Entering the 2017 season, Marcell Ozuna had been a roughly average offensive player over the course of his career and slightly better than that in the field. Per 600 plate appearances, that works out to something close to a three-win player. This year, Ozuna looks like he might reach 3.0 WAR by the All-Star break. He’s getting on base nearly 40% of the time and has powered up with 14 homers just a third of the way through the season. His switch from center field to left field doesn’t seem to have hurt his value.

There’s talk that Ozuna, whose salary is likely to increase through arbitration, could be a trade target. With two-plus seasons left of team control, it certainly looks like Ozuna is breaking out. That said, we’ve also seen this show before. Is this somehow different?

Back in 2014, Ozuna broke out for the first time. After a half-season of playing time the year before, Ozuna hit .269/.317/.455 and with good numbers in center field. The result: a four-win campaign. The following year, Ozuna was pretty close to average for a while, then slumped badly enough for the Marlins to send him to the minors and prevent him from becoming a super-2 arbitration player. Last year, Ozuna recorded solid numbers, hitting .266/.321/.452 and essentially matching his 2014 campaign. Unfortunately for Ozuna, the surge in offense over the last few seasons meant that his 116 wRC+ in 2014 was now just 105 last year. While hitting 5% better than average last year might not seem that great, we should remember that Ozuna broke out last year, too.

On May 20 of last season, I wrote a piece asking, “Is Marcell Ozuna Breaking Out?” At the time, Ozuna was hitting a lot like he is right now. Good power with a high BABIP has been Ozuna’s path to productive performance. Here are some relevant stats on Ozuna for this season and last season:

Read the rest of this entry »

This is now the third consecutive year in which I’ve written a post about the potential misuse of defensive metrics early in the season. We all want as large a sample size as possible to gather data and make sure what we are looking at is real. That is especially true with defensive statistics, which are reliable, but take longer than other stats to become so.

While the reminder is still a useful one, this year’s edition is a bit different. Past years have necessitated the publication of two posts on UZR outliers. This year, due to the lack of outliers at the moment, one post will be sufficient.

First, let’s begin with an excerpt from the UZR primer by Mitchel Lichtman:

Most of you are familiar with OPS, on base percentage plus slugging average. That is a very reliable metric even after one season of performance, or around 600 PA. In fact, the year-to-year correlation of OPS for full-time players, somewhat of a proxy for reliability, is almost .7. UZR, in contrast, depending on the position, has a year-to-year correlation of around .5. So a year of OPS data is roughly equivalent to a year and half to two years of UZR.

Last season, I identified 10 players whose defensive numbers one-third of the way into the season didn’t line up with their career numbers: six who were underperforming and four who were overperforming. The players in the table below were all at least six runs worse than their three-year averages from previous seasons. If they had kept that pace, they would have lost two WAR in one season just from defense alone. None of those six players kept that pace, and all improved their numbers over the course of the season.

The next table depicts the guys who appeared to be overperforming early on. If these players were to keep pace with their early-season exploits, the rest-of-season column would be double the one-third column. Brandon Crawford actually came fairly close to reaching that mark; nobody else did, however, as the other three put up worse numbers over the last two-thirds of the season than they had in its first third.

Just like with the underperfomers, all four of overperformers had recorded defensive marks six runs off their established levels. Replicating those figures over the rest of the season would have meant a two-win gain on defense alone. Again, no one accomplished that particular feat.

A funny thing happened when I ran the numbers for this season. There weren’t any outliers of a magnitude similar to last season or the season before. It’s possible you missed the announcement at the end of April, but there have been some changes made to UZR to help improve the metric.

Read the rest of this entry »

After the White Sox traded Chris Sale, rumors flew that Jose Quintana would be on the move soon, as well. Quintana has been quite good for Chicago, but the club had no designs on contending in 2017. With four more years of control at under $40 million, Quintana was a valuable trade chip. The White Sox were right to expect a return for Quintana that rivaled their hauls for Chris Sale and Adam Eaton. Those demands weren’t met, however, and the White Sox entered the season with Quintana as their ace.

Looking at Quintana’s line so far this season — he has a 5.60 ERA and 4.28 FIP — it’s hard to imagine that his current trade value remains as high as it was this offseason. The main problem has been home runs. Let’s take a closer look.

First, some good news: Quintana has actually increased his strikeout rate relative to previous seasons. That mark stands at to 23.0% currently, higher than his career average of 20.1% and last year’s 21.6%. His walks have gone up, too, though: up to 8.6% from his career average and last year’s average around 6%. A 40% increase in walks is definitely something to note, but more alarming is Quintana’s home-run rate. Here are Quintana’s relevant home-run statistics during his career:

Quintana has been pitching in a tough pitcher’s park for the duration of his career, so the regularity with which he’s suppressed home runs would appear to be a bit of a skill at this point. That said, there’s definitely been a departure this season from his established levels. His walks seem to indicate he’s not quite the pitcher he has been, but a lot of other indicators check out. His velocity seems decent enough. He’s getting first-pitch strikes. He’s pitching in the zone roughly the same amount and swings in and out of the zone don’t seem overly alarming. The home runs are only a big deal to the extent they have a tangible effect on Quintana’s stat line.

Read the rest of this entry »

For a guy with just 484 plate appearances, a 104 career wRC+, and 1.4 WAR, Kyle Schwarber gets talked about an awful lot. There are a lot of good reasons for that talk. He was part of a rejuvenation for the Cubs in 2015 that saw the team move from punching bag to NL force. He hit a massive home run in the National League Division Series that year. After missing almost the entire season and playoffs last season, he returned for just the World Series, during which he reached base in 10 out of 20 plate appearances. Those are some impressive feats for such a brief career.

But again, the regular-season numbers aren’t exceptional. Is it possible that Schwarber is overrated due to his performances in big moments? Maybe a tad. He is an offense-first corner outfielder who needs to hit a ton to be a really valuable player. The Cubs’ insistence on keeping him instead of trading him for a potential upgrade elsewhere might play into his perceived value versus actual value, as well. In either case, Schwarber was still a good hitter entering the 2017 season. Whatever his struggles so far, he probably still is a good hitter.

Right now, Schwarber is putting up poor batting numbers, including a .165/.286/.341 slash line and 70 wRC+ in 206 plate appearances. Those marks have rendered Schwarber something worse than replacement level so far this season. If the Cubs were running away with the division right now like they did last year, maybe Schwarber’s results get a bit less scrutiny. (Maybe. Of course, the struggles of Jason Heyward last year certainly drew a lot of attention.) It probably doesn’t help that Schwarber began the season in the leadoff spot, either. In any event, Schwarber’s results have been terrible. Before he makes major changes to his swing or his approach, however — or before the organization does something drastic — it’s probably worth exploring whether Schwarber’s just hit into a bit (or a lot) of bad luck due, simply, to hitting ’em where they are.

Read the rest of this entry »

Over the winter, Jose Bautista was forced to settle on a one-year contract of about $18 million, or roughly the price of a qualifying offer. Given Bautista’s performance over the previous half-dozen years — during which he’d been one of the game’s best hitters — that deal came as a surprise. Most thought he would get three or four years guaranteed at that rate.

When a player receives so little compared to the general consensus, there’s an inclination to believe that maybe the teams know something we don’t. Bautista had just recorded one of his worst seasons, putting up a 122 wRC+, a 20-point drop from his previous three campaigns. Perhaps there was reason to believe that his poor 2016 season was going to carry over into this year. That certainly looked to be the case just a few weeks into the current season. Not so much anymore.

On April 25, Jose Bautista had played in 19 games, recorded 85 plate appearances, and produced just three extra-base hits, only one of those a homer. His walk rate was a solid 15%, but his strikeout rate was 31%. A lot of strikeouts and no power caused an early-season hitting line of .129/.271/.200 and just a 33 wRC+. As for the cause of Bautista’s poor play, age-related decline was certainly a possibility. Curious himself, Jeff Sullivan requested reader assistance, on April 25, to help better understand the underlying causes for some hitters’ struggles. Jose Bautista was one of those struggling hitters. Since that time, however, he hasn’t struggled at all. In fact, he’s been one of the game’s best, recording a 177 wRC+ in the meantime.

Regarding Bautista, the first issue raised by Sullivan raised was contact. The Jays’ right fielder had historically made contact on 81% of pitches, but he was down to 71% this season. His whiffs both in and out of the zone were up. To help gain some context, let’s separate Bautista’s last few years into a few different segments: 2013-2015, 2016, the 2017 season through April 24, and the 2017 season since April 24. Let’s start by looking at contact rate.

The good news is that Bautista has brought his contact rate back up to near-vintage Bautista levels. When the ball is pitched in the zone and Bautista swings, he’s making good contact. Before we get to the damage done on contact, that dropping O-Contact% is worth a look. From 2013 to -15, Bautista was above the league average of 63% on swings on balls outside the zone. Last season, Bautista tumbled below the 62% league average. This season, whether looking at the early or latter part of this year, Bautista is well below league average. While that is likely an indication of his declining skills, given Bautista’s batting eye, it might not hurt him as much as others. Bautista’s 21% swing rate on pitches outside the zone is among the top-10 rates in baseball.

Read the rest of this entry »

About a year ago, I remember thinking that Billy Beane must be feeling pretty good about having Sonny Gray, perhaps one of baseball’s best trade chips. Stephen Strasburg had just signed a contract extension, leaving few, if any, pending free agents around the league and little else available on the trade market at the deadline. With a cost-controlled pitcher, the A’s could sell to any team without being limited to major markets. If Drew Pomeranz was capable of fetching a top prospect in Anderson Espinoza, Sonny Gray was going to merit a haul.

It didn’t quite work out that way. A combination of ineffectiveness and arm injuries, perhaps one causing the other, left Gray with a poor season. A year later, Gray is pitching well, and he might still be that valuable trade chip I considered him to be a year ago.

I have some recollection of Sonny Gray being a top-of-the-rotation starter, an ace-type player. Then I look at some of his stats, and I can’t help but feel slightly underwhelmed. There’s his 21% strikeout rate from 2013 to 2015, which ranks an okay 31st out of 89 pitchers with at least 400 innings. His 7.7% walk rate was 60th among those 89 pitchers — not that good at all, in other words. Then you look a little further and find the one thing that Gray did very well — namely, keep the ball on the ground. His ground-ball rate of 54% was seventh in the majors during that timeframe. It’s hard for opposing batters to collect extra-base hits when they can’t get off the ground. It’s impossible to hit it out of the park. Unsurprisingly, Gray’s 0.66 HR/9 was 12th best in baseball during that period. Opponent ISO was under .100, second only to Clayton Kershaw.

Read the rest of this entry »

When Eduardo Rodriguez came up in 2015, he relied heavily on his four-seam fastball, throwing it 69% of the time, the greatest frequency in major-league baseball among pitchers with at least 100 innings. He mixed in a slider and and change and was mostly successful, putting up league-average numbers at just 22 years old.

Last year, Rodriguez missed time at the beginning of the season due to a dislocated kneecap. He never really got on track after that, getting off to a bad start that included a demotion to the minors. He improved somewhat by the end of the season but never really put up great numbers. Clay Buchholz beat him out for the third spot in the playoff rotation, and Cleveland’s sweep of Boston meant there was no need for a fourth starter.

It would have been fair, not so long ago, to regard Rodriguez as the fifth starter — behind David Price, Chris Sale, Rick Porcello, and Drew Pomeranz — on the 2017 Red Sox. Two months into the season, though — with Price injured, Porcello failing to repeat last year’s success, and Pomeranz continuing to struggle since last year’s trade — Rodriguez has been the team’s clear No. 2 option after the excellent Chris Sale. His 3.10 ERA is quite strong; his 3.34 FIP, 20% better than league average and bordering on ace level. It’s early, but Rodriguez has made a few different changes that have helped him become a more successful pitcher

We could simply write off last season as one plagued by injury and not bother to examine it any more thoroughly than that, but there’s some solid data in there. One thing to keep in mind — and something we should do for all pitchers, especially younger ones — is that it generally takes time to figure things out at the major-league level. Pitchers can be tinkering with different pitches, different pitch mixes, in order to get things right. A pitcher might not be pitching well at times, but he also might be taking the next step to becoming a better pitcher. Some of this should be taken with a grain of salt, but here is Rodriguez’s pitch mix over the last three seasons.

As noted above, Rodriguez threw his fastball a ton when he first arrived in the majors, mixing in his slider and change. Last season, he introduced a two-seam fastball and upped his slider usage. The slider was a pitch on which he worked in the minors and used it a lot when he came back up, but ultimately didn’t have a lot of success with it. Rodrgiuez’s best pitches in the majors have been the fastball and change. This season, he has gotten back to using those pitches the most. He throws both pitches for strikes, induces swings close to 50% of the time, and generates above-average whiff rates for each pitch (11% for the fastball and 22% for the change, per Brooks Baseball). Throwing those pitches more has yet to lessen their effectiveness. While increased use of his four-seam fastball is notable, as is continued use of the change, the decrease in the use of the slider is a big difference.

Read the rest of this entry »

On Tuesday, I discussed MLB’s expected wOBA (or xwOBA) metric and one of its problems — namely, that guys with great speed might have the ability to outperform their xwOBA on a regular basis. I also pointed out that, despite this drawback, xwOBA should have considerable utility. This post looks at one potential aspect of that utility when it comes to projecting future performance when we have only completed just a small portion of the season.

Comparing wxOBA and wOBA for individual players over the course of a season, one find a pretty strong relationship — a point which I establish in that Tuesday post. To take things a step further, I’d like to look here at the relationships of these stats over the course of a couple seasons and see how they correlate from year to year. In order to establish a baseline, let’s look at how players with at least 400 at-bats in both 2015 and 2016 fared by wOBA.

So we see a decent relationship between wOBA marks in consecutive season. It certainly would be strange if there weren’t some relationship between a player’s offensive statistics from year to year, as players generally don’t get a lot better or a lot worse in such a short span of time — even if the players who do meet those criteria make for more interesting stories and analysis. So we see that, from 2015 to 2016, there is a relationship with wOBA. What about xwOBA?

Read the rest of this entry »

One of the more fascinating rollouts from Baseball Savant this season has been xwOBA, a metric that utilizes launch angle and exit velocity to assign a hit value (single, double, triple, home run, or out) to every batted ball and then translates the results to “expected” wOBA. Why does it matter? By stripping out the influence of luck and defense, it gets closer to something like a “deserved” hitting number.

Here’s what the glossary at MLB.com says about the metric:

xwOBA is more indicative of a player’s skill than regular wOBA, as xwOBA removes defense from the equation. Hitters, and likewise pitchers, are able to influence exit velocity and launch angle but have no control over what happens to a batted ball once it is put into play.

For instance, Tigers first baseman Miguel Cabrera produced a .399 wOBA in 2016. But based on the quality of his contact, his xwOBA was .459.

For the most part, those claims make sense. But that’s not to say xwOBA can’t be beaten. To understand how, let’s look a little bit at how wOBA compares to xwOBA. Let’s begin by looking at all players from last season who recorded at least 400 at bats and compared their wOBAs to their xwOBAs. The scatter plot looks like this.

There’s a pretty strong relationship there. Of the 183 players represented above, 150 had a disparity between wOBA and xwOBA under 30 points. That seems pretty conclusive.

So what are we to do with this data? We could look at the outliers on either end, presume that they were either unlucky or lucky when it came to batted balls, and then move on with the analysis. However, before we do that, we might want to look at other reasons for the potential disparity. To that end, I did an eye test of sorts. I took all players with at least 400 at bats in both 2015 and 2016 and looked at their xwOBA minus wOBA in both seasons. If a player had a negative number, he might be considered to have had some good luck. If the numbers were positive, he might have had some bad luck.

Read the rest of this entry »

After getting swept by the New York Yankees and losing two out of three to the Colorado Rockies, the Chicago Cubs are now sitting on a .500 record. By run differential or BaseRuns expected performance, tools that strip out sequencing, the answer is the same; the Cubs have played pretty much like a .500 team. The offense has been a little worse than average, the pitching a little better than average, but overall, the team has played roughly like an 81 win team so far.

Of course, this isn’t what recent Cubs teams have played like.

In 2015 and 2016, Cubs starters topped all of Major League Baseball with 36.3 WAR, just ahead of the Nationals, Mets, and Dodgers. The starters’ 3.50 FIP, without even considering the impact of defense or the potential of inducing weak contact, has been the best in the majors. The Cubs have returned almost all of last year’s staff intact, with Jon Lester, Jake Arrieta, Kyle Hendricks present for each of the past two seasons and John Lackey around last year.

The question we are trying to answer here is what is responsible for the downturn in results. We are just 34 games into the season, so we could chalk it up to luck. We could try to determine if the talent level has changed in any way, which might cause us to lower our expectations, and we could point to some outside factors that aren’t luck, but aren’t necessarily the responsibility of the pitchers, like defense. To frame our understanding of what is going on, it probably helps to create some expectations of what we would expect to see from a Cubs rotation this season. While Brett Anderson has made six starts, he’s only pitched 12% of the Cubs starter innings, and little was expected of him, so we will focus on the four returnees. Read the rest of this entry »