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FanGraphs Chat – 2/12/14

11:42
Dave Cameron: I’m hunkering down for Apocalyptic Snowstorm 2014 — for those outside the south, that means we’re going to get a few inches of snow today — so let’s talk baseball for a bit. The queue is now open.

12:00
Dave Cameron: A.J. Burnett has signed with the Phillies, for those who haven’t seen it on Twitter.

12:01
Dave Cameron: Brief analysis: Still a good pitcher, one year deals are almost always a good risk, but the Phillies aren’t a good team, so he’s now probably mid-season trade bait. Don’t be surprised if you see him moved at the deadline once the Phillies realize they’re out of it.

12:01
Comment From Graham
Should fringe-y contenders like the Reds and O’s commit to rebuilding or go all-in? It seems to make the least sense to sit right in the middle.

12:03
Dave Cameron: This is far more true in other sports than in baseball, since the returns on a top pick in the NBA or NFL can be enormous and instantaneous. In MLB, there’s little practical difference between picking 8th and 14th, and the revenue losses associated with being a non-contender may actually outweigh any gains from picking higher. I think the idea that there is little or no marginal value in wins 70-85 in baseball is just entirely wrong.

12:03
Comment From Ted
Is it unreasonable to expect Trout to continue putting up numbers like his first two seasons? What should we be expecting from him going forward?

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A Suggestion to Improve the Qualifying Offer System

Pitchers and catchers report to spring training this week, but there are still some pretty good unemployed players. And the most prominent of the remaining job-seekers — Ubaldo Jimenez, Ervin Santana, Stephen Drew, Kendrys Morales, and Nelson Cruz — all remain on the market in part due to the fact that they received a qualifying offer from their previous organization, attaching draft pick compensation in the process. All five will eventually sign, and like Kyle Lohse a year ago, most of them will probably end up with multi-year contracts for more than the $14 million in guaranteed money that they turned down in November.

However, several players and the MLBPA have been vocally unhappy with the way that the tax has encumbered some of the non-star players who have received qualifying offers, and even if we accept that the rule is designed to deflate player salaries and not actually compensate teams for losing players of value — if the system was just about compensating for a loss, it wouldn’t need to tax the signing team in the process — the drawn out process of keeping quality major leaguers on the market until February or March isn’t good for anyone. It is almost certain that the player’s association is going to ask for the qualifying offer system to be renegotiated in the next CBA, while MLB is likely to want to continue to keep some kind of compensation tax in place to help deflate free agent prices.

So, in thinking about potential alternatives to the qualifying offer system, I wonder if perhaps a very small tweak to the rules could actually produce a large change in how the system operates, and resolve perhaps the primary sticking point for the players. That change? Remove the expiration date from the qualifying offer itself.

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A Hidden Problem with Bronson Arroyo

The Diamondbacks signed Bronson Arroyo to a two year, $23.5 million contract on Friday, and predictably, response from the statistical community wasn’t that positive, especially with Paul Maholm signing for just $1.5 million in guaranteed money with the Dodgers earlier in the afternoon. Jeff already wrote up the pros and cons of Bronson Arroyo’s deal this morning, which I’m essentially in agreement with, so feel free to read that if you’re just looking for a summary of the deal. However, there’s another aspect to Arroyo that I think is worth mentioning, especially considering that he’s changing divisions.

Arroyo has really large platoon splits; some of the largest in the game, in fact. Over the last three years, he’s held RHBs to a .290 wOBA, much better than the league average, but LHBs have put up a .374 wOBA against him, making him one of the worst regular starting pitchers in baseball against left-handed bats. Among right-handed pitchers who have faced least 1,500 total batters over the last three years, only Jason Marquis (.389 wOBA) has been worse against left-handed bats. Including LHPs (which brings in the disastrous Ricky Romero), Arroyo ranks 106th out of 108 starters in wOBA vs LHBs since the start of the 2011 season. It’s a pretty big flaw.

Now, it’s not that uncommon for a pitcher to strongly favor pitching to same-handed hitters, and he’s hardly the only starter with a big platoon split. Gavin Floyd and Justin Masterson actually have bigger ratios between their wOBAs against lefties and righties, and Max Scherzer, Rick Porcello, and Lance Lynn aren’t far behind. These are all pretty solid pitchers — Scherzer obviously is more than just solid — and shows that a big platoon split doesn’t ruin a RHPs chance of sticking in the rotation. After all, you only have a big split as a Major Leaguer if you’re particularly good against same-handed hitters, so we’re selecting for pitchers who are strong against one side, giving them the ability to get some hitters out with a lot of frequency.

But this also leaves them vulnerable against teams who can stack the deck with lefties, and pitchers who run big splits tend to face a lower percentage of same-handed hitters than pitchers with a more even split. For reference, here are the five RHPs with the biggest platoon ratio over the last three years, with their batters faced totals included as well.

Player VsRHB VsLHB Total Platoon% RHBwOBA LHBwOBA Platoon Ratio
Gavin Floyd 722 910 1632 56% 0.274 0.356 1.30
Justin Masterson 1078 1539 2617 59% 0.259 0.335 1.29
Bronson Arroyo 1246 1267 2513 50% 0.290 0.374 1.29
Rick Porcello 1032 1271 2303 55% 0.291 0.369 1.27
Max Scherzer 1059 1397 2456 57% 0.264 0.334 1.27

Notice Arroyo’s Platoon%, relative to the other four? Masterson has faced nearly 60% lefties, and Floyd and the two Tigers are both over 55%. Arroyo, though, is at just 50%, as he’s faced an almost identical number of right-handed and left-handed bats since the start of the 2011 season.

A big part of that is that he’s the only National League starter in that group. An AL manager is never going to put a right-handed DH in the line-up against these guys if they can help it, so there’s basically an extra left-handed bat in the line-up against the AL platoon guys every single time out. It’s simply easier for AL managers to exploit platoon splits than it is for NL managers, which is one of the reasons why pitchers like Arroyo have more success in the NL than the AL.

But it’s not just the National League factor pushing Arroyo’s ratio of left-handed hitters down. It’s also the National League Central factor, and maybe even more specifically, a Cincinnati Reds factor. The Reds themselves had a decent amount of left-handed hitting last year, ranking 3rd in the NL in PAs from LHBs, but of course, Arroyo didn’t have to pitch against his own team, and the rest of the NL Central teams simply didn’t have much in the way of left-handed hitting.

The Cubs and Cardinals ranked 6th and 7th in the NL in PAs from LHBs, while the Pirates ranked 13th and the Brewers ranked 15th. The Brewers, in fact, were on an island to themselves in terms of right-handed slant, as every other NL team had at least 2,000 PAs from LHBs in 2013, while the Brewers had just 1,690. The Phillies and Giants sent nearly twice as many left-handed hitters to the plate last year as the Brewers did.

This wasn’t just a one year fluke, either. The non-Reds NL Central teams ranked 6th/9th/10th/11th/15th in LHB PAs in 2012, and 7th/9th/12th/13th/16th in 2011. For whatever reason, the NL Central has just not had many left-handed hitters over the last few years, with nearly every team skewing to the right side of the plate. So perhaps it shouldn’t be a huge surprise that other high Platoon Ratio/Low Platoon% pitchers happen to pitch for NL Central teams as well. Charlie Morton (PIT) has had a whopping 1.44 Platoon Ratio, but just 46% of his batters faced have been LHBs. Lance Lynn (STL) posted a 1.26 Platoon Ratio, but only faced 46% LHBs over the last three years. Shaun Marcum (MIL, mostly) put up a 1.24 Platoon Ratio, but faced just 49% LHBs from 2011-2013. Jeff Samardzija (CHC): 1.14 Platoon Ratio, 47% Platoon%.

Outside of NL Central hurlers, we just don’t really see examples of righties who struggle against lefties getting to face more righties than lefties. Especially in the AL, these pitchers end up facing 55-60% LHBs, and even in the NL West and East, the number is more regularly in the 52-53% range. And unfortunately for Bronson Arroyo, he doesn’t get to take the NL Central’s distribution of hitters with him to Arizona.

How big a deal is a few percentage points in platoon distribution? Well, let’s use Arroyo as an example. If you just take his three year wOBA against numbers (.290/.372), here’s what his total wOBA allowed would look like based on different platoon ratio distributions.

50/50 PA wOBA
RHB 425 0.290
LHB 425 0.374
Total 50% 0.332
—- —- —-
45/55 PA wOBA
RHB 380 0.290
LHB 470 0.374
Total 55% 0.336
—- —- —-
40/60 PA wOBA
RHB 340 0.290
LHB 510 0.374
Total 60% 0.340

You take the same pitcher with the same skills and move him from a 50/50 to a 40/60 distribution, and his wOBA allowed goes up eight points just from the additional number of left-handers he’d have to face. Eight points of wOBA might not seem like a big deal, but over 850 batters faced, that adds up to about an extra six runs allowed per year. Over 200 innings, that’s roughly equivalent to 20 points of ERA.

Now, Arroyo almost certainly won’t face 60% left-handed hitters in Arizona, since it’s still an NL team and he won’t have to face DH-filled line-ups too often, but this is one of those subtle things that suggests that Arroyo’s change of location might make him a little worse off than even the modest projections already suggest, and perhaps more importantly, this flaw significantly limits Arroyo’s usefulness in October. While there’s an argument to be made that regular season totals understate the importance of frontline pitchers and ace relievers in the playoffs — which is likely one one the reasons why teams pay premiums to acquire these types of players — starters with big platoon splits are less valuable in October than they are in the regular season.

If Arizona happens to make the postseason, any team facing them in the NLDS or NLCS will have the ability to stack its roster in such a way as to force Arroyo to face a bunch of left-handed bats, and if Arizona makes it to the World Series, starting him in an AL park is basically a no-go, because otherwise he’d be tasked with facing yet another left-handed bat in the form of the DH. In other words, the Diamondbacks paid Arroyo $23.5 million to help them make the playoffs in the next two years, but if they get there, he probably won’t be able to actually help them much in the postseason, given that his success is pretty dependent on facing line-ups filled with right-handed hitters.

This isn’t just a warning for the Diamondbacks. This is relevant for any team trading for Samardzija, Lynn, or any other right-handed pitcher in the NL Central. It’s not a huge factor and shouldn’t be the reason why you don’t complete a trade for a hurler from that division, but it’s worth keeping in mind that the RHPs in the NL Central are probably not quite as good as they look.


Dan Szymborski FanGraphs Chat – 2/10/14

11:57
Dan Szymborski: And boom goes the Danimite.

11:58
Comment From Jack
Better signing for the Nats: Burnett or Morales

11:59
Dan Szymborski: Morales probably better than Burnett – the Nats are one of the teams that have the least need for Burnett and I wouldn’t go after Morales in their position

12:00
Comment From Harjit
What do you think happens with Stephen Drew? This has to end at some point right?

12:01
Dan Szymborski: Have a little bit about Drew in an upcoming piece. I think that some of the QO decliners made a big tactical mistake.

12:02
Dan Szymborski: The cost of losing even a 2nd rounder is magnified when it’s a player of the type likely to be signed to a 1-or-2 year deal.

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The Escalating Trend of Paying for Prime Years

On Wednesday, the Braves announced that they had signed Freddie Freeman to an eight year, $135 million extension. I’ve already written about the diminishing need for a track record and about whether this deal heralds a coming market correction, but hopefully you’ll indulge some more thoughts about this contract and the changing economic structure of Major League Baseball.

There’s no question that teams are throwing more and more money at players who haven’t reached free agency; this is the 15th extension of $100+ million signed in the last three years by a player who was still under team control for at least another year. Players no longer have to reach the open market in order to obtain nine figure contracts, and as we’ve seen with Joey Votto, Elvis Andrus, and now Freddie Freeman, players don’t even have to get to their walk year to land a monster extension anymore. And while this shift towards big money deals for non-free agents is a new thing in MLB, it might be part of an ongoing trend that is shifting baseball’s payroll distribution back to what it was before “the PED era”.

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The Freddie Freeman Deal as a Market Correction

Even a couple of days after the news broke about the Braves locking up Freddie Freeman to a $135 million contract, there remains a lot of residual skepticism about this price for a non-star player who was still three years from free agency. Yesterday I compared the deal to similar contracts signed by Ryan Braun and Elvis Andrus, but Freeman doesn’t have Ryan Braun’s track record and Andrus was a year ahead of him in service time, so both comparisons required a little imagination. The reality is that we haven’t seen a contract like this for a player like Freeman before. The guys who have landed $100+ million extensions while still early in their careers have almost exclusively been superstars (Braun, Troy Tulowitzki, and Buster Posey), and Freeman is not at that level. This is the first nine figure commitment we’ve seen to a player this far from free agency who isn’t already one of the true elite players in the sport.

The size of the Freeman commitment stands out because, over the last four or five years, we’ve seen a rash of young player contract extensions that have generally been for far less than what the Braves just gave their first baseman; in most cases, the total guarantees were half as large as what Freeman just got from Atlanta. It’s easy to react negatively to 8/$135M for Freeman when you see contracts like 7/$80M for Carlos Gonzalez, 6/$66M for Nick Markakis, 6/$51M for Andrew McCutchen, Justin Upton, and Jay Bruce, and a bunch of contracts hanging in the 5/30M range for good young pitchers like Madison Bumgarner, Chris Sale, Jon Lester, Derek Holland. These prices are what we’re used to seeing in terms of long term deals for good young players with potential but also real risk. Freeman’s deal blew all those contracts out of the water, even though as a player at this point in his career, he’s pretty similar to many of them.

So that leaves us with two options. Either the Braves massively overpaid Freeman — a pretty popular sentiment, it appears — or that players and agents have concluded that the previously agreed to price levels were simply too team friendly. I’m going with the latter.

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Freddie Freeman and Choosing Youth over Track Record

As the calendar has flipped to February, we are officially transitioning out of free agent season — though a few stragglers remain — and moving into extension season. With arbitration providing the nudge for teams and players to run valuations and negotiate over their differences, it’s only natural that these discussions often turn into conversations about long term deals that avoid the process entirely, and the spring training months provide the best opportunity for a team and a player to come to a mutual agreement on a mutli-year extension. While Clayton Kershaw kicked off the extension season a few weeks ago, Freddie Freeman’s new deal with the Braves is a reminder that extension season isn’t limited to just big market teams with overflowing revenues, and also a reminder of just how important a player’s age has become in long term valuations.

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FanGraphs Chat – 2/5/14

11:43
Dave Cameron: The queue is now open. Fire away.

12:03
Dave Cameron: Going to start a few minutes late today so I can finish this Freeman extension post.

12:12
Dave Cameron: Okay, Freeman post is up. Short version: it’s expensive, but Freeman is young enough that this is the rare eight year deal that probably won’t end with the player being an albatross.

12:12
Comment From Oren
What’s taking so long? (You know… with all the players not signing contracts and such)

12:13
Dave Cameron: Tanaka killed the pitching market for a month. It will get sorted out in the next week.

12:13
Comment From EC
Which Nats pitcher has the best chance for a Cy Young?

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Revisiting a Blockbuster That Was Actually a Heist

On yesterday’s podcast, Carson and I had a brief conversation about how different history can look with the benefit of hindsight. Or, maybe more accurately, how different baseball history can occasionally look if you apply our current tools and analysis to players and transactions from before the statistical revolution really became popular. That isn’t to say our current tools are perfect — I’m sure in 15 to 20 years, we’ll look back at our current analysis and see a bunch of problems — but I think it’s pretty clear that both the people running baseball teams and watching baseball games understand the relative value of different players better now than they used to. And there’s perhaps no single transaction that better illustrates the stark changes in player valuation we’ve seen over the last 15 years than the trade that sent Ken Griffey Jr to the Reds after the 1999 season.

Griffey was, at that point, one of the game’s true elite. He’d racked up +20 WAR from ages 27 to 29, and that’s with defensive metrics that thought his defense was just average in center field, a sentiment which opposing managers didn’t agree, given that he won a gold glove in each of those three seasons. If he wasn’t the best player in the game, he wasn’t far off from that mark, and because he decided he didn’t want to play in Seattle anymore, the Mariners had to put him on the trade block.

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The Next Crop of Free Agent Pitchers

While a lot of the current focus is on the remaining starting pitchers from this free agent class and where they will end up, we are getting close to the point where the focus starts to shift to the players who are going to hit free agency after next season. Generally, spring training is the time of the contract extension, and for players under team control for only one more season, this is often the last time they’ll negotiate an extension before testing the free agent market. Last year, we saw guys like Martin Prado and Carlos Gomez sign new contracts during this stretch of the off-season, and the year before, we saw Matt Cain, Ryan Zimmerman, and Howie Kendrick sign deals that kept them from playing out their walk year. And of course, Clayton Kershaw just reset the bar on long term extensions for players with only one year of team control remaining.

With the recent trend of teams ponying up nearly free agent prices to keep players from testing the market, we should expect that Kershaw won’t be the last pitcher to choose guaranteed security now rather than playing out the string and opening himself up to a bidding war next winter. So, today, let’s take a look at the 2013 lines from the five big remaining starters who are either going to land an extension in the next few months or hit free agency next winter.

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