Overview

Behind one of the game’s better-looking rosters, the Braves have overcome a 9-14 April by winning nearly 70% of their games since. Turner Field has been a house of horrors for opposing teams, with the Braves winning nearly 80% of their games at home and outscoring their opponents by 51 runs (as opposed to a sub-.500 record on the road and only a +13 run differential). They are currently in first place.

Buy or Sell?

Undoubtedly the Braves’ record makes them candidates to acquire even more talent. They’re pretty much set at catcher with Brian McCann. At first base Troy Glaus has been a fantastic low-risk, high-reward signing (as has Eric Hinske) while Martin Prado is flashing power and on-base abilities along with being a human vuvuzela. The left side of the infield has a collective line of roughly .245/.367/.330, suggesting they can get on base, but can’t hit for power. It seems unlikely they add a new third baseman or shortstop, though.

The outfield definitely needs help. Nate McLouth is out after an outfield collision and Melky Cabrera is usually out when batting. Hinske and Jason Heyward are good, and Matt Diaz should return soon, but the Braves have had to turn to players like Brent Clevlen and Gregor Blanco to make ends meet. Someone like Luke Scott would fit in, as would David DeJesus, or hey, maybe Alex Gordon, which would give the Braves a Chipper Jones replacement for next year (if he does retire) and an outfielder this year.

Their pen is one of the three or four best in the game. The rotation features one elite starter in Tommy Hanson then a few guys closer to average. Kris Medlen has filled in admirably, but Jair Jurrjens should soon return from the disabled list which makes the unit stronger, even if it means Kenshin Kawakami sliding to the bullpen.

On The Farm

First base prospect Freddie Freeman and outfielder Jordan Schafer are the Braves’ hotter positional prospect names bound to rise in trade rumors. Pitching is the Braves’ oil, though, and they feature a number of intriguing and attractive arms. There’s Julio Teheran, a teenager with top of the rotation stuff but bullpen durability to date; Arodys Vizcaino, whom they acquired in the Javier Vazquez deal as well as Craig Kimbrel, Randall Delgado, and Ezekiel Spruill. Oh, and their top draft pick in 2008 is Mike Minor.

Budget

The Braves’ opening day payroll of ~84 million is their lowest since the 2000 season. Even last year they had a payroll over $95 million, which suggests an increase could be possible, particularly with the Bobby Cox’s ever-looming retirement occurring at season’s end.

The chart is insane but it barely breaks the surface on this game:

– A combined 104 plate appearances, along with 22 hits, 17 runs scored, 18 walks, and 20 strikeouts; all in 11 innings.

– 16 total pitchers used, only three of which pitched two or more innings.

– The game featured more runs in the 11th inning that it did in the first seven innings combined.

– Jorge Sosa with back-to-back-to-back walks to A) load the bases; and B) score two runs in the 11th inning. Sosa walked four batters and got two outs. Not a banner night for him.

– James Shields making his first career relief appearance on his throw day and thus allowing the Rays to avoid having a pitcher bat after Jeff Niemann’s fifth inning strikeout.

– Wade Davis (the Rays’ projected Tuesday starter) warming.

– Andy Sonnanstine making an emergency appearance after throwing more than 50 pitches on Friday night. He entered with a one run lead and runners on first and third with no outs. Somehow, someway, he struck out Brian Barden, Anibal Sanchez, and then got Dan Uggla to fly out.

– David Price (the Rays’ Sunday starter) missing the game after being hit in the groin with a warm-up toss in batting practice.

– The aforementioned Anibal Sanchez pinch hitting – only in the National League.

– Hanley Ramirez hustling out of the box to get a double, then overrunning second and pulling his hamstring, causing him to leave the game and be replaced by Brian Barden defensively.

– Just a horrid display out of Jason Bartlett. Along with one of the worst plate appearances you’ll ever see with the bases loaded, he also flubbed a defensive play and messed up a slide within a span of three innings. Naturally, Reid Brignac, who had been solid defensively all night long, had issues with a routine grounder after replacing Bartlett at short.

– The Marlins batting out of order, which voided a leadoff walk, and lead to Fredi Gonzalez’s ejection.

– Not only did more than 20,000 supposedly attend this game, but most of them had vuvuzuelas which confirms that Jeffrey Loria hates baseball, freedom, and sanity alike.

– Do yourself a favor and run ten laps around your house while imagining a pack of invisible bees chasing you. Then read the play log. You still won’t come close to the natural level of tension experienced, but it’s about as close as you can get artificially.

Enter the name Jim Leyland into your mind’s version of Google, then hit search – or “I’m feeling lucky” if you’re feeling lucky. What comes to mind is probably a variety of descriptive terms. “Old” “short” “chain smoker” “mustache” “old school” and so on. All of which are accurate. Leyland was born about three years and a week to the day of the Japanese’s attack on Pearl Harbor. He stands all of six feet tall. He does seem to enjoy a cigar or three on a daily basis. And yes, his mustache enjoys a few puffs too. Leyland’s appearance is everything that Hollywood would seek in casting an old-timey baseball manager.

But the word “progressive”? Sure, it might pop up; much in the way that searching for any female name will return a link or two to some obscure and random adult entertainment video or website. Yet, when speaking to the Washington and Detroit media staffs about Ivan Rodriguez and his impact on the Nationals, Leyland sounded less like a man born before the invention of bar codes, bikinis, and microwaves and more like someone born after the creation of Baseball Primer. Take this notable quotable from Adam Kilgore’s Nationals Journal for example:

“Take all that clubhouse [stuff] and all that, throw it out the window. Every writer in the country has been writing about that [nonsense] for years. Chemistry don’t mean [anything]. He’s up here because he’s good. That don’t mean [a hill of beans]. They got good chemistry because their team is improved, they got a real good team, they got guys knocking in runs, they got a catcher hitting .336, they got a phenom pitcher they just brought up. That’s why they’re happy.”

This isn’t some kind of victory worthy of a collective “Huzzah!” from the anti-chemistry crowd because one could just as easily find a quote from an opposing manager who suggests chemistry is vital for winning. Chemistry is like the baseball version of the chicken/egg argument. The only reasons I’m sharing the quotes are 1) Kilgore’s profanity edits are fantastic; and 2) how amusing it is to see someone who doesn’t buy into chemistry turn around and reference batting average and pitcher wins as the statistics of value.

Following Wednesday night’s disastrous start (3.1 innings pitched, two homers, and more walks than strikeouts) A.J. Burnett has now faced 382 batters on the season. Two hundred batters faced is the amount Pizza Cutter established as the threshold for strikeouts/plate appearances to become a reliable metric during a single season. That’s worth noting because Burnett’s strikeout percentage sits at 16.5%. Over the last three seasons, he struck out 23.7% of batters faced; over the last five that number is 23%; for his career it’s 21.7%. As it stands, the only season in which Burnett struck out batters at a lower rate than he is currently was way back in 2000. That year, he struck out 15.7% as a 23-year-old

When Burnett signed with the Yankees, the expectation was that his numbers could actually improve. He was battle tested in the rough American League East. More important than battled tested, though, he was successful. His xFIP had ranged from 3.55 to 3.64 over his three-year stint with the Jays, and a move to the Yankees meant he would no longer have to face a lineup consisting of multiple Hall of Famers on numerous occasions each season. That hasn’t been the case, though.

It was probably unrealistic to expect Burnett to improve on his whiff rate, which was over 10% in 2008, but that figure declined to 8.2% in 2009, and sits at 7.1% in 2010. A once raging fastball, sitting in the upper 90s on some occasions, has retreated in velocity. Pitchfx has its average velocity sitting just about 93 miles per hour, with empty swings occurring under 6% of the time. The only pitch Burnett is actually having batters miss often is his knuckle curve (12.5%). Compare that to last season and the only noticeable changes have nothing at all to do with his velocity being down. He’s actually getting more whiffs on the fastball and fewer on the curve.

That would suggest the decline is not entirely due to his velocity, which leaves predictability and location as the other potential culprits. The curve becomes Burnett’s go-to pitch when he reaches two strikes. With the exception of 3-2 counts, Burnett tosses his bender more than 50% of the time on each count. This doesn’t differ too much from 2009, when he threw it 60+% of the time on 0-2 and 1-2 and 48% on 2-2. This usage pattern actually resembles his 2008 pattern more than anything.

This would lead to a question of whether it’s Burnett’s location of the curveball that’s problematic. In 2009, the pitch was swung at under 40% of the time and resulted in a strike nearly 60% of the time. In 2010, however, the swing rate has remained static, while the strike rate has dipped to a little over 51%. That’s not a radical shift, mind you, but a big enough one that it alters Burnett’s ability to succeed. If batters are able to hold off on the inevitable avalanche of curveballs that dive below the zone on two strike counts, that means Burnett will have to beat them with his fastball or sinker, a combination of which hasn’t resulted in a positive run value since 2007.

The most troubling statistic associated with Burnett is that 40% of his strikeouts have come against the Orioles and Indians. Those starts account for a little more than 20% of his starts this season.

Entering last night’s game, Aubrey Huff owned a .395 wOBA through 256 plate appearances, a number significant for many reasons: (A) The .395 wOBA represents a career high for Huff, at the age of 33; (B) The career high comes after the second worst hitting season of Huff’s professional career; and (C) Huff only added to his numbers by hitting a homer, a double, and a single, while driving in two runs for the Giants in a victory over the Orioles.

For someone who spent his entire career in the American League, barring a three month stint with the Astros in 2006, Huff is enjoying National League life. He’s walking more than ever, striking out at rates unforeseen from him since his days as a zealous and nubile – oh yes, nubile – third baseman for the Devil Rays. His BABIP is in check, yet he’s hitting for more power than normal. Huff has also made contact at a higher rate this year than normal.

In playing the outfield for the first time in more than five seasons, it is like Huff has discovered the fountain of youth, as one of his home runs did yesterday. ZiPS now has him finishing the season at .372, which is leaps and bounds better than any projection system had expected for Huff entering this season. Take a gander:

CHONE: .338
Marcel: .332
ZiPS: .339
Fans: .334

The Giants signed Huff for $3 million on a one-year basis- meaning that just getting a combination of those projected figures probably would have made Huff worth it. Instead they have received one of the best hitters in baseball to date. It’s like a karmic refund for the Edgar Renteria deal turning into a mess.

On May 12 I wrote that Akinori Iwamura couldn’t play any worse and that there was nowhere to go but up. I was horribly wrong. Not only was Iwamura designated for assignment today, but his seasonal line somehow did get worse as his Pirates’ career ends with a .264 wOBA in 193 plate appearances. As vital as it is to lay out what we know about a topic, sometimes it’s even more important to spell out what we don’t know.

With Iwamura, we know that he is 31-years-old and suffered a knee injury last season. We don’t know the affect that knee injury has on his lateral movement or agility, with the latter being one of his best defensive assets. We know that Iwamura entered the season with a career BABIP over .330 and exits from Pittsburgh with a .211 BABIP. We also know that despite hitting a career high amount of groundballs, he’s registering a career low amount of infield hits.

Iwamura’s BABIP on groundballs hit is an almost unfathomable .135. His career rate, with this season’s numbers included, is .284. League average for this season is .230. I don’t have timed data on Iwamura’s runs from home to first, or first to third, or whatever distance becomes an acceptable measure of his speed versus the rest of the league, but from my exposure to Iwamura, he’s certainly got above average speed. So what could be the reason for such a seemingly contradicting relationship between his groundball rate and infield hits?

The most obvious and boring explanation is bad luck. With the information we have, this is in all likelihood the most reasonable answer. One could make the case that Iwamura’s time playing on artificial turf helped raise his BABIP but league BABIP rates for grass and turf alike show that grass actually has a higher BABIP this season. Iwamura’s career rates suggest the opposite, yet his grass BABIP is still over .300 and those numbers are predominantly in road circumstances, where Iwamura would be expected to hit worse.

Maybe he’s hitting the ball weaker, but that would seem to suggest he would be beating out more of them using his speed and the assumption that the infield isn’t playing him closer now than they have in the past. Or maybe he’s hitting the ball harder on the ground, but again, wouldn’t a few balls find their way into the holes; or, if the defense began playing further back, wouldn’t this increase Iwamura’s probability of reaching on weaker hit grounders?

The answer to all of these questions are of course: I don’t know. I don’t know what went wrong with Iwamura in Pittsburgh, and I’m not sure the Pirates really do either. They’re in full-blown youth mode in Pittsburgh and playing time for Iwamura was about to be severely restricted, in part due to his own crippling performance. Some team, maybe the Twins, maybe not, should take a chance on Iwamura though. I sincerely doubt he’ll continue to play this horrendously … but I’ve been wrong about that before.

When we last discussed Ian Snell, he was on his way back into the Seattle rotation. Nary four weeks into his return, he’s not only on his way back out, but might be on his way to the minors. The Mariners chose to designate the 29-year-old righty for assignment yesterday, hours after Snell was abused by the Cardinals on national television. As it stood, Snell’s deposit to the rotation lasted four starts, during which his totals equaled:

16 IP
10 BB
5 SO
5 HR

That’s a FIP of roughly … REALLYREALLYBAD. It’s easy to make jokes at Snell’s expense but the thing is: this guy used to be pretty good. Since 2006-2007 he’s become less of a groundball pitcher and more of a flyball pitcher; less of a strikeout pitcher and more of a contact pitcher; and more of a base giver and less of an out taker. Maybe if one or two of those things were true, Snell would still have a major league job, but all three is the kiss of death.

Snell’s issues with home runs aren’t shocking in the least. He’s a guy who often falls behind in counts. That’s problematic for any pitcher, even more so when your fastball has never been a plus pitch according to our run values. For Snell that combination was lethal. He threw his fastball 80% of the time he fell behind 2-1; 91% of the time he fell behind 3-1; 100% of the time he faced 3-0; and even 70% of the time he had a full count working. In fact, the only counts in which Snell threw fewer than half fastballs were 0-1, 1-2, and 2-2.

So, that’s Ian Snell in a blanket. He doesn’t throw strikes; he doesn’t miss bats; he doesn’t deceive anyone, and he has an ever-slimming hope of ever reaching 90% of his former self.

Overview

The Marlins are once again pacing for a record around .500 — an impressive feat, given a payroll shy of $50 million. Nevertheless, the Marlins are still in fourth place in the National League East and seem unlikely to make a real run to catch up and sustain the pace being set by Phillies and Braves. They could certainly add someone in a similar capacity to the Nick Johnson trade last deadline, but odds are, they’ll hold steady or even move a part or two.

Buy or Sell?

Sell seems like the better option since the Marlins could cash in on a few pieces getting too expensive. Dan Uggla, Cody Ross, and Ricky Nolasco will enter their final year of team control next season; meanwhile, Jorge Cantu and Wes Helms will become free agents (as will Nate Robertson, but the Marlins are only paying him $400K).

Cantu seems like the most likely to be moved. Gaby Sanchez and Wes Helms make him a bit redundant and he’s not going to bring back Type-A compensation in free agency.

Untouchables on the current roster include Hanley Ramirez, Mike Stanton, Josh Johnson, and Anibal Sanchez given how he’s pitched. Everyone else seems like a potential trade target — especially some of the Marlins’ relievers. Leo Nunez will probably stay in place, although they should listen to offers, but rejuvenation project Clay Hensley could lead to an interesting dilemma when it comes to weighing their confidence in his ability versus the guarantee of a return before a potential collapse.

The rest of the Marlins’ roster is a collection of young players and useful and (more importantly) cheap cogs without the kind of trade value that makes them must-goes.

On The Farm

Here’s where the Marlins shine. They just promoted Stanton, but Logan Morrison seems like the future at first base. 2007’s first-round pick, third baseman Matt Dominguez, is currently in Double-A Jacksonville. Meanwhile Triple-A New Orleans holds the team’s top two outfield prospects in Bryan Peterson and Scott Cousins. New Orleans also features a number of former major leaguers who could step in if the Marlins feel uncomfortable burning service time in a losing effort down the stretch.

As for pitching, the Marlins have a drove. There’s Chad James, Ryan Tucker, Brad Hand, Jhan Martinez, and yes, even old familiar names like Andrew Miller and Brett Sinkbeil – although it’s important to note neither is particularly close to their former prospect selves … Sinkbeil especially, he’s essentially a replacement level reliever at the Triple-A level.

The two spots the Marlins have organizational weakness at are the two that form the middle infield, although one could list catcher depending on their evaluation of Kyle Skipworth.

Budget

Just as Ambrose Bierce once wrote, “War is God’s way of teaching Americans geography”, the trade deadline is baseball’s way of teaching Marlins fans how the economic aspect of player development works. Hate him or … well, just slightly dislike him, Jeffrey Loria sticks to his guns when it comes to spending money. All success is credit to the Marlins’ front office’s creativity and ability to strike gold when they’re paying in tinfoil. Something that doesn’t appear likely to change within the next six months.

Prior to this season, I held only a few memories regarding Sean Rodriguez. I had seen him play and never paid much attention to him. He was on another team, after all. I can safely say that I’ve seen a fair share of Rodriguez now, and I think he may just lay claim to the title in the header.

Rodriguez’s line entering Sunday wasn’t terribly impressive: .270/.308/.451 – or a .327 wOBA, a pinch over league average; he’d struck out in 34.4% of his at-bats and walked in only 3% of his plate appearances, so it should be no surprise that Rodriguez had more strikeouts (42) than hits (33) and probably will throughout the season. The knock on Rodriguez was always about his windmill ways…the strikeout

Yet contact doesn’t seem to be the biggest issue with Rodriguez when it comes to his strikeouts. He makes contact at a rate below league average, yes, but he’s also super passive. He swings at the first pitch at exactly league average rates, which has been sparked by a recent surge of first pitch swinging (his career rate is still 20%). Rodriguez has fallen behind 0-1 in 72 of his 133 plate appearances; that’s more than half the time, but even that number is deceiving because it doesn’t consider the 14 plate appearances where he put the ball into play. The reality of the situation is that Rodriguez has fallen behind in the count 0-1 more than 60% of the time, and it’s not because he’s swinging and missing.

Since we’ve already established that Rodriguez takes the first pitch 73% of the time, let’s find out how often he swings (and misses) on 0-0 and whether he finds himself equally passive in 0-1 counts. Of the 24 times Rodriguez has swung – not bunted, mind you – he made contact a little under 60% of the time. He’s not exactly Dustin Pedroia or Luis Castillo. Now, of those 72 0-1 pitches, Rodriguez has taken exactly 50%; a little under 20% of which were called strikes. That means he falls behind 0-2 without ever swinging the bat in roughly 70% of his plate appearances that don’t involve Rodriguez putting the ball in play on pitch number one. It’s only then that Rodriguez’s questionable contact skills become the issue with his strikeout rate.

Rodriguez has an OPS over 1.000 for the month of June, and, sure enough, of those 39 first pitches, he’s swung at 36% of them. Correlation does not equal causation, but one has to wonder if there’s something to the aforementioned numbers. Whether it is the pitchers began just lobbing strikes, or that he just became more comfortable with recording an out early in his at-bats.

Just that exercise alone makes Rodriguez captivating, but that’s not it. He’s fast. A lot faster than you’d expect someone who strikes out more than one-third of the time. He’s turned eight bunts into six hits this season and he’s added two infield hits, too. That means that eight of his 19 singles this year never left the infield. Combine that with a .180 ISO, which would, if he qualified, put him among such second baseman company as Rickie Weeks, Brandon Phillips, and Dustin Pedroia. His offensive package alone is unique; but that’s not enough since he also looks good defensively at second base.

Rodriguez’s total package makes him a speed-blessed, defensively-able middle infielder with pop and a strikeout rate over 30% caused not necessarily by his inability to make contact, but by his consistent inaction on first pitches.

How many of those exist?

For a two year span beginning in 2005, Bill Hall was one of baseball’s best kept secrets. At the ages of 25 and 26, Hall combined to hit .280/.344/.525 while averaging 26 home runs and 13 stolen bases. Oh, and he did that while playing parts of four positions — mostly the left side of the infield with some center field and second base thrown in. During those years he accumulated 8.7 WAR. To date, he’s racked up 11.3 wins for his career. Needless to say, Hall’s career hasn’t quite turned out like it could have.

Yet, he’s in his first season with the Boston Red Sox and, through nearly 120 plate appearances, he’s looking sort of like his old self. You don’t even have to squint to see the similarities:

2005: .360 wOBA, .204 ISO, .336 BABIP
2006: .369 wOBA, .283 ISO, .320 BABIP
2010: .366 wOBA, .210 ISO, .317 BABIP

For the most part, 2010 has been a crude hybrid. The crux of Hall’s wOBA is being upheld by a strong walk rate which simply doesn’t reflect as well in his OPS. Still, it’s a bit soon to say the Red Sox have recaptured Hall’s magic — especially given his history of always having one insane month.

In April 2009, Hall posted a .304/.377/.522 line through 77 plate appearances. In July of 2008, Hall batted .288/.350/.548 through 80 plate appearances. There was even June of 2007, when he scorched through 104 plate appearances with slash stats of .307/.388/.523. All of those looked like maybe, just maybe, the rekindling of Hall’s fire, and they all faded quickly. The difference seems to be that this collection of good hitting from Hall is not as dependent on a high batting average on balls in play as those months were.

Given how the Sox’ roster was constructed, even if Hall cannot sustain this performance, they probably won’t regret trading Casey Kotchman for him too much.