I was originally going to write a counterweight to all the recent media speculation about a Yu Darvish posting, but the point was rendered moot on Tuesday by the man himself. In an announcement on his blog (translated here), Darvish said that he “will be wearing a Hokkaido Nippon Ham Fighers uniform” next year. Darvish hasn’t signed a contract for 2011, so the case isn’t totally closed, but his latest comments are consistent with what he’s been saying for years. He has consistently disavowed any interest in playing in MLB, though this season he was less adamant about it, and admitted some contact with agents like Scott Boras and Arn Tellem.

Darvish’s announcement is certainly good news for Nippon Ham. He’s key to their ability to compete, but beyond that, the current economic climate is problematic for Japanese exports to the United States. When Daisuke Matsuzaka was posted in 2006, the exchange rate was about 118 yen per dollar. Over the last week it has been hovering at about 81.4 Yen per dollar. So when Seibu posted Matsuzaka, their $51.1m fee translated to about 6bn Yen. If they had done it today and gotten the same fee from the Red Sox, it would have come out to about 4.18 bn Yen.

Moving back to the baseball field, 2010 saw Darvish post his fourth consecutive sub-2.00 ERA, at 1.78. Darvish’s ERA is FIP-endorsed, as he weighed in at a healthy 1.92 on that scale. In 202 innings pitched, Darvish set career bests with 222 strikeouts and five home runs allowed. His WHIP did inch across the 1.00 line for the first time since 2006 at 1.01, but he still lead his league in the category. Sub-par run support limited his win total to 12, a figure that will hurt his chances of taking a second Sawamura Award, but overall he was again Japan’s most dominant pitcher.

The historical greatness of Darvish’s performance often takes a backseat to the MLB rumors, so it’s worth underscoring here. Darvish is only the third pitcher in NPB’s modern era (since 1950) to post a sub-2.00 ERA in four consecutive seasons. The previous two are NPB Hall of Famers Masaichi Kaneda (1955-58) and Kazuhisa Inao (1956-59), who played their primes in a real pitcher’s era. Darvish is on a trajectory to rival the seven straight NPB batting titles Ichiro won from 1994-2000.

But the other side of the coin is that Darvish doesn’t have a lot left to prove in NPB. I think we will see him in the Majors at some point, but it could be a while. Conventional wisdom would suggest that Nippon Ham could post him the offseason before he’s due for free agency, which would be 2014. But who really knows? At this point, the thing that is looking the most certain is that the rumors will continue.

Cody Ross isn’t bald, he just emits Awesome from his head. – chatter Tony
Cody Ross is the answer to every question. – chatter TexasRanger

Ah, but this is the Philly review, so that will be enough of the Ross love here. Which is good, because we don’t have to cover the Great Bruce Bochy Lineup Disaster either, especially since it turned out okay for the Giants. Instead, we’ll reach back into the chat to find a couple quotes that offered real-time feedback on Ted Barrett’s strike zone:

Aren’t you noticing a completely different strike zone being called for both pitchers in this game. Matt Cain is getting inside, outside, and low. Have not seen those same pitches call for Cole Hamels – chatter T Barrett
Maybe the complaints are based on when Cole get squeezed rather than quantity. The non-strike 3 to Sanchez was a big call (like Halladay’s against Burrell in game 1). – chatter Andy

So we turn to the pictures – from Brooks Baseball – to try and get the full story:

At first glance, there’s reason to doubt Barret’s zone. There are five clear strikes on the outside the zone for the Giants, and only two that are as far outside the zone for the Phillies. If we count all of the “wrong” calls inside and out, we get eight called strikes that weren’t strikes and four strikes that were not called strikes for the Giants. Then there’s four called strikes that weren’t strikes and five strikes that weren’t called for the Phillies. It’s the sort of thing that seems both real and yet somehow not completely significant. But a lot of this is in the eye of the beholder, as these chat responses to the posted strike zone show:

looks pretty even to me – chatter Evan
Whole camels could fit inside Cain’s sz – chatter bowie
mostly shows me that cain did a better job of hitting that left side of the zone. he peppered a lot of pitches very close to the line – chatter Giants

Ah-hah. The truth is in the eye of the beholder often, but let’s try to say something true about this game: “Though the strike zone may have favored the Giants in a slight way and put pressure on Cole Hamels in key moments, the game was won by timely hitting by the Giants and the failure of the Phillies’ batters to come through in similarly tough situations.” You can quote me on that.

Let’s end this with a look at the highest leverage moments in the game, and the results of the at-bat.

Ted Lilly made a nice impression in his 12 starts for the Dodgers: Seventy-six innings, a 3.98 FIP, and a 3.52 earned run average, which are nice enough numbers that the Dodgers have re-signed the southpaw to a three-year deal worth $33 million. The deal serves as a nice follow-up to Lilly’s last free agent contract, which held a worth of $10 million annually. A value deal this is not.

Over the last three seasons, Lilly has posted Wins Above Replacement totals of 2.8, 3.8, and 2.3. Taking an average is not the best method for projection purposes. But if Lilly is a three-win pitcher then that gives him a market value of something around$12 million. Given Lilly’s age and decreased velocity – he averaged nearly 90 miles per hour on his fastball the last time he inked a contract, he’s down to 87 miles per hour now – it’s not unreasonable to say he could be in for some decline.

Let’s say he starts at three wins (and keep in mind, this does not account for any regression towards the mean) and declines at a straight-line rate of 0.3 wins per season. That’s not too aggressive, mind you, and gives us the picture of a best-case scenario. That gives us totals of 3, 2.7, and 2.4. Optimistically let’s say the market begins to perk up over these seasons, with win totals costing $4 million for next year, then increasing by 10% annually, which paints the following picture:

The margin for error is thin. What this analysis has yet to account for is the Dodgers’ placement on the win curve and the opportunity cost incurred by re-signing Lilly. The Dodgers finished fourth in the division, but the National League West seems perpetually open, meaning contention is not out of the question. Lilly is one of the better starting pitchers on the open market and the Dodgers needed to secure either Hiroki Kuroda or him, lest they head into the free agency period needing two starters with a budget saddled by divorce papers.

This deal is completely reasonable in the minds of those who think Lilly can continue to replicate his results year in and year out, but the inherent injury and attrition rate held by starting pitchers makes it a risky proposition. Once the ownership issues vanish, the salary becomes irrelevant – $11 instead of $9 is not going to get anyone fired. The length, though, is the most questionable aspect and will continue to be so.

The fourth game of the ALCS was, as we might have predicted, the least watchable game of this series. A.J. Burnett was better than Tommy Hunter early, but both pitchers were getting hit hard by the end of their outings, and it didn’t make for captivating television. While the Texas offense is its own story, I believe the only real compelling storyline was the performance of the game’s winning pitcher, Derek Holland. After entering the game in an impossible position — to quote Joe Sheehan’s Twitter account, “100 minutes late, the Rangers get their fourth-best starter into the game” — Holland continued to state his case for the Rangers rotation next season.

Last year, after a season where his xFIP was better than his FIP which was better than his ERA, Holland entered the 2010 season as a popular breakout pick. But Ron Washington wasn’t as forgivable of Holland’s 2009 HR/FB ratio as the sabermetric crowd, and the lefty entered Spring Training in a competition for a rotation spot. After a knee injury shortened his camp, Holland had little chance at winning the job, earning a ticket to Triple-A, where he’d made just one start in his career. The reason is the Rangers player development staff decided his talents were advanced enough to render the league unnecessary, and given the six starts that led to his big league call-up in May, they were right: 0.93 ERA, 38.2 IP, 7 BB, 1 HR, 37 K.

Lest I waste too much space on a review of his season, we’ll hit the highlights: a great season debut against Oakland; a shoulder injury on May 30; a knee injury during his rehab; a mediocre return to Triple-A; a spot in the big league rotation on September 3; and prep for his forthcoming playoff middle relief role near the end of the season. Considering the bugaboo during his 2009 campaign was the longball, it’s worth pointing out that Holland didn’t give up a long ball in 11 of his 14 appearances this season, but he gave up two in each of the other three. In September, Holland showed the best groundball abilities of any month in his career: 1.46 GB/FB, 47.7 GB%, 0.0 HR/FB%.

I point this out because against the New York Yankees prolific offense, Holland did a nice job of mixing in the two end results you want to see from your pitcher: strikeouts and groundballs. He had three and seven, respectively, facing 13 batters during his middle innings stint. Holland had good command in the outing; I expect his 3.77 BB/9 from 2010 will regress closer to the 2009 number (3.06) going forward. He was generally using a strategy you don’t see often from young pitchers: living on the inside corner to right-handed hitters, and the outside corner to left-handed hitters. By consistently pounding the inside half of the strike zone, he induced a couple ground balls by finally giving in and spotting a good low-and-outside fastball late in at-bats.

The now 24-year-old lefty threw 55 pitches in all, going fastball on 71% of his pitches. Holland, who has averaged 92.4 miles per hour with his fastball during his big league career, averaged 93.81 vs. the Yankees, touching 95 mph on numerous occasions (data courtesy of Brooks Baseball). His fastball has more movement this year, and when added to the increased velocity of pitching in relief, you saw how dangerous the pitch can be. But his weapon is the slider, as Robinson Cano can attest after three straight strikes against it to lead off the bottom of the sixth. Holland was unafraid to use the pitch against right-handed hitters, but it’s no surprise to me that he’s shown a marked and traditional platoon split in his short big league career: 3.49 FIP vs. LHH, 5.16 FIP vs. RHH.

We saw only one of his third offering, the change up, and it didn’t go well: he left it middle-middle to Derek Jeter, who started off the fifth inning with a line drive double. What remains to be seen is if the pitch can be the third dependable pitch he’ll need for rotation success (barring the addition of a cutter). In his five September starts, Holland went with the change 13.6% of the time, according to the Texas Leaguers Pitch F/X database. The pitch had the highest strike, swing, and whiff rates of any pitch during that time, but I’d also argue it had the worst command. If you see the Pitch Locations by Type graph, you’ll notice how often he leaves it middle-middle. I found just 14 instances, in 58 total pitches, where Holland threw the change-up where you’re generally supposed to: low and away to a right-hander.

Between the likelihood that Cliff Lee leaves Texas for richer pastures this winter, and the hopefully-growing realization that Tommy Hunter is not the team’s fourth-best starting option, it’s hard to imagine Derek Holland loses a chance at starting again next spring. Assuming that’s true, it is advised the left-hander spends the winter working on the command of his change-up, and to continue the work done at becoming a groundball pitcher. Given a couple looks at him this October, I think we can expect the walk rate to come down next season, the groundball rate to be somewhere between his September rate and his career 41.7 mark, and continued great performances against left-handed hitters. The key for Holland is how his approach against right-handed hitters will mature — whether he can hit the inside corner with his fastball consistently (like he did last night against the Yankees), and whether he can depend on his change (like he did not).

Melky Cabrera debuted in 2005 with a cherub face and as a dosage of imagination. At the time, the 20-year-old represented a better alternative to Tony Womack (although, with an on-base percentage of .276 and slugging percentage of .280, who didn’t?) and while Cabrera failed to capitalize in his six-game stint his return to the majors was all but ensured. Players who reach the majors at such youth usually reserve special futures. The aggressive manner with which the Yankees promoted him suggested they believed he could adjust quickly too.

Sure enough, the Yankees threw him into the everyday lineup starting in 2006 and he hit at a league average rate. All the signs pointed towards Cabrera becoming a regular – and he did – but rumors persisted that he became even more of a regular to the grandiose New York nightlife. Those rumors flare up about players throughout the league and only become worthwhile when the player begins to struggle. Unfortunately for Cabrera, his struggles began in 2007 and lasted until the 2009 season, when he once again hit league average.

The Yankees took advantage of the uptick by flipping him to the Braves in the Javier Vazquez deal over the winter and Cabrera’s slide took another hit today – fewer than 12 months later – as the Braves have officially released him. Poor conditioning reportedly set in this season and Cabrera showed little progress in any aspect of the game. He mostly remained static across the board, but his ISO slipped and his defense became reliant upon his arm strength and little else.

Concerns about Cabrera likely exceed his shoddy performances given Atlanta’s notorious behavior to cut bait on players they feel are not holding up their part of the bargain. He’ll be 26 when the 2011 season opens for play and some team is going to give him a job based on the promise and hope that he flips the switch. If changing teams for the third time in 15 months doesn’t do it, maybe the promise was misplaced to begin with.

Previous Reviews:
MIN/NYY
PHI/CIN

This is the first non-sweep of the division series so far and the only division series to feature repeat starting pitchers.
Best Games
T-4. Colby Lewis, Game 3
5 IP, 0 R, 2 H, 5 BB, 5 K, +.240 WPA

At the risk of offending Carson, it’s hard for me to say that Lewis pitched too well in game 3, mainly because of the five walks and seven total baserunners in only five innings. However, one can’t argue with the run total, and it’s because of the shutout innings in a tight game – 1-0 Rangers at the time of his exit – that Lewis received a +.240 WPA for his efforts.

T-4. C.J. Wilson, Game 2
6.1 IP, 0 R, 2 H, 7 K, 2 BB, +.240 WPA

This was a pretty fantastic start, but it gets overshadowed partly by the fact that the Rangers scored five runs behind Wilson and more by the fact that it followed the ridiculous starts by Cliff Lee, Roy Halladay, and Tim Lincecum. 6.1 scoreless innings with the stuff Wilson showed in this start deserves more credit than it received.

3. Carlos Pena, Game 3
2-3, HR, 2 R, 3 RBI, 2 BB, +.256 WPA

Pena struggled mightily against Cliff Lee in game 1 and didn’t see the field at all in game 2. The first baseman broke out in game three, reaching base four times, including a game tying RBI single off Darren Oliver in the seventh and then a two run homer in the ninth to put the Rays up four and knock the Rangers’ win expectancy all the way down to 2.0%.

2. Cliff Lee, Game 1
7 IP, 5 H, 1 HR, 1 R, 10 K, 0 BB, +.260 WPA

The first start of the postseason now seems pedestrian for Lee. The Rangers’ ace baffled the Rays for seven innings, with the only damage coming on a Ben Zobrist home run. As the Rangers managed to chip away off of David Price, scoring five runs by the time Lee left the game, Lee’s WPA isn’t terribly impressive, but don’t let that take away from this start.

1. Cliff Lee, Game 5
9 IP, 6 H, 1 R, 11 K, 0 BB, +.477 WPA

Take all the greatness of Lee’s first start. Now add two innings, a strikeout, and turn the run from a homer to one that the Rays were forced to manufacture. Finally, throw in that it clinched the Rangers’ first playoff series victory ever in a game that was played within two runs for the first eight innings, and you have easily the biggest performance of this ALDS.

Worst Games
T-5. Nelson Cruz, Game 3
1-4, HR, R, RBI, GIDP, -.142 WPA

Cruz’s home run was utterly meaningless, as it was a solo shot with the Rangers down 6-2 in the ninth inning (+.012 WPA) Far more important were his GIDP in the third inning with a 1-0 lead (-.072 WPA) and his inning ending lineout to SS in the sixth (-.065 WPA).

T-5. Darren Oliver, Game 3
1.1 IP, 3 H, 2 ER, 3 K, -.142 WPA

Oliver’s first inning went easily enough, as he worked around a Ben Zobrist double for a scoreless seventh. However, the Rays tagged the lefty in the eighth, as Dan Johnson roped a double off the wall and then Carlos Pena singled home the pinch runner Desmond Jennings. That allowed the Rays to get back into the game; when Oliver left, the Rays win expectancy was 50.1%.

4. Chad Qualls, Game 2
.1 IP, 4 H, 1 HR, 2 ER -.185 WPA

Qualls was thrust right into the fire in game two, replacing James Shields with two runners on. It appeared that Qualls had induced a swinging strikeout against Michael Young, but the umpires ruled that Young checked his swing. Young then proceeded to blast a three run home run that basically put the Rangers up for good, giving them a five run lead. Qualls couldn’t get anybody out after that either, ending with the four hits allowed in only a third of an inning.

3. Carl Crawford, Game 5
0-4, -.186 WPA

Crawford simply couldn’t produce in his last game as a member of the Tampa Bay Rays. He reached on two fielder’s choices, but each resulted in the force of the lead runner, once at second (-.030 WPA) and once, with two in scoring position in a tie game, at home plate (-.101 WPA).

2. David Price, Game 1
6.2 IP, 9 H, 2 HR, 4 R, 8 K, -.203

Price was dominant at times during his game one start, as evidenced by his eight strikeouts. However, the Rangers bats were able to get to Price for some big blasts, particularly including home runs by Bengie Molina and Nelson Cruz. With Cliff Lee dominating the Rays, the four runs given up by Price were even more costly, as the Rays had a huge hole to dig out of by the time Price left the game.

1. Neftali Feliz, Game 3
.1 IP, 2 H, 1 HR, 1 R, 1 BB

Ron Washington was scolded by many for not going to Netali Feliz in an important but non-save situation in game 1 of the ALCS. He did just that in the eighth inning of game 3, putting in Feliz with two outs and a runner on first in a tie game. Feliz couldn’t get the job done, though, as he walked Jason Bartlett and then allowed the go-ahead single off the bat of fellow rookie John Jaso. Feliz managed to finish the inning without allowing any more runs, but Carl Crawford chased him after opening the Rays’ half of the ninth with a solo home run. Feliz left the Rangers with a mere 8.2% win expectancy.

Best Series
Hitter: Ian Kinsler
8-18, 3 HR, 5 R, 6 RBI, 2 BB, +.451 WPA

Kinsler’s three home runs were key for the Rangers. His game two home run gave the Rangers a two run cushion against James Shields. In game three, Kinsler’s home run gave the Rangers a one run lead in the seventh inning and an inside track in a game that would eventually be blown by Neftali Feliz. In game five, his home run off Rafael Soriano in the ninth inning effectively dashed all hopes for the Rays.

Pitcher: Cliff Lee
16 IP, 11 H, 1 HR, 2 R, 21 K, 0 BB, +.737 WPA

Was there any question? His performances, as described above, were transcendent.

Worst Series
Hitter: Carl Crawford
3-21, HR, R, RBI, SB, 4 K, 0 BB, -.363 WPA

Crawford just was a non-factor in this series outside of his game three home run. It’s not that he was unclutch – he had a pLI under 1.0 in this series – he just couldn’t find a way to get on base. It’s unfortunate that his fantastic Rays’ career had to end this way, and Rays fans shouldn’t allow this series to be a legacy for Crawford.

Pitcher: Neftali Feliz
1.1 IP, 2 H, 1 HR, 1 R, 2 K, 3 BB, -.301 WPA

This was a pretty well pitched series for the most part, but young closer Neftali Feliz received only one high-leverage appearance and was poor in it, posting the worst game by WPA in the entire series, as detailed above.

Notables

Josh Hamilton: -.181 WPA
Nelson Cruz: +.022 WPA
Evan Longoria: -.059 WPA
Matt Garza: +.035 WPA
James Shields: -.045 WPA

Game Graphs

Game 1
Game 2
Game 3
Game 4
Game 5

Let me start by saying that I support the Yankees’ decision to start A.J. Burnett this evening. That was the plan, and the Yankees are sticking to it. The circumstances might seem dire, but the Yankees knew this scenario was a possibility. They also know that no matter how well or poorly Burnett pitches, they’ll play tomorrow and have their ace on the mound. That sounds a bit better than having Burnett pitching a potential elimination game.

Still, I can’t help but examine the other side of the issue. Going down 3-1 and having to face the Rangers’ three best pitchers doesn’t exactly seem like an ideal scenario. CC Sabathia undoubtedly gives the Yankees a better chance to even the series, so there has to be something to the argument that favors him taking the ball on short rest. Let’s examine that case.

This morning Craig Calcaterra laid out the argument for starting Burnett tonight. Within he makes two main points and one side point. The first is that starting Sabathia tonight would only delay the inevitable, since Burnett has to pitch in this series one way or another. The second is that Burnett matches up better against Tommy Hunter than he does against C.J. Wilson. The side point is that pitchers going on short rest generally have poorer numbers than their normally rested counterparts.

To counter:

1) Yes, Burnett will pitch in this series no matter what, but that doesn’t mean that pitching him in Game 4 is the same as pitching him in Game 5. In Game 4 the Yankees will either enter an elimination scenario or they will avoid it. No one wants to enter that elimination scenario, and so I can understand going to the ace in order to keep the team alive for at least two more games. If things go according to plan and Sabathia wins tonight, Burnett could still pitch the Yankees into an elimination game. But being down 3-2 is quite different than being down 3-1. Of course, CC is guaranteed nothing and could lose the game tonight. I’d still rather lose with my best on the mound than with my fourth best.

2) Burnett matches up well against Hunter, apparently, because Hunter is not only the least of the Rangers’ pitchers, but he has fared poorly against the Yankees. Yet we know that Hunter’s regular season performance against the Yankees means exactly zero right now. This is one game, and anything can happen. If we’ve learned anything from the endless previews for each playoff game, it’s that there is no way to get a good idea of what will happen based on past performance.

What we do know is that the Yankees’ offense has been horrible this series. Can we expect them to turn it around against Hunter? Maybe. Again, anything can happen in any given game. If the offense doesn’t show up I’d trust CC to hold down the Rangers far more than I would trust Burnett.

3) Looking at the data from the past five years, yes, pitchers throwing on three days’ rest fare worse than those throwing on four, five, or six-plus days. The problem is that those starts on three days’ rest count for just 1.2 percent of all starts. In addition, a number of those starts on three days’ rest don’t follow other starts. For example, Javier Vazquez has one start on three days’ rest this season; it came after he faced one batter in relief, which certainly calls into question some of the data.

For his part, Sabathia has been superb when pitching on three days’ rest. He has done it during the regular season four times in his career, accumulating 26.2 innings and allowing just seven runs, three earned. That also comes with 26 strikeouts to just six walks. In last year’s postseason he added another two starts and 14.2 innings with three days’ rest. His overall line:

41.1 IP, 28 H, 11 R, 7 ER, 11 BB, 37 K

The walks is the most interesting part. The overall numbers for pitchers going on three days’ rest indicates that control is the biggest problem. On four days’ rest pitchers have walked 7.8 percent of hitters. On three days’ rest they have walked 9.4 percent. I’m not sure how much of that is the noise of a comparatively small sample, but it does appear to be a significant difference. Home run rates do favor four days’ rest pitchers, but not nearly to the degree of walks. Strikeout rates are close. Sabathia’s walk rate on three days’ rest is 6.8 percent, while his rate on four days’ rest (not counting the postseason) is 7.1 percent.

How would the Yankees manage the rotation if they went with Sabathia on three days’ rest? That would push Burnett to Game 5, Phil Hughes to Game 6, and then either Andy Pettitte on normal rest or Sabathia on short rest in Game 7. I’d go with Pettitte, having Sabathia ready in the bullpen. It’s almost exactly the same as the current scenario, except Sabathia would have on extra day of rest for a relief appearance in a potential Game 7.

The overall point of using Sabathia tonight is to give the team the best chance of prolonging the series. No matter the match-up, Sabathia gives the team a better chance to win this evening. That means at least two more games. Since the Yankees are down two games to one, prolonging the series should be their foremost thought.

Again, I’m not sure if I buy this argument myself. I do think Burnett matches up best with Hunter, and I do trust Sabathia in an elimination game against Wilson. The Yankees have said that they’re not starting Sabathia on short rest, so I assume that they have reasons for not doing so. But there is certainly something to the argument for starting Sabathia tonight and Burnett tomorrow. Thankfully, in both scenarios there will be a tomorrow.

Pedro Martinez’s 1999/2000 seasons are probably the best stretch of pitching in baseball history. His numbers are just hilarious when you look back at them – in 1999, he put up a line of 1.56 BB/9, 13.20 K/9, and 0.38 HR/9, good for a 1.39 FIP. Don’t like the fact that he had a high BABIP that year? Then pick 2000, when his ratios fell all the way to 1.33 B/99, 11.78 K/9, and 0.78 HR/9, but his BABIP was .253, which helped push his ERA to just 1.74.

Regardless of which year you prefer, both are historically great. And if you didn’t get to see it happen, you’re seeing it again with Cliff Lee in the playoffs.

0.38 BB/9, 12.75 K/9, and 0.38 HR/9 through three starts, good for a 0.91 FIP. It’s not like he’s getting all that lucky on home runs either – his xFIP is 1.34. This is Pedro-in-his-prime stuff, but he’s doing it against the best teams in the best league in games that are basically do-or-die. If there have been better performances in playoff history, they aren’t that much better, and they probably didn’t come back to back to back. This is a legend in the making.

We will all tell our children about these three starts. If he does this again in Game 7 to win the ALCS for the Rangers, we’ll be wondering where this ranks in the history of sport.

On the biggest possible stage, Cliff Lee is pitching about as well as anyone has ever pitched. He deserves every accolade thrown his way. As Jerry Crasnick said, we are running out of adjectives to describe him.

All we can do is enjoy it. We may never see anything like this again.

The weekend took your faithful Phillie correspondents to places we didn’t expect, and none of those places featured wifi and a comfy moment to kick back and review the first two games of the NLCS. Better late than never. The Phillies and Giants split the weekend, which wasn’t great for the maroon marauders because the series tilted lightly in the Giants’ favor with those results – teams that win one of two games on the road in a seven-game MLB series win the series 56.2% of the time.

Game One was just one of those games, it seems. Seven innings, eight hits, seven strikeouts, no walks and more ground balls than fly balls doesn’t seem like a line that would normally produce four earned runs, but that’s what happened to Roy Halladay Saturday night. The difference between excellent and a -8.8% WPA night for the Doc could have been summed up in two fly balls from Cody Ross that ended up in the seats. This same Cody Ross had exactly average power this year (.145 ISO) and had gone -for-16 against Halladay in his career. The same Cody Ross that was Cody Ross the Marlin until Brian Sabean briefly made him Randy Myers by supposedly claiming him just to block the Padres. Then the Giants then realized that he was better than Jose Guillen, at least in the field, so that he could become the Cody Ross, Giant, that the Bay Area now knows and loves. Either way, you read that fateful name backward as Grant did on the McCovey Chronicles, and you get “ssoR y doC,” which is about all that can be said to Halladay, who pitched well enough to win.

It did seem like the Phillie offense could have put together a five spot – Tim Lincecum wasn’t at his best either. He walked more (three), and gave up equal numbers of fly balls and ground balls, but he also struck out eight – one of which was Ryan Howard with two batters on in a tie game in the third inning (worth 6.6% in WPA alone). Though the two teams had the same amount of baserunners, and the Phillies showed a better slugging percentage as a team, it was the Giants that strung together the hits in the big moments.

The following may seem random – and most likely was – but the big lineup change between games one and two may have had a little bit to do with the different outcomes. As Rob Neyer noted before the game Sunday, Charlie Manuel reversed Placido Polanco and Chase Utley in the batting order so that the heart of the order did not include two straight lefties in Utley and Howard.

It’s a little strange to see Polanco and his lack of power batting third, and it may feel like separating two lefties isn’t that big of a deal, but just look at what the Giants did in the two games for your pudding-based proof. In Game One, Javier Lopez brought his lefty sidearm release to the mound to get Utley to ground out and Howard to strike out before leaving in a double switch that would have made Dusty Baker proud. In Game Two, Bruce Bochy brought Ramon Ramirez out to pitch to the righty Shane Victorino, but after Victorino sacrificed, he was faced with the choice of walking the lefty Utley to keep Ramirez in the game and pitch to Polanco, or burning Lopez on Utley, bringing in Sergio Romo to pitch to Polanco, and then summoning Jeremy Affeldt to get Howard. That is a lot of relievers, but with the off-day coming today, the second move-heavy approach is probably what Bochy should have done. Instead, this is what happened:

Bottom 7th: Philadelphia
– R. Oswalt singled to shallow center
– R. Ramirez relieved J. Sanchez
– S. Victorino sacrificed to third, R. Oswalt to second
– C. Utley intentionally walked
– P. Polanco singled to shallow center, R. Oswalt scored, C. Utley to second
– J. Affeldt relieved R. Ramirez
– C. Utley stole third, P. Polanco stole second
– R. Howard struck out swinging
– J. Werth intentionally walked
– P. Sandoval at third
– S. Casilla relieved J. Affeldt
– J. Rollins doubled to deep center, C. Utley, P. Polanco and J. Werth scored
– R. Ibanez lined out to third

4 runs, 3 hits, 0 errors
San Francisco 1, Philadelphia 6

Don’t underestimate the difference the new lineup made, as it obviously made Bochy’s life difficult in the seventh inning Sunday night (and then he went and made some dubious decisions of his own). Now it’s clear that he’ll have to use both of his lefties to get through the heart of the order late in game three, provided his starter once again gets the job done against the new-look lineup.