Few things are more frustrating than watching your team ground into a double play. This is FanGraphs, so you know what’s next: quantification. Who has hurt their team the most by grounding into double plays so far this season?*

*Although wOBA doesn’t include this, stats like RE24 and WPA/LI do (along with many other things). This posts isolates the run value of just the GiDPs.

John Walsh and others have written on this before, and I don’t have anything to add methodologically — I’m going with my own simple method using the Baseball-Reference table found here. To get the runs above and below average, we need to take into account not just rate, but opportunities (runner on first with less than two outs).

The rankings are based on runs above and below average. The linear weight run value of a GiDP varies from source to source, but for simplicity I’ll use .35, as listed in The Book (p 141), which is close to other values I’ve seen (for other issues, see this discussion). The 2010 league GiDP rate is 11% (as it is most seasons). To get the number of double plays above or below average, I’ve used a simple formula tweaked so that minus is “bad,” which is intuitive: player opportunities times league rate [11%] minus player GiDPs. I round this to a whole number, then multiply times 0.35 to see about how many runs a player has cost/gained his team below/above average. Enough boring methodology, let’s check out the hitters who have hurt their teams the most with the GiDP so far in 2010, ranked by runs below/above average.

[The numbers are GiDPS-opps, percentage grounded into, rounded number of GiDPS below average, and runs below average]

Three-way tie for third worst:

Wilson Valdez, 8-25, 32%, 5 below average, -1.75 runs
Carlos Lee, 9-38, 24%, 5 below average, -1.75 runs
Michael Cuddyer, 12-64, 19%, 5 below average, -1.75 runs

Valdez is a replacement-level scrub, so that isn’t that interesting, other than to see his amazing efforts in so little playing time. El Caballo has found yet another way to kill the Astros this season, even for him. Michael Cuddyer has been below average for his career, although 19% is his worst season in a while. He gets so far down the list because he hits fifth on the Twins batting order most nights, right behind two players currently sporting near-.400 and .500 on-base percentages (Joe Mauer and Justin Morneau, respectively), so he gets plenty of chances.

There is also a three-way tie for second worst:

Pablo Sandoval, 12-54, 22%, 6 below average, -2.1 runs
Ivan Rodriguez, 10-32, 31%, 6 below average, -2.1 runs
Joe Mauer, 12-53, 23%, 6 below average, -2.1 runs

Kung Fu Panda isn’t hitting up to his usual standard so far this season, and that’s also true of his double play rate, as, perhaps a bit surprisingly, he hasn’t been that bad in previous seasons. We’ll have to see how things develop. Pudge Rodriguez, on the other hand, was a GiDP machine even in his pre-Zombie seasons. Fellow catcher Joe Mauer has a bit of a reputation for grounding into double plays, and while he has been slightly worse than average for his career, in 2009 he was actually a bit better than average. It is probably magnified because because he primarily hits third for the Twins, and as discussed in The Book, the third spot in the order sees the most double play situations, on average. Mauer is also interesting because, despite being a lefty (who tend to be better at avoiding the DP, more discussion of this on Friday), he might be more suspectible because he likes to go the other way, and also hits the ball on the ground at an above average rate. He’s still a great hitter, of course.

The worst so far in 2010:

Billy Butler, 13-53, 25%, 7 below average, -2.45 runs

After beginning to fulfill expectations at the plate in 2009 with a .369 wOBA, Butler is hitting even better in 2010: .337/.391/.483, .382 wOBA. But the double play has been an issue for Butler in the major leagues. Being a right-handed hitter has something to do with it, as does his, um, “speed.” Like Mauer, he also hits a lot of balls on the ground. Hitting third for the first part of the season and now fourth (in both cases usually behind David DeJesus‘ .374 OBP) probably has something to do with it.

In the case of good hitters like Mauer, Butler, and others who have a problem with the DP, is it worth moving them out of the middle of the order? This is one thing I’ll briefly discuss in Friday’s post, which will also list 2010’s best at avoiding the GiDP as well as some other trends.

Before the 2010 season began, many thought that the American League West was the tightest division in baseball. Everyone had their favorite, of course: the Rangers had taken a step forward in 2009 and have the best young talent, the Mariners had made many high-profile moves in the off-season, and the Angels still retained their core talent and, frankly, seemed to win every season whether people thought they would or not. While the As were acknowledged to be on the upswing, I don’t think I read a single “expert” who thought they would win the division. I thought the As had a good shot, maybe a better shot than others, but I can’t say I was overly confident in their chances.

The As haven’t won anything yet. But through Sunday’s games, they are in the lead in the West, if only by half a game over the Rangers. Yes, the As have outplayed their Pythagorean record by three games so far (although no team in the West is currently over .500 according their run differential), but those wins are “in the bank.” Can they keep it up going forward?

On offense, the As as a team haven’t been particularly “lucky,” as they’ve scored 201 runs, while creating 200 according to “absolute” linear weights runs (wRC). I doubt anyone expected the As to hit much this season, and with a .310 team wOBA, they’ve fulfilled that expectation and then some. However, 2010 is no more a constant than is 2009. A quick look at the As’ hitters and the ZiPS RoS projections indicates that some offensive improvement in 2010 is to be expected. Some hitters are a bit over their head at the moment: Daric Barton is finally fulfilling expectations with a .363 wOBA, although ZiPS RoS doesn’t expect too much regression. Second basemen Mark Ellis and Adam Rosales (who filled in while Ellis was injured) are clearly due to fall back to earth. Kurt Suzuki is back from injury and should hit better, and Rajai Davis and Ryan Sweeney should, as well. CoCo Crisp’s return from injury should shore up the outfield on both sides of the ball. Kevin Kouzmanoff isn’t a good hitter, but it’s highly unlikely he’ll finish the season with a .274 wOBA. Unlike the Mariners, the As seem to have realized that the DH is still legal in the AL West, and even a fraction of Jack Cust is better than Zombie Eric Chavez. This isn’t a good offense by any stretch of the imagination, but it is one that should be better going forward, and that’s without taking into account the possible call-ups of Chris Carter and Michael Taylor.

Oakland isn’t getting especially “lucky,” in relation to run prevention, either. The team 4.38 ERA is right in line with a 4.18 FIP and 4.25 xFIP. Of course, their starting staff’s biggest upgrade will be young ace Brett Anderson’s return fro injury, even if he (or anyone, for that matter) isn’t quite as good as he’s been so far in 2010. While neither Gio Gonzalez and Dallas Braden aren’t quite as good as they’ve pitched so far this season, they’re both starting to look like average or above-average starters. Big off-season acquisition Ben Sheets hasn’t worked wonders, but he’s not killing the team, either. Trevor Cahill has been very lucky so far, so that is something to watch.

It’s too early to get much from the fielding statistics. While according to UZR, Oakland is +2.7 runs (16th in the majors), according to Plus/Minus +23 runs (7th in the majors, but 3rd in the AL behind the Rays and Seattle). Kouzmanoff is doing well so far at 3B according to both systems. Dewan’s loves Barton, UZR not so much this year, although history is with him. Cliff Pennington is holding his own as shortstop, and Mark Ellis should improve the situation at second base. Ryan Sweeney and Rajai Davis aren’t at their usual standards, but can be expected to come around.

Overall, while the As run prevention should probably be expected to fall back a bit (although the fielding should mitigate the regression of the pitching), they should also be expected to hit better. The AL West is still a very tight race, with the Rangers and Angels right there, and a full analysis would need to include all four teams. As for the As, they haven’t played far above their talent so far, and, contrary to the pre-season expectations of many, Oakland has a good chance to remain in the divisional race for the rest of the season.

By now, you’ve probably read at least one tribute to the Jose Lima, who passed away at the surprisingly young age of 37 on Sunday. You can surely find good accounts of his rather… flamboyant style as a person in and around the major league. Here is a good one. A quote from former teammate Brad Ausmus (whose continued presence in the major leagues is a shocking story in its own right) sums up the feelings many probably had when reflecting on the sad news:

Always in a good mood, loved to sing… We had to listen to his demo tape all the time in the locker room. Now it’s a fond memory. Back then, it was annoying.

From an analytical perspective, one could say something similar. While bouncing around the majors, Jose Lima was annoying, particularly in seasons like 2004, when he went 13-5 for the Dodgers despite a 5.09 FIP (although he had a 4.19 xFIP, his tERA was 6.64 Yes, that’s Six Point Six Four). But, like his musical aspirations and other clubhouse antics, while his statistically less-than-great pitching was frustrating to explain at the time, now it’s interesting and, yes, sort of fun to look back on. This is a pitcher who, during the FanGraphs WAR Era (2002-present) managed a FIP under FIVE only once over a full season, yet still pitched over 460 innings inthe major leagues over give seasons. Indeed, the 2005 Royals (naturally) sent him out to the mound for 168 innings of 6.34 ERA ball, although to be fair, his FIP was only 5.71, and hey, his xFIP was 5.34!

This is all well known, and today, rather than discussing Lima’s contribution to one of the worst teams in recent memory (and the worst in Royals history, losing 106 games), perhaps it is a more fitting “analytical” tribute to Lima to look at his brief-but-memorable contribution to the 2003 Royals, who somehow won 83 games and stayed in contention for the AL Central past the All-Star break.

That 2003 Kansas City team featured a not-yet-Zombified Mike Sweeney, a great season from Carlos Beltran, and, of course, Rookie-of-the-Year Angel Berroa. But Lima was there, too, and although his 4.91 ERA was less-than-spectacular, he did win seven games in a row, tying David Cone’s franchise record. But Lima’s performance was noteworthy in other ways. For one, his FIP was non-horrible, and actually lower than his ERA, at 4.67. Lima never was great at keeping the ball on the ground, though, and his 37% groundball rate was no exception. The good vibes he brought to the clubhouse might have made a difference, though, as he miraculously kept the ball in the park, with only a 6.2% HR/FB rate. Naturally, xFIP was not impressed, giving him a 5.53. Still, his tERA was 4.89, not good, but not terrible. 2003 was the only season Lima’s tERA was under 5.

What I find truly amazing about Lima’s 2003 wasn’t so much that it happened despite his inability to strike hitters out (3.93 K/9 or his lucky .295 BABIP. Rather, he did all this despite having a horrible defense behind him. While Carlos Beltran was (and is) an outstanding defensive center fielder, and Joe Randa was decent at third base, the 2003 Royals were terrible defensively. Many players “contributed” on defense, but Carlos Febles, Desi Relaford, and Michael Tucker deserve special recognition to a team that overall was about 44 runs below average according to UZR, and 41 runs below average according to Dewan’s Plus/Minus (those days are behind KC now, right?)

Maybe it was a fluke. Today, I prefer to think that 2003 was, indeed, Lima Time. Nosotros Creemos.

Although the 2010 Arizona Diamondbacks are fading into NL West irrelevance fairly quickly, their infield has had a good season so far. Mark Reynolds, Adam LaRoche and Kelly Johnson are all hitting well. The fourth member of the infield, shortstop Stephen Drew, has gotten relatively little attention this season. However, he’s actually leading the Diamondbacks’ value leaderboard as of today at 1.6 Win Above Replacement.

While Drew performed well in his 59 game (226 PA) 2006 debut, his first full season in 2007 was a disappointment both offensively and in the field. At the plate, Drew simply didn’t show much power (.133 ISO), and while there were good signs as far as his walk rate and plate approach went, as well as a fair share of BABIP bad luck, a .303 wOBA (-18.9 batting runs below average) wasn’t exactly what the Diamondbacks were hoping for from their 2004 first round pick, especially when his defense was at best average (Plus/Minus) and at worst abysmal (-12.3 UZR). 2008 showed marked offensive improvement for Drew. Although his OBP was merely adequate (.333) he hit for good power (.211) ISO as part of a .353 wOBA campaign — very good for a shortstop, even of of the most hitter-friendly parks in the majors. However, his defense was, if anything, worse than it had been the season before, between below average (-3 DRS) and Betancourt-esque (-15.8 UZR). According to the defensive metrics, 2009 was an improvement in the field for Drew (+8 DRS, +3 UZR), but his bat fell back below average.

It isn’t as if Drew has been terrible the past couple of seasons. On the contrary, with the less-friendly UZR numbers, FanGraphs WAR has him at 2.2 in 2008 and 2.1 in 2009 — about a league-average player. I suspect that a detailed study would find this is be decent production for a #15 draft pick. Still, it would be understandable if the Diamondbacks and their fans were a bit disappointed in Drew.

2010 has been a different story. It’s too early to say much about the defense other than to note that Drew’s numbers look to be in line with his improvements in 2009. Drew’s offensive output (.304/.372/.507, .387 wOBA) has been impressive so far. He’s hitting with the power he displayed in 2008 without excessive home run/flyball luck (although he has had one inside-the-parker). There isn’t much different going on for Drew, actually, in terms of plate discipline or batted ball profile — a few more walks, and a few more line drives. He’s probably benefiting from luck on balls in play (.357 BABIP), and his platoon split (a career-long issue) in 2010 is big even for a lefty. And, of course, he’s only 165 plate appearances into the season.

It is to the organization’s credit that they didn’t get frustrated with Drew’s “merely” average value the previous two seasons. The Diamondbacks have let Drew work out his struggles with the bat and glove on the field, rather than scapegoating him, moving him to a different position in favor of a mediocre stopgap, or trading him when his value would be low. Maybe Drew will just turn out to be an average player in the long-run, but the Diamondbacks have been smart enough to realize that their best choice in the situation has been to be patient, and so far in 2010, they are reaping the reward.

The 2010 season isn’t going the way the Chicago White Sox had hoped. They are currently 7.5 games behind the Twins, and 5.5 behind the surprising Tigers. It’s still early, but given the talent gap between the Twins and White Sox, and the unlikelihood of the AL Wild Card coming out of a division other than the East, the White Sox playoff chances are fading rapidly. Starts at DH by Juan Pierre, Zombie Mark Kotsay, and, above all, Zombie Omar Vizquel are a fitting summary of the troublesome season on South Side.

There have been bright spots. Paul Konerko and, in particular, Andruw Jones have been hitting better than they have in years. One hitter whose season is off to an excellent start while not getting much press (although I’m sure White Sox fans are aware) is Alex Rios. Rios, who came over in a waiver claim from Toronto last August, has been on fire offensively, hitting .308/.350/.564 (.401 wOBA) while stealing bases efficiently and playing good center field defense. This is probably a surprise to many given his terrible 2009, when the Blue Jays let him go for nothing in return other than someone willing to take on the remainder of the seven-year, $70 million dollar contract that extends through 2014 (with a 2015 club option). While many analysts criticized the original contract as well as the White Sox/Blue Jays decisions to pick him up/let him go, as Dave Cameron and Tom Tango showed last season, all three decisions were justifiable at the time they were made.

Rios didn’t get better upon arrival in Chicago, to say the least, and finished 2009 with a horrific .247/.296/.395 line (.306 wOBA), with his fielding nowhere near his usual standard. Some probably thought the Jays had pawned off an albatross. So far in 2010, however, there are no obvious “luck” indicators for Rios. His current average on balls in play (.312) is actually lower than his career average (.319), and he’s hitting plenty of line drives without it being unsustainable. His home run per fly ball rate is a bit up, but not excessively, and it may be that he is better suited to his new home park. Hit Tracker doesn’t see him as overly lucky, in any case. Rios walk rate is down a bit and his O-Swing% is up a little, so those are worth tracking.

I doubt anyone thinks that Rios’ true offensive talent is really .400 wOBA. ZiPS sees his current true talent (“rest of season”) as .350 wOBA. Given his performance so far, if he hits .350 with average defense (to add to his current +7 figure) for the rest of the season, he will be worth about five wins in 2010. That’s a great deal for the White Sox money this season (Rios is owed $9.7 million guaranteed).

What about going forward? From 2011 to 2014, Chicago owes Rios about $49 million dollars. Assuming a gentle salary inflation (7%) and 0.5 WAR a season decline, they’re paying for a player who will be worth somewhere between 3 and 3.5 wins in 2011. Assuming Rios is a .350 wOBA hitter, that makes him a +12 hitter over 700 PA. I currently estimate Rios to be about a +4 position neutral defender. +12 hitting + 4 defense +25 AL replacement level all times 85% playing time = a 3.5 WAR player. This is a decent deal for the Sox. Not great, it isn’t as though the contract would be easy to trade if they wanted to do so. But it hardly looks like an albatross at this point.

A more interesting facet of this whole thing has to do with sample size. Yes, I know, that gets mentioned here all the time. The ZiPS RoS projections incorporate the proper amounts of regression for the various components, so it isn’t as if the current .350 wOBA projection is getting “fooled” the hot start. The point about sample size I want to make isn’t about 2010, though. Rather, it is about the overreaction that many had to Rios’ 2009. Rios was bad in 2009. However, from 2006-2008 he was worth an average of 4.5 wins a season. That history did not disappear during or after 2009. So many times we get wrapped up in pointing out that the current season is a “small sample size” that we forget that even a whole season (Rios had 633 PA in 149 games in 2009) tells us surprisingly little about a player’s true talent. That isn’t to say that 2009 should get thrown out as an ‘outlier’. But once previous performance and regression to the mean are taken into account, even the significance of a full season can be exaggerated.

I’m not sure the White Sox front office was thinking in exactly these terms when the picked Rios up off of waivers — I’m sure they consulted their scouts heavily, as well they should have. However it came about, they rightly understood that there was more to Rios than his 2009 performance, and got a very good player at a reasonable price without giving up talent. 2009 counts, but it wasn’t the whole story — or the whole sample.

If nothing mattered in this sport beyond VORP or WARP, this would be simple. In this case, though, we have a human being involved. And not just any human being. A human being who has been one of the greatest players of modern times. And he matters…. People like Griffey can’t merely be crumpled up and fed to the waste-management trucks when they stop hitting. They deserve more. They’ve earned more. Clearly, the Mariners are wrestling with how to afford this particular human what he’s earned. And that means he can’t be just another name in the transactions column.

— Jayson Stark, May 13, 2010

I don’t have a problem with Jayson Stark; I think he does a fine job. I don’t want to make media criticism a habit, but I do take issue with some of Stark’s comments on the Ken Griffey, Jr. situation in Seattle.

We’ve been over Seattle’s DH situation before, and nothing has changed. Griffey and Mike Sweeney are a waste of time and money in terms of their likely performance. Although I find the notion that Griffey makes up for what he costs in wins with merchandise sales dubious, that is not the issue, either. Hey, maybe there is some sort of CPAP cross-promotion that will give the organization more money to put into player development and free agency. Jokes aside, this isn’t about the “sleeping incident,” either.

This is not another re-hash of Griffey’s performance, (alleged!) clubhouse nap, or the value of the 38 Ken Griffey promotional nights the team still has remaining in the season. The issue is Stark’s moralizing tone. It is as if people are talking about sending Baseball Immortal Ken Griffey, Jr. off to the nursing home or the pound. Ken Griffey, Jr. is a “human being.” What, unlike Pat Burrell, Josh Anderson, Eric Byrnes, or scores of players who are let go (practically speaking) without asking their permission first? Were these violations of their “dignity”? Apparently, Griffey is “not just any human being,” but a certain kind of human being that can’t just be “thrown out,” and one who’s “earned more” and “deserves more.”

Ken Griffey, Jr. has had a great career and is a Hall of Famer. But “earned more”? Ken Griffey, Jr. was last anything like Good in 2005, and that’s about the only time during the FanGraphs WAR era. He was last great, according to Sean Smith’s numbers, in 2000, ten years ago with a 5.8 WAR season. To get perspective on how long ago that was, Yankee quasi-icon Bernie Williams, last seen being angry at the Yankees for not bringing him back for a fifth year of near-replacement performance, was still excellent that season, posting 5.0 WAR in 2000, with a couple very good years remaining.

That’s right — Bernie Williams, who has been out of the game for four years already (and was clearly finished some time before that) was a really good baseball player more recently than Ken Griffey, Jr. It isn’t as if the Mariners would be “throwing him out” as soon as he got bad. Griffey hasn’t been worth having around for a long time, and he hasn’t “earned” his giant paychecks in years. Since 2002, he’s been paid in excess of $60 million dollars by baseball teams (mostly the Reds) while being worth about a quarter of that. Maybe Stark just meant “hitting.” But it isn’t as if Griffey just started now hitting — as DH’s job is just to hit, and Griffey didn’t hit last season despite being heavily platooned.

This isn’t about whether Griffey can still play. Almost everyone agrees that he can’t. But what has he “earned” beyond that? Stark isn’t talking about money, of course. Respect? Dignity? A basic level of human dignity isn’t something earned, it is a universal right. Ken Griffey, Jr. is owed that. So is Pat Burrell. So is Eric Byrnes. So is Milton Bradley. Has anyone complained of such a “violation” when those players have been traded, cut, or DFAed without the players’ endorsement? No.

I don’t deny that the Mariners face a potential public-relations minefield in dealing with the situation, or that they might make decent money from Griffey promotional nights. However, those things have to do with corporate self-interest, not some extra obligation they have regarding Griffey’s “dignity.” Stark invokes some additional moral obligation to Griffey that he’s apparently “earned.”* He thinks Ken Griffey, Jr. is special in his own right, despite Junior last being useful about five years ago.

* Perhaps one could make the case on the basis of Griffey forcing his way out of Seattle in a trade that ended up being utterly lopsided in the Mariners’ favor (since Mike Cameron by himself blew away Griffey’s production in the succeeding seasons), but that isn’t Stark’s angle.

Publicity and performance aside, all the Mariners owe Griffey is what a team owes any player: a basic level of human respect and the prorated remainder of his guaranteed contract.

It felt like it had been coming forever, but it wasn’t until Saturday that the Tampa Bay Rays finally designated Pat Burrell for assignment. Signed from the the Rays’ 2008 World Series opponent Philadelphia Phillies after that season to a two-year, $16 million dollar contract, the now-ironically nicknamed Pat “The Bat” was supposed to add offensive punch at DH. Needless to say, as R.J. discussed Friday, things haven’t worked out that way, and the American League East-leading Rays seem to be ready to go with a Hank Blalock/Willy Aybar platoon. This has all been covered. But perhaps the failure of the Burrell Era in Tampa Bay can be a little reminder, or lesson, for us.

Just over a year ago many (myself included) were lauding the Rays for their contract with a good hitter whose defensive problems would be rendered irrelevant in the AL as he filled their Cliff Floyd-sized hole at DH. The Phillies did not offer Burrell arbitration, and so the Rays didn’t have to give up draft picks.* A win-win for the Rays. Now that they’ve basically admitted that it didn’t work out, what can we make of them, and, of course, “us” (the community of internet baseball bloggers who have nothing in common)?

* In the wake of the Ryan Howard Contract Brouhaha, Philadelphia’s side of the story, involving Raul Ibanez, lots of money, draft compensation, Ibanez’s career year in 2009, and so on is important, too, but outside the realm of what I want to get at in this particular post. So far, yes, Philadelphia has done well for themselves in the Ibanez-over-Burrell sweepstakes. Still, keep in mind that the Ibanez contract isn’t done yet, his 2010 is a far cry from 2009 at this point, and there’s still his age 39 season left after this one.

First of all, the obvious: if the Rays didn’t think Burrell was going to give them anything better than what they could do with Blalock/Aybar platoon, then they had to dump him. The Rays are winning the East now, but the Yankees are right there, and the Red Sox aren’t completely vanquished yet. Whether the team is a contender like the Rays or on the other end of the win curve, holding on to a washed-up hitter who can’t play the field on the five percent chance that he might “heat up” before the deadline and bring back a C-minus prospect if Tampa Bay eats the whole salary is, well, not a good process. I hope that’s obvious to everyone at this point (ahem). Now, let’s get to “us.”

Let me be clear: this isn’t a Very Special Moment of Critical Self-Reflection. It is simply a little reminder. While it’s clear that the Rays got the short end of the stick on this one, that doesn’t mean it was necessarily the wrong decision at the time. Maybe the Rays’ scouts and statisticians did miss something. ZiPS and CHONE, two well-respected publicly-available projections systems, saw Burrell as a good hitter going into 2009, and I’m guessing the Rays had similar numbers. Sometimes, things just don’t go the way one expects. Projections are not guarantees, they are best estimates of “true talent in context” for as many players as possible. When looking at how they do for large groups, they do well. But the nature of the beast is that they will miss on a number of individuals, too. The Rays front office knows this, and this implicit in the analyses of most sabermetrically-oriented analysts, too, even if it is rarely explicitly stated. Sometimes brevity is more important. If every blogger filled up their “brief notes” with as many qualifications as I do, well… it wouldn’t be good.

This isn’t to say that the Rays front office or their internet admirers are above reproach when they or “we” turn out to be wrong about something. A miss is a miss. The point is that while the tone of some analysts may seem certain, implicit in the good work is the assumption that we are working with “densities of probabilities,” and that inevitably, one will be wrong about (many) things (not me, of course, but everyone else). The goal is to be right more often than wrong. I think it’s safe to say that despite how the Burrell contract worked out, over the last few years, the Rays have accomplished that.

Toronto’s signing of Kevin Gregg this offseason to a one-year deal with a club option was a bit puzzling, given that a) he’s a reliever, and b) rebuilding teams generally shouldn’t spend money of veteran relievers. Moreover, the Blue Jays already had at least two pretty good relievers in Jason Frasor and Scott Downs, as well as players like Josh Roenicke (who came over as part of the Scott Rolen trade) waiting in the minors. But with a little thought, it became clear that not only was the Gregg contract not all that onerous, but that Frasor and Downs, as free agents after 2010, would both be good trade chips, and that Gregg, while perhaps not spectacular, could help hold down the fort.

He has done a bit more than that so far, moving into the closer’s role not long after the season started and handling the highest-leverage situations on the team (2.05 game LI). Gregg’s 2.12 ERA is not deceiving. He has a 2.09 FIP, and it’s not build on a house of fly ball luck, either, as his xFIP is 2.37. His 1.70 tERA is aided by a 10.5% line drive rate that is probably unsustainable, but clearly, Gregg has had a authentically good run so far this season.

Gregg hasn’t had a full-season xFIP under 4 since 2004, so we should look a bit closer. So far this year, Gregg is getting more strikeouts and avoiding walks better than ever before, which are obviously Good Things. He’s not getting lucky against lefties, either, as Gregg actually has a reverse split for his career — a career xFIP versus righties is 4.49, and 3.92 versus lefties, and that’s continued in 2010 with a 3.14 versus righties and a 1.26 versus lefties. What really stands out for Gregg in 2010 is his ground ball rate. Prior to this season, Gregg fluctuated between about average and greater-than-average groundball rates, but so far in 2010 ground balls have been a major key to to his success — 55% of balls in play have been on the ground. As Ric Flair might ask, “what’s causin’ all this?”

On this blog (and this podcasts) and elsewhere, there has been on-and-off talk of the cutter being a “miracle pitch” that more pitchers should add to their arsenal. Through 2009, BIS pitch types record Gregg has throwing almost no cutters. Guess what? In 2010, about 30% of his pitches have been identified as cutters. I haven’t read anything about Gregg talking about adding a cutter, and I’ll leave it up to BIS and the Pitch F/X experts to decipher, but whatever is going on, it is likely connected with Gregg’s better ground ball rate this season.

Let me emphasize for the nth time that all player performance is subject to random variation that can exaggerate changes over a short periods of time. This has to be keep in mind with relief pitchers in particular, given that even their full-season sample is so much smaller than everyone else’s. That being said, if Gregg has discovered something new that helps him keep the ball on the ground, he could not only be an good stopgap for the Jays when they trade their other veteran relievers, but he could become a valuable trade chip for a rebuilding Toronto club himself.

[Author’s added note, May 14, ~10:20 A.M. EST: You really should check out Posnanski’s post that really lays out Hillman’s clubhouse issues that I hinted at below. Do so if for no other reason that to find out that by the end of his first season, “the players were rather openly comparing Trey Hillman to Michael from “The Office.” Hmm… I wonder where they got that idea?]

The first manager of the 2010 season has been “let go”: Thursday afternoon, immediately after Zack Greinke’s first super-duper meaningful pitcher win of the season, the Kansas City Royals announced the firing of manager Trey Hillman. I’m not an “insider,” so I won’t get into analyzing the specific politics of the organization. That sort of stuff will hopefully come from the almost-always outstanding work of Joe Posnanski, Rany Jazayerli, Sam Mellinger, and others.

It is tempting to run through a sampling of Hillman’s “greatest hits.” (Who can forget Kyle Farnsworth pitching to Jim Thome on Opening Day 2009?) We’ll always remember Hillman’s response to the person who asked why left-handed reliever Ron Mahay wasn’t brought in to face Thome : “Mahay isn’t a lefty specialist.” Hillman handled the bullpen poorly, made bizarre playing time decisions, had an amazingly poor grasp of the platoon, and allegedly lost the clubhouse in his very first Spring Training with the club. I personally soured on Hillman fairly quickly. I didn’t appreciate the condescending tone Hillman tended to take when he felt cornered, and it was clear that part of the problem was his personality and attitude (he didn’t have time to “educate” us).

Nevertheless, even when someone has lost their job deservedly, it is difficult to take much joy in it. Hillman clearly loves the sport, and went to great lengths to be “in baseball” any way he could — working his way through the Yankees’ minor league system as as manager, leading the Nippon Ham Fighters to Pacific League championships in 2006 and 2007, and finally getting a shot at the American major leagues with the Royals in 2008. This is what happens to managers who preside over terrible teams. I would be shocked if Trey Hillman ever managed in the American major leagues again, and while that’s an accurate reflection of his abilities, it is sad to see that part of his dream end. Like just about every defeated political candidate I’ve ever heard, he never sounded better than during his ‘concession speech.’ All the best to Trey Hillman in his future endeavors. I’m just glad he got to stay long enough to see Jason Kendall’s emotional 250th hit-by-pitch.

The least surprising post-firing announcement is that Hillman’s replacement, at least on an interim basis, is former Brewers skipper Ned Yost. You aren’t going to believe this, but Yost was a coach for the Atlanta Braves at the same time Dayton Moore was working there. Some blame Yost for the Brewers’ pennant race problems during the last part of his Milwaukee tenure, but it is safe to say Yost probably won’t have to deal with that situation anytime soon with Kansas City. The truth is that it just doesn’t matter all that much, from a pure baseball perspective. You’ve read the sabermetric “managers don’t matter all that much” thing before: yes, managers often make bad strategic decisions, and sometimes they blow up in their faces, as in the Farnsworth/Thome example above. But over time… sometimes you pinch-run Tony Pena, Jr. for your designated hitter Billy Butler in a close game, Pena gets stranded, then, in extra innings, one of the worst hitters in the history of the major leagues, playing DH, gets the game-winning hit. Within a few games, random variation limits the amount of damage (or good) a manager can do. Yes, Hillman played Jose Guillen too much, but he’s not the person who gave an obviously declining outfielder in his early thirties a guaranteed $36 million dollar contract, either.

Back to the matter at hand. If you’re reading this, you probably know how this usually plays out. A new GM (Dayton Moore) comes in, quickly gets rid of the current manager (Cf. Buddy Bell) and brings in “his guy” (Trey Hillman). If after two or three seasons, if the team is still losing, the manager gets canned, and the GM’s leash gets shorter. Dayton Moore was quite emotional during Thursday’s presser, but it would be cynical to suggest that it was for any reason other than his personal relationship with Trey Hillman. Still, this is a clear sign (especially if one thinks the order to make a change came from ownership) that patience with the Royals’ lack of progress at the major league level is running thin. Pre-Moore acquisition Alex Gordon has been successfully neutered, but the most valuable on the team are still pre-Moore draftees Zack Greinke and Billy Butler. Hillman was Moore’s last line of defense. Some may say that Moore needs time to “see the end of what he started” in the minor leagues. Did anyone say that Allard Baird should be allowed to see what became of Greinke, Butler, and Gordon?

Trey Hillman (about whom Moore once said had a chance to be “one of the best baseball men of his generation”) needed to go, if for no other reason than showing that there is some level of “accountability” within the organization. The signals indicate that ownership isn’t going to wait around indefinitely on Dayton Moore, either. Again, we’ve seen this movie: new general manager comes in, honeymoon period (he isn’t the old guy!), seems to have a plan (I bet no one has ever thought of building a “farm system” before!), hires new manager (new ideas from Japan!), spends lots of money of free agents… then, when/if things go south, one of the last lines of defense is that the GM’s managerial hire gets fired. The typical next step isn’t to fire the new manager: after the first hire-and-fire, it’s usually the GM’s turn.

Now that is a process worth trusting.

On April 9, Jeff Francoeur hit two home runs, and his line stood at .429/.471/1.000. On April 14, he not only homered, but walked twice. Okay, one of them was intentional, but this was Jeff Francoeur. His line stood at .429/.514/.929. The most recent of Jeff Francoeur’s 10 walks for the season took place on May 5 against the Reds, at which point his line had dropped to a still respectable .263/.336/.474. But after a blistering .284/.355/.531 (.373 wOBA) April, May has not been kind so far: .147/.205/.147 for a pitcher-esque .184 wOBA. Jeff Francoeur’s current overall line for 2010 is .243/.311/.417 (.321 wOBA). His career line in the major leagues is .270/.311/.431 (.317 wOBA). So much for turning a corner.

I won’t need to recount the full saga of the former Atlanta hometown hero traded to the Mets last season for eventual non-tenderee Ryan Church. Despite a less-than-refined approach at the plate, he was very valuable on both sides of the ball during a 274 PA call-up in 2005 (3.2 WAR) and over a full season in 2007 (4.0 WAR). Since then, however, Francoeur has gone from a guy who once graced the cover of a magazine your Dad used to read to a guy who produced one of the classic self-referential quotes of all-time. After putting up a miserable .286 wOBA for the Braves in 2008, he was even worse for them in 2009 (.278 wOBA), which precipitated the trade to the Mets.

Some still believe in Francoeur. He did put up a .350 wOBA in 308 PA for the 2009 Mets. During his hot start (and all those walks!) to 2010, one columnist actually used the phrase ‘OBP machine’ to describe Francoeur. And yet here we are, with Francouer sitting at around his career averages.

It’s natural to want to believe in a (fairly) young player. And in a way, it’s refreshing that two organizations have kept playing Francoeur when young players are so often given up on after a near-meaningless sample. But while 26 is young, it isn’t that young. More importantly, Francoeur has over three thousand major league plate appearances in which he’s accumulated a .317 wOBA. A few good weeks don’t cancel those out. He’s hitting a few more flyballs out of the park so far this season, but he’s also hitting fewer line drives. More significantly, the ‘OBP Machine’ is swinging at pitches out of the zone 43% of the time, that’s ridiculous even for him (37% career). ZiPS Rest-of-Season projections see Frenchy as a .265/.324/.429 (.324 wOBA) hitter for the rest of the season. He had some great defensive seasons in right field in Atlanta, but most of that was due to his strong arm, and teams aren’t testing him as much anymore. All things considered, he’s about a 1 WAR player over a full season. This is probably who he is: a bench/platoon player with a strong arm, declining range, occasional power, and no concept of the strike zone (I wonder which Atlanta team official liked him?) If the Mets have any sense at all (ahem), Francoeur will be non-tendered after the season, since he isn’t even worth his arbitration salary this year.

This isn’t only about 2011. Despite everything they have endured (much of it self-inflicted), the 2010 Mets have a realistic shot at the playoffs. It’s unlikely that they’ll catch a far superior Philadelphia team in the NL East, but they’re in the hunt for the wild card. Organizational favorite Carlos Beltran will hopefully be back at some point to give the Mets a boost. When and if he returns, the Mets should use the opportunity to finally sit Francoeur in favor of Angel Pagan, a decent hitter (.341 ZipS RoS wOBA) and very good defender (+10 career UZR/150 in the outfield) who could start for many teams. Again, this isn’t about the future. Francoeur and Pagan are what they are — an expensive bench guy and an underrated above-average player. When Beltran returns, the Mets need to forget the Francoeur Dream and start Pagan in right (or center, if Beltran can’t play there).