John Lackey certainly hasn’t been the pitcher that the Red Sox hoped they would be getting when they signed him for over $80 million this past winter. As an Angel, Lackey had consistently run xFIPs right near the 4.00 mark with stable rates in strikeouts, walks and ground balls. 2010 John Lackey however has fewer strikeouts and a lot more walks raising his xFIP to 4.63 coming into play today. That is the highest mark of Lackey’s career and does not portend well for the next four seasons to Boston.

Lackey’s pitch types and frequencies have not changed much if at all and signing with Boston did not mean a change in leagues. While the AL East might appear to pose stiffer competition than the AL West did, when discussing an individual pitcher, the sample sizes vary too much to be generalized. Lackey’s average hitter faced his season had a .737 OPS while it was .755 and .766 the previous two seasons with Anaheim. Even adjusting for the overall decline in offense this season, Lackey has faced weaker hitters in 2010 than in either 2009 or 2008 and yet his performance has declined noticeably.

Lackey’s struggles can be parsed further by examining his splits. His performance against right-handed hitters remains close to his established levels while he has struggled mightily against southpaws this season. Lackey’s strikeout to walk rate versus righties was 3.0 in 2008, was 2.9 last year and is at 2.9 this season. Versus a lefty it has slipped from 3.6 in 2008 and 3.1 in 2009 all the way to 1.3 in 2010. John Lackey isn’t facing significantly more lefties this season than he did in the past, but perhaps he should be given his collapse against them this year.

As always with splits, it’s a small sample and more time will be needed before being able to see if this is a mere blip or if this is something that will severely hamper his ability going forward. Not being able to retire other handed hitters will lead to teams more dramatically stacking their lineups and also makes the chances for a return of the 4.00 xFIP version of Lackey much less likely.

In the fifth inning of yesterday’s game between the Seattle Mariners and the New York Yankees, the Mariners decided to intentionally walk Mark Teixeira with runners on second and third and one out in a 1-0 game. With Alex Rodriguez out of the lineup, that brought up Robinson Cano with the bases loaded. Cano hit a grand slam, putting the Yankees up 5-0. At that point, the Yankees win expectancy was over 95%, and a formerly close game was effectively over.

The Yankees scoring after an intentional walk of Teixeira isn’t exactly something new. Yesterday marked Teixeira’s fourth intentional walk. Three times, including yesterday, the result was a grand slam. The other resulted in a run-scoring wild pitch, a strikeout, and then a two-RBI single. Overall, Teixeira and both runners in front of him have scored every single time that he’s been intentionally walked.

Obviously, we wouldn’t expect this to continue to happen every single time, but that doesn’t make the intentional walk a good strategy in this case. Here’s what The Book has to say:

If all batters have equal ability, intentionally walking a batter to set up a double play, force, or other situation is at best a break-even move (or insignficantly better than a break-even move). Doing so early in the game is counterproductive, since it increases the odds of a big inning more than it increases the odds of a scoreless inning.

Now, all batters in the Yankees lineup aren’t of equal ability, but when we look at those after Teixeira, they are all very good. Alex Rodriguez and Robinson Cano are typically the two hitting after Teixeira, making them the important two to examine when it comes to analyzing the value of the intentional walk. The third batter also matters, but far less; this season it has been a mix of players such as Jorge Posada, Marcus Thames, Nick Swisher, and Randy Winn. Overall, though, what matters is that the hitters that come to bat after Mark Teixeira are well above average, particularly Rodriguez and Cano.

Using the Markov chain calculator at Tom Tango’s website, we can take a look at the run expectancy for the composite line of Alex Rodriguez and Robinson Cano, which is essentially what managers are looking at after walking Mark Teixeira. The results, unsurprisingly, suggest that the Yankees are probably going to score a lot of runs after walking Teixeira, even in the situation with one out and runners and second and third, the situation most conducive to a productive intentional walk. Here’s what the calculator spits out.

Runners on 2nd, 3rd, 1 out: 1.578 runs
Bases loaded, 1 out: 1.986 runs

So opposing managers are essentially forfeiting .4 runs for the opportunity to say “Well, I didn’t let Mark Teixeira beat me!” at the post game press conference. The odds of scoring at least 1 run in an inning don’t justify the managers’ decisions either.

Runners on 2nd, 3rd, 1 out: .707
Bases loaded, 1 out: .752

Intentionally walking Mark Teixeira is simply not a smart move. The Yankees lineup behind Teixeira, particularly Cano and Rodriguez, is simply too good, which just magnifies the fact that the intentional walk adds to the possibility of a big inning. Four times, opposing managers have attempted to get out from a jam by walking Teixeira. Four times, at least three runs have scored. If a manager wants to win, his best option is to pitch to Teixeira and hope for the best.

A few months ago, I wrote about my experience watching MLB.tv on the PS3, and there seemed to be a pretty decent amount of interest in the subject. Today, I’m going to review a piece of technology that is not quite as baseball specific, but that we here at FanGraphs use everyday, and is probably something that anyone involved in cooperative writing projects should probably be aware of: Yammer.

What is Yammer? Their tagline refers to themselves as “the private social network for your business,” which is a pretty decent – if still vague and buzzworded – description of what the product does. I’d describe it more as a hybrid version of Facebook and Twitter to help assist in collaboration with your coworkers.

At its heart it’s a user interface that will be familiar to pretty much anyone who uses the internet nowadays. It is centered around a feed of messages from users you are connected to, which essentially acts as a place to share quick bits of information with numerous people without sending out an email. Earlier this year, we basically replaced our internal author mailing list with Yammer, and now use it to claim topics and discuss ideas for the site.

For this purpose, it’s great. No one really liked having their inbox bombarded with messages from R.J. telling us which Rays bench player he was going to write about, so now he just puts that update into Yammer, and we can all find out without that message clogging up our email. This single function has made the move entirely worthwhile, and it’s been a large asset in helping spur communication between our writers. That isn’t the only functionality they offer, however. It also offers the ability to upload files to be shared within the group, create profile pages for individual users with contact information (clearing up your bulky address book), build an organizational chart, and send private messages to specific users, though for various reasons, we don’t really make full use of many of those additional features.

Yammer offers access in three ways – through web login, a desktop application, and mobile apps. I have all three, but generally have found that I stick mostly to the web login. The desktop app is okay, but I hate having cluttered applications overrunning my screen, and I’ve found that it’s just too much for me to have both it and TweetDeck notifying me of new messages every few minutes. The mobile app has potential, but also has a lot of problems. It’s great to be able to access the feed from my phone, and push notifications are less intrusive than on the desktop application, but the software is simply riddled with bugs.

Trying to send a message through the Yammer iPhone app is hit or miss, with more misses than hits, honestly. It crashes more than any other app I have ever used, and repeatedly crashes when trying to submit a new message to the stream. This is obviously frustrating, and Yammer has released numerous updates to fix the issues, though they keep creating new problems with each update. The most recent update has significantly reduced crashing, but now also makes it so that reading the new messages in your feed does not eliminate the app’s suggestion that you have new messages. I see that there are two new messages to read, fire up the app, read them, and close it out, and yet, I still have two new messages.

I’d say this is a simple fix that I’m sure they’ll resolve soon, but having updated the app so many times, I’m now just wondering what else they’ll break in the process of fixing that issue. I’d love to use the iPhone app more often, but right now, it’s just not reliable enough, so I mostly stick to the web portal. The mobile app isn’t useless, as I still use it to read what others are talking about, but for updating my own status, I rarely attempt that anymore.

If you’re part of a company that is using an internal mailing list and you get annoyed at how many messages you find taking up your email, Yammer could be a great solution for that issue. It is great at accomplishing that one task. It is less great at everything else, and it probably won’t change your life, but it might make it somewhat easier to communicate with coworkers. For that reason, I give it a thumbs up. If they want the second thumb, they need to permanently fix their iPhone app.

One of Friedrich Nietzsche’s many frequently quoted lines comes from a posthumously published notebook: “Nihilism stands at the door: whence comes this uncanniest of all guests?” Whatever one makes of this in relation to Nietzsche’s thoughts on modernity, etc., the occasional gloss on the translation of “uncanniest” as “most unwelcome” brings to mind nothing more (for me, at least) than the Giants acquisition of Cody Ross from the Marlins via waivers, an acquisition which might understandably lead some to begin speculating that former Nationals and Reds GM and legendary outfielderophile Jim Bowden is working as a consultant for San Francisco GM Brian Sabean.

It has been speculated that the Giants put a claim in on Ross to prevent divisional rival San Diego from filling their own need at center field in the wake of Tony Gwynn, Jr.‘s injury. However, as Rob Neyer rightly points out, the Giants are far enough behind the Padres at this point in the season that they should be less focused on the division than on the wildcard. Moreover, with Andres Torres taking the bulk of Aaron Rowand’s playing time in center field away, Pat Burrell filling the Mark DeRosa-sized hole in left field, and Jose Guillen coming over from the Royals in a waiver trade, the Giants seem to have really put themselves in a playing-time bind. This is particularly so because other than Torres (the only clearly good player of the bunch), all of the above-mentioned outfielders hit right-handed, which makes getting some sort of platoon system out of all these players problematic.

It isn’t clear at the moment exactly how the Giants intend to deal with the playing time situation. Still, although the move is initially puzzling, it is defensible. In purely monetary terms, Ross will cost them about a million dollars over the remainder of the season, but that isn’t too much given that the Giants are still in the running for the playoffs and the marginal value of a win is higher than usual for them.

While Andres Torres has shown that he should be getting all the starts he can handle in center (I’ll leave aside the disastrous Aaron Rowand situation for the sake of space), there’s plenty of room for Ross to play on the corners. They are currently manned by Pat Burrell and Jose Guillen, two players DFAed by the Rays and Royals, respectively, earlier this season. Burrell has hit well (.380 wOBA) in his 220 PA with the Giants, but FanGraphs readers should know by now that simply looking at a player’s current-season statistics isn’t a wise way to project future performance. ZiPS Rest-of-Season projection sees Burrell as a .350 wOBA hitter for the rest of 2010. Jose Guillen started the season with a bit of a bounceback in Kansas City, but to the surprise of almost no one, receded into mediocrity, and is projected for a .327 wOBA by ZiPS for the remainder of 2010. Ross, on the other hand, despite having a down (.319 wOBA) year in 2010, is younger and coming off of two decent seasons in 2008 and 2009, and ZiPS sees him as a .340 wOBA hitter going forward.

Even if one doesn’t think Ross offers much offensively, few would doubt that Ross might get to a few more balls in the outfield than the other two. Burrell and Guillen were primarily DHs in their recent time it the AL, while Ross spent more time in center than right, which should tell us something about what their respective teams thought of their defensive abilities. The statistics support this, and my projections have Ross as about 15 runs better in the field over either Burrell or Guillen over a full season, which at least makes up the offensive difference between Ross and Burrell, and making Ross the clear choice over Guillen.

One remaining factor in all this is that Ross is still eligible for arbitration for 2011 if the Giants want to keep him around. Whether or not he would be worth his likely arbitration number is open to question (even with the thin 2011 class of free agent outfielders), of course, but it’s worth noting. In any case, despite the Giants; uncanny scouring of the waiver wire for outfielders, it seems that the acquisition of Ross gives them more than nothing.

Everyone knows that Cliff Lee is having an extraordinary season. Through 174 innings he has just 11 unintentional base on balls. That works out to 0.57 BB per nine innings. Even with regression it is very likely that Lee will average fewer than one walk per nine on the season. The last time a pitcher did that was Carlos Silva in 2005. That year Silva struck out 3.39 per nine; this year Lee is striking out 7.78 per nine.

Matthew pointed out that Lee’s season is even more amazing when you consider his tiny rate on other free passes (just two IBBs and one HBP). Matthew also showed how this lack of free passes allows Lee to get deeper into games than anyone since 1994 Greg Maddux.

I wanted to take a more micro-scale look and see what this amazing control looks like on a per-pitch basis. Not surprisingly, Lee leads the league in Zone% (BIS’s zone) with 58.7%. Ted Lilly is next at 54.5% and after that no other pitcher is above 53%; Lee is a major outlier, as expected.

Next I was interested in where all these extra pitches in the zone were ending up, and where those out of the zone didn’t end up. So I broke pitch locations (as the ball crosses the front edge of the plate) into a number of bins and color coded each bin based on the proportion of Lee’s fastballs in that bin compared to the proportion of all LHPs’ fastballs in that bin. Bins where Lee had a higher proportion of fastballs are red, and bins where all LHPs had a higher proportion are blue. The intensity of the color shows the size of the difference.

The pattern is not surprising. The bins in the zone are red (Lee throws the ball there more often) and those out of the zone are blue (Lee throws the ball less often). But I think how strength and consistency of that pattern is surprising. There are just a handful of red bins out of the zone and they are very pale. Within the zone Lee tends to locate on the outer proportion of the zone, a good place to be.

It is not like we needed any further evidence that Lee has amazing command, but it is interesting to see what Lee’s command looks like on a per-pitch basis.

We are now more than 10 years past the height of the shortstop renaissance. In 1999, it seemed like shortstops ruled the American League. Two of them, Nomar Garciaparra and Derek Jeter, finished among the top 5 in the AL in wOBA, with .436 and .428 marks. Alex Rodriguez was right behind at .397, and even Omar Vizquel broke out the hitting shoes that year and produced a .379 wOBA. Royce Clayton was the fifth best-hitting AL shortstop that year with a .344 wOBA.

In 2000, we saw the trend continue. A-Rod produced a .433 wOBA and Garciaparra trailed him by a single point. Jeter remained near the top, at .399. That year six AL shortstops finished with a .340 wOBA or better, including Jose Valentin, Miguel Tejada, and again Vizquel. But in 2001 that changed a bit. While five AL shortstops finished with a .340 or better wOBA, only one, A-Rod, finished above .400. Jeter was the next closest at .379. The same held true in 2002 and 2003, with only A-Rod topping .400. But after he moved to third in 2004, no AL shortstop reached a .400 wOBA (though Jeter and Carlos Guillen both came close, each at .399 at one point.)

Even without the top-heaviness, AL shortstops remained a productive bunch. In most years they have five or six with wOBAs above .340. In 2007 that was the case, as five hit the .340 mark. The difference was that the leader, Jeter, produced a .369 wOBA, far down from the top end of years past. In 2008, AL shortstop was even further down. In 2009, it recovered a bit, mainly because of superb season from Jeter and Jason Bartlett, but in 2010 it is down again. It is, in fact, lower than it has been in more than two decades.

Here’s a chart showing the flow of wOBA for AL shortstops from 2005 through 2010:

You can see the top end tumble precipitously from 2006 through 2008, with a quick spike in 2009 and then back to the normal decline. Chances are we’re not going to see a significant uptick any time soon. The guys who topped this list either don’t play the position any more (Michael Young, Guillen, Jhonny Peralta), are aging (Jeter), or both (Tejada). Since there doesn’t seem to be any upcoming AL shortstops with big-time power potential, and since teams have placed an emphasis on defense, chances are we’ve seen the era of the shortstop come to a close, though maybe it’s more like a temporary halt.

Thankfully, shortstops need not hit like right fielders to provide value to their teams. Defense plays a big part in evaluating a shortstop. The quirk in this is that while AL shortstops are producing at a lower offensive level, they also seem to be producing a bit less in terms of UZR defense. That is the topic for another article, though.

If you go to the leaderboard, click on the advanced tab and set minimum plate appearances to 150, you’ll see something rather shocking, especially if you haven’t been paying attention to the Royals this year.

Justin Morneau, .447 wOBA
Miguel Cabrera, .446 wOBA
Josh Hamilton, .445 wOBA
Joey Votto, .435 wOBA
Wilson Betemit, .431 wOBA

Four guys who have played like MVPs this season… and a cast-off minor league free agent who only got called up from Triple-A at the end of May. Which of these is not like the other?

Betemit has been a monster for the Royals since joining the team, hitting .346/.425/.577 in 179 plate appearances. Small sample or not, it’s an impressive batting line. He’s walking and hitting for power, and as a former top prospect, it’s not unthinkable that he’s finally figuring out how to translate his tools into major league skills.

But his overall batting line is also inflated by a fluky .426 batting average on balls in play, which won’t last. Not that anyone thought Betemit was a true talent .346 hitter anyway. The secondary skills are nice, but he strikes out too much to hit for a high average, which is why ZiPS projects him as a .270/.333/.429 guy going forward.

The updated numbers makes him a roughly average hitter, maybe a tick better, which sounds about right for a guy with his skillset. He won’t keep hitting like this, but he’s still a useful player, even with his cover-your-eyes defense around the infield.

To me, however, the most interesting thing about the Betemit story is his potential arbitration case this winter. He’s been around so much that he had accumulated 4 years and 147 days of service before the season, so his time on the Royals roster this year will push him over the five year mark, meaning he’ll be arbitration eligible for the last time. And, given his performance, he’ll want a pretty decent raise.

Since he signed a minor league contract with the Royals during the off-season, Betemit is making the league minimum this year and the most money he’s ever made was the $1.3 million that the White Sox paid him last year. Even with his offensive performance, the fact that he’s only played a part-time role will limit who his agents can point to as comparable players, and he’s unlikely to file for more than $3 million.

The scnario puts the Royals in an interesting situation. He’s been a revelation for them this year, but even they know he won’t keep hitting like this. Further he’s still a brutal defender. The Royals also realize they have Mike Moustakas down in Triple-A. Moustakas is not quite big league ready, but there are reasons to think he could take the third base job next year.

For their situation, paying him a few million dollars in 2010 could easily just be a waste of cash. But non-tendering a guy who is coming off a year like Betemit’s seems untenable. They could try and trade him, but given his previous travels and likely raise, it’s unclear how many teams would actually want to give up anything for him.

It is feasible that Betemit could actually be playing himself out of a job. If he finishes the year with offensive numbers that resemble his current line, he might be too expensive for KC, and yet, his defensive problems and general lack of performance before this year could keep his trade value at a minimum.

It might just be in everyone’s best interests if he finishes the year in a slump. Take some of the shine off of his numbers and he’ll only be able to ask for a modest raise in arbitration, allowing it to make sense for KC to keep him around. Otherwise, they may have to consider non-tendering a guy coming off a career year.

Just three tiny hours ago, I submitted for the readership’s consideration a bigger, badder version of the NERD metric that I originally introduced back in June. Having come to something like a consensus on NERD for pitchers, it was clear that the American people were ready for more. They were ready — dumdumdum — for team NERD.

At the risk of overstimulating the home audience, who are likely still reeling from this morning’s announcement, I’d like now to discuss what these new advances in NERD technology — what they do for the One Night Only game previews I’ve taken to posting in these electronic pages.

Really, the differences won’t be huge-huge. It’s my solemn vow always to write (or, at least, try to write) in a prose style equal parts G.K. Chesterton and Mickey Avalon.

But there will be one difference, and it’s kinda awesome. Regard:

pNERD = Pitcher NERD
tNERD = Team NERD
Game = Time and Average NERD for Game
* = Estimated NERD

What you see there is all of today’s games, graded via NERD scores. Under the column labeled pNERD, you got your pitchers’ NERDs; under tNERD, you got your teams’ NERDs; and under Game, you got both the time of the game (Eastern) and the average of both pitchers’ and teams’ NERD scores. That last number, if everything is working correctly, should give you a sense of how appealing the game in question ought to be.

I intend to provide such a list in these pages everyday, Monday through Thursday, and then a weekend edition on Fridays. (I also might not do that, on account of how Sloth’s strong strength.)

In any case, were I you, I’d probably watch that Yankers-Blue Jays game tonight. Morrow is awesome for a bunch of reasons that are probably obvious; the Toronto offense hits a lot of home runs; and Ivan Nova will be making his first career major league start.

Barring that game, there’s the Twins-Ranger game. Derek Holland (NERD: 5) was originally slated to start for Minnesota, but now it’s Rich Harden. Will he throw even one strike? Tune in to find out!

Although it won’t impact the 2010 playoff race, the retirement of Cubs manager Lou Piniella certainly qualifies as high profile news. Piniella’s 23 years as manager makes him one of only 21 managers in MLB history to manage for at least 20 years, and ties him for the 13th most years as manager with a pair of Hall of Famers in Walter Alston and Harry Wright. The only eligible manager with more time than Piniella to miss the Hall of Fame is Gene Mauch, who is also the only one without a pennant or World Series title.

Piniella won his one and only World Series championship in 1990 with the Cincinnati Reds, his first year with the team after a playoff-free three year stint with the New York Yankees. Those Reds were led primarily by Mariano Duncan, Chris Sabo, Barry Larkin, and Eric Davis at the plate, along with a solid rookie performance from Hal Morris. The pitching staff was led by a fantastic season by Jose Rijo (3.14 FIP, 148 ERA+) and solid bullpen performances from Randy Myers, Norm Charlton, and Rob Dibble. The Reds opened the season with a nine game winning streak and never looked back, winning the NL West by five games, and then steamrolled through the Pirates in the NLCS and then the Athletics in the World Series.

The next two seasons saw a World Series champion finish under .500 and then a second place finish, and Piniella was out of Cincinnati on to his longest and most famous managing job in Seattle. Despite the fact that Piniella’s Mariners boasted such talents as Randy Johnson, Ken Griffey Jr., Edgar Martinez, Alex Rodriguez, and Ichiro Suzuki, they never reached a World Series. In Piniella’s 10 seasons in Seattle, the Mariners reached the playoffs four times, including three division championships and two division series victories. Piniella also was at the helm for the Mariners 116 win season in 2001, a remarkable feat despite the first round exit that season.

The next stop of Piniella’s career is mostly the butt of jokes, as Sweet Lou moved to the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, managing in his hometown. As the pre-Andrew Friedman era went in Tampa, the Devil Rays under Piniella were terrible teams. In three years of managing, Piniella’s Devil Rays finished in 5th twice and in 4th once, compiling an overall 200-285 record and at least 90 losses in each season.

Piniella’s final position in Chicago began well enough, with two division titles. But the Cubs were swept in the first round each time, only increasing the disappointment of a fanbase entering its second century without a world championship. As the core players in Chicago have aged and albatross contracts have prevented the infusion of new, impact free agent talent into the team, the situation in Chicago deteriorated to the point at which it is today – the Cubs are on pace to lose 96 times in 2010.

No doubt, this is a disappointing end for Piniella, who is known as much for the accomplishments of his teams as he is for his antics on the field. Between his seven playoff appearances, .517 winning percentage, World Championship ring, and most importantly, the longevity and visibility of his career, I have little doubt that Piniella will take a place in Cooperstown. Piniella was a fantastic personality, and the game of baseball will certainly miss Sweet Lou.

This is a post introducing and explaining NERD scores for teams. I’m including the results first and then the background, methodology — all that junk — second.

Curious as to what NERD is? The short answer is: it’s a number, on a 0-10 scale, designed to express the “watchability” of teams for those of the sabermetric persuasion.

For more information, consult the index right after the results.

The Results
Here are the results for team NERD:

Read the rest of this entry »