There have been rumblings of discontent among parts of the Philadelphia media with Jayson Werth recently, but I never thought it would come to this: apparently, the Phillies are considering moving Jayson Werth. But this isn’t as part of a plan to sell at the deadline, which would make sense given the Phillies status, seven games behind the Atlanta Braves in the NL East, in a struggle for second place with the New York Mets, and behind Cincinnati, San Francisco, Colorado, and Los Angeles for the Wild Card. Instead, Werth would be either be moved for starting pitching or in tandem with a move for starting pitching, indicating that the Phillies are still playing for this year.

The plan seems patently ridiculous. Jayson Werth is the Phillies second best position player – the best, with Chase Utley on the disabled list – and the only pitcher on the team more valuable than Werth is Roy Halladay. Werth has been worth 2.2 WAR to date, hitting almost exactly at his ZiPS projection and with his worst fielding season on record. Weth’s feilding numbers are not wholly unreasonable, given his age, but it’s also possible that his UZR isn’t properly reflecting his ability this season. Given his projections and recent performance in the field, expecting something around 2.5 WAR for the 300 or so plate appearances remaining in the season is perfectly reasonable.

For the Phillies to move Werth and still function as buyers, they have to trade his 2.5 wins – for which they’re only paying $2.85 million – and receive a pitcher worth more than 2.5 WAR. With 69 games remaining, there are probably 13 starts remaining for whoever the Phils would acquire, which would probably max out at 90 innings. Here is an exhaustive list of pitchers currently averaging 2.5 WAR per 90 innings pitched:

Francisco Liriano
Josh Johnson
Cliff Lee
Jon Lester
Roy Halladay

I don’t think the Phillies will be acquiring any of those players, and nobody else terribly close to 2.5 WAR/90 IP is going to be available.

But there is the argument that Dominic Brown is ready to come up and replace Jayson Werth in right field. As a rookie, it seems clear that Brown’s absolute peak would be the year that Jason Heyward has compiled so far, a 2.0 WAR season in just over 300 PAs. But there is no way that we could project that for Brown, a player with 76 plate appearances above AA. Projecting Brown as a league average, 1.0 WAR player in 300 plate appearances even seems like it may be a bit much – his CHONE projected worth prior to the season was 0.1 WAR, and his great season in the minors so far has only boosted that to 0.4 WAR in the July update. For the sake of argument, however, let’s call Brown a 1.0 WAR player for the rest of this season.

In this case, the Phillies would have to gain more than 1.5 WAR out of a starter to improve the team while unloading Werth, which certainly increases the pool of players that they could add from – 46 pitchers have done that so far this season, and the bottom of the Philadelphia rotation is almost certainly replacement level. Still, these types of players are expensive, and teams know that wins are at a premium for Philadelphia. We actually have a recent analog for this kind of move, as Joe Blanton had posted 1.3 WAR in 127 IP and was coming off a 5+ WAR season before the Phillies acquired him in 2008. The Phillies traded Adrien Cardenas and Josh Outman, who were in the bottom half of John Sickels’s Top-100 prospects list at the end of 2008, and Cardenas was also ranked in the 70’s in the Baseball America top 100 list before both 2008 and 2009. Perhaps Werth can net that pitcher instead, but Victor Wang’s prospect value research places top-100 prospects as assets worth roughly $10 million – two of those prospects add up to a solid amount more than Werth’s surplus value.

That leaves two scenarios: either Werth and possibly a prospect go for a starting pitcher, or Werth is traded for prospects and some other prospects are traded for a pitcher in a separate deal. Neither seems particularly likely to leave the Phillies with a better team, and this convoluted scenario seems awfully similar to dealing for Roy Halladay and then turning around and dealing Cliff Lee just to re-stock the farm system. It doesn’t mean that the Phillies shouldn’t trade Werth – selling isn’t the worst idea given their current situation – nor does it preclude a call up for Brown, as he could easily replace Raul Ibanez, who is in the middle of a complete collapse.

The idea of trading Werth in order to make the team better today, though? As much as I try to wrap my head around it, I can’t find a way for it to happen. There is about a 1% chance that Dominic Brown can even approach Jayson Werth’s value this season, and no pitcher on the market approaches Werth’s value either. If this move or combination of moves happens, this is just one more mark in a series of questionable moves by Ruben Amaro Jr. His simultaneous desire to stock a farm system while also improving for a playoff run just might lead to a string of .500 seasons instead of the dynasty we may have expected after two straight World Series appearances.

From the Chicago Sun-Times:

According to a major-league source, Williams spent the last few days trying desperately to pry Adam Dunn from the grasps of the Washington Nationals, offering up “anyone and anything he has in the minor leagues in a package.” And no one is untouchable, including pitcher Daniel Hudson or infielder Dayan Viciedo.” The problem Kenny is finding out is that [Nats GM Mike] Rizzo is acting like Dunn is Ryan Howard,” the source said.

I suppose that on the surface, this comparison might seem kind of ridiculous. Adam Dunn wasn’t even offered arbitration upon leaving the Diamondbacks and is in the final season of a two-year, $20 million contract. Ryan Howard, on the other hand, has an MVP award and has three more top-five MVP finishes. He has parlayed that into a five-year, 125 million dollar extension, on top of his most recent arbitration award of $19 million. One would certainly think that this kind of disparity in contracts, as well as the reputations that have led to them, would be reflected in the numbers.

On the contrary, however, the numbers support Rizzo’s comparison, particularly in terms of hitting. Given that the White Sox would play Dunn at DH, this would be the primary concern of Kenny Williams. Here’s how Adam Dunn’s career compares to Ryan Howard’s, without park adjustments.

Particularly notable is the stretch from 2007-2010 – the significant stretch for predicting a player’s future, as when you start getting more than four years out, those stats are hardly predictive of what a player can do now. And you’ll notice, that even without park adjustments, that Adam Dunn has been just as good or better than Ryan Howard for four years. The parks aren’t much of a factor for the years that Dunn was with the Reds (LHB HR park factor of 123) or the Diamondbacks (118), but Nationals Park (95) is much harder for lefties to homer than Citizens Bank Park (116). Dunn has a wRC+ advantage this year of 152 to 134, a pretty significant difference – although it is worth noting that it is easier to hit doubles at Nationals Park than it is at Citizens Bank Park, which mitigates much of the difference in parks.

ZiPS projects Dunn and Howard for .400 and .399 wOBAs respectively. Dunn is 10 days older than Ryan Howard. Basically, the only difference in these players is that Dunn is a worse fielder. Yes, Howard is slightly more valuable, but Rizzo isn’t too far off base in this comparison.

However, where Rizzo is completely off base is in his expectation that the return for Dunn should be that of a superstar. The simple fact is that neither Dunn nor Howard are superstars – their positions in particular and their defensive issues (an average defensive 1B has a net defensive value, including position, of -12.5 runs per 150 games, over a win) make them above-average players but well below the elite of the league. Given that Dunn will be a rental, Rizzo is going to have to severely tone down his expectations if he wants to move the slugger before the deadline. Maybe, if Rizzo values Dunn so highly, the Nationals should just give Dunn the four-year, $60 million contract he’s seeking.

Park factors from StatCorner

Overview

Not too many expected much of a race in the NL Central this season, but lo and behold, on July 20th, the St. Louis Cardinals have only a half game lead over the Cincinnati Reds, and it’s taken a six game winning streak to claim the lead. The Cardinals are still probably the most talented team in the division and arguably in the entire National League, but they’re in for a fight down the stretch, especially given how easy (warning: ESPN insider link) the Reds schedule is in the second half.

Buy or Sell

The Cardinals are clearly buyers, and there are a few clear positions to upgrade: starting pitching, shorstop, and depending on the timetable for David Freese’s return from the DL, second base, as Freese’s return would allow Felipe Lopez to shift from third base to second base.

The most obvious and the most pressing need is at starting pitcher, as the Cardinals rotation currently contains Blake Hawksworth and Jeff Suppan, who have combined for a total of -0.3 WAR this season, and neither is projected to reach replacement level.

Essentially any starting pitcher on the market fits the Cardinals roster, ranging from Fausto Carmona and Jake Westbrook to Roy Oswalt and Dan Haren. Haren and Oswalt are both highly unlikely, but the addition of Carmona or Westbrook would be an improvement over Hawksworth or Suppan, and if the price is right, the Cardinals should move to add any of the available starting pitchers on the market.

The needs in the middle infield aren’t quite as pressing, as Skip Schumaker‘s performance at second base is likely to improve (.323 projected wOBA), as is Brendan Ryan’s. Still, neither are more than an average player at this point, and the addition of Stephen Drew or a similar shortstop – if one is available – would both provide a big improvement to the starting lineup as well as the bench.

The Cardinals needs aren’t huge, though, as the additions of Ryan Ludwick, David Freese, and Brad Penny could be all the boost that St. Louis needs. I would still recommend the addition of another starting pitcher, but between Albert Pujols, Colby Rasmus, Matt Holliday, Adam Wainwright, and Chris Carpenter, there’s plenty of elite talent to go around on this team.

On The Farm

The Cardinals farm system is, quite frankly, pretty weak. The Cardinals ranked 30th in Beyond The Boxscore’s preseason farm system rankings, with only one prospect ranking in the top 95. That prospect is Shelby Miller, a right handed starter currently running 11.96 K/9 in A ball. 3B Zach Cox, the Cardinals first round pick, should be a huge addition to the farm system.

Budget

The Cardinals are going to need all the money they can have on hand in 2011, when Albert Pujols’s contract expires. As such, don’t expect the Cardinals to take on the contracts of Dan Haren or Roy Oswalt, or any other big time, multi-year contract. But the Cardinals don’t have any real albatrosses on hand and only four players due for arbitration raises in 2010 according to Cot’s Contracts, so one would assume that they could take on some cash for at least the 2011 season.

Sifting through trade rumors this season, one thing has been constant: the Oakland Athletics seemingly have no desire to trade Ben Sheets. Sheets signed a one year contract with $10 million prior to the season and there are no options on the contract. The Athletics are currently seven games behind Texas and 3.5 behind Los Angeles in the AL West; if they weren’t already sellers, one would think that Texas’s acquisition of Cliff Lee would push Oakland over the edge.

There are two stipulations in the contract that make the A’s reluctance to deal Sheets so confusing. First off, Sheets receives $0.5M if he reaches 165 innings pitched and another $0.5M for 175, 185, and 195 as well. He sits at 112 IP so far and, although he has a pretty major injury history, probably only needs to make 10-11 more starts to reach the first level of incentives. Given how frugal the Athletics organization has been, it would be surprising for them to allow Sheets to reach these incentives.

The second is a stipulation that wouldn’t allow the Athletics to offer Sheets arbitration if he were to reach type A status (Source: Cot’s Contracts). This isn’t going to be an issue as long as the Elias rankings reverse engineered over at MLB Trade Rumors are even approaching accurate, as Sheets isn’t even close to a Type B at this point. Still, one potential reason for not trading Sheets would be free agent compensation, and that just doesn’t seem like an issue here, nor could it be even if Sheets were to be a Type A.

Of course, you can only draw so many conclusions from what a general manager allows to reach the press. Still, the Athletics just don’t appear to be geared up for a playoff run and should be looking for financial relief as well as young talent for the future. That seemed to be the entire basis of the Sheets signing: if the A’s are in it at the deadline, great, but if not, flip him for some prospects. Maybe the offers for Sheets just aren’t what Billy Beane likes right now, given that his player is having the worst season of his life, as the strikeouts are down and the walks and home runs are up. It’s not terribly surprising that Sheets is having such a poor season at age 31 (he turned 31 yesterday) and coming off a full season of injury rehab. Despite the struggles, the promise of the ace-level performance from 2002-2008 might be enough to draw some suitors, and it would be remiss of the Athletics not to cash in on their asset while they still can.

In his latest column, Jon Heyman relays the asking price for Diamondbacks ace Dan Haren. According to Heyman’s source, Arizona wants “two starting pitchers plus bullpen help” back for the ace. That’s a pretty staggering asking price, and one that probably precludes any team actually completing a trade for Haren.

What it really comes down to, though, is that Haren is just a phenomenally good pitcher. The only pitcher (starter or reliever) that ZiPS projects to beat Haren’s projected 4.95 K/BB ratio is Roy Halladay, at 5.71. Haren has posted four straight seasons at or above 4.0 WAR and looks prepared to do it again, with 2.6 WAR through the All-Star break. Certainly, with the Diamondbacks completely out of it and Cliff Lee set with the Texas Rangers, Haren looks like the ultimate prize on the market.

That is, if there was any reason whatsoever for Arizona to consider moving him. Haren is locked up through 2012 for a mere $25.5 million and, barring injury or collapse, should be a good bargain in 2013 with a $15.5 million team option. The 3.26 FIP that ZiPS projects is a roughly 5.5-6-win mark over a full season, making Haren about a $24-27 million player. He has a tremendous value both in terms of pure talent and in terms of his contract – the fact that he turns 30 in September is probably the major reason he doesn’t factor into our trade value rankings.

It seems to me that the ridicluous request of two starters and bullpen help is simply Arizona’s way of saying that Haren is untouchable. Although Arizona’s situation looks hopeless right now, they aren’t terribly far away from competing in 2011, 2012, or 2013, either. They have a legitimate superstar locked up in Justin Upton. Chris Snyder is under control until 2014 at catcher. Edwin Jackson is a decent mid-rotation pitcher. Mark Reynolds has tremendous power and is locked up until 2013. They have a variety of solid position players and starting pitchers. The bullpen, however, has been atrocious, and the unit’s historically bad -7.26 WPA is almost the complete reason for the team’s .382 winning percentage.

It’s certainly not going to be easy to fix all the holes that they have, but patching up a bullpen is much easier than attempting to add an ace or a superstar slugger. It may take more than one season, but there’s reason to believe that the core in Arizona can compete soon. Right now, it appears that the interim management in the desert knows that Dan Haren is going to be a major factor in any Diamondbacks team that competes any time in the near future.

The Reds are in first place after the All-Star game and are looking to make the playoffs for the first time since 1995. In order to help them finish out the season, they will be adding a pitcher who arguably vaults to the top of the rotation in Edinson Volquez, who will be making his return from Tommy John surgery on Saturday.

The Reds have already used nine starters this year, partially thanks to injuries to Aaron Harang and Homer Bailey. The rotation currently features three rookies, in Mike Leake, Travis Wood, and Matt Maloney, and Sam LeCure has also seen time in the rotation. As a whole, this group, along with Harang, Bailey, Bronson Arroyo, and Johnny Cueto have seen decent results, with a 4.10 ERA. But peripherals suggest that this group is performing over its head – as a whole, they have a 4.43 FIP and a 4.60 xFIP, and I’m not sure if that kind of talent is good enough to stave off the Cardinals for another 70 games.

Volquez likely won’t be the kind of ace that he looked like in 2008, where he threw 196 innings of 3.60 FIP baseball. He was poor before going down with injury in 2009, wasn’t much good in 2007, and is coming off one of the hardest surgeries to recover from in all of sports. But ZiPS still projected a 4.04 FIP for this season and CHONE projected a 4.11 mark, which is almost certainly a large improvement over Maloney, who hasn’t shown the ability to draw strikeouts in the MLB. If he hits around his ZiPS projection and can throw about 70 innings, he’ll provide about 1.0 WAR for Cincinnati, and at this point, every win is extremely important.

Of course, there’s a good amount of uncertainty surrounding Volquez given the fact that he is returning from Tommy John surgery. Given his excellent performance at AAA, where he struck out 28 and only walked eight in 31 innings, there’s reason to believe that Volquez is ready to go. It would be unreasonable for Cincinnati to expect Volquez to become a true ace for them, but he should become the best pitcher on the team, at least until Harang’s return. The fact that they’ve been able to hold first place until the cavalry could arrive is a great sign for the team. If Volquez can even be 75% of what he was in 2008, the Reds will be in excellent shape in their quest for the NL Central crown.

For the player poll that will appear in the July 19th edition of Sports Illustrated and is now online here, 187 players responded to the question of who is the most overrated player in the Major Leagues. To me, it’s always interesting to see how players evaluate other players, and how they perceive how those of us outside the game evaluate them. This question sort of kills these two birds with one stone, although the question is also very vague. Are these players overrated by other players? By GMs? By fans? By writers? Let’s dive in and take a look at what the players answered.

#5: J.D. Drew, 3%

J.D. Drew has been a point of contention between the sabermetric analysts and much of the mainstream media for a good bit now. Typically, we don’t side with the players here. Dave Cameron says that Drew has been worth the money, and I defended the contract here. The fact is, Drew is a fantastic player when he’s on the field, and despite the time that he misses, he remains one of the best right fielders in the league. Drew put up 4.0 WAR in 2008 and 4.8 in 2009 and is on pace to go over 4.0 once again in 2010 (and he might even reach 600 PAs this time!).

Why would the players think he’s overrated? Honestly, that’s a good question. I have a feeling that it is because he misses time, and the machismo aspect of sports would lead the players to believe that anyone that is injured as often as Drew can’t possibly be worth that much. However, I have a hard time placing Drew as “overrated” because he seems to be almost universally panned by the mainstream media, who complain about his contract, work ethic, and injuries multiple times every year.

#4: Nick Swisher, 4%

Another interesting choice, this one comes on the heels of Swisher’s first All-Star selection. I would think that Swisher is underrated, if anything, as he was traded for Wilson Betemit, the player equivalent of a bag of balls. Swisher has been consistently solid and has really turned it up this season, with a career high .391 wOBA and 2.7 WAR through only 360 plate appearances this year. That’s certainly All-Star caliber production.

Why would the players find him overrated? Swisher doesn’t exactly have the most fantastic body, and he doesn’t (usually) hit for a great average. There also seems, as you might notice as we continue, to be a bit of an anti-Yankees feel to this list. There also could be some hard feelings from the .219 batting average he put up with the White Sox in 2008. Swisher certainly isn’t your typical All-Star or even your good player, but his production for the last few years is hard to ignore.

#3: Gary Matthews Jr., 5%

This one is spot on. Matthews basically parlayed one decent year and one fantastic catch into a $50 million contract and whined when he couldn’t get playing time with the Angels. Why would he be considered overrated, after the Mets finally dumped him last month? Possibly because he managed to make the opening day lineup for the Mets in center field, despite the fact that he’s just plain not good: GMJ has posted a total of -1.1 WAR since 2007.

The players find him overrated for the same reasons we do: he’s bad, overpaid, and somehow manages to keep finding roster spots. The Reds signed him to a minor league deal recently, so there’s still a chance that Matthews’ MLB career isn’t over.

#2: Alex Rodriguez, 5%

Is Alex Rodriguez actually overrated? Over his career, no chance. If we look at the last few seasons, possibly. At age 35, Rodriguez has posted a staggering 106.0 WAR in his career. That has him in the top 25 position players of all time and he should have at least a few good seasons left in him. Even recently, Rodriguez has been excellent, even though a 4.7 WAR season in 2009 doesn’t live up to his contract. Still, he posted 6.0 WAR in 2008 and a staggering 9.2 WAR in 2007. He has the ability to remain a premiere player, even though his 2.2 WAR so far this season doesn’t live up to that.

The reason for Rodriguez’s spot on this vote seems simple to me: the contract and the steroid use. Rodriguez easily makes the most of any player in the game right now and is quite clearly not the best player in the game: that would be Albert Pujols, and there are certainly arguments to be made on a number of other players too, including Chase Utley and Hanley Ramirez. Throw in the steroids and I’m actually surprised that Rodriguez wasn’t number one. There’s three easy ways to be a hated baseball player: get a huge contract, use steroids, and play for the Yankees, and Rodriguez has all of those down.

#1: Joba Chamberlain, 12%

Joba “wins” — and in a landslide. Given the hype surrounding his ascent to the Major Leagues, the fact that Chamberlain isn’t the dominant pitcher that we expected is certainly disappointing. His ERAs the last two years of 4.75 and 5.79 certainly fuel that fire, but Chamberlain has actually pitched pretty well this year according to his peripherals. His FIP is below 3.00 and his tERA and xFIP are both below 3.40. Given the hype, it’s disappointing that Joba is settling in as a pretty good middle reliever, but it would be hard for me to say “most overated in baseball.”

But the players almost certainly see the hype and the media frenzy surrounding Chamberlain’s arrival, combined with the fact that some of them have hit him around this year, and the decision for them is simple. Not only that, but much has been made of Joba’s emotions on the mound, which could certainly irk some players on opposing teams. Given that perfect storm, I’m not terribly surprised to see Chamberlain on this list, although I am surprised that he is first by such a wide margin.

Previous Four Factors Entries:
Joe Morgan
Brennan Boesch
Martin Prado

After dealing with some current events over the last couple of days, we’re back with another entry in the Four Factors series, this time a request: Colorado Rockies uber-outfielder Carlos Gonzalez. Gonzalez is in his third season in the majors, and this is the first in which he will likely approach 600 plate appearances. Even in limited duty, though, Gonzalez has posted 5.2 WAR in just under 1000 plate appearances. His glove has always been solid, but his bat has really taken off in the last two seasons. In just under 700 plate appearances between 2009 and 2010, Gonzalez has slugged 30 home runs and posted a .377 wOBA. Let’s examine his progression through the four factors of hitting.

As a reminder, the four factors are BB%, K%, POW, and BABIP. As Julien Headley pointed out, I was using an incorrect form of POW. I was using XB/H instead of XB/(AB-K). The latter actually measures XB on balls in play, including HRs. League average is currently .185.

First, Gonzalez’s 2008, with Oakland:

Two thousand and eight was a poor season by basically any measure. Gonzalez excelled at nothing, and only a solid BABIP kept it from being a complete failure. He showed little discipline and little contact, and when he did make contact, nothing much came of it. The result was a 69 wRC+, showing little potential, and this season likely resulted in his inclusion into the Matt Holliday trade, sending him to Colorado for the 2009 season.

Everything came together for Gonzalez in 2009. The walk rate nearly came up to average; his power spiked; his strikeouts fell a bit, and, to top it all off, Gonzalez had good results on balls in play. The particularly striking factor here is Gonzalez’s power, rising from 86% of league average to 173% of league average. It’s important to remember that Gonzalez moved from McAfee Coliseum to Coors Field- a pitcher’s park to a hitter’s park. According to Statcorner’s park factors, however, Oakland isn’t as tough on left handed batters as it is on righties, and Coors doesn’t help lefties as much as it helps righties, making the boost in power much more significant, although the small sample means, at this point in Gonzalez’s career, it must be regressed heavily.

Two thousand and ten showed more of the same on the power front, certainly an encouraging sign for Rockies fans. But Gonzalez’s BB% has dipped back to where it was in Oakland, which is obviously disappointing after the 2009 season, as his minor league track record – no extended stints with double digit walk rates – doesn’t particularly suggest an ability to walk at a high rate, and this start to 2010 is dashing some of the hopes that Gonzalez’s on-base skills would approach average. Cutting down on the strikeouts each of the last two seasons has helped mitigate that damage, although not as much as an unsustainable .360 BABIP disguises the issues.

Over all, Gonzalez’s more controllable skills have gone down this year. Obviously, half a season can only tell us so much, but without a walk rate rebound in the second half we would have to expect a drop in Gonzalez’s offensive production, and even 980 plate appearances into his career, there is still moderate regression necessary on his power. At this point, however, it looks like he indeed has more than enough power to be an above average hitter, and as a good defensive outfielder, that makes him an extremely valuable asset going forward, and good enough to earn him a spot on Dave’s honorable mentions for highest trade value in the league.

(Note on POW: I’m not sure if I like XB/H or XB/(SO-AB) better for this exercise, but the difference isn’t huge in this case. I’m not sure if I like the idea of equating an out to a single, as XB/(SO-AB) does, and I may want to take outs out of the equation. For now, though, I trust Julien, the creator of the statistic.)

Today, Alex Gonzalez and prospects were traded for Yunel Escobar. Maybe that doesn’t seem too insane today, but if this news had broke last offseason, nobody would believe that Alex Gonzalez could bring in a player worth 10.1 WAR from 2007-2009 and yet to reach arbitration. Obviously, a large part of this deal is Yunel Escobar’s offensive struggles in 2010, but perhaps an even larger part is Alex Gonzalez’s power surge.

Alex Gonzalez has hit 17 home runs in 348 PAs this season, only six fewer than his career high from 2004 (a 599 PA season). He’s on pace to hit 29 this season if he reaches 600 plate appearances. Thanks to that, Gonzalez’s ISO is a career high .238, allowing him to wOBA .341 despite only reaching base at a .296 clip.

Jose Bautista is having a similar season. After posting ISOs between .160 and .185 for the last four seasons, his ISO is now up to .306, earning him a position on the AL All-Star team. Bautista’s 24 home runs in only 366 PA is already a career high, as his previous high was 16 (in 469 PA) in 2006. With the Blue Jays swiftly falling out of the race, it wouldn’t be surprising to see Bautista included in a trade down the road.

Since so much of their value is tied up in their ability to hit home runs, let’s take a look at how far they’ve hit their home runs this year, courtesy of the ever excellent HitTracker Online

Both Bautista (red) and Gonzalez (blue) are right-handed and extremely pull-happy home run hitters. Bautista’s home runs, overall, tend to go farther, but there is one cluster in particular that both share in common. Gonzalez and Bautista have eight combined home runs in the area between 130 degrees and 125 degrees and less than 375 feet, and Gonzalez has an additional five in the area between 135 and 130 degrees and less than 355 feet.

The rather unimpressive spread of home runs is confirmed when we look at the classifications that HitTracker uses for home runs. This is the HitTracker definition of a “Just Enough” home run:

“Just Enough” home run – Means the ball cleared the fence by less than 10 vertical feet, OR that it landed less than one fence height past the fence. These are the ones that barely made it over the fence.

Alex Gonzalez is currently the NL Leader in Just Enoughs with ten. Jose Bautista is second with eight. Both have HR/FB rates that eclipse their career averages. Even though the park factor for overall runs in Toronto favors the pitcher, the factor for home runs largely favors hitters. According to StatCorner, the RHB HR park factor in Toronto is 110, heavily favoring the hitters. This is balanced out by a 92 park factor for singles for both hands, which is why we see pitchers seemingly favored at the Rogers Centre.

All of the factors for a heavy decline in the second half are there, particularly for Alex Gonzalez, who moves to Turner Field and its 90 park factor for RHB HRs. These players are getting lucky in almost every possible sense with home runs. The Braves are likely to fall victim to a drop in power from Alex Gonzalez, and any team, particularly without a RH-friendly ball park, would likely see the same out of Jose Bautista.

It wasn’t the most important play of the game, but I’m willing to bet that the play that generates the most talk around the baseball world will be this play, from the bottom of the 9th.

(Jonathan Broxton pitching) John Buck reached on fielder’s choice to right (Fly). David Ortiz out at second.

In case you didn’t see it, you can watch it here. Ortiz was waiting to see if Buck’s short fly ball would drop. It did, and Byrd managed to field the ball on a hop and fire to second in time for the force out. A player with any sort of speed would have easily been safe, but Ortiz was out by a slim margin.

Instead of two runners on base and one out, the AL was in the undesirable situation of two men out with a two run deficit against possibly the best pitcher in baseball. Let’s examine the impact that this play had on the All-Star Game.

According to Table 8 of The Book, with an average pitcher on the mound, the home team will score 2 runs and tie the game 11.1% of the time with runners on 1st and 2nd and one out. They will score 3+ and win 16% of the time, for a total win expectancy of 16% + 5.5% (they will win half the time in extra innings), which comes out to 21.5%. With a runner on first and two out, this number falls to 4.9% (5% tie, 2.4% chance win in 9 innings),which means that the difference in Ortiz making it safely to second and making the first out at second is 16.6% of a win – quite significant.

The numbers here differ slightly from what you’ll see in the Game Graph as The Book is based on the 1999-2002 run environment, but since it”s a difference of only about .4% of a win, it doesn’t make much difference

It’s key to note that this is if the AL All-Stars were facing an average pitcher, which they were not: CHONE projects Broxton for a 2.69 ERA, or 2.92 RA per 9 innings. (ZiPS projects a much lower FIP, but, for the purposes of the exercise, this works better. You can mentally adjust the numbers down if you want.) The Book also presents a run expectancy table for a team which would allow 3.2 runs per game, which is reasonably close to what Broxton and the NL All-Stars would probably allow, although a little high.

With runners on first and second and one out, the AL would be expected to win 16.3% (10.6% extras, 11.0% win) of the time, about 5.2% less than with the average pitcher on the mound. With a runner on first and two outs, that number falls to only 2.9% (3.4% extras, 1.2% win), or 13.4% worse than if Ortiz reaches second safely.

Broxton’s presence on the mound actually makes the impact of the play, purely in terms of the WE difference, lower than with an average pitcher, as it’s more likely that an out is made with Broxton on the hill. With an average pitcher, however, the AL would still be left with about a 1 in 20 chance of winning the game. Against Broxton, that falls to only 1 in 34.5.

Obviously, the biggest play in last night’s game was Brian McCann’s three RBI double, but this play will certainly be remembered as well. Against Broxton, a gaffe of the sort made by David Ortiz on the basepaths will almost certainly doom your team. Of course, Marlon Byrd deserves heaps of praise for coming up strong with the baseball and firing a near-perfect throw to second base, and there will certainly be much made of the decision by Joe Girardi to leave Alex Rodriguez on his bench as Ortiz plodded on the basepaths. But even somebody with Ortiz’s speed should have been able to reach second in that situation; with a proper read, we may not even be having this discussion.