Featuring Chris Davis, Zack Greinke, Jason Heyward, David Price, and Justin Upton, this offseason’s free-agent class was one of the best in recent history. Of that group, Davis, Heyward, and Price entered free agency with the minimum six years of service time, while Greinke was taking his second bite at the free agency apple and Upton had his slightly delayed by a contract extension signed with Arizona before the 2010 season. Of this year’s class, Mike Leake, Jeff Samardzija, and Jordan Zimmermann also went without contract extensions before hitting free agency, creating one fantastic class. Next year’s class is much weaker — not because there are fewer valuable players who’ve recorded similar service time, but rather because so many great players entered contract extensions delaying free agency.

Yoenis Cespedes has a one-year opt-out in his new contract with the Mets that will enable him to enter a poor free-agent class with aging hitters like Jose Bautista, Adrian Beltre, and Edwin Encarnacion; mid-level outfielders like Carlos Gomez and Josh Reddick; just one elite pitcher in Stephen Strasburg; and a few elite closers in Aroldis Chapman and Kenley Jansen. Next year’s class was not always like this. A slow erosion of free-agent eligible players occurred over the last several years, robbing the market of what could have been one of the greatest free-agent classes of all time.

Consider the following timeline:

• March 26, 2012 — Milwaukee Brewers sign catcher Jonathan Lucroy to five-year deal worth $11 million with an option to take the deal through the 2017 season.

• April 16, 2012 — San Francisco Giants sign Madison Bumgarner to five-year deal beginning in 2013 worth $35 million with two options that could take the deal through the 2019 season.

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Yoenis Cespedes didn’t sign a bad contract, but he certainly signed a surprising one. With Chris Davis and Jason Heyward receiving more than $150 million, and Justin Upton in the picture with a $130 million, it would figure that Yoenis Cespedes might line up somewhere in that range. Perhaps not above Upton, but certainly above $100 million. Consider: the Cuban outfielder just produced a career year at age 29 which saw him record 35 home runs and nearly seven wins above replacement. Furthermore, wasn’t eligible for a qualifying offer, meaning a signing club wouldn’t have the burden of sacrificing a draft pick. The contract he did sign with the Mets pays him $75 million over three years, which seems like a small total guarantee relative to the rest of the free-agent class, but the opt-out and the opportunity to return to free agency next year does provide Cespedes with another opportunity to cash in.

If Cespedes decides to stick with his current contract, he’ll be a free agent entering his age-33 season after making $75 million dollars. While that is not the ideal scenario for him, if he is still playing well at that time, he might end up making close to the amount Justin Upton is to be paid over the next six years. If Cespedes plays poorly over the next three years, he will at least have his $75 million — not what he would have hoped, but also preferable to just a one-year pillow contract.

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We have seen a lot of money thrown around this offseason, particularly on the pitching side. Players at the top end like David Price and Zack Greinke have received $200 million contracts while mid-tier pitcher like Mike Leake, Jeff Samardzija, Wei-Yin Chen, and even Ian Kennedy have received contracts approaching nine figures. On the hitting side, the market moved considerably slower, but Jason Heyward got nearly $200 million, including close to $80 million over the first three seasons before a pair opt-outs become available to him. Justin Upton still got more than $130 million with a favorable opt-out clause, and it appears that Yoenis Cespedes will do just fine as well after some talk that both he and Upton might have to take one-year deals. Describing this year’s class is one thing, but compared to the classes over the last decade, it might be the best we have seen.

A brief look at this year’s class reveals a collection of high-end players who produced strong 2015 seasons. Consider the players in the table below, sorted by projected contract value per FanGraphs Crowdsourcing and featuring both 2015 performance and the total dollar amount of the contract signed.

Assuming Cespedes signs somewhere in the $100 million range, the average will still be right around $140 million per contract, an increase of more than 50% from the top ten free agents last year. Thanks to the efforts of Carson Cistulli, we can take a look at the free agent classes in each of the past five years, and compare the top ten free agents according to the FanGraphs crowd.

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There is enough literature out there to debunk the theory that players generally play better in the year prior to free agency. Anecdotally speaking, this season, we saw top pitchers like Johnny Cueto, Zack Greinke, and David Price have solid years in line with their established levels. Jason Heyward and Justin Upton also produced seasons that resembled their career numbers. Meanwhile, Ian Desmond, Jeff Samardzija — and, to a lesser extent, Alex Gordon and Jordan Zimmermann — did not quite live up to prior years. The two biggest examples of players with out-of-the-ordinary walk years, Yoenis Cespedes and Chris Davis, remain unsigned into the middle of January. Out of the top 11 free agents, just two had abnormally strong walk years. Just because the walk-year performance is a myth, that doesn’t mean that players who do perform extraordinarily well receive less in the way of compensation than their more consistent counterparts.

Examining recent contracts, we can attempt to determine if those players who had big jumps in their walk-year performance were paid more than those with more consistently strong performances. Over the past ten offseasons, 39 hitters have received contracts in excess of $50 million. While a broader look at all free agents might reveal a few more interesting players, I set a floor to examine only those free agents who could have benefited substantially from big walk years, as well as similar contracts for those without the same leap in performance during the final season of their contracts.

To establish those players with big walk years, I performed a simple, Marcel-like calculation (weighting seasons by multipliers of 5, 4, and 3) of the WAR of a player’s three previous seasons to establish a base of expectations for their walk-year performance. Then, I looked at the player’s walk-year performance as a comparison. Due to survivorship bias, this group does not represent an appropriate dataset to debunk the walk-year myth, given that most players who would perform poorly (e.g. Ian Desmond) in their walk year have already been purposefully removed. It is interesting to note, however, that only 15 of 39 (38%) players had big jumps in their walk years. Eighteen players (46%) were fairly close to their expected WAR, while another six (15%) had down years (defined here as a 40% drop or worse) ahead of free agency. On average, the group of 39 players was just 0.7 WAR (18%) better in their walk year despite the survivorship bias issue.

Below is a chart with the players who exceeded their expected WAR by 50% or more in their walk years, including Yoenis Cespedes and Chris Davis. Players are sorted in order of percentage by which they exceeded their expected win totals (denoted as % Over Exp. WAR).

Given the nature of big free agents, it would be easy to suggest that teams ought to avoid paying big money to players who have huge walk years. On the other hand, that wisdom is relevant to all free agents, as many fail to return complete value for the signing team. Many of the deals above are still ongoing. The Adrian Beltre contract has been fantastic, while Nelson Cruz and Russell Martin have been solid deals thus far.

One easy way to determine if the members of the above group are being paid more than they would have been in the absence of their giant walk year, would be to simply add up the years and salaries and compare the totals to those produced by the player who didn’t produce unexpectedly strong walk years. The above group’s average contract went for 5.9 years and $109.5 million, for an average of $18.6 million per year. Removing the six walk-year underperformers, we are left with 18 players who were within expectations in their walk year. Those 18 players received contracts averaging 5.6 years and $102.8 million, for an average of $18.4 million per year. A slightly higher guarantee in a group of players this small could lead to the conclusion that the big walk year provides some extra benefit. However, this could also be mitigated by the fact that the big-walk-year group had an average WAR of 5.5 during the walk year, while the other group’s average WAR was 3.8 in the walk year. Given that number, it might be fair to say that the walk year is of no benefit.

The evidence so far would lead you to believe that players who have unexpectedly big seasons in their walk year do not see a benefit from that great year. However, we can delve a bit further. Just because they receive the same amount of money, and just because their WAR was higher in their respective walk years, that does not necessarily mean their talent level and expected production over the course of the contract was necessarily higher. By creating an expected contract based on their present talent level, we can better compare who is getting paid more relative to expected production.

To calculate these expected-contract terms, I first set about determining the level of production one could expect from each player in the first year of his new contract. To do this, I used the same method as above, taking each player’s previous three years and weighting them (5, 4, 3 with normal aging). Then, using the first year WAR total, I projected WAR totals over the life of the contract using standard aging curves (-0.5 WAR/year age-31 to age-36, -0.75 WAR/year at age-37 and beyond). That WAR was translated into dollar figures by using $8 million per WAR this season and subtracting $250,000 every year for the value of a win at contract start date. Over the course of the contract, 5% inflation per year was used when valuing a win. Note that for contract years I’ve used the same figures as each player actually received. While it is possible to create an expectation for more or fewer years, using the same length for each expected contract allows for easier overall comparison.

The projected dollar figures overshot the actual dollar figures by about 15%, and there are certainly a few valid reasons for this: (1) it is possible that high market hitters are slightly undervalued when compared to all of free agency, especially pitchers and those who take mid-sized deals, (2) it is possible that the dollar-per-win estimates used are a bit high, and (3) some regression toward the mean might be necessary. While not necessarily solving the above problems, but helping to more easily show the difference between the big walk year group and the rest, the expected figures were downsized to meet the totals actually handed out.

The average expected value of the contract for the average walk year players was higher than those that had a big walk year, but as we know from above, the players with the big walk year got paid a bit more. To be clear, the average walk year players are not players who are average relative to Major League Baseball, but put up a performance that was average for them in their walk years. The chart below shows the difference between the groups.

The walk year decliners have been included mainly to separate themselves from the players who had average years. With just six players who had surprisingly poor walk years, not much can be shown, but the decline did not appear to have had much of an effect on the individual contracts in that group. As for the players with the big walk year, the difference in expectations between those players who produced a typical year is nearly $18 million over the life of a contract.

In looking at the individual numbers, which I will show in full below, there is a major outlier in Jason Heyward, whose projection had him getting a massive $300 million payday. A few other players are out there, but not quite to that level. Even taking Heyward away, there is still a difference between groups.

Admittedly, 39 players is not a lot of data — nor is the addition of Cespedes, Davis, or Upton likely to move the needle much this offseason unless they end up taking less than $100 million. Looking into the individual numbers, over the last ten years, the players who had a big walk year were more likely to be overpaid relative to expected production and highly unlikely to be underpaid.

While it is not definitive, there is some evidence to suggest that players benefit from having big walk years compared to similarly situated free agents.

*****

Here’s the full chart of free agents in their walk years. Note that Victor Martinez appears twice; he signed two contracts.

A year ago today, things were looking pretty good in Ian Desmond’s world. He was 29 years old and the starting shortstop for the Washington Nationals, heavy favorites to win the National League East. A few months earlier, Desmonds completed his third straight season of at least 20 home runs and 20 stolen bases. Defensive metrics indicated he was roughly average to above average at shortstop, and in terms of overall value, he was sitting on three straight seasons of more than four wins above replacement. In matters related to his bank account, he was just one season from free agency with no other big-name shortstops and a big payday.

But now, after a disastrous year, Desmond is still unsigned and his market is unclear.

There were some signs heading into last season that Desmond was in decline. His wRC+ went from 128 to 116 to 107 from 2012 to 2014, and his strikeouts moved in the opposite direction: 20% in 2012, 22% in 2013 and way up to 28% in 2014. Noticing a decline and expecting a collapse are two different situations, however. This is the list of players who, along with Ian Desmond, produced at least four WAR in each season from 2012 to 2014: Andrew McCutchen, Buster Posey, Dustin Pedroia, Ben Zobrist, Adam Jones, Alex Gordon, Robinson Cano, Miguel Cabrera, and of course, Mike Trout. A year ago at this time, MLB Trade Rumors rated Desmond as the fourth-best pending free agent and mentioned a potential $200 million contract with another good season.

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Read Part I here.

The last few Hall of Fame elections have seen quite a few pitchers gain induction. In 2014, Tom Glavine and Greg Maddux were elected, and in 2015, Pedro Martinez, John Smoltz, and Randy Johnson went in. Prior to 2013, only one full-time starting pitcher had gained election this century: Bert Blyleven in 2011, and he had to wait until his 14th year on the ballot. Roger Clemens, Mike Mussina, and Curt Schilling all have very strong cases for the Hall of Fame, and at least in terms of pitchers, the next few years look pretty clear of even borderline candidates before Roy Halladay, Roy Oswalt, Andy Pettitte, and Mariano Rivera appear on the ballot in 2019.

Getting elected by the BBWAA has been a tough hill to climb for starting pitchers. Only 33 starting pitchers in the Hall of Fame were elected by the writers. From 1950 to 1979, just 10 starting pitchers were elected. The 1980s saw just four starting pitchers elected while the 90s had eight players inducted before another slowdown last decade. If Clemens, Mussina, and Schilling and get in, this decade will see nine starting pitchers gain election. Despite greats like Bob Gibson, Juan Marichal, and Jim Palmer failing to achieve the 300-win milestone and gaining election, for a time, it seemed only pitchers with 300 wins would gain election. Blyleven, Martinez, and Smoltz appear to have tempered that attitude somewhat, giving more hope to Mussina and Schilling.

Coming up with standards for the Hall of Fame can be a difficult process. I went into detail in my process yesterday when I introduced a Hall of Fame rating system, but included only position players in the results. The basis for the point system is repeated below: Read the rest of this entry »

The Major League Baseball Hall of Fame is a lot like the game itself: wondrous, fascinating and great in scope. The voting process for the Hall of Fame, meanwhile, resembles the umpiring aspect of the game: even though the arbiters typically perform their job well enough, their failures receive considerable attention — nor is it particularly easy to determine who should be in charge of different aspects of gatekeeping. Predicting who will get into the Hall of Fame using any statistical measures has become much more difficult in recent years due to changes in rules, changes in the electorate, and confusion about steroids. Analyzing who should get into the Hall of Fame statistically is also wrought with difficulty, but perhaps presents a clearer process. This is my attempt.

Jay Jaffe has been the standard-bearer for Hall of Fame analysis over the last decade, with most of his work appearing at Sports illustrated. Inventor of the JAWS system, he designed a great metric — one which appears on Baseball-Reference — to compare Hall of Fame candidacies. JAWS takes a player’s bWAR (that is, WAR as calculated by the methodology employed by Baseball Reference) and averages it with the player’s seven highest bWAR seasons, meant to represent a player’s peak. Jaffe then compares every player in the Hall of Fame to those who might gain election in order to provide a basis for the player’s candidacy.

Jaffe’s work is fantastic, and while I don’t claim to have improved on JAWS, I’d like to introduce an alternative method of combining a player’s peak with his overall value to compare to Hall of Famers. JAWS will be discussed below, not because it is full of flaws, but because it provides the basic framework for creating a method for evaluating players for the Hall of Fame.

The first, most noticeable departure from Jaffe’s system is that this one use fWAR (that is, FanGraphs WAR) instead of bWAR. While many people use one or both metrics and each has their own group of devotees, I have always been partial to fWAR when evaluating players even before my time writing at FanGraphs. A simple solution would be to repeat Jaffe’s exact methodology using fWAR, but creating a metric from scratch (sort of), we can look for alternate methods to look at the Hall of Fame.

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For the first three months of last season, Joc Pederson looked like a future star. At the All-Star break, Pederson was hitting .230/.364/.487 and his 137 wRC+ placed him 12th among National League batters. In the last 20 years, the only players younger than Pederson to hit 20 home runs faster than Pederson (95 games) are Albert Pujols, Adam Dunn, Giancarlo Stanton, Carlos Correa, and Chris Davis, per Baseball-Reference’s Play Index. In the second half, however, things unfolded quite differently: Pederson recorded 219 terribly unproductive plate appearances, leading to questions about whether the league had figured Pederson out.

Pederson’s strikeouts rose as steadily as he did through the minors, topping out at 27% in his last Triple-A season in 2014 before he was promoted to the majors. The rise in strikeouts was accompanied by a a rise in walks and power, and that pattern continued in the first half of last season with a 16% walk rate and a 29% strikeout rate. Pederson’s first half surge did not last into the summer months, as both his BABIP (from .282 to .232) and ISO (from .257 to .122) plunged — although his walk and strikeout rates remained unchanged.

While it would be easy to point to Pederson’s BABIP decline and hope for a turnaround, there are too many other peripheral statistics that point to a general drop in Pederson’s ability last season. Pederson’s line-drive rate dropped from 18% to 14% from the first half to the second half, his infield-fly percentage went from 10% to 23%, and his soft-contact percentage moved from 15% up to 29% in the second half. His exit velocity was 93.5 mph in the first half, ranking behind only Giancarlo Stanton, Yoenis Cespedes, Ryan Braun, Miguel Cabrera, and Jorge Soler among players with 100 at bats. In the second half, however, it dropped to 89.3 mph, per Baseball Savant.

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Despite losing out on Zack Greinke, the Los Angeles Dodgers look to have one of the best teams in major league baseball. While Jeff Sullivan made a reasonable case recently for the Chicago Cubs as the best team in baseball currently, the Dodgers are right there with them, even without the benefit of a major move. But now that the Hisashi Iwakuma deal has fallen apart and led Iwakuma to reunite with the Seattle Mariners, the Dodgers need pitching. They were rumored to be involved with the Atlanta Braves for Shelby Miller and rumors still surround the pursuit of Jose Fernandez and pitchers in the Tampa Bay Rays organization. It’s possible, however, that it’s Matt Harvey who could best solve the Dodgers’ problems.

Despite likely losing Yoenis Cespedes and Daniel Murphy to free agency, the New York Mets also have a very good team returning next year. By our Depth Charts projections, the Mets have the fifth-best team in baseball, less than a win behind division-rival Washington Nationals. The club has a really good shot at repeating as division winners, with a rotation of Harvey, Jacob deGrom, Steven Matz, and Noah Syndergaard leading the way, and a returning Zack Wheeler and Bartolo Colon as insurance. The team has a solid infield, shrewdly picking up Neil Walker, and they should be able to cobble something semi-productive out of Asdrubal Cabrera and their returning middle infielders at shortstop. The team does have a bit of a hole in center field, and the offense, without Cespedes or Cespedes, doesn’t look all that great. The Mets might still have some financial concerns going into next season. It’s possible, though, that the young and cheap and talented Joc Pederson could solve the Mets’ problems.

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The San Francisco Giants have made a decent amount of noise this offseason, signing two of the five biggest starting-pitching contracts in free agency this year. Bringing in Johnny Cueto and Jeff Samardzija certainly solidifies a rotation that needed help. Last season, Madison Bumgarner, Chris Heston, and Jake Peavy made just over half (82) of the Giants’ starts and were worth about eight wins above replacement, most of that from Bumgarner. The other 80 starts came primarily from Ryan Vogelsong, Tim Hudson, Matt Cain, and Tim Lincecum, and that group was below replacement level. Bolstering the rotation makes a lot of sense for the Giants, but the team now appears unlikely to pursue a major signing for the outfield, leaving it as the team’s primary weakness.

Having just one weakness instead of two is a positive development for the Giants, but perhaps the brightest spot for the club heading into next season is not their newfound rotation depth, but the return of an emergent infield after some breakout seasons last year from Brandon Crawford, Matt Duffy, and Joe Panik. Add in Brandon Belt, and that quartet in the field more than tripled their production, going from 5.7 WAR in 2014 to 18.1 WAR this past season. The lack of pitching depth and the issues in the outfield kept the Giants out of the playoffs, along with an unusually high bar for entry — if they had won 84 games in 2014, they still would have qualified for the postseason — but their infield was amazing and should be again next year.

The graph below shows the FanGraphs Depth Chart projections for every infield in Major League Baseball (catchers included). As we might expect, the Giants rate very highly.

The Chicago Cubs, with Kris Bryant, Anthony Rizzo, Addison Russell, and newly signed Ben Zobrist, look to be the class of MLB when it comes to the infield, but the Giants are not that far behind. There is a decent gap between the Giants and the Josh Donaldson-led Blue Jays. Unfortunately, the outfield is not quite as promising.

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