Comparison of two players at the same position:

Player A hit .239/.340/.442 with 25 home runs for a .346 wOBA while playing +10 defense.

Player B hit .250/.342/.452 with 24 home runs for a .346 wOBA while playing +9.5 defense.

Quite similar. They walk almost equally as often (12.3% for A, 11.9% for B), neither has a good average, although that hardly matters, of course. They have similar power. If you didn’t know that they played good defense, you’d be tempted to say that they had “old player skills,” just from the three slash.

I won’t pretend this is a big surprise: both players are Mike Cameron. Player A is the 29-year-old Cameron of 2002, and Player B is the 36-year-old Mike Cameron of 2009. Mike Cameron has been good, there’s no doubt about that, so I won’t go on about it. It’s his aging — or, more precisely, his seeming lack thereof — that is so striking. A graph of Cameron’s seasonal wOBAs is representative:

That is remarkably stable since 1999. Many of his other graphs have a similar shape.

Cameron’s UZR varies more year-to-year than his offensive stats, but that’s the nature of defensive metrics in general. And his truly down years according to UZR are in his injury-shortened 2005 with the Mets and his two seasons in San Diego. It’s also worth nothing that while Cameron has often been called “injury prone,” starting in 1998 he’s played 140+ games every season except 2005 and 2008.

One might be tempted to say that “you know what you’re going to get with Mike Cameron” after all these years: low batting average, good power, good walks, many strikeouts, 20+ homers, good defense in center field, and until 2009, a decent number of steals. But we aren’t talking about a player’s 25-32 seasons; in Cameron’s case, we’re talking about a period that’s almost completely made up of his thirties, when most players are declining. Looking at Cameron’s numbers, the only real change to be seen in recent years is that he attempts fewer stolen bases, and that is a very recent development (2009).

I don’t think it really means anything, to be honest. I’m just amazed that Mike Cameron has been able to go out every year and put up four-plus win seasons, one after the other (with a few exceptions) in the part of his career when many would be slowly dropping out of baseball. Of course, players being productive in their thirties and even forties isn’t unheard of, but many of them were great players to begin with, so their decline phases could still be very great. Of course, not everyone ages the same. Some players were more productive in their thirties — Honus Wagner comes to mind. But again, while Cameron is a good player, no one would put him on Wanger’s level. Like Wagner and other productive “old” players, Cameron’s athleticism is well-renowned, and that certainly makes a difference.

But Cameron is an exception, not the rule. We shouldn’t take his singular case as a “refutation” of what we know about player aging. CHONE expects a pretty big offensive drop-off to a .317 wOBA, while ZiPS sees more of the same, projecting another .346 for Cameron in 2010. But projection systems (rightly) work off of general rules. Who knows? So far, though, Mike Cameron’s play through his thirties brings to mind the following (incredibly nerdy) lines from the first chapter of Tolkien’s Fellowship of the Ring:

Time wore on, but it seemed to have little effect on Mr. Baggins. At ninety he was much the same as at fifty. At ninety-nine they began to call him well-preserved, but unchanged would have been nearer the mark.

As we begin the 2010 season, I’d like to take yet another (brief) look at something from 2009. If you’re here, you probably know that three young American League pitchers took big steps forward last season: Justin Verlander, Felix Hernandez, and the 2009 AL Cy Young winner, Zack Greinke. While all thee had good seasons in 2008, they each had a monster season in 2009. Their individual paths to greatness has been much chronicled here and elsewhere. But while browsing through some player pages recently, I noticed something all three had in common as they moved from 2008-2009: the effectiveness of their fastballs.

Some of my friends who are Tiger fans have said that Verlander had a down season in 2008. I don’t agree, and neither do FanGraphs’ win values, having Verlander’s 2008 in line previous seasons at 3.4 Wins Above Replacement, and his FIP was the second best of his career to that point. 2009 went far beyond that, of course, with Verlander sporting a 2.80 FIP and an 8.2 WAR. That’s a monster season. This is, again, well-documented, and I’m sure that there are pitch f/x experts, scouts, etc. that could give you an account of what he did differently. Numerous stats improved for Verlander, as well. But for now, the one that stands out to me is in Verlander’s pitch type linear weights. With the exception of a +13.3 season in 2007, Verlander’s fastball had been about average prior to 2009. However, in 2009, coming off of a +0.4 season with his fastball in 2008, he put up a +24.3. He threw his fastball a bit more often, but it wasn’t just quantity. While his slider and curveball were less effective than they had been in 2008, per 100 pitches, his fastball linear weights rose to 0.96 from 2008’s 0.02 (his changeup was also more effective).

King Felix’ ascension to his throne had been long-awaited. That’s not to say that his series of ~four win seasons from 2006-2008 weren’t very good for a very young pitcher, but 2009 was a new level — an extremely impressive 6.9 WAR outing. In 2006 and 2007, his fastball was actually below average (according to pitch type linear weights, which is different than a pitch f/x or scouting analysis, I’m not saying his fastball was “bad” during those seasons). In 2008, he began to through his fastball more, and it was +6. In 2009, he threw it almost as much, and to greater effect, +19.0, although all his pitches improved per 100 over 2008.

It was Greinke’s number that started me down this path. Everyone knows about Greinke’s 2009, but he was also the best of these three according to WAR in 2008, with 4.9. 2009 was one of the best seasons by a pitcher in the FanGraphs era, at 9.4. What was surprising to me was that in his excellent 2008 season, his fastball was below average, and this was true of all of his other seasons in the majors other than 2007, much of which he spent in the bullpen. Through 2008, his slider had been his most effective pitch (by linear weights). In 2009, as one might expect from the overall improvement, all of Zack’s pitches improved, including his devastating slider and so-so change, but none more than his fastball. Whereas his fastball was only -3.8 in 2008, in 2009 it was +25.8, and he actually threw it a bit less frequently.

Other pitchers could be discussed here, for exampe, Florida’s Josh Johnson, whose fastball was +4.7 in his 2.0 WAR 2008, and +21.5 in his 5.5 WAR 2009. Of course, Greinke’s 2008 season indicates that some pitchers can have great seasons without their fastball being that effective (by count). Johnson’s teammate Ricky Nolasco improved from 2008 to 2009 despite his fastball linear weights going from +4.7 to -15.5 — his slider was awesome in 2009. Again, scouting and pitch f/x has much more to tell us why and how these things happened. And keep in mind that the linear weights are by count, so pitcher could be changing their sequencing and other things that we can’t see directly from the linear weights.

But I find this interesting nonetheless. Hence, my groundbreaking thought for the day: the fastball is an important pitch.

In the wake of Adam Lind’s monster 2009 at the plate, the Toronto Blue Jays have signed him to a multi-year deal. In short, Lind (who will be 26 to start the season) is guaranteed $18 million from 2010-2013, with the Jays holding options for 2014-2016, which would have been Lind’s first three years of free agency.

At first blush, this is a good deal for the Jays. To spoil the ending: it is. But how good? Remember that players typically get less money in arbitration, and Lind wasn’t going to be arbitration eligible until after the 2010 season. In other words, for 2010, Toronto was going to have Lind for practically “free” (around league minimum). For the three arbitration seasons, a player is typically paid 40, 60, and 80 percent of what he would make on the free agent market. To comparing Lind to the free agent market scale, rather that assuming 4/18, we take the three arbitration years, and multiply the time by 0.4, 0.6, and 0.8 respectively, and evaluate this deal as if it were a 2/18 (for simplicities sake, we round 1.8 up to 2) deal in the current free agent market. Assuming a current market value of $3.5 million dollars per marginal win, a typical 0.5 win a season decline, and 7% per season salary inflation, a two year, $18 million dollar contract would be an average deal for a player that is currently 2.5 Wins Above Replacement.

In 2009, Lind put up 3.7 WAR. In general, cherrypicking one good (or bad) season as a “new standard” for any player is a bad idea for projections, and even worse for deciding whom to resign. That’s why we look to projection systems that take account of playing time, run environment, age, and so on, and I’ll also add in the Fan projections for that “personal touch.” Averaging Lind’s projected 2010 wOBA from CHONE (.368), ZiPS (.359), and the Fans (.383), we get .370, or about 24 runs above average per 700 plate appearances.

Lind is… not much of a defender, to put it kindly, and Toronto is aware of this, making him their primary designated hitter (although I’m disappointed we’ll miss out on the comedy an everyday outfield of Lind, Vernon Wells, and Travis Snider would have provided). But he’s done it before, so we don’t need to worry about it effecting his hitting too much.

Putting it all together: +24 offense -17.5 DH positional adjustmen + 25 AL replacement level all times 85% playing time = about a 2.7 WAR player. Given the level of imprecision we’re dealing with here, that’s pretty much right on as far as what we’d expect. Of course, Lind is only 26 (turning 27 in July), so perhaps he isn’t in for as much decline and/or attrition as is built in to the 0.5 WAR-a-season estimate. Perhaps, although Lind isn’t exactly a the type we’d expect to age gracefully. It’s safe to say that the guaranteed portion is a good, not great deal for the Jays, and fair for Lind as well. This only looks “great” or like a “steal” if it’s compared with the free agent market, but Lind wasn’t slated to reach free agency until 2014 . Team have lots of leverage with pre-arbitration players, and the Jays used it properly.

One might argue that the Jays got a “steal” because Lind will be an “exception” to the projections. I’m aware of the uncertainty in projections. But while some professional and amateur scouts may be able to can pick the exceptions amidst uncertainty, I can’t, and I’ll leave that sort of thing to those who can.

What makes this deal even better, though, are the club options tacked on for what would have been Lind’s first three free agent years (2014-2016). They are worth about $7.5M annually (not counting the buyouts). I’ve said that it isn’t a good idea to bet on Lind being an “exception,” and by 2014 he’ll be entering his thirties. Guaranteeing something substantial five years down the road to most players, especially those who couldn’t run or play the field in their their mid-20s is, to say the least, not a good idea. But the Jays haven’t. When I look at the projections, and assume an average aging curve, I think it’s about even money, that Lind will be worth keeping around in 2014. But the Jays haven’t guaranteed him anything beyond a reasonable buyout for 2014. If he does turn out to age well in his late-20s, and is still going strong, the Jays can keep him on at a great price. If not, they can let him go. That’s what makes this deal decent now, but potentially great later.

[Author’s Note, 5:46 p.m. EST : I meant to include Minnesota originally, but forgot… Now added.]

It is often said of fourth outfielders and utility infielders that “they could start for so many other teams!” I wrote something along those lines myself in yesterday’s post about the Rays. Are there players of whom this is true?

Take Angels utility infielder Maicer Izturis. Izturis has seen time at third, second, and short, and has done well in limited action, including a near three-win season in 2009. Averaging CHONE, ZiPS, and Fan projections, his 2010 offensive projection is for a .335 wOBA, about +4 runs above average for the season. Izturis is a good defender and his stats reflect the positional adjustments fairly well; let’s call him an average defensive shortstop, and a +5 defender at second and third, so a +7.5 per season infielder. Izturis’s playing time has been limited because of his utility role, so let’s conservatively assume he could handle starting 75 percent of the time. We should also take into account that he is projected to face more difficult AL pitching. In all it comes out to: 4 offensive runs + 7.5 fielding + 25 AL replacement level x 75 percent playing time = ~2.7 WAR.

Izturis can play third, second, and short, making it easier to find places he could start, so I don’t want to make this any simpler for Izturis or myself. I’m excluding horrible and/or rebuilding teams like Washington, Pittsburgh, Kansas City, San Diego, or Houston, for whom many players above replacement level could start. I’m also going to stick with fairly clear-cut cases. I won’t pretend to be exhaustive, I’m sure readers will find additional cases to be made (and cases with which to disagree!). One last important note: this does not take into account contracts, age, or player development. It’s just to see who Izturis projects to be clearly better than in 2010.

In the NL West, Izturis could clearly start at shortstop over Zombie Edgar Renteria, and I’d take him over Freddy Sanchez at second, too. In LA, I’d play Izturis over the Blake Dewitt/Ronnie Belliard/Jamey Carroll morass at second and Casey Blake at third. I like Arizona’s Kelly Johnson, but Izturis is better. Colorado 2B Clint Barmes has a great glove, but Izturis is no slouch in the field, either, and can actually hit.

Moving on to the NL Central, the “best fans in baseball” might love Skip Schumaker’s grittiness, but I think they’d prefer a good player. St. Louis could also start Izturis over the David Freese/Felipe Lopez/whatever group at third. Izturis is better than Cubs’ second baseman Mike Fontenot, Milwaukee third baseman Casey McGehee, and Reds shortstop Paul Janish.

In the NL East, I’m sure Marlins fans (let’s pretend they exist) would love to see Jorge Cantu’s glove banished from third forever in favor of Izturis. Ditto for Mets fans (whom I’m sure exist) and Luis Castillo at second.

Moving our way back across the continent, the AL East has only one obvious case (outside of Toronto) — Maicer could easily take his half-brother Cesar Izturis‘ job at shortstop in Baltimore.

In the AL Central, Izturis could start at any of three positions in Detroit: Adam Everett‘s and Brandon Inge’s excellent gloves aren’t enough to beat out a 2.7 WAR player, and Scott Sizemore isn’t likely on Izturis’ level yet. In Cleveland, Izturis would beat out Luis Valbuena at second and Jhonny Peralta at third. I like Mark Teahen, so it pains me to write that Izturis is far superior to the White Sox third baseman. Izturis is obviously far superior to Nick Punto and Brendan Harris at third base for Minnesota, and honestly, I think he’s probably better than Orlando Hudson at second, too, but I was going to leave out the close ones.

Back home in the AL West, I’m sure Oakland would love to have Izturis starting at shortstop rather than Cliff Pennington or Adam Rosales. Even a defensively oriented team like Seattle should realize that Jack Wilson’s bat makes him an inferior performer at shortstop to Izturis, and that Izturis would be better than Jose Lopez at second or third (wherever former teammate Chone Figgins isn’t playing).

That’s a long list of teams, but Izturis is a good player. If he was on the market, he wouldn’t be out of work for long. Oh, one more: Izturis could start at third over Brandon Wood for the Angels.

Beginning with the obvious and oft-repeated: The 2010 Tampa Bay Rays have the third best current talent in the American League.* But they are also the third most talented team in their division. This team has far too much talent to get any pity from me, though.

* I’d say “all of baseball,” but one could make an argument for the Phillies (Thanks, Doc!).

Straight up (not considering contracts or age), I’d probably take the 2010 Rays’ position players as a group over just about any other in baseball. They have something of a hole with Pat Burrell (possibly platooning with [shudder] Hank Blalock) at DH, although they could do much worse. Matt Joyce is probably around an average performer in right field, although if he’s platooned with ageless defensive-whiz Gabe Kapler, the Rays could get above-average performance out of the position. Those worried about Kelly Shoppach’s contact problems forget that even with his worst offensive projection (ZiPS), he’s an above-average catcher. It’s a cliche to say that a team has bench players “that could start for a lot of teams,” but it’s true of Willy Aybar and Sean Rodriguez.

The next “rung” for most teams contains a few above-average players. The Rays, in contrast, have five “above-above average” players here, guys who are around 3.5-4.5 WAR: Jason Bartlett, Carlos Pena, B.J. Upton, Ben Zobrist, and Carl Crawford. I know that is inadequate praise, but if I went on about all the individual talents on this team, this post would be 2,000+ words.

That’s it for the position players. Oh, yeah. Evan Longoria is the best third baseman in baseball. No, not just the “best value.” The best third baseman in baseball. Period.

Pitching lets the Rays down. Put away the torches and pitchforks. The bullpen is good enough (despite J.P. Howell’s injury concerns) with off-season acquisition Rafael Soriano and Grant Balfour both being strong options. Many, many teams would love to have James Shields and Matt Garza at the top of their rotations, not to mention Jeff Niemann and (especially) youngsters like David Price and Wade Davis. What I mean by “lets the Rays down” is that when I look at the Rays’ projections next to New York’s and Boston’s, the biggest difference is in the starting pitching. Again, it isn’t that Shields, Garza, et. al. aren’t good. But there is a sizeable gap between, say, Shields and Garza (each project at around four WAR) and guys like CC Sabathia, Jon Lester, Javier Vazquez,* and Josh Beckett (each project at around five WAR).

* I actually had a Tampa Bay fan bring up Javy’s 2004 in New York as a reason he won’t be good for the Yankees in 2010. C’mon, Rays fans, I expect that kind of thing from Red Sox and Yankees fans, but not you, too!

I am not claiming that the Rays are “doomed because of their pitching.” They are definite contenders for the wildcard and even the divisional title. It is tough going up against Boston and New York, but the Rays have substantial hope. While the Rays’ rotation may not project to be as dominant as those of their chief rivals, it is younger. This means that there is more variance in the projections, and thus they have a greater chance of might be better than projected (of course, it also means they might be worse). The relative youth of the team as a whole means likely continued improvement and less attrition. While some might think the Rays have to “win now” (2010) because of Crawford and Pena’s expiring contracts, some of their best players are still developing, and much near-ready talent looms in the minors, as well: Jeremy Hellickson, Reid Brignac, and, above all, Desmond Jennings (who might show up sooner rather than later).

The Rays might not be the divisional favorites in 2010, but they are contenders, and they will be in 2011, and… well, that’s for the “Future Talent” post.

As you’ve probably heard by now, the Mariners waived Ryan Garko, having been thoroughly unimpressed with his glove and bat this spring, particularly his glove, which is so bad they don’t want to platoon him with Casey Kotchman at first base. Plenty of reaction and analysis is already out there in the blogosphere, here I offer a loose series of (dis)connected thoughts.

1. Given that Garko’s glove is apparently un-platoon-able, and assuming that the Mariners had been willing to use him as their full-time DH, how would that compare to the current plan? CHONE (less optimistic on Garko than ZiPS) projects Garko for a .336 wOBA. ZiPS is more optimistic for both Mike Sweeney and Ken Griffey Jr. If they platoon at DH (with a 70/30 RHP/LHP distribution), and adjusting for estimated platoon skill, a Griffey/Sweeney platoon projects for a .327 wOBA. Over 150 games (about 630 PA), that’s about a 5 run (about half a win) difference.

2. Using the same inputs as in #1, against RHP, right-handed hitting Garko projects to have a .329 wOBA; against RHP, left-handed hitting Griffey projects for .325.

3. A league-average hitter is a replacement level DH. For the past three seasons, the league-average wOBAs have been .331, .328, and .329, respectively.

4. Sweeney and Griffey are apparently important to the Mariners for their positive effect on chemistry. Last season, Tom Tango used the example of Cliff Floyd to show that the open market values the “intangibles” at $350,000 per season. What does this situation tell us about the 2010 market for intangibles?

According to Cot’s, Garko is guaranteed $550,000 this season, Sweeney $650,000 in the majors, and Griffey $2.35 million (we’ll leave out the various playing time and award incentives for the sake of simplicity). First, let’s eliminate the “replacement salary” of about $400,000 for each player, so we’re left with $150,000 for Garko, $250,000 for Sweeney, and $1.95 million for The Zombie Kid. From #1 and #3 we can infer (generously) that a Sweeney/Griffey DH platoon would be around replacement level. So their “surplus salary” would tell us how much the Mariners are willing to pay for chemistry — $2.2 million. But we need to take account of Garko. Let’s assume he adds nothing to chemistry (or is it alchemy?). Still, we’ve established him as (conservatively) half a win (runs) better than the Sweeney/Griffey DH platoon (and we should really be only eliminating one of Griffey/Sweeney’s replacement salaries, since Garko only takes one roster spot, but this was supposed to be a simple post…). A win on the open market this offseason was going for around $3.5 million, so half a win is $1.75 million. That means that the Mariners are valuing Griffey and Sweeney’s “clubhouse presence” at almost four million dollars this season. The Mariners thus must think that the chemical advantage added by Sweeney and Griffey will add at a bit more than a win for them this season.

Feel free to check my math.

5. If Griffey and Zombie Sweeney are platooning at “chemistry,” does this mean their lockers are on either side of Milton Bradley’s?

6. I wonder what Kenny thinks of all this?

7. Yes, it’s only one decision, so “small sample size” caveats apply, even to front offices. Still, how fitting is it that this decision is announced so close to the Mariners’ organizational ranking being posted?

Any team making its home at Coors Field is going to look superficially like it is all hitting and no pitching. Once the run environment is taken into account, a more nuanced picture of the Colorado Rockies becomes available. It would be a bit of a stretch to say that the Rockies project as a defense-and-pitching team. More accurately, this is a balanced team with two under-appreciated stars, some young players with upside, a number of above-average performers, and useful role players. Taken as a group, the Rockies are one of the most talented teams in the National League.

The Rockies don’t have any one player that projects as an offensive monster once Coors is taken into account. What they do have is a number of players who are good at the plate and in the field. Among the position players, the undoubted star is 25-year-old shortstop Troy Tulowitzki. 2008 can’t be ignored, but Tulowitzki still projects as very good hitter, and while his defensive ratings have been up and down, he’s average at worst. Todd Helton is still a useful piece who hits well and is good defensively at first base. Third baseman Ian Stewart is enigmatic, but projects as at least average and is only 25. Clint Barmes is truly awful offensively, but he’s also outstanding enough defensively to be a stopgap second baseman. Chris Iannetta is a good, offensively oriented catcher.

The Rockies also have some talent in the outfield, although it remains to be seen if they’ll be deployed optimally. The best combination of three is probably Carlos Gonzalez in center, with Seth Smith and Ryan Spilborghs on the corners. While Gonzalez (just 24) hasn’t had a huge impact yet, he profiles as a very good outfield defender with a developing bat who is at least above average now and potential to be much more. The underutilized Smith is a good hitter who is at least average in the field. Spilborghs is older and inferior to Smith, but he’s got enough of a bat and glove to be about average over a full season. Sadly, the Rockies may still go with Gonzalez in left; Dexter Fowler, a fast guy who is a poor hitter and hasn’t impressed in the field, either, in center; and… wait for it… the legendary Brad Hawpe in right. Much virtual ink has been spilled over Hawpe’s dreadful fielding. Suffice it to say that while Hawpe has a good bat, if Adam Dunn (a superior hitter) can’t come close to being a league average player while putting up -30 seasons in the field, Hawpe can’t either. Some sort of arrangement putting Gonzalez in center, Smith in left, and platooning Hawpe and Spilborghs (with judicious use of Fowler) would likely give the Rockies at least one more win in a tight divisional race. Surely it has crossed someone’s mind.

The Rockies have made impressive strides in finding the right pitchers for their home park. Their rotation is both a skilled and deep. Ubaldo Jimenez‘s excellence should be more widely acknowledged; at the moment he’s on the same level with more celebrated pitchers like Clayton Kershaw and Chad Billingsley. Aaron Cook continues to defy the odds with few strikeouts but tons of grounders. Jorge de la Rosa, obtained after the Royals lost patience with him, has managed to get it together and become an above-average starter. Jason Hammel is also close to average, and once Jeff Francis’s return from injury is figured in, the depth of the rotation is impressive indeed. Huston Street, Rafael Betancourt, and Manny Corpas are key parts of a good bullpen.

It would be inaccurate to say that the Rockies have no stars — Tulowitzki and Jimenez certainly qualify. But the Rockies aren’t totally dependent on their production, as they have many other skilled players around the diamond and on the mound, as well as a useful bench. Colorado will probably be in a tight NL West race with the Dodgers during which pretending like Fowler and Hawpe are everyday players isn’t a great idea. Even so, the Rockies are probably the best team in the division at the moment, and Los Angeles is the only serious competitor in 2010.

I am not a fantasy expert. In fact, I’m pretty lousy at fantasy (as my various league-mates can attest), and the more I learn about “real” baseball the worse I get at fantasy. I’m not here to give fantasy advice (ahem), or tell people how it should be played (I participate and enjoy different kinds of leagues). I’m not even here to defend fantasy baseball (Carson already did). This isn’t even really a “fantasy” column. I simply want to suggest that traditional 5×5 (W, K, ERA, WHIP, S; BA, R, RBI, HR, SB) fantasy categories aren’t as retrograde as one might think, and in fact, may be in one sense more “realistic” than more recent fantasy scoring methods.

How can a writer for FanGraphs, of all places, be serious about traditional fantasy categories being more “realistic” than, say, ERA? This site doesn’t even use that to value pitchers! Steals on the same scale as home runs? Runs and RBI? Batting Average? Pitcher Wins? Even [terrible GM du jour] doesn’t care about those! Well, get ready to squeeze those mind grapes.

What I’m calling the “realism” of traditional categories isn’t come based their being “analytically correct.” In fact, I think it comes from the exact opposite, from their relative arbitrariness (for lack of a better word). While here at FanGraphs we talk about teams “buying wins” on the market, the teams, of course, aren’t literally buying wins, but players who can help them win [insert Royals/Astros/Mets joke here]. This is best done not by looking at how many “runs” a hitter might score or drive in, or projecting how many “wins” a pitcher will get, of course. Smart front offices will look at projected linear weights runs above/below average, or runs saved above/below average using some sort of defense-independent stat like FIP, tRA, or some kind of component ERA.

While these are superior methods ways to judge how many runs a team will likely score and allow and thus how many games they will probably win, we also know that they aren’t a “perfect fit” to actual baseball games. We know, that the team runs scored column is (almost) never identical to their wRC, or (non-calibrated) BaseRuns. Sometimes terrible hitters like Jose Guillen and Tony Batista rack up lots of RBI. Sometimes Scott Feldman wins more games than Zack Greinke. That doesn’t mean that teams should be going after Jose Guillen,* or trading Zack Greinke for Scott Feldman. This is the reality of the “looseness of fit” between our analysis of the game and the way actual games turn out.

* Wait, I’m a Royals fan. I meant to say, “Jose Guillen is due for a classic age-34 ‘breakout,’ and teams would be foolish not to look into taking on half his salary off of the Royals’ hands.”

Yes, part of this is adjusting projections for a fantasy context, e.g., how many runs will this high-OBP guy get score now that he’s in a better lineup, or how many games will Roy Halladay win now that he’s in the best team in an easier division. But I’m primarily (and obliquely) addressing something different — a conceptual gap. In real baseball, there’s a gap between how many runs a team “should” score and allow according to linear weights (or whatever), and how many they do. In more advanced fantasy leagues using say, linear weights, that gap isn’t present. I’m sure baseball GMs (the smart ones with good teams, anyway) would love baseball to be that way, so they wouldn’t be subject to those random variations. But reality has a way of evading our conceptual grasp. In this way, the experience of traditional (rather than “sabermetric”) fantasy more realistically reflects the experience of baseball reality.

The Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim have won the American League Western division three years on a row while outperforming their Pythagorean expectation by a combined 20 games. This has tended to generate a lot of hot air. Are they just lucky? Does Mike Scioscia have some managerial secret? Are they good at situational hitting? These concerns distract from the obvious: the Angels have had very talented teams, and still do.

The outfield is a good-hitting, poor-fielding group. Juan Rivera, (along with Chone Figgins, Kendry Morales, and Torii Hunter) had a career year in 2009, and while I think he’s far from a +15/150 fielder, he isn’t helpless out there and can still hit after missing almost two years due to injury. Bobby Abreu’s power has dissipated at an alarming rate, but he remains an on-base machine. His defense is terrible, but he isn’t in the same league as Jermaine Dye and Brad Hawpe… yet. Torii Hunter doesn’t get enough attention… that is, attention for how overrated he is (particularly in the field), but he’s an above-average player. As a whole, this a decent group, if older and (in the cases of Abreu and especially Hunter) overpaid. Depth is also a concern, given the group’s age and history; if one of the three has a serious injury, that could lead to far too much playing time for Willie Bloomq–, I mean Reggie Willits. Or worse, Terry Evans. I suppose designated hitter Hideki Matsui could see some time in the outfield but that seems… sub-optimal.

If the outfield is aging and overpaid, the Angels are getting great value from their underrated group of home-grown, cost-controlled infielders. It’s unlikely that first baseman Kendry Morales will have another +28 season at the plate in 2010, but after finally getting a chance, he’s shown he’s an above-average player. Erick Aybar’s bat is also due for some regression, but he has a tremendous glove at shortstop. Remember a few years back when Howie Kendrick and Brandon Wood were slated to be destroy the league infield, with Wood hitting 30+ homers a year from shortstop and Kendrick being a second base version of Tony Gwynn? Well, that didn’t happen. But Kendrick is a plus bat and glove at second, and Wood is finally getting his chance at third base. If any of the three should stumble, Macier Izturis is a plus bat and glove who is good enough to start for almost anyone. Mike Napoli may not be much with the glove at catcher, but he more than makes up for it with a bat that might be the Angels’ best.

While the Angels’ 2010 rotation doesn’t feature an obvious ace, it’s not as if the departed John Lackey had pitched like one since 2007, anyway. It’s a big advantage to be able to go four-deep with good starting pitchers, and Jered Weaver, Scott Kazmir, Ervin Santana, and newcomer Joel Pineiro are all various degrees of above average. Concerned fans should look to the bullpen, once a great strength of the team. Brian Fuentes and Fernando Rodney are a less-than-intimidating 1-2 “punch” at the back end; Jason Bulger might be the best choice for high leverage situations.

The losses of Chone Figgins and Lackey hurts the Angels a bit, but not terribly given the relative quality of their replacements and the $120 million combined for which Figgins and Lackey signed. The starting lineup has no holes. There are depth concerns, and the bullpen isn’t what it was, but many teams have those problems. The main problem the Angels have is that the other three teams in their division are no longer floundering. As will probably continue to be said ad nauseum, the AL West projects as the most closely matched division in baseball. It would be foolish to count a good team like the Angels out, but for the first time in years, they aren’t the obvious favorite.

[Author’s note: slightly modified to correct my bad arithmetic]

I recently wrote about Oakland’s roster, but there is one thing I didn’t get to: the fate of Jake Fox. Assuming that the As go with 12 pitchers, then the 9 starters, that leaves 4 spots on the 25-man roster. One spot will be taken by backup catcher Landon Powell. Franchise Centerpiece Utility Man Eric Chavez is in as a backup 1B/3B. Adam Rosales is the only player on the roster who could back up Cliff Pennington at shortstop, so he’s in as the backup middle infielder.

That leaves one for four candidates: Gabe Gross, Travis Buck, Eric Patterson, and Jake Fox. Gross and Buck are both decent outfielders, but Gross was acquired for a reason, and he should make the roster. Travis Buck still has an option, so he’ll probably head back to the minors. That assemblage means that Patterson and Fox won’t make the cut, but given that neither has options remaining, they would be exposed to waivers. If the As were to bite the bullet and DFA Zombie Eric Chavez, which should they keep?

While Patterson has played second base, his defense reportedly isn’t that great there. With Rosales presumably making the team for his greater infield defensive abilities, the speedy Patterson would need to make the team on the basis of his abilities as an outfielder. One might make the argument that Gross is really only a corner outfielder, so the As need a backup for center. While I think his defensive numbers show that Gross could be at least adequate in center, it doesn’t matter because, as has often been remarked, the As are already starting three center fielders in Rajai Davis, Coco Crisp, and Ryan Sweeney. If Crisp goes down, the As can move Davis or Sweeney into center, and put Gross in the corner. Offensively, both CHONE and ZiPS project Patterson for a .320 wOBA, which isn’t all that great.

Jake Fox is clearly a better hitter than Patterson, but where he fits on the team is another issue. While he’s probably a terrible third baseman, he wouldn’t kill the team if he had to play there or first base occasionally, and Rosales can cover third when they need a defensive replacement. Fox might be able to cut it as an emergency fifth outfielder, but that’s not much of an argument for keeping him on the roster, and neither is his potential as an emergency catcher.

Eric Patterson has his uses, and I could see why the As would be loathe to let him go. It’s a tough (if relatively trivial) choice, but I’d go with Fox. He could be platooned with Jack Cust at DH, or play first when Barton needs a rest. Given his CHONE and ZiPS projections, I estimate Fox’s ability versus left-handed pitching to be around .350 wOBA. Given that most of the As’ decent hitters are left-handed, that is likely to be more useful than a fifth-outfielder/pinch-runner.

Of course, this assumes the As are willing to finally cut ties with the injury-ravaged remains of Eric Chavez, and whether they would ever contemplate that, or whether it’s even a good idea, is a post for another day.