The Royals desperately needed a shortstop. Their collective group was batting a cool .208/.234/.281 with awful defense and little in the way of upside.

Today, they pulled the trigger, acquiring Yuniesky Betancourt.

Betancourt doesn’t hit for power, walk, take coaching well, field, or keep himself in shape. His contract calls for 3 million next year, 4 million in 2011, and 6 million in 2012 (although the Royals can always pay him the 2 million buyout instead), so he’s not cheap either. Over the last three seasons Betancourt has hit .278/.299/.392 while playing most of his games in Safeco. He doesn’t hit for a lot of power, but even if you assume Safeco suppressed him a bit, he’s still not a very good hitter. He’s a below average fielder at shortstop, and the whispers – which have became a bit more than that in the Seattle press – suggest he lacks work ethic.

The Royals give up Derrick Saito and Dan Cortes. Saito is a low-level reliever striking out a ton of batters, meanwhile Baseball America ranked Cortes as the third best prospect in the Royals system. I’m not a GM, I don’t know what Jack Zduriencik wanted for Betancourt, but Cortes seems like a lot for a perpetually below average shortstop.

If adding playing time threats, benching, closed door meetings, and a team in contention didn’t snap Betancourt into focus, then what will? Even if the Mariners are picking up most of the tab, which we don’t know at this point, it’s still a questionable gamble for Dayton Moore.

The Royals still desperately need a shortstop.

Juan Cruz is a huge fan of aviation. Of all qualified relievers, Cruz has allowed the most fly balls and inversely the least amount of grounders. 30% of Cruz’s batted balls aren’t going for grounders, nope, not 20% either, 15%? A touch high, but essentially equal to Cruz’s 14.7%. Not only is it a career low, but nearly half as many as Cruz allowed just last season. Best I can tell is that the previous lows for GB% with 20+ innings pitched include Mark S. McLemore in 2007, Al Reyes in 2007, and Chris Young in 2008 – who somehow maintained the feat despite starting.

Each of those pitchers finished over 20%, so Cruz is in some historical territory if he somehow keeps on this pace. I wouldn’t put money on him completing the task, but it is interesting to look at Cruz’s steady increase in fly balls allowed over the past few seasons, dating back to when he made the full-time switch from starting to relief duty. Check out his GB/FB ratios:

2004: 1.26
2005: 1.23
2006: 1.07
2007: 0.75
2008: 0.47
2009: 0.23

Most know you should weigh averages instead of expecting trends to continue, but I’m guessing Cruz has tested a few people’s resolve at this point. I would love to give an explanation as to why Cruz is inducing more and more fly balls, but I can’t really find anything. Maybe he’s pitching up in the zone more, or mixing his pitches better, I don’t really know. The only thing different this year is that he’s throwing his change more and his fastball less. That could help explain this year’s raise, but does little to solve the mysteries of the past.

I intend on keeping my eyes on Cruz, much like he seems to enjoy keeping his eye on airplanes.

While talking with a fellow writer about the July 2nd signing period, he told me he was tired of two questions being asked. The one that I’m writing about today is one that reigns true about every player acquired and is simply “How close is he to the majors?”

The question and phrasing itself is innocent in nature, but the answer should be pretty easy to dictate, especially during this signing period. Most draftees are given two-to-four year windows by most fans depending on whether the player went to college or jumped straight from high school. These international signings include a lot of 16-year-olds, which makes them even younger than the high school seniors taken a month before.

Playing in Venezuela or the Dominican Republic leaves these players markedly less experienced than their domestic counterparts. Loss on them is the length and competitiveness that comes with a typical high school schedule. Take Miguel Angel Sano; most of his game experience is from showcases set-up by buscones. It’s going to take some time for the players to physically and mentally adjust to playing every day, even in the lower minors.

The cruel reality is that most of these players aren’t going to make the majors. If 60% of first round draft picks bust, and those players are presumably the best-of-the-best available amateurs who have fought through competition and difficult schedules, then what makes the international game any more likely for success? You can argue that these players are going to be the ones who need the most developmental time and work since they are so raw and fresh to the idea of organized baseball.

All of this is to say, we don’t know. For 16-year-old international signings, that’s always the answer.

It took long enough, but it seems the National League has discovered the secret to Alfonso Soriano’s success: throwing him fastballs. As a nightmare season creeps on for Soriano, he continues to see more and more breaking and off-speed pitches than previous years. Just compare the amount of fastballs thrown his way to those of recent campaigns in the NL:

2006 – 54.1%
2007 – 54.0%
2008 – 53.2%
2009 – 45.7%
Trying to hit any pitch that registers below 90 miles per hour has always been a chore for Soriano. Since 2002 his wFB/C is 2.02 and wCT/C is 1.65, with the exception of change-ups, Soriano has struggled mightily against every other pitch. -0.92 versus sliders, -0.37 against curves, and even -3.32 against split-finger fastballs pitches. That means that for every 100 fastballs Soriano sees, he produces two runs, and for every 100 sliders, he loses a run of production.

Soriano is walking and striking out as expected without flashing his power as often. For some perspective, consider this: Soriano’s .184 ISO would be the lowest of his career since 2001, when he was 25-years-old and in the midst of his first full season. A spotty BABIP is to blame for some of the issues, but Soriano is also hitting fewer homeruns and more infield fly balls. I wouldn’t expect that to continue since Soriano has seen his IFFB% rise and fall over the years with little predictive value.

Soriano is hitting a career high in groundballs and a career low in line drives which aren’t the directions you would like to see from your highly-paid slugger. Of course Soriano is 33-years-old, and some drop in offensive performance was expected, but no projection system had Soriano falling below a .350 wOBA and now ZiPS has Soriano finishing at .330.

Quite a drop, and nothing his defense to date is making up for.

The bottom of the order in the National League is reserved for pitchers and usually the worst hitters. This season, the average 7-9 slot is occupied by a non-pitcher hitting .249/.320/.381 – the equivalent of Luis Castillo. For whatever reason, Joe Torre has decided to up the ante for those lower-hole hitters by placing Matt Kemp in the tier – the same Kemp with a higher OPS than Ryan Howard.

Kemp is the Dodgers second best hitter when sorted by wOBA or wRAA. Entering last night’s game his line was .305/.369/.474 and yet in 52 of his 81 appearances this season Kemp has batted 7th or lower, and only two of those appearances came as a pinch hitter. Most nights Torre is running out a lineup that goes in order as follows: Rafael Furcal, Orlando Hudson, Manny Ramirez, Andre Ethier, Casey Blake, James Loney, Russell Martin, Matt Kemp, and then the pitcher.

Kemp might not even be the biggest issue with this current lineup since Furcal is receiving the most plate appearances while boasting a .297 wOBA. Furcal is better than that, but if hitting poorly (or really well in Kemp’s case) has no affect on Joe Torre’s lineup plans, then why have Casey Blake, Russell Martin, and Juan Pierre been able to slip and slide batting slots based on their performances?

Torre’s been blessed with a large lead in the standings so early in the season that the Dodgers’ playoff chances are sealed. Batting Kemp 8th isn’t going to cost the Dodgers the division and probably not even the top seed, but what message is Torre sending to Kemp and to opposing managers by keeping a stellar hitter in front of the pitcher? Kemp’s placement seems to extend beyond performance, and that’s too bad, after all Torre is supposed to be the master of managing egos and personalities, and here he is hurting his team by flexing his own.

Rough night for Johnny Cueto:

0.2 IP, 5 H, 2 HR, 1 SO, 3 BB, 9 ER, 25 strikes, 49 pitches

Let’s take a look over his start using Pitchfx. Cueto threw over 50% strikes thanks to the home plate umpire who extended the zone a few times and forced the Phillies batters to swing at some pitchers they probably wouldn’t have otherwise. One glance at Cueto’s strike zone plot reveals that he’s not M.C. Escher when it comes to painting the corners. Cueto really wanted to stay away from lefties and he certainly accomplished that by avoiding the plate entirely.

Image courtesy of Brooksbaseball.net

Cueto could control neither his fastball nor change-up, but did seem to have a decent grip on his slider. Anytime a pitcher lacks fastball control he’s going to struggle; having the inability to control his off-speed stuff just put the nail in the coffin. More concerning for the Reds is that this is becoming a trend rather than an isolated incident. 51% of Cueto’s pitches in April and May were inside of the strike zone. Only 42% found the zone in June, and through two July starts that number is down to 40%. Cueto’s velocity is lacking any telltale signs of potential injury, and his velocity chart looks pretty normal:

Although the improved walk rate doesn’t reflect this, Cueto is actually throwing more balls this season, in part because his amount of whiffs has decreased. At the same time, Cueto’s run values have increased thanks to the Reds upgraded defense. If we were discussing the defensive independent version, I’m not so sure that would be the case.

Over the weekend I watched the middle game of the Cubs/Brewers series. The Brewers bludgeoned Rich Harden behind Casey McGehee’s four hit, five RBI afternoon against his former team. In the wake of McGehee’s performance, I scoped his player page and subsequently raised my brows, for this is perhaps the quietest .343/.396/.567 line in the land. It’s only 150 plate appearances though, and there isn’t much reason to believe McGehee will continue to hit like this.

With the Cubs McGehee spent three seasons in Triple-A Iowa, hitting .282/.335/.410. His career best OPS in the minors came in Double-A when he hit for a .776 figure. Consider that McGehee’s current slugging percentage nearly tops that on its own and you can understand why most Cub fans are scratching their heads at the idea of McGehee becoming the Brewers version of Jake Fox.

An ISO resting comfortably around .220 is a power surge unlike any we’ve seen from McGehee before. A .385 BABIP suggests he’s finding every hole and gust on the field, and he’s even walking more than usual while striking out less. McGehee’s defense at second base has been average, and in the past Baseball America named him the best third base defender in the Southern League, so there’s a chance his glove work is legitimate.

McGehee is 26-years-old, making some improved performance likely, just not this extent. Not many players can rebound from three straight below average offensive seasons in Triple-A to suddenly hit better than any other time in their professional careers. What McGehee has accomplished by simply reaching the majors is impressive, but this hot streak serves little predictive power. Fortunately for McGehee, there are a few GMs more than willing extend opportunities based on it.

Entering Tuesday’s game, the Red Sox lead the Orioles by 12 games. With John Smoltz on the mound opposing Rich Hill, the challenge appeared to resemble little more than a lay-up for the best team in the American League. Early on, that was exactly the case. Julio Lugo singled to open the game, and after stealing second, jogged home thanks to a Kevin Youkilis homerun. David Ortiz would add a double and Jason Varitek would walk before the inning ended on a groundout.

The Sox would add another two runs in the second, and entering the third lead 4-0 with Smoltz facing one more than the minimum amount. A Felix Pie triple in the third pushed the first Oriole run across, but Boston wasted little time responding, Jacoby Ellsbury homered on the third pitch of the 4th and scored the first of five Boston runs.

Smoltz took a 9-1 lead and pitched a perfect inning before giving way to Justin Masterson who promptly retired six straight batters. When the Orioles came to bat in the 7th, Boston had added another run, making it 10-1, and placing the Orioles win expectancy at a firm 1%. Aubrey Huff singled on the first pitch, then Nolan Reimold shot one through the right side of the infield. With two on and nobody out, Luke Scott hit a deep fly ball to right field, plating Huff and placing two on in scoring position. Oscar Salazar checked in for Melvin Mora, and two pitches later, hammer a ball to left field that cleared the fences.

Just like that, the score was 5-10, and Matt Wieters was stepping to that plate. After getting ahead 0-1, Masterson yielded yet another hit and was quickly pulled for Manny Delcarmen. Robert Andino and Brian Roberts quickly grounded out to second base, giving Baltimore dim hope for scoring another run, yet Pie once again proved timely, and scored Andino on a liner up the middle. 6-10 Baltimore, with Hideki Okajima called upon to finish the inning.

In order to preserve any chance of an unlikely comeback, Mark Hendrickson would have to hold the Sox under command with the heart of the lineup due up. Jason Bay grounded out easy enough, and a walk was almost erased by a George Kottaras force play. Then Baldelli and Ellsbury singled on back-to-back plays, and it was up to that guy, Felix Pie, to throw the runner out at home.

Making Pie’s play all the more improbable is that he was filling in for the injured Adam Jones and that he actually finished with a negative WPA. Go figure.

With Okajima remaining in the game, the Orioles pounced. Reimold singled, Scott doubled, Salazar reached on an infield single, Wieters singled, Wigginton would hit a sac fly, and then Roberts would single, chasing Takashi Saito after only two batters. Jonathan Papelbon entered with one out, a one run lead, and a 70% win expectancy, he made quick work of Pie, and the outnumbered Baltimore fans were no doubt dubious about their already ridiculous comeback.

Nick Markakis stepped to the plate and on the very first pitch doubled to deep left, scoring two runs and giving Baltimore the lead against the best team in baseball. The O’s would fail to add any insurance, and the game would be left in the hands of George Sherrill.

A Jeff Bailey singled opened the 9th, but a strikeout and fly out seemed to kill any chance of another comeback on this night. Sherrill plunked Kevin Youkilis, then struck out Jason Bay on four pitches, ending the game, and capping a fine Baltimore victory.

The all-star teams were announced yesterday, and by the sheer number of first basemen on the rosters you can tell which end of the offense/defensive spectrum is considered during the team building process. Michael Young? Sure, Franklin Gutierrez? Ew, no. With that in mind, today I’m going to crown the all-star teams compiled completely of the best defenders in each league. Since we don’t have a central thought process on how to evaluate catchers defense, I’ll skip over those roster spots. Also I went by qualified players only, so some, like Ben Zobrist at second, have a really good case, but don’t qualify due to playing time at the position.

First up, the National League.

1B: Derrek Lee, Adrian Gonzalez
2B: Brandon Phillips, Freddy Sanchez
3B: Ryan Zimmerman, Pedro Feliz
SS: Jack Wilson, J.J. Hardy, Rafael Furcal
COF: Nyjer Morgan, Colby Rasmus, Jay Bruce, Justin Upton, Randy Winn
CF: Matt Kemp, Mike Cameron

Any team in need of a defensive middle infielder for the rest of the season should call the Pirates. Zimmerman is really good, and probably has a real all-star bid locked down until Stephen Strasburg becomes the greatest pitcher in the universe. Lots of youth in the outfield with Rasmus, Bruce, and Upton; what are the odds that those three make up a few real all-star outfielders during their careers? Naitonals/Pirates representation, it doesn’t matter, Morgan is the starter in left.

American League:
1B: Paul Konerko, Miguel Cabrera
2B: Howie Kendrick, Placido Polanco
3B: Joe Crede, Brandon Inge, Evan Longoria
SS: Marco Scutaro, Elvis Andrus
COF: David DeJesus, Nelson Cruz, Juan Rivera, Ichiro
CF: Franklin Gutierrez, B.J. Upton, Ryan Sweeney

What a ridiculous quartet of defensive talent at third base. If Adrian Beltre were healthy, the AL would have four third basemen with 8+ UZR. Originally I had Ian Kinsler on the team as the third second baseman, but I’m pretty sure Evan Longoria could fill in at second and produce 5+ UZR. The most surprising placer is probably Juan Rivera. Given his recent fielding history his UZR this year seems like a small sample size mirage, his last good fielding season was in 2005 after all. How fun would a Gutierrez, Upton, and Ichiro outfield be to watch? Don’t get any ideas, Seattleites.

Since no all-star team is complete without gimmicky vote-in schemes, here’s a list of five in each league worthy of your consideration for addition.

NL: Juan Pierre, Jayson Werth, Casey Blake, Ryan Theriot, Clint Barmes
AL: Carl Crawford, Ian Kinsler, Dustin Pedroia, J.D. Drew, Aaron Hill

All things considered, I’m not too sure out team of defenders couldn’t defeat the real all-stars.

Dave covered Joel Pineiro’s defensive dependent tendencies earlier this season. Part of Pineiro’s success can be traced to an increased groundball rate. Pineiro’s stuff is generating over 60% groundballs after producing a little less than 50% last year. Keith Law submitted a post idea involving other large jumps and whether those pitchers were able to sustain the batted ball trait in the following season.

Using our groundball data (dating back to 2002) I looked at every starting pitcher with at least 100 innings during that season and compared their rates to the preceding and following seasons. I found eight cases where a pitcher increased 10% from one year to the next. Those cases include Cliff Lee, Josh Beckett, Ryan Drese, Jon Garland, Johan Santana, CC Sabathia, Kris Benson, and John Thomson. Below you’ll see the data table. The first column is self explanatory. Year N dictates the season in which the large jump occurred. Delta is the difference between Year N and Year N-1. N+1 is the year after Year N, shown to represent whether the jump sustained or regressed in the following season.

None of the pitchers suffered a 50% or higher loss in the next season. Only Jon Garland lost 5% or more, and only two pitchers gained more than 1%. All of which is to say that if the pitcher can show such improvement in causing groundballs, then the improvement is most likely legitimate rather than a sample size fluke. So what’s the improved part of Pineiro’s game? His fastballs.

For one, Gameday is now classifying a large chunk of Pineiro’s fastballs as two-seamers, which seems accurate. Pineiro’s four-seam fastballs are also breaking in to righties more and ‘up’ less. Whatever the pitch is, Pineiro is giving batters of both hands absolute fits this season. Righties have a .702 OPS against despite an inflated BABIP and lefties have a .661 OPS against, albeit with a deflated BABIP. This isn’t the Pineiro we or the batters are used to, but I guess we’re stuck with this version for at least another year.
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For more reference on groundball rate spikes, check out Eric’s piece from earlier in the season.