Starting Pitchers (Min IP: 100)

The Best:
Johan Santana 66.3%
Matt Clement 69.7%
Randy Johnson 71.2%
Jason Schmidt 71.7%
Oliver Perez/Kelvim Escobar 72.4%

This was the season that Perez convinced everyone he was turning the corner. And with good reason, beyond his friendly old-timey stats (12-10 record on a poor Pirates team, 2.98 ERA), Perez also held a 3.45 FIP and 3.55 xFIP (for reference, Felix Hernandez’ career FIP is 3.54 and xFIP is 3.43). He promptly followed this up with xFIP of 5.26, 5.24, 4.65, 4.8, and then received a $36M contract.

The Worst:
Carlos Silva 90%
Ismael Valdez 88.9%
Jimmy Gobble 88.7%
Kirk Rueter 88.6%
Aaron Sele 87.9%

Speaking of poor contracts … here’s the scary thing: Silva not only tops this contact rate in 2005, but he does even worse at missing bats in 2009. Yeah, Silva at his best gets groundballs and avoids walks – and yes, that is a successful formula – but at the same time, Silva posted xFIP of 3.94, 4.81, and 4.57 before signing his four-year, $48M poison pill that the Cubs swallowed. Nick Blackburn can only hope Bill Bavasi is a general manager when he reaches free agency.

Relief Pitchers (Min IP: 40)

The Best:
Brad Lidge 50.5%
Eric Gagne 60.1%
Francisco Rodriguez 65.9%
Dennys Reyes 66.2%
Octavio Dotel 66.2%

The 2003 post established how nasty Gagne was during these days. Yet Lidge is even nastier. His trusty slider held a 3.39 wSL/C – easily a career best. Remember, at one point, the Astros’ bullpen featured Billy Wagner, Dotel, and Lidge.

The Worst:
Paul Quantrill 92.1%
Dan Kolb 88.8%
Tim Harikkala 87.8%
Jose Mesa 86.9%
Travis Harper 86.3%

There’s nothing particularly interesting about any of these five outside of Harper’s line from June 21st, 2005: 0.2 IP, 8 H, 4 HR, 1 BB, 0 SO, 9 ER. When he entered, the Rays were ahead by two. 46 pitches later, they trailed by seven.

Starting Pitchers (Min IP: 100)

The Best:
Kerry Wood 66%
Brandon Webb 69.8%
Pedro Martinez 70.4%
Randy Johnson 71.3%
Matt Clement 71.6%

2003 was nearly a special season for the Cubs. Mark Prior and Wood carried the team to the cusp of a World Series appearance, but in the end fell just shy. Wood had dealt with durability questions before, but 2003 was his second consecutive 200+ inning season. In those two seasons he totaled a little over 420 innings, he’s thrown 371 since. His slider held a run value of 2.33 per 100 thrown, a career best amongst seasons where he pitched more than 100 innings.

Webb is the other non-repeating name on the list. 2003 was his first season in the Majors and he posted his best K/9 to date. Webb was and still is a groundball-generating maven, but let this be a reminder that pitchers won’t always improve on their strikeout rate after their rookie season. To make up for it, Webb began walking fewer batters and posting only somewhat lower K rates.

The Worst:
Kirk Rueter 91.7%
Nate Cornejo 90.2%
Ismael Valdez 89.1%
Rick Reed 88.7%
Danny Graves 87.9%

There’s our old friend Rueter again. Believe it or not, he’ll appear with a 90+% contact rate once more before this series is over. Cornejo is a tall righty from Kansas with an average fastball of 87.5 MPH. As it turns out, his secondary stuff didn’t fare much better in the majors, and his fastball actually did post an above average run value. Batters never chased Cornejo’s pitches out of the zone (career 15.3% O-Swing) and never missed when they swung at a pitch in the zone. That’s a recipe for disaster.

Relief Pitchers (Min IP: 40)

The Best:
Eric Gagne 56%
Jose Valverde 62.3%
Scott Williamson 65.6%
Tom Gordon 67.2%
Rafael Soriano 67.3%

Yes, Gagne was that less hittable than any other reliever in baseball in 2003. This was the stuff of Gordon’s last hurray. He’s yet to post a contact rate sub-70% since and he held up well enough for the White Sox to be rewarded with a few years of setting up Mariano Rivera.

The Worst:
Paul Quantrill 88.1%
Matt Roney 87.8%
Chad Zerbe 87.7%
Julian Tavarez 86.3%
Graeme Lloyd 86.3%

Quantrill survived by getting groundballs. He was a high-leverage reliever still, and actually was worth 1.5 WAR for the Dodgers. The next season he headed to the Yankees and had similar success. His last Major League season was 2005 even though it seems like just yesterday.

Starting Pitchers (Min IP: 100)

The Best:
Randy Johnson 66.1%
Matt Clement 68.4%
Pedro Martinez 70.2%
A.J. Burnett 72%
Curt Schilling 72%

Fitting how the Big Unit tops out as the least hittable starter of 2002. A future Hall of Famer is joined by two others – Pedro Martinez and Curt Schilling – who are flanked by two (at the time) high-upside young arms who spent time with the Florida Marlins.

Burnett’s inclusion is expected. During this season his average velocity was a tick shy of 95 MPH and he leaned heavily on his heater and curve. In many ways, 2002 was also the breakout season for Burnett as he posted his first FIP under 4 and began flashing scintillating strikeout ability.

Clement is the odd man here. He never threw hard and at the time his supporting arsenal existed of a slider and little else. Clement’s fastball had movement, though, and as such he generated a good number of groundballs. Not only was 2002 the breakout year of Clement’s career but also a career-best season when judged by FIP.

The Worst:
Kirk Rueter 88.6%
Aaron Sele 88.3%
Ismael Valdez 86.3%
Scott Erickson 86.1%
Esteban Loaiza 85.9%

And on the opposite end of the stuff spectrum is Rueter. He pitched until 2005 and those four seasons of velocity information result in an average fastball velocity of 84.7 MPH. Give Rueter credit for throwing the pitch nearly 80% of the time yet somehow posting a 3.23 ERA over 203 innings. While you’re at it, give credit to that Giants defense and ballpark, too.

This was the season before Loaiza exploded back onto the scene with the White Sox, in large part thanks to learning a cutter that helped extend his career.

Relief Pitchers (Min IP: 40)

The Best:
Eric Gagne 61.5%
Dave Coggin 63.1%
Ugueth Urbina 64.2%
Luis Vizcaino 65.4%
Scott Williamson 65.8%

Much like the presence of Johnson and Pedro, Gagne topping the list should surprise no one. It’s almost hard to believe so much time has passed since Gagne became one of the Dodgers’ biggest attractions. Between the goggles, the Guns N’ Roses entrance music, and Game Over shirts, Gagne-mania mimicked the Hollywood adoration of closers. Gagne’s flame-throwing ways and story of triumph fit right in.

2002 remains Coggin’s shining moment, as he missed most of 2003 and never returned to the Majors. 2007 appears to be his final season in organized ball. Williamson always battled with injuries and the last time he threw on a Major League stage his once solid velocity (93.5 MPH in 2002) was reduced to a measly 89.1 MPH.

The Worst:
Terry Mulholland 88.1%
Chad Zerbe 87.8%
Jeff Farnsworth 86.9%
Jeff Tam 85.8%
Rolando Arrojo 85.8%

Fun fact: two of these pitchers would never pitch in the Majors again. Unlike the guys who missed bats, it wasn’t because of injury.

Franklin Gutierrez wasn’t the only former Cleveland Indian to receive an extension yesterday. Rays’ catcher Kelly Shoppach, acquired in early December, agreed to terms with his new club as well, signing at $5.5M over two seasons. Eligible for his second year of salary arbitration, Shoppach forwent the potential for more money in exchange for security. For their part, the Rays lock Shoppach in at a set rate and hold a club option over Shoppach for the 2012 season, taking away Shoppach’s first year of free agency.

Shoppach, who turns 30 in late April, has received sparse playing time over the past three seasons, spending most of his time on the bench while observing Victor Martinez. When he did play, he hit well; .245/.336/.467 with 40 home runs in 907 plate appearances. The knack on Shoppach is a large amount of empty swings, as detailed by his career 64.6% contact rate. Pitchfx data reveals that Shoppach has issues with anything that bends or curves. Last season he whiffed on close to a quarter of the sliders he faced, almost a third of change-ups, and almost a-fifth of curveballs. Such issues help explain his 37.3% strikeout rate throughout his career.

A modest walk rate and the ability for bleacher treats* are Shoppach’s two best qualities, right alongside being able to catch at a Major League competency. There are questions about just how well he catches — which does affect his value beyond the WAR figure we produce – however he is a league average hitter from the catcher position which makes him valuable despite his flaws. Heading forward, he should be around a two-win player. Wins are going for about $3.5M this off-season, meaning if Shoppach does produce at that level he’ll be worth two years worth of salary in one season.

As for the option, its cost is a little over $4M, bringing the total to three-years and $9.5M. There’s not much downside here for either side.

*As the Rays press release was quick to point out, Shoppach has hit as many home runs as Joe Mauer over the past two seasons and only eight fewer than the A.L.’s leader in catcher homers, Mike Napoli.

I have never toured the confines of Safeco Field. I watch a few Mariners games throughout a given season, mostly when the Rays visit the Pacific Northwest, and I’ve never asked anyone who would know, but I do not believe the Mariners have a flag flying or pennant hung commemorating their 116 win season. Though I wish they did.

Ask most baseball fans: what is the ultimate team goal in any given season?

The responses will be something along the lines of “World Series,” “winning the title,” “championship,” or a synonym thereof. Fair enough. That goal is certainly shared throughout the league itself and it’s probably the correct answer. I pose this question to Mariner fans: would you trade that 116 win season for a World Series title? And to fans of the Phillies: would you trade your world title for a 116 win season? Both sides likely reply no. In part because familiarity breeds comfort and most people hate change.

Let’s try something different with the next set of questions. Which is more impressive? Which is more valuable? Which should be more respected?

Consider this: winning 116 of 162 games means the team won 72% of their games. Winning the 11 games required to become World Series champions in the post-season could mean the team won 58% of their post-season games if each series went the distance. We expect that, as sample size increases, the true talent levels will be unveiled in more clarity. Compared to 19 games, 162 is a large sample. 162 is a pretty small sample compared to what we would want if our goal was true talent levels throughout.

A 162 game schedule also represents more time in which injuries could occur, but there’s also the ability to add additional players throughout a regular season. In the post-season, what you have is what you can use. Also, in the playoffs, the quality of teams against which you play rises – or at least it should – and the amount of home games is decreased. Although, that might be a wiling sacrifice for teams who in turn get to use their top three or four starters instead of starting a so-so-option every fifth day.

None of this is groundbreaking and some may call it obvious. There is a large sector of college football fans – casual and diehard – who very much want a playoff. A real playoff, they say. It makes sense, depending on how you weigh the BCS with the potential selection committee. The idea is a bit odd, though. Why is it that we need a post-season tournament to tell us which team is the best? Is that not what the regular season is for? In the case of two or more teams that seem equally qualified, then the means of additional play as a way to give conclusion to the crown seems adequate, but if a team wins 116 games, they were (a) incredibly lucky and (b) incredibly good.

So I’m torn. It seems the majority place unfair significance on the victor of the final game rather than the 160 before. I don’t know if it’s right or wrong and I’m not even sure there is a right or wrong. I do hope Seattle has a “116” flag though.

Some questions for discussion:
1. Is the ultimate goal to win, or to win the title?
2. What amount of regular season wins would you trade a World Series title for? What about the lowest amount of regular season victories with a World Series title for 116 regular season wins?

A Google search for “Jason Bay + Run Producer” brings back 91,100 hits. Bay’s name and “RBI Guy” brings back 159,000 hits. “Jason Bay + good hitter” only brings back 160,000. The funny thing is that Bay has topped 105 RBI throughout his career only twice despite being a constant force in the middle of the Pirates’ and Red Sox’ lineups. He’s really not much of a “RBI Guy”. Which brings up another point — a warning, though: stop here if you don’t feel like reading another piece that discusses how RBI totals can fluctuate heavily (and sometimes amusingly) on a year-to-year basis.

For those who chose to read on, consider Tommy Davis. He has more than a few things in common with Bay. Both are left fielders, stand around 6’2”, and weigh around 200 pounds. Davis even played with the Mets at one point. In 1962, as a 23-year-old, Davis played his best season of ball. He hit 27 homers, held a line of .346/.374/.535, stole 18 bases, and had 153 RBI. Focus on that last statistic. 153 runs batted in. Since 1961, that ranks as the sixth most RBI in a single season and, until 1998, was the most. Since then, Manny Ramirez, Sammy Sosa, Juan Gonzalez, and Alex Rodriguez have managed to pass Davis, including two seasons with more than 160.

There are about a dozen different fun tidbits to pull from Davis’ ensuring career. Here are the ones I enjoyed the most:

Davis had 153 RBI in 665 at-bats. Over the next two years, he racked up 1,148 at-bats and 174 RBI.

Davis never had reached the 100 RBI plateau, and never would do so again. In fact, he never reached 90 again.

In 1962, he spent the majority of his time batting fourth. This remains true through the 1968 season. In 1969, he spent most of his time hitting third rather than cleanup.

His teams kept him there in large part because of that huge RBI season. To be fair, he also had a .910 OPS that season, but his OPS in the immediate seasons afterwards: .816, .708, and .729 (after skipping an extremely short 1965 season for Davis).

Bay is a better hitter than Davis ever was, but if for no other reason than Bay’s health, hope a similar fate isn’t awaiting him.

Adrian Beltre is still a free agent and Scott Boras is still his agent. Matt Holliday is still a bigger name and will still receive a bigger contract, but discounting the assumed stare-down between Theo Epstein and Boras over Beltre’s contract demands is amusing if nothing else. A few weeks back Boston trotted out manager Terry Francona to talk up Casey Kotchman. Why Kotchman? Because if the season began tomorrow, Kotchman would man first while the incumbent, Kevin Youkilis, moved across the diamond to third. Epstein also talked up Kotchman in the press, focusing mostly on his strong contact skills.

Pretend, for a moment, that Youkilis would field equally at third and first. I know he wouldn’t, but just pretend. Over the last three years, Kotchman has hit .279/.346/.421 while the ‘disappointing’ Beltre has batted .269/.318/.444 with 59 homers. Those numbers aren’t park-adjusted, which means Beltre is still being punished heavily for playing within Safeco’s constricting park. Even so, Beltre is only four OPS points off. Defensively Kotchman is above average for a first baseman while Beltre is well above average for a third baseman. Putting it all together, Kotchman’s career best season (2.5 WAR) is barely better than Beltre’s worst season since 2002 (2.4 WAR).

In fewer words: Beltre is a better player than Kotchman. How much better and how much money is the upgrade worth to Boston?

Let’s dive back into the Youkilis-to-third predicament first. His career sample at first is more than double his time at third (~3,802 innings versus just under 1,600) and in those spans we have UZR/150 of 8.6 at third and 6.5 at first. That implies he’s actually better at third base, although most of that time at third base came in 2004. Youkilis was 25 then, not 31 like next season. For the sake of argument, let’s say Youkilis is five runs worse at third than first next season. Feel free to adjust that as you see fit, but remember it’s better to be conservative than optimistic.

With that in mind; estimate Beltre at ~10 runs defensively and ~5runs offensively. That makes him a three and a half win player. Kotchman is probably good for a win, maybe a bit more. Let’s say the difference is two wins and then factor in the Youkilis transition. Overall a 2.5 win upgrade. Wins are going for roughly $3.5M so Beltre is worth $8.75M more than Kotchman. Meaning the tops Boston should give Beltre is just under $9M. Given Boston’s placement on the win curve and how much those additional wins could help to distance themselves from Tampa, it seems the reported asking price of $10-15M isn’t too far-fetched after all.

Worth noting: one of the four players represented by Boras on Boston’s roster is J.D. Drew, who shares quite a bit with Beltre in the means of unfair criticism and a sentence to perennially underrated purgatory. I wonder if they would get along and tell war stories.

Because we care about the players and the players care about the Hall of Fame.

The average player probably was on his high school team and before that may have played some little league or grade school ball. From there either he went to college or straight to the minors. There are exceptions to that, but again this is the average player. Some players last through their 30s; others burn out. Either way, that’s at least a decade of dedication to the game. Hate Barry Bonds for any reason you want, but his first wife is baseball and his long-time mistress is breathing.

The pay is good and the fame is probably pretty sweet at times too, but let’s not ignore the disappointment that some of these guys feel when the Hall call never comes. Yet we care about the snubs. We make case after case for the snubs. The competitiveness and glory-seeking doesn’t simply vanish upon filing of retirement papers. Jon Heyman Tweeted that if Jack Morris played on non-World Series teams, he wouldn’t consider Morris a Hall of Famer. Think about that for a moment. His vote for Morris is based almost entirely on luck; meanwhile, Bert Blyleven’s candidacy is in the shadows over bad luck with certain metrics. Life is funny, isn’t it?

The guys like Blyleven and Tim Raines have a type of fan support that some would describe as obnoxious. They’d say that some people need to remove their nose from the spreadsheet because the game isn’t played on Baseball-Reference.com. Besides being a silly thing to say, those people miss the point. Rich Lederer, Jonah Keri, and Tom Tango didn’t waste those words to come off as omniscient or as holier than the non-believers. They spent those words because they care about those players and 99.9% of all Hall cases are based on numbers, just not the numbers that make sense to people like them.

And you know why those guys care about the players? Not because of their numbers – although they certainly help – but because in the end, those players enhanced the game-watching and -attending experience. Keep that in mind the next time someone writes a piece bemoaning the deserving nature of a future candidate. The motive isn’t to be a pain in the neck or trendy. It’s an exhibit of appreciation earned through merit.

Isn’t that what the Hall should really represent?

One thought process seems to be that Jason Bay and agent Joe Urbon were silly to take what could be a heavily back-loaded contract from the Mets in favor of Boston’s deal which offered more cash upfront. The idea stems from this Peter Gammons piece which includes this nugget of information:

While the Mets offer is four [years] for 65 [million], it’s so backloaded that I’ve been told by Mets people that it’s far less than what the Red Sox were offering in present-day value

Present-day value is important because $100 today is more valuable than $100 a year from today. If the two offers were equal in dollars, however constructed differently, with one deal being front-loaded and the other back-loaded, then the agent should have his player sign the front-loaded contract. That scenario doesn’t match reality though. Boston reportedly offered four years and $60M while the Mets offered four years and $66M. More present-day value or not, Urbon and crew were correct to take the Mets offer. Here’s why.

Let’s assume Boston offered Bay 4/$60M split evenly across the four seasons; which is to say $15M in 2010, 2011, and so on. Meanwhile New York’s offer is more in total dollars, but most of the payout is located in the final two seasons. For our purposes, let’s say the money breakdown is 10/15/20/21. Using the time value of money formula and a discount rate of one’s liking, you can quickly figure the adjusted totals in present-day value. In this example, Boston’s deal is worth roughly $56M while the Mets’ offer is worth nearly $61M, or a spread in $5M, almost identical to the unadjusted spread.

Say one gets really aggressive with the discount rate and bumps it to 10% with the same contract breakdown. The Boston offer would be worth $52M in present-day value while the Mets’ offer worth $56M. Closer, but still no cigar. Keep that discount rate and get creative with the back-loading, say, 7/12/22/25; it’s even tighter at $52M and $55M. Still though, the Mets offer is worth more.

Barring some really ridiculous discount rate or extensive back-loading of the contract, there’s just no way around it. New York offered more dollars.

At one point or another, everyone has been exposed to the concept of the spring training position battle. Whether it comes down to the fifth rotation slot or the final bench spot, these competitions are always made out to be the stories of the spring. Undoubtedly spring training has lead to some dismissals and promotions over the time, but should it?

Most agree that spring training stats are irrelevant which means the exhibition season is more about process than results. If Gabe Kapler hits .100/.200/.100 – which he basically did last year – it’s not the end of the world as long as he appears in shape and isn’t swinging at everything (or nothing). Pitchers often work on new grips or arm slots – amongst other things that become overhyped as reasons for a potential breakout season – so that 6.50 ERA from the staff ace isn’t concerning. The most common scenarios in which the idea of an open spring competition is used includes:

– Young players looking to crack the roster
– Two players of near equal value
– Non-roster players with a history of success

In each case we have some idea of expectations. Even with younger players we can assume league average performance for some of the top young talents and less from more fringe prospects. The second scenario seems to be the most likely where spring performance can be used while minimizing risk and accounts for the majority of middle reliever battles. Meanwhile, in the final tier, you have guys like Eric Hinske in 2008 coming off a down season. He shows health and no reason to believe the previous season was because of decaying skills and in exchange finds a spot on the 25 man.

I suppose we rely heavily on the past in any situation while weighing the newest information, but not being complete slaves to it. That seems like the way it should be. So maybe teams don’t really make decisions based on 20 games in the springtime, but rather 20 games in the springtime and the x before it.