This time last year, Daniel Schlereth was waiting to be drafted by a team. The University of Arizona reliever found himself chosen by the hometown Arizona Diamondbacks in the first round. A few days ago, Schlereth got the promotion from Double-A, only he didn’t report to Triple-A, instead he jumped into the majors. Two low leverage situations later, Schlereth was tossed into the fire last night.

Entering the 8th inning, the D-Backs held a 5-1 lead over the hosting Dodgers. Tony Pena took the mound, taking over for Dan Haren after seven solid innings. Matt Kemp greeted Pena with a single, but Pena would sit down a pair of former Astros as Brad Ausmus popped out and Mark Loretta struck out. Juan Pierre would single, placing runners on the corners for Rafael Furcal, who drew a walk. Orlando Hudson would walk as well. Making it a 5-2 D-Backs lead with two outs and the bases loaded. Rather than allow Pena to face James Loney, A.J. Hinch went to the youngster to defuse the threat.

Schlereth would allow a double to Loney, allowing the bases to clear and tie the game. Casey Blake would then single, giving the Dodgers their first lead of the night. The D-Backs would face Jonathan Broxton in the ninth inning and go down 1-2-3 with a pair of strikeouts and a groundout. It’s a bit hard to peg this one on Schlereth though. A glance at his strikezone plot from Brooks Baseball in the Blake at-bat shows that he was squeezed on two strike calls:

The top and bottom of strikezones change with different hitters. Blake’s top is at the 3.58 mark and extends to 1.7. The constant is the width of the zone – or at least should be. It’s hard to argue that pitches three and four aren’t strikes, yet that’s how the umpire called it. Nobody can say for sure how a strike call on pitch three sets up pitch four or five, or if there is a pitch five, but we know how the situation played out in reality, and I’m guessing the D-Backs and Schlereth would love to try their luck with a 1-2 count instead of a 2-1 count; especially given the .300 point swing in OPS between the counts.

Schlereth gets tagged with his first major league loss, and his first major league squeezing.

It seems silly that a team sitting at 13-36 with a -68 runs differential can be talked about as having playoff chances, but technically, the Nationals do. Most simulations have the Nationals between 0.0 and 0.1% playoff odds. I’m with you if you’re willing to write the Nationals chances completely off right here and right now, but there’s always an outlier or two in history that suggests we shouldn’t be so declarative.

In this case, that outlier is the 2005 Houston Astros. On June 7th, the Astros sat 16 games behind first place, same as the Nationals. Their record was a revolting 21-35. The Astros would win four of their next five series, bringing their record on Jun 26th to 33-40. Little headway was gained despite the 12 of 17 run, as they remained 13 games back. On July 19th, the Astros crossed the .500 barrier for the first time in ages, putting themselves at 47-46, 13 games back. They would go on to reach win 50 before losing another game. On July 31st the division leading Cardinals were 9.5 ahead after a Mets victory, but still the Astros were 57-48 and on a ridiculous tear.

The Astros were helped by hot streaks like Lance Berkman. Entering June 7th, Berkman’s OPS sat below .730, and would dip below .700 days later, during the stretch Berkman hit .341/.447/.582 in a little over 215 plate appearances. Roy Oswalt would make 11 starts, allowing 16 earned runs and nine walks in 82.3 innings. Roger Clemens would top Oswalt by going 61 innings in nine starts, allowing only eight earned runs and 20 walks.

On September 1st, the Astros were 70-62, 14 out of first place, but in the thick of the Wild Card hunt. Four weeks later the Astros would finish with 89 wins, one more than the Philadelphia Phillies, allowing the improbable to occur. The 2005 Houston Astros had somehow made the playoffs.

Outliers like that don’t occur often, despite the 2004/2005 Astros and 2002 A’s run to the playoffs, but they do happen. It seems highly, highly unlikely that the Nationals will even sniff .500, far from a playoff spot. The Nationals lack a Roy Oswalt or a Roger Clemens or even an Andy Pettitte. They may add Stephen Strasburg at some point, but unless he’s cloned a dozen times, it probably won’t be enough.

I know I said that we shouldn’t be declarative, but the Nationals have about as much chance of making the playoffs this season as Dave Cameron revealing himself as Bill Bavasi. Although, I must say, the idea of a sinking ship somehow winning a cross-Atlantic boat race after enduring massive damage in the first leg sure does make for a good underdog story.

Amongst the oddities in the UZR rankings, Carlos Beltran’s -3.9 value ranks high on the list. Beltran is universally renowned for his defensive prowess and ability to make even the most difficult of plays look routine. The accolades are well deserved. Only once in our UZR data has Beltran posted a UZR in the negative for an entire season. That was in 2005, Beltran’s first year with the Mets and as a whole one of the worst seasons for Beltran.

During that season, Beltran posted a career low in RngR of -8. So far this year, Beltran’s RngR is -2.5, his ErrR is -0.5, and his ARM is down to -0.9. Overall his UZR -3.9 while +/- has him at 1.6 runs. Clearly, Beltran hasn’t been quite what we would expect. What’s the reason for his sudden decline?

Well, how about the brand new ballpark? UZR attempts to adjust based on the parks played in, a new park offers little in the way of data for adjustments, so for now we’re still using the park factors from Shea. Obviously upgraded seats and paint isn’t causing Beltran to make more errors, but could it be affecting Beltran’s range?

It’s hard to take such a small sample size of defensive data seriously, but if we just compare the outfielders who were with the Mets during their time in both parks, we can see if there’s any overlaying trend involved. Beltran, Fernando Tatis, Ryan Church, Angel Pagan, and Daniel Murphy are all included in this grouping. Upon doing so you find…nothing. There’s far too much statistical noise to draw anything worthwhile out of these numbers, even for speculative purposes.

Moving on, we do know the dimensions have changed slightly. Here’s a comparison:

Shea Stadium LF: 338 LC: 371 C: 410 RC: 371 R: 338
Citi Field LF: 335 LC: 379 CF: 408 RC: 383 RF: 330

There’s some more room in the left/right center areas, but less to deep center. Checking Bill James Online’s +/-, they have Beltran with the following rankings for shallow, medium, and deep; -2, +3, +1. Over the last three years, Beltran has had shallow rates of +10, +5, -4; medium rates of +5, +1, -3; and deep rates of +10, +18, and +18. Basically, Beltran struggles to play shallowly hit balls, but excels at balls hit deep.

I haven’t been able to observe many Mets games this year, but I do wonder if this is a positioning thing. With Beltran playing back further to guard against balls hit in to left and right center, thus allowing some balls to drop in front of him that he would usually catch. For any of the Mets fans out there, have you noticed any difference in Beltran’s defense?

Straight out of literature; embattled young man takes his dreams elsewhere, becomes a lionized figure in the world of baseball, then experiences a tragic fall from grace. David Ortiz is one of Theo Epstein’s masterstrokes as GM, and could quickly become one of his greatest challenges. A contract extension in 2006 has Ortiz earning 12.5 million this and next year, and then a club option for 2011 without a buyout. If Ortiz continues hitting like he’s hitting – not at all – the contract can quickly become an albatross.

The best method to avoid such faith is to figure out whether Ortiz will improve or not and then decide on an appropriate action to pursue. Ortiz’ vitals show a declined walk rate, increased strikeout rate, and uncharacteristic ISO. Ortiz’ BABIP is .263, lower than last year, and far lower than Ortiz’ career .307 BABIP. This is despite an increased amount of line drives and fly balls being hit. In the old days, more fly balls meant more homeruns, right now, Ortiz’ HR/FB is 1.7%, a drastic decrease from previous years; 26.1% in 2006, 17.2% in 2007, and 14.8% in 2008.

Ortiz’ O-Swing% is at a post-2002 high 25.8%, the previous five-year high came in 2008; 20.6%. This means Ortiz is swinging out of the strike zone more and this is leading to the changes in walk and strikeout rates. Ortiz is swinging nearly 50% of the time and only making contact 76.1% of the time, consider that his career averages in those measures are 44.6% and 78.1%.

Hit Tracker Online is a ridiculously handy resource. You get a graphical view consisting of each Ortiz’ during the last four years and over measures, like the speed of the ball off of the bat. In 2007 Ortiz launched 35 homeruns and had an average speed of nearly 105 MPH, that number was actually up in 2008 to 106.3 MPH but his amount of homeruns dropped. The difference seems relatively unimportant, and the sample size for this year’s SOB – which registers in around 96 MPH, for what it’s worth – is so small that nothing can be drawn from the data.

Pardon me for stating the obvious, but something isn’t quite right with Ortiz and it seems to be physical. Either Oritz’ pitch recognition abilities are slipping, which would explain the increased hacks and decrease solid contact, and/or his bat speed, which again, would explain the former two as well as the loss of power. I’m not sure Ortiz can regain either ability, even if I do think he’s going to finish with a wOBA well above .300.

Of course, I also never thought I’d write that about David Ortiz.

Of all of the pitchers struggling on the Phillies, Brad Lidge is the most surprising. A glance at the relievers’ WAR board has Lidge firmly at the bottom of the totem pole; something unimaginable just a few months ago. Lidge’s 9.15 ERA is a scrambled mess of the 1.95 ERA posted last year. Lidge’s important metrics aren’t fairing too well either.

About 32% of the batters to step to the plate against Lidge last year went down via strikeout. That number is down to 21% this year. Fewer pitches are being thrown inside of the zone, and far less first-strikes are being recorded, leaving Lidge down in most counts. Batters are still swinging out of the zone at about the same rate but Lidge is still getting fewer strikes overall. When he is throwing pitches in the zone, batters are making contact at a ridiculously high rate. Lidge’s career Z-Contact% is 74.5%, this year it’s 86.4%.

Of the 29 hits given up, 12 have gone for extra bases, including six homeruns and doubles apiece. Lidge’s BABIP is a rotund .400. Combining this information, it would be easy to infer that Lidge is having a ton of line drives hit against him, yet this is simply not the case. His line drive percentage is at 16.7%, lower than last season or his career total. The Phillies defense is middle of the pack in UZR and BABIP against, which suggests Lidge is an outlier, that or the story lies beneath the numbers.

Looking at the pitch data, Lidge’s pitch usage is roughly the same, but velocity on his fastball is down just a bit. Lidge’s slider is still moving about the same, as is his fastball, which raises all kinds of questions about why both pitches are being hit harder than before. Our linear weights have Llidge’s fastball at -5.51 runs per 100 pitches and his slider at 0.27 per 100; last year Lidge’s fastball was worth -0.53 runs per 100 pitches and his slider 2.5 runs per 100. So again, what’s the deal here?

Per Baseball-Reference, Lidge’s fly balls have resulted in three doubles, the same amount as his line drives allowed. Lidge has a .192 fly ball BABIP against while his line drive BABIP against is .900. If those numbers seem high, well, they are. Major League average for fly ball BABIP is .143 this year; .725 for line drives. Either Lidge is unlucky, is being hit harder than the league average pitcher – which the homeruns support, although not the line drive percentage – or a combination.

Until we get more data to suggest otherwise, I’m going to assume Lidge will be fine, but he’s an interesting case none the less.

Leave it to Francisco Liriano to produce one of the oddest lines I’ve seen in a while from a starting pitcher. The Boston Red Sox paid visit to Liriano and the Twins yesterday, and brought their offense with them. Liriano lasted only four innings, allowing no walks, 11 hits, and striking out seven. Usually you see a large number of strikeouts and fewer hits or a large number of hits and fewer strikeouts, in combination it presents a bit of a paradox.

Only seven times (now eight) had a starting pitcher went four and struck out at least seven without issuing any walks. Mike Witt in 1987 allowed eight hits to the Oakland Athletics; Don Sutton in 1986 also allowed eight hits, this time against Seattle, oddly both were members of the California Angels during the feat. John Smoltz and Juan Mateo were the last two pitchers to do it, with Smoltz’ turn coming in 2007 and Mateo’s almost a year prior in 2006. J.R. Richard in 1973 and Josh Beckett in 2002 share a common opponent in the Los Angeles Dodgers and neither allowed more than three hits.

Back to Liriano, here are his hit descriptions:
– Dustin Pedroia singles to left on a fly ball.
– Mike Lowell singles to left on a line drive.
– Rocco Baldelli doubles to right on a fly ball.
– Jacoby Ellsbury singles on a ground ball to shortstop.
– Dustin Pedroia singles to left on a fly ball.
– Kevin Youkilis doubles on a sharp ground ball to left.
– Jason Bay doubles on a ground ball to left.
– Mike Lowell singles to left on a sharp ground ball.
– Jacoby Ellsbury singles on a line drive to center.
– Dustin Pedroia singles on a ground ball to left.
– Kevin Youkilis doubles to left on a line drive.

Without seeing the game, it seems to me like Liriano had a few bloopers fall in, a slow roller to short, and a few down the line. I guess this was one of those games were everything that could go for a hit did, whether it was hit hardly or not. The BABIP gods are fickle, and apparently flexed their wrath all over Liriano yesterday.

Same format as last week, but first to address the corner outfield question. Both have equal positional adjustments, hence why I lumped them together. I understand some people would rather have separate the two positions listed separately, so heading forward that’s what I’ll do.

1B
Best: Chris Davis (3.4), Ryan Howard (3.3), Lyle Overbay (3.2)
Worst: Jason Giambi (-5.3), Prince Fielder (-3.3), Aubrey Huff (-3.2)

2B
Best: Brandon Phillips (6.6), Placido Polanco (6), Howie Kendrick (5.1)
Worst: Dan Uggla (-8.1), Chris Getz (-5), Jose Lopez (-2.9)

3B
Best: Adrian Beltre (7.7), Joe Crede (7.4), Evan Longoria (5.3)
Worst: Michael Young (-7.9), Josh Fields (-5.4), Chipper Jones (-4.6)

SS
Best: J.J. Hardy (5), Ryan Theriot (4.2), Marco Scutaro (4.2)
Worst: Yuniesky Betancourt (-9.1), Miguel Tejada (-6.9), Orlando Cabrera (-2.4)

LF
Best: Nyjer Morgan (10.9), Juan Rivera (4.9), Raul Ibanez (4.6)
Worst: Jason Bay (-6.4), Jeremy Hermida (-4.7), Carlos Lee (-4.2)

CF
Best: Matt Kemp (7.4), Mike Cameron (6.6), Franklin Gutierrez (5.7)
Worst: Vernon Wells (-10.3), Shane Victorino (-8.1), Carlos Beltran (-4.8)

RF
Best: Nelson Cruz (6.3), Hunter Pence (5.4), Ichiro Suzuki (4.2)
Worst: Andre Ethier (-9.4), Brad Hawpe (-7.6), Jermaine Dye (-7.2)

The Mariners have three players rank amongst the “best” at their position, which appears to be the most of any team in the league. Unfortunately, they also have two of the worst at the middle infield positions, including Betancourt, who stakes claim of the worst individual infield defender to date. Oddly the Mariners have chosen against using Ronny Cedeno in place of either Betancourt or Lopez despite the defensive upgrade.

Vernon Wells’ days as a good center fielder might be over. Over the last three years: -14.3, -1.1, 7.5, so far this year Wells is showing no signs of bouncing back, and actually seems to be getting worse. Whether that holds up or not is another story.

Ricky Nolasco is not having the season expected of him. Nolasco’s ninth start occurred last night, and it might be his last in a Florida uniform for a while. After the game he was optioned to Triple-A. That suggests how he fared. Sort by ERA descending on the leaderboards and you get the following grouping as the only qualified pitchers with ERA over 7:

Ricky Nolasco 9.07
Scott Kazmir 7.69
Jamie Moyer 7.62
Joe Blanton 7.11

Sort by FIP and you get Moyer at the top, Kazmir, Blanton, yet Nolasco is nowhere to be found.In fact, he’s far down the page, grouped with Roy Oswalt, Matt Cain, and John Maine. Those three have ERAs of 4.47, 2.65, and 4.53, giving you an idea of where Nolasco’s walk, strikeout, and homerun rates would theoretically place him. So if Nolasco’s peripherals are decent, what’s the problem with his ERA?

After last night, about 40% of the balls being put into place against Nolasco are resulting in non-homerun hits. To say that’s a bit on the high side is like saying a flood resulted from a little rain. Nolasco’s line drive rate is up to 26%, which hardly falls in line with his prior performances. Nolasco’s pitches are finding the zone slightly less while still maintaining similar break and velocity as in prior years. The excess hits are leading to an awful strand rate of 49.4%, Nolasco’s career strand rate is 68.1%.

Maybe Nolasco does have something to work on in Triple-A, but this move seems more like a space-clearer than anything else. The Marlins are in dire need of fresh arms for a pen overworked this week. If you have the room on your fantasy bench, stash Nolasco or if you see him waived, see if you can’t pick him up after he clears waivers. It’s not like his fantasy value can drop any further.

Tonight will mark the starting debut of highly anticipated Rangers prospect, Derek L. Holland. As many of you know, Holland has already pitched in the bigs this year, seven times, oddly enough he registered his first career blown save before his first major league start. Go figure. So far his strikeout, walk, and homerun ratios have been off, leaving Holland with a 5.65 FIP, higher than most of his minor league career’s FIP combined.

Holland’s fastball has above average velocity and horizontal movement for a left-hander. He featured the pitch prominently in relief work. As for specifics, Holland throws it between 92-94 and generally sees it break in to lefties around eight inches. His slider is registering as breaking in to lefties. It’ll be interesting to see how and if Holland adjusts from throwing his fastball 80% of the time as he transitions back to the rotation.

Opposing Holland will be the Houston Astros. The only offenses in the NL scoring less than Houston are the D-Backs, Giants, and Padres, which tells you just about everything you need to know. The Astros do have some ‘fear’-inducing hitters like Lance Berkman, Carlos Lee, Hunter Pence, and Miguel Tejada, but the rest of their lineup is lacking at this point. Houston strikes out a ton and doesn’t walk too much, so that bodes well for the youngster.

Two things that may not bode well: his durability and efficiency. Here are each of Holland’s appearances listed with innings and pitches thrown.

2.1 IP 42 P
3 IP 48 P
1 IP 29 P
2 IP 16 P
0.1 IP 3 P
1.2 IP 20 P
2.2 IP 58 P

An average of 16.6 pitches per inning with a max of 58 pitches. It’s been a while since Holland extended beyond 60, and at this rate he would reach that point by the fourth inning. Without a DH, you have to wonder if Holland lasts more than twice through the lineup tomorrow, no matter how well he’s pitching.

Eric Chavez’ career could be coming to a close soon. The list of injuries associated with Chavez is long and tiresome and this news has simply thrown gas on a debate just as silly; whether Billy Beane should have blame placed on him for the Chavez extension failing. The quick answer: no.

Chavez inked a six-year 66 million dollar extension prior to the 2004 season. The contract included a club option for 2011, raising the potential contract value to nearly 80 million. It seems like a relatively safe bet to assume that option will not be exercised in favor of a 3 million dollar buyout. Our WAR numbers only go back to 2002, meaning two seasons prior to the extension being signed, ion those Chavez posted 5.6 and 4.1 win seasons. In 2001, Chavez had about the same offensive production as 2002, a little less playing time, and who knows about defense. Even if we assume he was a league average defender you get a ~4 win player. Meaning you have three consecutive 4+ win seasons.

In 2004, Chavez would post a 5.7 win season. A year later he posted a 4.3 win season, then a 3.6 win season. From there on out, Chavez has seen his health deteriorate at a rapid piece. To date, Chavez has recorded about 9 wins under the extension, totaling 30.6 million. That leaves the A’s losing about 36 million over this and next season. Surely not what Beane imagined when he called Chavez career “[A lock]” in Moneyball, but why would Beane have imagined a ton of injuries and missed time for Chavez? Chavez had seen at least 550 plate appearances in four straight seasons and played in at least 115 game every season since being promoted for good in 1999 and at least 150 from 2000 to 2004.

There’s a risk of injury with every player, but for all purposes, Chavez was a damn good risk to take. If Chavez had lost only a half of a win every season since 2006 we would be talking about a career path lke this (extension years only):

2005 4.3 WAR ($3.4 m/win)
2006 3.6 WAR ($3.7 m/win)
2007 3.1 WAR ($4.1 m/win)
2008 2.6 WAR ($4.5 m/win)
2009 2.1 WAR (~$4.7 m/win)

That’s 62 million over the first five years with one more year and then an option year to go. A six million dollar profit. No, it’s not Evan Longoria’s deal, but it was a heck of a lot less risky. We can only project the future based on what we know at the present and from history, same with any team in the league. The key in evaluating any deal in retrospect is keeping mind what was known at the time, otherwise what’s the point if only one side has the benefit of hindsight.