%

This year Greinke has the highest groundball rate of his career, the lowest line-drive rate, and the second-highest GB/FB ratio. However, he’s also striking out about two batters fewer per nine innings, so he may be giving up some speed and power for more balls hit on the floor. We can take a closer look at Greinke’s fastball (all types) location, as shown by data in the Bloomberg Sports Pro Tool. Here’s 2009:

For proper analysis, make sure to notice where the outlined batter’s box is in relation to home plate (the top/bottom/far left/far right portions inside the white lines of the batter’s box are a few inches out of the strike zone). Greinke threw his fastball on the outside corner to lefties/inside corner to righties. However, he threw the ball vertically similar to how he did in 2008, staying about belt-high. Here’s 2010:

Here we see a significant difference. Greinke is throwing his fastballs lower in the zone and more out over the plate. It could be that he’s throwing his two-seamer lower, or at least enough to make a difference. For a relative comparison, here’s where his four-seamers are for 2010:

As you can see, Greinke’s four-seamer is well higher in the zone than his overall fastball average, and another image of his two-seamers that I won’t show in order to avoid overkill does indeed show he’s throwing it very low in the zone. While this may not be the definite reason for his career-high groundball rate, I’d like to think that it’s a front runner. Whatever he’s doing, it’s working. Greinke has put together another excellent season thus far.

Introduction
#50-#46
#45-#41
#40-#36

#35 – Justin Verlander, SP, Detroit

The Tigers ace is one of the most dominant power pitchers in the game, but after what looked like a breakout season in 2010, he’s essentially reverted to being what he was before 2009 – a good pitcher who doesn’t get as much out of his stuff as you would expect. Teams would love to have him, certainly, but with an $80 million extension and a heavy workload, he comes with a fair amount of risk. That said, power arms are always highly sought after, and there’d be a line for his services if the Tigers put him on the market.

#34 – Mike Stanton, OF, Florida

Stanton is arguably the strongest player in baseball, and he doesn’t turn 21 until November. His ability to drive a baseball is almost unheard of for a player his age. The power comes with a cost, as his ferocious swing doesn’t make enough contact right now, but its important to remember just how young he is. He’s improved his approach at the plate, and while he’s still too aggressive, it shouldn’t be a permanent thing that can’t be fixed. Once he harnesses his natural abilities, look out. The Marlins would have to be overwhelmed to part with their monster in the making.

#33 – Matt Wieters, C, Baltimore

A year into his career, Wieters isn’t yet what everyone anticipated. Billed as a switch-hitting Joe Mauer with power, he’s shown the skills that got him so much hype in the first place except for the one that was supposed to set him apart – the ability to drive the baseball. It hasn’t helped that he’s been worse this year than he was last season, making it hard to find progress in his development. But we should also keep in mind that, for all the talk of how disappointing he’s been, he’s essentially been a league average catcher as a rookie, and there’s certainly potential for more. It’s far too early to give up on Wieters, though we have to adjust our expectations and perhaps recalibrate the timeline a bit.

#32 – Elvis Andrus, SS, Texas

In a league with few good shortstops, Andrus stands tall despite being just 21 years of age. A defensive specialist, he’s never going to be the best hitter in the league, but he provides enough value on offense that his total package makes him one of the better players at his position. His lack of power and too frequent baserunning gaffes are problematic, but the good outweighs the bad with Andrus. Good young players who provide value now and potential for more later are building blocks of good franchises, and that’s exactly what Andrus is to the Rangers right now.

#31 – Buster Posey, C, San Francisco

The Giants rookie catcher has shown why many thought he should have been given the starting job out of the gates this year. You can bet that he won’t be surrendering the position any time soon, and by limiting the service time he will gain this year, they ensured that he won’t be a free agent until after the 2016 season. San Francisco fans can look forward to six more years of a catcher who offers value both at the plate and behind it.

Since the Pittsburgh Pirates selected him out of a Washington prep school in the second round of the 1999 draft, Ryan Doumit’s calling card has been his bat. The switch-hitter compiled a .293/.366/.454 line in the minors, managing to stay on the prospect periphery despite numerous injuries and a defensive reputation that produced an unfortunate nickname: “Ryan No-Mitt.”

Pittsburgh’s previous front office regime, led by Dave Littlefield, appeared ready to pull the plug on Doumit’s catching career. The club had Doumit log considerable time at first base and right field over the 2006-2007 seasons, while the injuries (including a torn hamstring and a sprained wrist and ankle) continued to pile up. Neal Huntington and company had a different philosophy, however. While Doumit wasn’t considered a defensive standout, they reasoned that his positional value was still greatest behind the dish. At first base or a corner outfield spot, Doumit’s bat didn’t stand out near as much.

The Pirates were rewarded handsomely for that decision in 2008, as Doumit posted a .367 wOBA in 465 plate appearances. According to Sean Smith’s Total Zone defensive system, which grades a catcher by stolen bases, caught stealing, errors, pick offs, passed balls and wild pitches, splitting the data by handedness and comparing a catcher to the league average, Doumit cost the Bucs five runs defensively. Catcher defense remains a hazy area for sabermetrics, but the trade-off appeared to be well worth it — even with -5 D, Doumit rated as a three-and-a-half win player. After the season, the Pirates inked Doumit to a three-year, $11.5 million contract that locked him up through his arbitration years. The deal also included a club option for the 2012-2013 seasons (at a total cost of $15.5 million) that must be exercised or rejected after the 2011 campaign.

Since then, things haven’t gone near as well for Doumit. He suffered a wrist injury that required surgery in 2009, putting up a .306 wOBA in 304 PA and rating as a -1 defender in limited playing time. This season, his bat has bounced back (.331 wOBA in 296 PA), as he’s not hacking as much as last year and his BABIP has climbed more toward his career average. Normally, a backstop hitting better than the league average would be a very valuable commodity. But, from the metrics we have on catcher D, it appears that Doumit is sadly earning that prospect nickname this season.

In 2010, 74 runners have taken off with Doumit behind the plate. Sixty-six of them (89 percent) have come up safe. Among qualified big league catchers, Doumit’s 11 percent CS rate is by far the lowest. He also leads the NL in passed balls, with six. According to Total Zone, Doumit has already been nine runs worse than the average MLB catcher. Matt Klaassen has developed his own defensive rankings for catchers (methodology here), grading backstops by linear weights above or below average on fielding errors, throwing errors, passed balls, wild pitches and caught stealing. His most recent update in late June had Doumit dead last among all catchers. Even though Doumit is having a good offensive year and has remained healthy aside from a few games missed with a concussion, he has yet to crack the one WAR plateau.

Chances are, Doumit’s not this bad defensively — Total Zone has the 29-year-old as a -8 run catcher per 135 games during his career, while he’s currently at -17 runs per 135 games in 2010. But the re-emergence of “No Mitt” has been an unwelcome development during yet another trying season in Pittsburgh.

It wasn’t the most important play of the game, but I’m willing to bet that the play that generates the most talk around the baseball world will be this play, from the bottom of the 9th.

(Jonathan Broxton pitching) John Buck reached on fielder’s choice to right (Fly). David Ortiz out at second.

In case you didn’t see it, you can watch it here. Ortiz was waiting to see if Buck’s short fly ball would drop. It did, and Byrd managed to field the ball on a hop and fire to second in time for the force out. A player with any sort of speed would have easily been safe, but Ortiz was out by a slim margin.

Instead of two runners on base and one out, the AL was in the undesirable situation of two men out with a two run deficit against possibly the best pitcher in baseball. Let’s examine the impact that this play had on the All-Star Game.

According to Table 8 of The Book, with an average pitcher on the mound, the home team will score 2 runs and tie the game 11.1% of the time with runners on 1st and 2nd and one out. They will score 3+ and win 16% of the time, for a total win expectancy of 16% + 5.5% (they will win half the time in extra innings), which comes out to 21.5%. With a runner on first and two out, this number falls to 4.9% (5% tie, 2.4% chance win in 9 innings),which means that the difference in Ortiz making it safely to second and making the first out at second is 16.6% of a win – quite significant.

The numbers here differ slightly from what you’ll see in the Game Graph as The Book is based on the 1999-2002 run environment, but since it”s a difference of only about .4% of a win, it doesn’t make much difference

It’s key to note that this is if the AL All-Stars were facing an average pitcher, which they were not: CHONE projects Broxton for a 2.69 ERA, or 2.92 RA per 9 innings. (ZiPS projects a much lower FIP, but, for the purposes of the exercise, this works better. You can mentally adjust the numbers down if you want.) The Book also presents a run expectancy table for a team which would allow 3.2 runs per game, which is reasonably close to what Broxton and the NL All-Stars would probably allow, although a little high.

With runners on first and second and one out, the AL would be expected to win 16.3% (10.6% extras, 11.0% win) of the time, about 5.2% less than with the average pitcher on the mound. With a runner on first and two outs, that number falls to only 2.9% (3.4% extras, 1.2% win), or 13.4% worse than if Ortiz reaches second safely.

Broxton’s presence on the mound actually makes the impact of the play, purely in terms of the WE difference, lower than with an average pitcher, as it’s more likely that an out is made with Broxton on the hill. With an average pitcher, however, the AL would still be left with about a 1 in 20 chance of winning the game. Against Broxton, that falls to only 1 in 34.5.

Obviously, the biggest play in last night’s game was Brian McCann’s three RBI double, but this play will certainly be remembered as well. Against Broxton, a gaffe of the sort made by David Ortiz on the basepaths will almost certainly doom your team. Of course, Marlon Byrd deserves heaps of praise for coming up strong with the baseball and firing a near-perfect throw to second base, and there will certainly be much made of the decision by Joe Girardi to leave Alex Rodriguez on his bench as Ortiz plodded on the basepaths. But even somebody with Ortiz’s speed should have been able to reach second in that situation; with a proper read, we may not even be having this discussion.