This past Friday, Bob Dutton of the Kansas City Star mentioned that the Seattle Mariners were showing “signs of interest” in Royals designated hitter and “outfielder” Jose Guillen. I’m not exactly sure what that means, given that Dutton (a well-respected reporter) also mentions that there had been “no formal inquiry,” but let’s run with this a little bit. Does this trade even make sense for the Mariners and Royals?

At first blush, this trade rumor seems insane. Guillen is in the last season of an ill-advised three-year, 36 million dollar contract signed with the Royals in 2008. He is owed a prorated portion of $12 million this season. In 2008 he was almost replacement level, and in 2009 somehow managed to “top” that by being almost two wins below replacement in barely half a season. There’s been much talk about Guillen’s return to health after an injury-plagued 2009 (no word about why he was horrible in 2008, naturally) and he’s been hitting for considerable power as the Royals full-time DH this season, at .268/.321/.528 for a .365 wOBA. He’s been pretty lucky with a career-high 20% HR/FB rate, but ZiPS Rest-of-Season projections see a respectable .266/.322/.453 (.342 wOBA) in his immediate future.

But what would Seattle want with this guy? Their current DHs platoon features Ken GriffeyJr., projected by ZiPS ROS for a .304 wOBA, and Mike Sweeney, projected for a .312 wOBA the rest of the season. Even assming a hyper-efficent (and lucky) platoon would get them to .315, with Milton Bradley out indefinitely, a .342 wOBA-hitting Guillen would probably represent about a win improvement over the Leadership Platoon.

That much might be pretty obvious, but what about Guillen’s big salary? Seattle has apparently shown interest in players like Luke Scott, but was unwilling to take on the money, so how would they be able to afford Jose Guillen? This is why this trade rumor isn’t as insane as it seems: even the Royals have to know they would be lucky to get anything back for Guillen. Frankly, even being mentioned in a trade rumor is shocking, given his utter worthlessness in 2008 and 2009. Teams and scouts are rightly skeptical of his hot start. But this also means that unlike with, e.g., Luke Scott, even the Royals know that to get anything back they’ll have to eat almost all of Guillen’s salary. In a weird way, given the perception of his value, Guillen might actually be cheaper. The Mariners could get a cheap (for them) DH to solve that problem, and the Royals (who would be eating a salary they’d have to pay anyway) might get something a bit useful back, like a competent relief prospect. Even the Royals realize they aren’t going anywhere, and might finally be ready to let Kila Ka’aihue fly or flop in the majors, and this would open up a spot for Ka-aihue since they aren’t willing to risk the Wrath of Guillen by sitting him. The Mariners, who had designs on contention this season, could plug a DH hole they’ve been ‘unable’ to fill.

But while a Guillen-to-Seattle notion might not be completely crazy, it breaks down on that last point. The Mariners, with some justification, might have seen themselves with a good shot at winning the West prior to the season, even if they weren’t the favorites. However, they currently find themselves in last place, more than five games back of the first place Rangers. That’s not insurmountable, but given that Rangers are the better team, it’s not clear that even a nearly free Jose Guillen is really worth it, even if Erik Bedard stays healthy when/if he returns. With each loss, the marginal value of a win for Seattle drops, and trading anything of value for a one-win improvement makes less sense. So it’s not insane, but move along, very little to see here.

Dave Cameron’s post from yesterday about the Rays’ clutch hitting reminded me of the Little Things. In short, what the “Little Things” stat does is subtract decontextualized offensive linear weights (called wRAA here at FanGraphs) from game-state linear weights (WPA/LI) to give an idea of how well a team or player has done at playing to the game situation, over and above the average linear weight of the event. For, in the contemporary run environment, a walk averages an increase in run expectancy of about 0.3 runs above average, and a home run about 1.4, which is what wRAA/linear weights records, no matter when in the game they occur. However, in a tie game in the bottom of the ninth inning with the bases loaded, a walk and a home run give exactly the same change win expectancy for the home team, which is what WPA/LI records (while factoring out the “leverage” element in order to make each plate appearance of equal relative value). So to get the “Little Things,” the “situational” performance (not to say awareness, not yet, since analysts differ on how much this is a repeatable skill that players possess), we subtract wRAA converted to wins (I simply divide by 10) from WPA/LI: the Little Things. Which three offenses are doing the best and worst so far this season?

The Three Best

3. Mets, -16 wRAA, -0.59 WPA/LI, 1.01 Little Things. Well, David Wright is slightly negative in Little Things, so I guess the fans are right to boo him. It’s not been an impressive offense performance for the team, but they’ve made more out of their production than what their wOBA suggests, as the Mets are a surprising (to me, anyway) 15-13 so far.

2. Reds, -13 wRAA, -0.2 WPA/LI, 1.1 Little Things. Another team that is negative in both categories, but is getting some good situational offense. Scott Rolen’s veteran-ness might be the big difference here (ahem). But seriously, he’s done well, “Little Things-wise” so far.

1. Braves, -16 wRAA, 0.55 WPA/LI, 2.15 Little Things. Yes, Jason Heyward does the Little Things (so far), too.

The Three Worst

3. Angels, -11 wRAA, -3.28 WPA/LI, -2.18 Little Things. A few months ago, I noted that despite their reputation for doing the Little Things, the Angels have a spotty record, at least regarding this issue. Off to an ugly start in 2010, they are still waiting for Mike Scioscia’s magic touch to kick in.

2. Tigers, +23 wRAA, 0.11 WPA/LI, -2.19 Little Things. The Tigers offense is one of the main reasons they are the only team seemingly within striking distance of the Twins so far, but their hitters certainly haven’t maximized their chances so far, being more than two wins below what their context-neutral linear weights would suggest. Given the talent gap between the Tigers and Twins, they’re going to need all the situational skill/luck they can get if they want a shot at the AL Central this season.

1. Red Sox, +28 wRAA, -0.18 WPA/LI, -2.98 Little Things. Has anything gone right for the Red Sox so far this season? Kevin Youkilis is about half-a-win below average, and David Ortiz has (somehow) been worse the more crucial the situation has been. It’s gotta be tough for all those 2 year olds who haven’t seen a Red Sox championship in their lifetimes.

Apparently, struggling Baltimore Orioles OF/DH Luke Scott is running out of ideas on how to break out of his slump. Here’s one: just wait. I know, that’s really helpful. Seriously, Scott and his coaches (and probably opposing scouts) might be able to find something that’s wrong with his current approach and routine, although it does sound like he’s been frustrated on that score. But from the looks of things, Scott is the same hitter he was in past years, when he made up for a relatively low batting average with a good walk rate and power. Scott’s line so far this season really has been dreadful, as he’s “hitting” .177/.253/.354 for a .270 wOBA. That’s bad even for Jason Kendall. “Small sample size” is the first thing to say, and probably is all we need to say, quite frankly, but let’s dig a bit deeper.

Scott came to the Orioles from the Astros before the 2008 season, and hit .257/.336/.472 for a .343 wOBA in 2008, and improved on that line in 2009: .258/.340/.488, .355 wOBA. While Scott’s on-base percentage isn’t mind-blowing, that’s mostly due to his slightly below-average batting average, his walk rate has always been above average. His main asset other than his walks is his power, as his career ISO is .228. His walk rate has remained intact so far in 2010 at about 9.2%, which is only slightly lower than his usual rate. His strikeout rate has increased, however, jumping ot 29% whereas in recent seasons it has been between 21% and 23%. While his overall contact rate is about the same as in past seasons, he does seem to be swinging at a few more pitches out of the zone than usual (28.6 2010 O-Swing% vs. 23.2%), although it isn’t a drastic, perhaps a reflection of growing frustration. Scott’s isolated power is also down to .177, which isn’t bad. Scott’s batted ball profile is also roughly the same as always, with a slighly lower HR/FB ratio than in the past, which partly explains his lower isolated power. Scott’s never been reliant on a high BABIP, with a career BABIP under .300, but his current .208 average on balls in play is clearly founded on a whole lot of bad luck.

The Orioles as a whole have been terrible so far this season, just like Scott, but, like Scott, they aren’t as bad as they’ve looked. Scott’s struggles so far must be frustrating for the Orioles because he’s a good hitter on a cheap salary who has trade value as a left fielder (despite being pushed out of left by younger players, his defense there is average at worst) or a designated hitter, especially when teams with designs on the playoffs are starting players like Ken Griffey Jr., Mike Sweeney, Eric Chavez, Juan Pierre, and Pat Burrell at DH. But whether it’s for the Orioles or for some other team, the “secret” to Scott coming out of his struggles seems to be to wait around for his luck to even out.

Toronto Blue Jays catcher John Buck had a big night on Thursday, blasting three home runs against the Oakland As.

The graph doesn’t really convey Buck’s contribution (only showing two of his home runs). Any team’s total WPA (adding up WPA plus and minus) is always equal to either +.500 or -.500. Buck’s WPA last night was .449. That doesn’t mean his offense was worth almost 90% the Jays’ victory, of course, since there were negative WPA contributions (as always for any team) as well. But it’s still an impressive number. WPA is a cool toy for quantifying a game story, not one responsibly recommends it as a way of evaluating player skill. But it is fun to look at occasionally.

But about player skill… Now, if less than four weeks of a season is a small sample size, then one game is, well… But Buck’s power surge wasn’t a total fluke. Full disclosure: I’ve always irrationally liked John Buck. I can be pretty honest about him, though. He’s not a defensive whiz, especially when it comes to controlling the running game. Marc Hulet has been impressed with Buck’s work with the Blue Jays pitching staff this season; I’ll have to take his word for it.

As for offense, Buck hasn’t quite turned out to be the second coming of Mike Piazza. Buck hit 18 home runs in 2007, although his problems with contact and poor BABIP skill resulted in only a .319 wOBA. In 2009, when he was clearly on his way out with Kansas City, he had a career-high .332 wOBA — good for a catcher. Still, in 2009, as in every other year of the Dayton Moore Era, Buck was sharing time (at best) with another catcher, in this case Miguel Olivo* (and before him, in 2007, there was Jason LaRue).

* To be fair, Olivo is so awesome that he’s currently displacing Chris Iannetta in Colorado (ahem).

While Buck has a putrid .296 career on-base percentage, this is less because of an refusal to take walks than a poor batting average grounded in low average on balls in play. In 2007 and 2008, Buck had above average walk rates, and wasn’t too bad in 2009 in limited playing time. But he very high strikeout rate (around 25% for his career, and edging upward). While his O-Swing percentage in 2010 reflects his overall struggles at the plate in 2010 (until last night, at least), he’s usually only slightly below average. It’s his poor contract rate that kills him, around 75% for his career, and under 70% in 2009 and almost down to 60% so far this season.

Buck isn’t what you’d call a good hitter, although he’s adequate for a catcher. However, one thing he has done increasingly well is get the ball in the air (which also contributes to his low BABIP). Starting in 2007, he began to hit flyballs around 45% of the time, and a respectable amount of those flies have gone out. While he had a bit of bad luck with that in 2008, more recently years have seen him at about 14% HR/FB and up. According to Hit Tracker, other than 2008, Buck’s true home run distance and speed of bad have been clearly above average almost season. While 2008 can’t be ignored as a ‘mere outlier’, 2007 and 2009 do seem to be closer to his true talent level, power-wise. Buck’s current ZiPS Rest-of-Season projection calls for a .211 ISO, which is in-line with his 2007 (.207) and 2009 (.237) numbers. Perhaps moving out of the home run-suppressing Kauffman Stadium will make a difference as well. It will be interesting to watch.

Anecdotally, I’ve personally heard some cool stories about monstrous John Buck homers, which is sort of fun, because those stories are usually told about players like Adam Dunn and Ryan Howard. Objectively speaking, John Buck isn’t anything particularly special as a baseball player. But he’s got some power at the plate, and last night, it showed up.

Ryan Howard’s massive new extension brought forth various responses, many of them focusing on Philadelpha General Manager Ruben Amaro and his front office. Most of the reactions I read were negative, some were positive. None of what I read praised Howard’s agent, Casey Close.

Andrew Friedman and the Tampa Bay Rays’ front office are regularly and rightly praised for transforming a laughingstock with a small budget into a stacked monster with a small budget. The crowning achievement of Tampa Bay’s front office (so far) is undoubtedly signing third baseman Evan Longoria, then (2008) quite new to the big leagues, to a contract that guarantees him less over the guaranteed portion of the the contract (2008-2013) than Ryan Howard will be paid in 2010. It also includes three club options for 2014-2016. Longoria’s 2010 base salary (without prorating his signing bonus) is less than one million dollars. Nothing I have read says anything about the job done by his agent, Paul Cohen.

Last month, in reference to Barry Zito, R.J. Anderson wrote,

Should we really mock players for making prudent financial decisions when we praise management for doing the same?

I’m curious about something very much like this, with agents standing in for players. When we (and “we” here is not merely rhetorical, it includes me) praise/condemn a deal, we usually mean good or bad for the team’s budget. I know that some of us will sometimes call it a “win” for the player, or a “fair deal for both sides,” but I don’t think I’m being inaccurate in saying that is not the usual discourse on these matters. If the deal is good/bad for the team, we say that the general manager or front office did a good/bad job.

Take an agent like Casey Close, or, I don’t know, let’s pick someone non-controversial… Scott Boras. Close or Boras will come up, but usually the best that is said about them outside of sabermetric circles is that “they are part of the process” and that “it’s their job to get their clients the most money.” Sabermetric circles mostly avoid “Boras is the devil” talk. This isn’t another “agents are just doing their job” peice. Well, not exactly, although that is true.

What interests me is not the lack of praise for agents who are good at their job (although I think Mystery Team is probably sick of being unable to sign anyone). What interests me is the comparison of the negative cases: while someone might call a general manager “terrible” or “incompetent” because of foolish contracts, I’ve never read a piece going on at length that an agent should be fired because of an extremely team-favorable contract. One can quibble over specific circumstances, but just as it is the GM’s job to look at his team’s future and the player’s likely performance down the line when establishing what he can pay a particular player, it is the the job of the agent to do the same in the players’ interest. The agent has to be able to evaluate talent and the market down the road. I’m not trying to pick on any agent in particular — one would need to look at each agent’s clients to see how they made out. This would be an interesting comparative project.

Our current focus is understandable. Most of us are fans first, we want our teams to do well, and so we admire/denigrate GMs who sign good/bad deals. This also give us the urge (that some resist) to get angry with agents for “just doing their jobs.” My question to us, not as fans, but as (amateur) analysts going forward: what about the agents who (might be) doing their jobs badly?

Some guys are really hitting a lot of home runs, but it’s early. Everyone knows it’s early, but rather than getting into what constitutes an acceptable sample size for analysis, let’s look at a concrete example using an unsubtle, but helpfully simple tool.

Another thing that everyone knows is that Ryan Howard (any news on him today?) has monster power to all fields. While there are a few sluggers who hit around 25% of their fly balls out of the park, from 2007-2009 Ryan Howard hit an incredible 29.4% out of the park, far and away the best among qualified hitters during that period. Let’s call that the “Howard Zone.” Many players who are playing far above or far below their true talent in different areas so far this season. Let’s look at one extreme — the six players who have hit 30% or more of their fly balls out of the park so far in 2010, players who are (currently) beyond the Howard Zone.

Jason Heyward, 40.0%. I won’t bore you with another recititation of Heyward’s sudden legend. Despite some problems with pitches in the dirt, his overall numbers show a guy who isn’t swinging at many bad pitches (21.9 O-Swing%). He’s got great power, but no one has 40% HR/FB power. At least I don’t think so. One thing to watch is Heyward’s ability to get the ball into the air as the season progresses. So far, he actually isn’t hitting that many fly balls (26.3%), and is hitting a bunch of grounders (55.3%). I’m not sounding any alarms, but it’s something to watch.

Nelson Cruz, 36.8%. Cruz has always shown power (.231 career ISO), but this is beyond him. Yes, the park helps, but he’s a good hitter that actually passed through waivers a few years ago. Despite the inevitable power regression from terrifying to merely excellent, he could be in for a monster season. Have people noticed he’s probably a better player than Josh Hamilton?

Kelly Johnson, 36.8%. Speaking of being helped by a park… Jack Moore covered Johnson this morning, so I’ll keep it brief: Johnson’s always had good offensive skills, but he’s not going to finish the season with anything close his current .492 ISO, but 20+ home runs is realistic. Great pickup by Arizona.

Ty Wigginton, 35.3%. I just realized that Ty Wigginton and Garrett Atkins are two different people. Ty’s the one who can hit. Okay, so he’s not going to his more than a third of his fly balls out, but so far, he’s hitting righties just about as well as lefties, although his career splits aren’t as horrible as one might think, given his reputation. He’s a useful hitter in a part-time role, but his presence on this list should be a warning to all those who think that Vernon Wells‘ and Jose Guillen’s power resurgences (with lower HR/FB rates thatn Wigginton) are for real.

Paul Konerko, 32.0%. A big .400 wOBA start from the guy in the last season of a seemingly endless contract. His career HR/FB rate is 16.7%, and he hasn’t been over 20% since 2005.

Derek Jeter, 30.0%. Despite the big overall surge in 2009 and a new stadium that helped his power output, no one expects Jeter to continue this. Indeed, despite the great fortune on fly balls so far, his 2010 ISO is merely a decent .158, and Jeter is hitting about 74% of his balls in play into the ground.

Whatever else might be written about the 2010 San Francisco Giants, they have assembled an excellent pitching staff. Tim Lincecum, Matt Cain, and Jonathan Sanchez are all tremendous young pitchers, and, yes, good ol’ Barry Zito is a pretty good #4 pitcher. Once you leave the contract jokes aside, that is, and focus on his numbers, yeah, a lot of teams would be thrilled to have a guy with Zito’s projected talent at the back of their rotation. And so far this year, he looks much better than that, with a 1.86 ERA and a 2.88 FIP. Once again, I won’t give you the small sample size lecture that I’m sure you all know by heart at this point. It still applies. But is there anything in the numbers (I’ll leave the Pitch F/X stuff to someone smart) to indicate that Zito has changed something in his approach in his first three starts such that we migth see a turnaround for him in 2010? After all, after projecting him for a 4.60 FIP before the season, as of now, ZiPS rest-of-seasonn has him at 4.35.

So far this season, Zito’s walk rate is only 2.33 per nine innings, and he hasn’t given up a home run yet. While his BABIP is an unsustainable .209, he is managing to hold hitters to a mere 15.5% line drive rate. These are the primary reasons he has a 2.73 tERA, right in line with his tremendous ERA and FIP.

Other numbers are less impressive. After having a better strikeout rate in 2009 than in any other previous season, in 2010, he’s only striking out a Horacio Ramirez-esque 4.19 batters every nine innings. I’m personally agnostic regarding how much control pitchers have on line drives rates (if they do, I think it’s much less than with regard to groundball rates, strikeouts, walks, etc.), but even if you think Zito has found something new in that regard, most of those former line drives have turned into flyballs — up to about 46% this year from Zito, as opposed to his usual rate of about 40%. Zito doesn’t get that many groundballs — he’s at about his usual rate of 38% at the moment. But as for the flyballs… yes, so far he’s been very lucky to not give up any home runs, which is why his xFIP is 4.79 so far this season. While his pitch type values (by count) reflect the success he’s had in preventing runs so far this season, and his pitch typesshow a slight decrease in sliders in favor of his 86 mph “heater,” his plate discipline numbers reflect his low strikeout totals — getting fewer swings on pitches outside the strike zone, allowing more contact in general, and a lower swinging strike percentage.

None of this is to say that Zito is actually worse than expected, or that he can’t be helpful. Nor do I intend to start a debate about the relative value of FIP, xFIP, and tERA — all three are useful. All I wanted to examine in this post is whether Zito’s hot start might be attributed to some changes in his pitching this season. From what I can see in the numbers, the answer is “no.”

I hope that FanGraphs readers don’t need lecturing on sample size, so I won’t. Scouts might be able to pick up on something a player is doing differently in the first two weeks, but I don’t have that kind of insight myself. Let’s check out the starts of three outfielders with big contracts (one isn’t quite as big, although it was arguably almost as bad an idea as the other two) who, to say the least, haven’t justified their paychecks, but two of whom are hitting surprisingly well in 2010, and a third who is not.

I’ll be using ZiPS in-season projections to look at how ZiPS projected the player’s offense before the season, how ZiPS projects the player’s offense the rest of the season (“RoS” on the player pages), i.e., the current estimate of the player’s “true talent” in context, and what that means for the player’s final 2010 offense value (ZiPS “Update”).

Your current All-Albatross Outfield:

Center Field: Vernon Wells
Contract: $126 million 2008-2014, $12.5 million in 2010 (Cot’s)
Current 2010 wOBA: .507
ZiPS 2010 Preseason Projection: .328
ZiPS Rest-of-Season (RoS): .342
ZiPS Update: .359

As horrible as Wells’ contract undoubtedly is now, it wasn’t as crazy at the time as people thought. Wells has been insanely hot (.340/.436/.787, .507 wOBA) from the very first game. Before the season, ZiPS saw him as about a league-average hitter (.328 wOBA), which wouldn’t be bad from a center fielder if he a) could field the position, b) wasn’t being paid $12.5 million, c) wasn’t in his 30s, and c) wasn’t signed through 2014 with a full no-trade clause. ZiPS is pretty impressed by the first two weeks, though, projecting a .342 wOBA for the rest of the season finishing at .359. If Wells finishes as ZiPS envisions (+15 runs offensively), he would actually be worth about what he’s being paid this season… assuming he can play average defense. This is still an albatross, of course, particularly given the Jays’ situation, but it’s a nice change in projection after only two weeks.

Right Field: Jose Guillen.
Contract: $36 million 2008-2010, $12 million in 2010 (Cot’s)
Current 2010 wOBA: .491
ZiPS 2010 Preseason Projection: .333
ZiPS Rest-of-Season (RoS): .344
ZiPS Update:.361

Some may feel that Guillen doesn’t belong on this list, given that he’s the Royals primary DH, but he insists he can still play the outfield, and was only bad in 2009 because of life-threatening blood clots in his legs. One might wonder why the blood clots also went untreated in 2006, 2007, and 2008, when he played terrible defense, or in 2006 and 2008 when he didn’t hit, but whatever the situation is, Guillen is definitely smoking the ball now (.367/.404/.755), and people have remarked that his bat looks quicker. Before the season, ZiPS (much more optimistic on Guillen than CHONE or the Fans) saw Guillen as a slightly above-average hitter, which would make him a slightly above-replacement level DH. If he finishes the season at about +13 offensively (as ZiPS projects), that’s about a 1.5 WAR DH, exceeding my wildest dreams for Guillen 2010. I’ll be glad to admit I was wrong if that happens. It’s still a disaster contract for the Royals that should never have been signed, and a 1.5 WAR season doesn’t even justify his 2010 salary, but hey, maybe the Royals will be able to offload a small portion of his remaining contract and/or get a C- prospect back, which seemed inconceivable two weeks ago. Trust the Process.

Left Field: Alfonso Soriano
Contract: $136 million, 2007-2014, $18 million in 2010 (Cot’s)
Current 2010 wOBA: .322
ZiPS 2010 Preseason Projection: .357
ZiPS Rest-of-Season (RoS): .357
ZiPS Update: .354

I’ll do a longer write-up on the Soriano contract soon. For now: it was a terrible decision at the time that somehow turned out worse. Like Wells and Guillen, Soriano was absolutely dreadful in 2009, although the other two didn’t have the benefit of having Milton Bradley as a scapegoat/distraction. ZiPS saw Soriano as the best hitter of the three going into 2010, and although he’s off to a less-than-inspiring start, still does see him as that for the rest of the season. But even if he finishes with a .354 wOBA for the season, he’ll still merely be around an average player making $18 million a season… until 2014.

Projections admit of uncertainty. I don’t know all the ins-and-outs of ZiPS (created by Dan Szymborski), but this does give a perspective on what a small hot streak may or may not mean. Even in the optimistic cases, these contracts remain albatrosses.

Young Blue Jays outfielder Travis Snider is off to another rough start. After spring rumblings that Snider would have to “earn his spot on the roster,” he apparently did so. After 34 plate appearances, Snider’s line is .107/.265/.179 for a .195 wOBA, and astounding 6 wRC+. If you’re reading this, I don’t have to tell you that 34 plate appearances don’t mean anything significant for anyone, whether it’s the first two weeks, the last two weeks, or 34 PA randomly selected from different points in the year. Still, it’s hardly what people expected from Snider. So it is already time for another predictable “don’t panic on player x” post.

As a reminder: in 2008, when he was 20, Snider hit .262/.357/.461 with a .366 wOBA in AA , then in a brief stint (70 PA) at AAA hit .344/.386/.519 with a .399 wOBA, then more than held his own in a September call-up (.301/.338/.466, .345 wOBA). At 21, he demolished AAA pitching (.337/.431/.663, .462 wOBA) but wasn’t nearly as dominating in 276 plate appearances in the majors (.241/.328/.419, .327 wOBA). While that line was no doubt disappointing, it was a league average offense performance (100 wRC+) for a hitter of only 21, so he wasn’t lost. Snider’s main problem so far is strikeouts, averaging between 25% and 30% in the minors, and over 30% in the majors, although his walk rate remains above average. According to pitch type linear weights by count, Snider does well against major-league fastballs and is less effective against other pitches, as is stereotypical for many young hitters. Contact is Snider’s primary problem at the plate, although his O-Swing percentage has improved each season in the majors. The monstrous power he has shown in the minors hasn’t translated to the majors yet, but it has been above average. Youth is clearly on Snider’s side. He’s at an age where the his current problems — strike zone judgement and contact — are usually still improving, as is (frighteningly) power.

Snider has been highly regarded as a hitting prospect for some time, but we also know that many highly-regarded prospects disappoint. No guarantees are to be found here, but it’s worth thinking about why patience in Snider is likely to be rewarded (and hopefully this patience will be displayed by the Blue Jays as well, who have absolutely nothing to lose by giving Snider every chance possible in the majors this season).

Snider’s fellow Blue Jay Adam Lind is the obvious comparison. Lind also destroyed the minors, but after than his brief call up in 2006, Lind raked in the minors in 2007 and 2008 while struggling in the majors (.238/.278/.400, .291 wOBA in 2007 and .282/.316/.439, .325 wOBA in 2008). But in 2009… well, all this is also well-known, but its relevance to Snider is that in in 2007 and 2008, during which Lind didn’t hit as well in the majors as Snider did in 2009, Lind was 23 and 24 years old, whereas Snider was only 21 last season. Everyone ages differently, but the younger a player is, the more rapid the upward ascent is likely to be.

Lind never had as severe a strikeout problem as Snider, although he doesn’t take as many walk, either. Nonetheless, both of those statistics have improved year-by-year for Lind, as has his success against offspeed and breaking pitches. Lind is far superior in terms of making contact, which remains the biggest single offensive concern for Snider, but it’s not an insurmountable problem, given Snider’s age and incredible power potential. Young players are can improve quickly when given the chance, and Adam Lind provides an example of the general rule that should give Travis Snider some breathing room.

When the Yankees’ CC Sabathia lost his no-hit bid against the Rays this past Saturday, I jokingly tweeted that it would have been a cheap no-hitter anyway. Some people seemed a bit confused by this, so I had to explain that I was being sarcastic. In fact, it was a very impressive performance given the high regard that I have for the current Rays lineup.

While no-hitters are fun to watch (unless your team is the victim, of course) and always involve a great pitching performance, their relative greatness tends to be exaggerated. For one, non-home run hits are greatly influenced by luck and the ability (or lack thereof) of the fielders behind the pitcher. For another, there isn’t really that much of a difference between a no-hitter and a one-hitter, especially given the luck/defense factors just mentioned.

Nonetheless, no-hitters have a rightful place in baseball lore. None of them are exactly “cheap.” Still, I thought it might be fun to “rank” the no-hitters from the last three seasons by difficulty, given the offenses against which the pitcher was going. A more precise way to do this would be to take the precise lineups into account, adjust for park, and maybe even do a post-facto Marcel to see what the true talent of the hitters in the game really was. I’m not going to go that “all out” for a blog post. I’m simply going to rank them (going in reverse order of “difficulty”) by the wOBA of the opposing team for the season in which they occured. I’m ranking the seven no-hitters thrown from 2007-2009. I’m not saying this the the “best” way to do such a trivial exercise, but it’s a start. Let the arguments begin!

7. Jonathan Sanchez, San Francisco Giants vs. San Diego Padres, July 10, 2009, 8-0
Padres 2009 wOBA: .310
Comment: Only one baserunner during this game due to a Juan Uribe error. The Padres’ wOBA is, of course, deflated due to their home park, but Sanchez did get to face the pitcher during this game.

6. Jon Lester, Red Sox vs. Royals, May 19, 2008, 7-0
Royals 2008 wOBA: .314
Comment: Um, I guess it was at Fenway, but other than that…

5. Carlos Zambrano vs. Houston Astros, September 14, 2008, 5-0,
Astros 2008 wOBA: .321
Comment: This was the first no-hitter ever thrown at a “neutral” Miller Park due to Hurricane Ike. Yeah, right, “neutral.” Probably deserves to be downgraded for that.

4. Clay Buchholz, Red Sox vs. Orioles, September 1, 2007, 10-0
Orioles 2007 wOBA: .328
Comment: Only Buchholz’s second start of his career. The Orioles’ offense has come a long way since then.

3. Mark Buehrle White Sox versus Texas Rangers, April 18, 2007, 6-0
Rangers 2007 team wOBA: .329
Comment: Less impressive than one might think give the how weak the Rangers offense was that season (once one takes their home park into account), but still very good. The Rangers were so weak that season they took a flier on Zombie Sammy Sosa, who got was their only baserunner of the game and got picked off.

2. Justin Verlander, Detroit Tigers versus Milwaukee Brewers, June 12, 2007, 4-0
Brewers 2006 wOBA: .337
Comment: Very impressive, given the Brewers’ above-average offense. Moreover, it was in an AL park, so Verlander didn’t get to face the pitcher.

1. Mark Buehrle vs. Tampa Bay Rays, July 23, 2009, 5-0
Rays 2009 wOBA: .346
Comment: The easy winner, as the Rays offense was one of the best in baseball in 2009. Oh, and it was a perfect game.