After this afternoon’s graph, some of you requested a breakdown by starters and relievers to remove any potential bias among soft-tossing relievers getting inflated strikeout rates due to their situational usage. So, here you go – I broke the group presented in the first graph into greater than 100 IP and less than 100 IP, which is a good enough proxy, and redid the graphs.

Obviously, there are a lot more relievers than starters, but the data is basically the same. As you can see, the slope of the regression line is very similar – there doesn’t appear to be a significant difference between starting and relieving in terms of correlation between fastball velocity and strikeout rate. The r (not squared, which I’ve adjusted based on a couple good comments this afternoon) is .43 for starters and .38 for relievers.

Of course, this is for major league players only. How does velocity interact with strikeout rate in the minors? We’ll look at that tomorrow.

One of the things that I’ve been wanting to look into this off-season is the relationship between velocity and effectiveness. As we all know, major league pitchers are selected off of the strength of their fastball more than anything else. Body type, breaking balls, performance – all of those fail to receive the same level of confidence as fastball velocity. If a guy can throw in the upper 90s consistently, he’s going to get a chance to work out all his other issues. If a guy can’t break 80, he’s going to have to be phenomenal at everything else to even get a crack at a major league job.

However, we know that velocity isn’t everything. Command, movement, the ability to mix pitches – these all count, and in many cases, they count a lot. Jamie Moyer is the obvious example that everyone points to. It’s clear that velocity isn’t a prerequisite for major league success, but that doesn’t really give us an answer for how important it is.

To start looking at the issue, I’ve taken the 427 pitchers who accumulated at least 30 IP in the majors last year and plotted their velocity and K/9 rate on a graph. Rather than talk about it some more, I’ll just show you that graph.

You can click on the graph to see the full version, by the way.

First off, there’s an obvious relationship. The regression line through the middle trends up, which fits with common sense – guys who throw hard strike out more batters than guys who don’t. But perhaps the slope of the line isn’t quite what you might have expected? It’s lower than I thought it would be, honestly. While there are guys like Jonathan Broxton and Fernando Rodney who fit right into the high velocity/high strikeout rate category, there’s also Brandon League and Matt Lindstrom – the two hardest throwers in the sample, and they posted K/9 rates of 6.27 and 6.75 respectively.

If you look down in the right hand corner, you’ll notice the r squared, which is the coefficient of determination. This number, .2299, essentially means that if you had a pitcher’s single year velocity data, you’d know about 23% of what is necessary to know his strikeout rate for that year. The other 77% of strikeout rate is not explained by how hard he throws his fastball. Now, since these are just single year samples, a portion of that unexplained K/9 rate will be noise, so don’t take that to mean that 77% of strikeout rate is command, off-speed stuff, and other factors all under the pitcher’s control. There’s variables outside of what the pitcher can influence that are in play, too – the umpires, the opposing batters, etc…

Still, though, it’s important to know that if you’re trying to predict strikeout rate, velocity is about 1/4 of what you need to account for. That makes it likely to be the biggest factor, but it’s not so dominating as to exclude the other things besides throwing hard. A high velocity fastball is a good thing, but it is definitely not the only thing.

I know Matthew wrote about this a few weeks ago, but hopefully, you’ll bare with me as we revisit the topic of Ichiro’s value. It has become prominent again in the local discussions of the Seattle Mariners, as J.J. Putz and Adrian Beltre have expressed frustration with his style of play.

In the last three years, here’s the Win Value leaderboard for major league outfielders.

1. Grady Sizemore, +20 wins
2. Carlos Beltran, +18.4 wins
3. Matt Holliday, +18.1 wins
4. Curtis Granderson, +14.7 wins
5. Ichiro Suzuki, +14.5 wins

Over the last three years, Ichiro has been a more valuable player than Manny Ramirez, Magglio Ordonez, Alfonso Soriano, or Vladimir Guerrero. Do you see their teammates complaining that they don’t play the game the right way (okay, Manny, but that’s a different kind of issue entirely)? Do you see them continually being derided for what they don’t do?

We’re in desperate need of a paradigm shift. For too long, baseball players have been put into boxes and defined based on how well they fit a preconceived notion of what is valuable. If you don’t do those certain things, then your value is diminished, regardless of how well you do everything else.

A player’s value is the sum of his total contributions on the field. And those contributions come in all shapes and sizes. You don’t have to hit home runs to be a star. You don’t have to play defense to be a star. You don’t have to be nice to the media to be a star. If you have a deficiency in one area, you can make up for it with superlative greatness in another.

Ichiro is a star. That he doesn’t produce like Guerrero or Ramirez doesn’t make him less valuable, just because he doesn’t look like a right fielder.

Let’s just toss our preconceived notions of what a player should do overboard and evaluate them on what they actually do. We care about their tangible value, not our interpretation of whether their value fits the mold.

One graph is not enough for today, so, here’s another. This one is 2008 major league outfielders with defense on the horizontal axis and offense on the vertical axis. I adjusted the UZR for all the centerfielders up 10 runs (except Ichiro and Ellsbury, who got lesser adjustments for less than full seasons as a CF), since the average CF is about 10 runs better defensively than the average corner OF. I also adjusted all the wRAA numbers down by 8.5 runs to account for the fact that outfielders are better than average hitters. This puts all the outfielders on the same scale, where we’re comparing them all evenly to each other.

The upper left quadrant would be the the good bat/bad glove, group, consisting of guys like Brad Hawpe, Adam Dunn, and Bobby Abreu. This could also be referred to as the reality check group, as they just had their contract demands violently re-adjusted. These guys have been, for the most part, viewed as star level players, but are generally less valuable than perceived due to their lack of defensive ability.

The lowet left quadrant would be, essentially, replacement level players. A below average bat and a below average glove is not a good combination. Here you see guys like Jeff Francoeur, Delmon Young, and Jose Guillen. They didn’t help their teams last year.

The lower right quadrant are the bad bat/good glove guys – the ones who don’t hit all that well but offer their value in the field. These players are the antithesis of the sluggers, and in general, have been undervalued for the last few years. Carlos Gomez is a great example, as his bat was bad but his glove more than made up for it, making him a positive contributor to the Twins.

But then there’s the upper right quadrant. These guys are the ones that everyone likes. They hit, they run, they throw – they are five tool superstars and among the best players in the game. You’ll find guys like Carlos Beltran, Grady Sizemore, and Nick Markakis hanging out over here.

We’ve introduced a lot of cool new metrics here on the site in the last year, and we’ve also written a lot of stuff about those metrics and various goings on in baseball. However, you’ll note that the main part of the site’s name is still graphs, so I figured it was about time we got back to our roots. So, for this post, I’m doing less writing and more graphing.

This graph represents the spread in talent among major league outfielders for 2008 for three different metrics – wRAA, Range Runs, and ARM. Basically, what we’ve got here is the distribution of offensive ability, fielding ability by running, and fielding ability by throwing. These metrics essentially encapsulate the value of the traditional five tools – hitting for average, hitting for power, running, fielding, and throwing as they relate to outfielders.

As you’d expect, the biggest gap is in offensive ability. There are a few outfielders who can really hit and some who are pretty lousy with the bat, making the spread from best to worst nearly 80 runs. Likewise, there’s a pretty decent spread in terms of range, with the best outfielders being about 50 runs better than the worst outfielders. But the spread in arm ratings is much, much smaller – not quite 20 runs. Throwing is nice, but it’s not running, and it’s certainly not hitting. This is why MLB players are selected based on their bats and their legs, not their arms.

My favorite thing to draw from this graph, though, is the value of elite defenders with average bats. If you had a guy with 0 wRAA, meaning he was the epitome of a league average hitter, but he was best in the league at both fielding and throwing, he’d be at the +30 point on the graph. Look at where +30 is in wrAA compared to the spread of talent. There are not very many +30 wRAA outfielders.

A league average bat who is an elite runner and thrower is about equal in value to a Ryan Braun type of hitter. You can make up for a lot of offensive lack with defensive greatness in the outfield.

Yesterday, David announced that the UZR data presented here on the site has been updated to include outfield arm ratings and double play ratings for infielders. So, today, I figured I’d take a look at some of the guys who have been standouts in those categories. This afternoon, we’ll look at outfield arms.

ARM ratings, like UZR, vary a bit from year to year. Because of that, it’s generally better to look at more than one season’s worth of data to get an idea of how much value a player is adding with his throwing ability from the outfield. So, here are the leaders in ARM over the past three years:

Alfonso Soriano – +25.6 runs
Jeff Francoeur – +23.4 runs
Ichiro Suzuki – +12.5 runs
Nick Markakis – +10.8 runs
Michael Cuddyer – +10.4 runs

and now the trailers over the same time period.

Brian Giles – -19.5 runs
Juan Pierre – -16.3 runs
Jermaine Dye – -13.5 runs
Shawn Green – -12.3 runs (and he didn’t play in ’08!)
Adam Dunn – -12.2 runs

As you can see, the spread in value of a strong arm versus a weak arm is significantly smaller than it is with range. The very best arm is +45 runs compared to the very worst arm over a three year period. In range, the spread is almost 100 runs from best (Carl Crawford) to worst (Brad Hawpe). So, while arm strength is nice, it is simply not as important as range.

That doesn’t mean that it doesn’t have any impact, though. Over the last three years, Soriano is averaging +8.5 runs per season with his arm. That’s almost a win per year in value. Likewise, Francouer, Markakis, Ichiro, and Cuddyer get significant value from their ability to gun down runners and hold runners from advancing.

These numbers cover 2006 to 2008. But, what if we go back in time, and look at 2003 to 2005?

At the top, we see Jim Edmonds at +21.8 runs, followed by Richard Hidalgo (+17.9), Alex Rios (+17.1), Rocco Baldelli (+16.8), and Ichiro again (+14.0). The noodle arms are led by Juan Pierre (-18.4), Jason Bay (-13.8), Tike Redman (-13.7), Brady Clark (-13.2), and Johnny Damon (-13).

Pierre, as you may have noticed, shows up in the bottom of both three year periods. Indeed, since 2002, Pierre’s arm has been worth -42.2 runs, canceling out more than half of the +70.9 runs he got with his range. He has been consistently awful at throwing, and it’s just yet another reason why the contract the Dodgers gave him was absurdly awful.

The corner OF market began to unclog today. First, Abreu goes to the Angels, which we discussed this afternoon, and now Adam Dunn has joined the Washington Reds for $20 million over two years. This is a classic Jim Bowden move – acquire a former top prospect that he’s already acquired previously, especially if he doesn’t really have room for them on his roster. If Bowden was a general contractor, he’d build houses with nine bedrooms, six garages, no bathrooms, and half a roof.

But, getting beyond Bowden’s hilarious roster construction strategies, this move is similar to the Abreu signing – it will make the Nationals better, is a good deal in terms of cost per wins, and will create a roster headache for Manny Acta.

By all accounts, Dunn is signing with the understanding that he’s going to play first base. He replaces the Nick Johnson/Dmitri Young duo of unhealth, and they’ll just call the $10 million that they owe those two a sunk cost. In a best case scenario, Johnson shows something in spring training and the Nationals could move him to someone who needs a LH bat and they get out of his contract.

Dunn, as a first baseman, should be worth something like +2 to +3 wins for the next two years. Moving to first base gets his glove out of the outfield, but he’s been pretty awful at first base in the 900 innings he got in Cincinnati, so he still gives back a decent chunk of his offense with his poor glovework. But, a +2 to +3 win player for $10 million a year at only a two year commitment isn’t a bad deal, especially for a team that’s trying to draw some fans to a new park and.

The problem, though, is that using Dunn as a first baseman means Josh Willingham is now stuck in the outfield, and it’s a ridiculously crowded outfield. Without Dunn, Acta could have potentially hid Willingham at first and gotten Kearns or Harris into the line-up, so Dunn isn’t replacing replacement level players. Both Kearns and Harris can play a really good outfield and hit a little bit, and this move makes it significantly harder for either of them to find playing time for Washington.

Just like with Abreu, the overall value added to the roster by the player will be less than his individual win value. Dunn’s a nice enough player, but this doesn’t make the Nationals significantly better. This should bump them up by a win or so. This is still a really poorly constructed roster. Why is Jim Bowden still employed?

The Angels spent most of the winter declaring that 2009 was the season when they were finally going to give their young kids a real shot, and used that as an explanation for why they weren’t active in replacing Mark Teixeira after he headed to the Yankees and told Garret Anderson to enjoy the rest of his career elsewhere. However, with the price for Bobby Abreu crashing through the floor, they couldn’t pass up a deal when they saw one, and have reportedly signed him to a one year, $5 million-ish deal.

From a pure dollars per win standpoint, this is obviously a good move. Even with Abreu’s defensive decline, he’s still something like a +2 to +2.5 win player, so the Angels are paying just a couple of million per win in this deal. If he puts them over the top and helps them win the AL West, the return on those dollars could be in the 500% range. It’s money well spent.

However, it creates some interesting questions in LA. They already re-signed Juan Rivera to a three year contract earlier this winter, and obviously Torii Hunter and Vladimir Guerrero are going to play when healthy. Plus, there’s guys like Gary Matthews Jr and Reggie Willits hanging around as reserve outfielders already on the roster. There had also been talk of moving Chone Figgins to the OF to make room for Brandon Wood, one of the young kids who the Angels had been saying was going to get a real chance to prove himself in the majors this year. So, how do they sort all this out?

Let’s take a look at the five positions that are related here – LF, CF, RF, 3B, and DH. Between those five spots, the Angels have something like 3,500 plate appearances to hand out. 2,500 or so will be against RHP, with the other 1,000 coming against LHP, assuming a 70/30 split. Let’s start filling up those PA totals with one potential option.

RF – Guerrero, 375 PA vs RHP, 150 PA vs LHP
RF – Abreu, 125 PA vs RHP, 50 vs LHP

CF – Hunter, 450 PA vs RHP, 150 PA vs LHP
CF – Matthews, 50 PA vs RHP, 50 PA vs LHP

LF – Abreu, 250 PA vs RHP, 75 PA vs LHP
LF – Rivera, 125 PA vs RHP, 100 PA vs LHP
LF – Matthews, 125 PA vs RHP, 25 PA vs LHP

DH – Rivera, 200 PA vs RHP, 100 PA vs LHP
DH – Abreu, 125 PA vs RHP, 25 PA vs LHP
DH – Figgins, 75 PA vs RHP, 25 vs LHP
DH – Guerrero, 50 PA vs RHP, 25 PA vs LHP
DH – Wood, 50 PA vs RHP, 25 PA vs LHP

3B – Figgins, 400 PA vs RHP, 125 PA vs LHP
3B – Wood, 100 PA vs RHP, 75 PA vs LHP

Total by Player:

Guerrero: 425 PA vs RHP, 175 PA vs LHP
Hunter: 450 PA vs RHP, 150 PA vs LHP
Abreu: 500 PA vs RHP, 150 PA vs LHP
Rivera: 325 PA vs RHP, 200 PA vs LHP
Figgins: 475 PA vs RHP, 150 PA vs LHP
Matthews: 175 PA vs RHP, 75 PA vs LHP
Wood: 150 PA vs RHP, 100 PA vs LHP

That’s one way that the Angels could potentially distribute the 3,500 PA they’ll get from those five positions. As you can see, the regular line-up would include Guerrero, Hunter, Abreu, Rivera, and Figgins, with Matthews and Wood relegated to backup duties.

The problem, however, is that if you’re consistently starting Guerrero, Rivera, and Abreu, two of those three have to play the outfield. That’s just not going to be a pretty sight to watch, and the pitching staff will take a hit with that kind of outfield defense behind them.

Abreu will help the Angels offense – that’s not in question. However, there are roster issues here that need to be worked out. In reality, the at-bats Abreu is going to get are coming from Gary Matthews (which downgrades the defense) and from Brandon Wood (which stalls his development, again). The marginal impact of Abreu’s presence on the team, while taking playing time from those two, is probably in the +1 win range.

This is a good move for the Angels. Adding a +2 win player, who is about +1 win better than your current alternatives, for $5 million in a season where you’re expecting to contend is a move that you should make. But this isn’t a huge upgrade for the Angels – it’s a marginal improvement, and one that could potentially cause some other issues.

This afternoon, we talked about the raising of the acceptable level of offense in baseball in the last 20 years. Alfredo Griffin simply wouldn’t be allowed to play full time for 12 years anymore – he was that bad of a hitter. However, Griffin’s -286.7 wRAA isn’t quite the worst in MLB history.

That belongs to Bill Bergen, who nudged Griffin by -1 wRAA – but needed 4,000 less plate appearances to do so. Bergen, a catcher from 1901 to 1911, was an unbelievably bad hitter, even in an era of bad hitting.

He got 3,228 plate appearances over 11 years. His career average was .170/.194/.201. That’s not a typo. He really posted a .189 wOBA for his career.

He hit two home runs. Two. In 3,200+ plate appearances.

His wRAA per 600 PA stands at a staggering -53.4. Remember, Griffin’s was -23. Over a full season, he was 30 runs worse than one of the worst hitters of all time.

Baseball has obviously changed quite a bit since Bergen played, so numbers can’t be compared straight across, but even for his day, Bergen was a miserable hitter. And yet, he was sent to the plate 3,228 times in his career.

Pretty amazing.

On Sunday, in Peter Gammons’ latest blog post, he talked about how baseball is falling back in love with defense. You’ve probably noticed that we’ve been beating the defense-is-undervalued drum for a while here, so it’s nice to see some mainstream recognition that glovework is still a significant part of a position players value.

In the post, Gammons talks about the Whitey Herzog Cardinals, the ones who had Ozzie Smith and Willie McGee and Andy Van Slyke. Remember, that St. Louis team in 1985 started Vince Coleman in left field, even though he hit one home run and slugged .335 that season. They went with a speed-and-defense outfield, eschewing power outside of Jack Clark. Is that where we’re headed once again?

In short, I don’t think so. The concept of what the acceptable level of offense from a position player is has dramatically shifted over the last 20 years. In 1979, Alfredo Griffin claimed the starting SS job for the Toronto Blue Jays, and he would essentially have a full-time job through 1991. In his career, he racked up 7,330 plate appearances despite a .268 wOBA. His career wRAA is -286.7, or -24 runs per 600 PA. In 1990, the Dodgers gave him 502 plate appearances in which he posted a .227 wOBA, good for a -35.7 wRAA on the season.

Griffin’s not the only example of guys who were absolutely terrible hitters racking up substantial playing time. Ozzie Guillen got 7,133 PA and accumulated -282 wRAA. Tim Foli – 6,573 PA, -242 wRAA. Everyone knew these guys couldn’t hit, but they played anyway.

In the 1990s, however, that shifted. Yes, we still saw players like Rey Ordonez make the majors, but he lasted just 3,407 plate appearances before teams decideed that his defense didn’t make up for his lack of offense. Rey Sanchez is almost exactly the same level of hitter as Griffin (-23.5 wRAA per 600 PA), but managed just over 5,000 career PA, and was only handed a regular everyday job by one organization, who fixed their error after two and a half years.

Likewise, Neifi Perez has managed just over 5,000 career PA while producing at a level similar to Foli. Royce Clayton is the worst modern hitter to rack up 8,000+ PA, and he’s “only” -15 wRAA per 600 PA. Quite simply, the acceptable baseline level of offense has gone up, and probably correctly so.

While it’s great to see teams valuing defense more and more, I don’t think we’re heading back to Whitey Herzog’s baseball. After the over-emphasis on defense in the 1970s and 1980s, and the over-emphasis of offense in the 1990s and 2000s, we might actually be headed towards middle ground.