As you likely have already heard, George Steinbrenner died today of a heart attack at the age of 80. Steinbrenner has been a gigantic figure in the baseball world since his purchase of the New York Yankees in 1973. The Yankees were a truly mediocre franchise for the decade immediately following their 1964 World Series loss to St. Louis. The Yankees finished in the bottom half of the standings every season from 1965 to 1973 except for a 2nd place finish – and no playoffs – in 1970.

Steinbrenner’s Yankees saw quick success, reaching three straight World Series beginning in 1976, his fourth full season as owner. The Yankees would win in both 1977 and 1978, and the impact of free agent acquisitions such as Reggie Jackson were certainly significant.

After losing in the 1981 World Series, however, the Yankees entered another period of relative futility which would last until the strike. The Yankees did win 90+ games three times in this stretch, but also finished below .500 five times and didn’t make the playoffs a single time. Steinbrenner certainly left his mark on this period, constantly meddling with his team, particularly with the managers. After the 1981 season and before the hiring of Buck Showalter in 1992, the Yankees played under nine different managers, including three of Billy Martin’s five separate managing stints with the team.

This brings us to the Yankee dynasty that we all remember. From 1995-2000, the Yankees made the playoffs six times including four division championships and four World Series victories. These teams did include some home-grown talent – Derek Jeter, Jorge Posada, and Andy Pettitte, for example, and others brought in through trades, such as Paul O’Neill, Scott Brosius, and Roger Clemens. Still, free agency proved key. The Yankees brought in Joe Girardi, Wade Boggs, David Cone, and David Wells, all key pieces in various seasons in this period.

Steinbrenner’s teams really began to make use of free agency and his massive wealth in the 2000s. In 2001, the Yankees signed Mike Mussina to a big money deal. 2002 saw the addition of Jason Giambi. 2003 saw the import of Hideki Matsui. Although they were through trades, the 2004 additions of Alex Rodriguez and Kevin Brown were shows of the power of Steinbrenner’s impressive financial assets. On top of Rodriguez’s $22 million contract and Brown’s $15 million contract, the Yankees signed Jose Contreras for $8.5 million out of Cuba and added Gary Sheffield for $13 million. The Yankees took the $16 million owed to Randy Johnson in 2005. In 2006, the Yankees had four different players (Mussina, Jeter, Rodriguez, and Giambi) earning at least $19 million, and then they added Bobby Abreu’s $16 million contract. The Yankees added $39 million more in free agency via the Andy Pettitte, Carl Pavano, and Johnny Damon contracts in 2007. The Yankees stood pat in 2008, waiting for various contracts to come off the books.

This period is generally seen as a failure, due to the fact that the Yankees didn’t win any titles over this period, but lest we forget, these teams were very, very, very good. Every team except for the 2008 team, which suffered from the end of some big contracts but still won 84 games, reached the playoffs. Overall, the Yankees had a .599 winning percentage from 2001-2008, which is about as much as money can buy. The team simply sputtered in the playoffs, something that the media tended to blame on the inability of expensive free agents to play with chemistry.

Even though Steinbrenner retired in 2006, his fingerprints are still on the team. The revenue streams he managed to set up allowed the Yankees to continue to pour money into the free agent market, adding players like CC Sabathia and AJ Burnett for the 2009 World Series championship team, despite the fact that it contained many expensive free agents.

Much of the coverage today has featured Steinbrenner as a hero. That, to me, is going a bit far. He was notoriously hard on his workers. He made illegal campaign contributions to the Nixon campaign. As always, Joe Posnanski puts it best:

Steinbrenner is what you make him. He is the convicted felon who quietly gave millions to charity, the ruthless boss who made sure his childhood heroes and friends stayed on the payroll, the twice-suspended owner who drove the game into a new era, the sore loser who won a lot, the sore winner who lost plenty, the haunted son who longed for the respect of his father, the attention hound who could not tolerate losing the spotlight, the money-throwing blowhard who saved the New York Yankees and sent them into despair and saved them again (in part by staying out of the way), the bully who demanded that his employees answer his every demand and the soft touch who would quietly pick up the phone and help some stranger he read about in the morning paper.

As far as his impact on the game of baseball, however, there can be no debate. George Steinbrenner was a big part of making free agency relevant. His teams changed the way that other large market teams did business, as his Yankees teams of the 2000s forced teams like the Red Sox and Mets to drive their payrolls into a never before thought of territory, be it $100 million or the nearly $170 million on the Red Sox payroll this season. George Steinbrenner created winners in New York, and although he occasionally created losers through his meddling, I doubt that his seven World Series rings and 11 AL pennants particularly care about that. Steinbrenner is certainly the most successful owner in professional sports history, and that is what baseball will remember him as.

It is incredibly unfortunate that my generation of baseball fans knows Joe Morgan primarily from his antics in the broadcast booth. Some know more about Fire Joe Morgan than they do about Hall of Fame second baseman Joe Morgan. Today, I’d like to use my four factors of hitting to shed some light on Morgan’s ridiculous peak, in particular his 1975 and 1976 seasons, in which he posted 21.5 total WAR and won the MVP both seasons.

For a reminder, the four factors are BB%, K%, POW (XB/H), and BABIP. The short reason for using POW instead of ISO is that Colin Wyers told me to. The actual reason is that BABIP actually can have a heavy influence on ISO. There doesn’t appear, to me, to be a reason to judge power based on what somebody does in ABs where they make outs (think “long outs”) or don’t even make contact (strikeouts). This doesn’t mean that ISO doesn’t have its merit, but in this case we are trying to separate what these four statistics are telling us as much as possible, which, to me, is the best solution.

Back to the task at hand, here are the four factors for Joe Morgan’s 1975 with The Big Red Machine.

The numbers are staggering across the board. It should come as no surprise that this season resulted in an MVP award and an 11.4 WAR season. Morgan had a walk rate 230% of the average player. When he wasn’t walking, he was making contact, and when he was making contact, it was either a resulting in a base hit or solid power. It’s disappointing that we don’t have plate discipline numbers from this period; I can’t imagine how ridiculous Morgan’s O-Swing% or contact rates were this season to allow him to walk over 2.5 times more than he struck out.

Amazingly enough, the 1975 season almost pales in comparison with what he accomplished in 1976:

The drop in Morgan’s walk rate was pretty much in line with a league-wide drop in walks. Then, in two categories where he already outclassed the entire league, Morgan made huge strides. The drop in strikeouts compensated for the natural drop in BABIP he saw – .298 was still significantly above the league BABIP of .281, making a .336 mark like he had in 1975 slightly ridiculous. If Morgan had merely equaled his power numbers of 1975, we would’ve been looking at another 190 wRC+ type season. Instead, Morgan slugged 27 home runs, a career high and ten more than he put out in 1975. Morgan walked at a rate 226% of the average player and hit for power at a rate 184% higher than that of the average player. Morgan’s numbers is the stuff of which any baseball analyst dreams, sabermetrically inclined or not.

It can be easy to simply dismiss Joe Morgan when we hear him talk in the broadcast booth. It’s important, for those of us who care about the history of the game, however, to remember that Morgan may have been the best second baseman of all time. These two seasons are only part of a five year peak which saw five 9.0+ WAR seasons and 3 10.0+ WAR seasons. Joe Morgan was a fantastic baseball player, and that is how I will remember him.

It seems like there was a warm response to my four factors for evaluating hitting that I presented in this post on Martin Prado last Friday. As such, I’d like to use it to take a look at a few more players. One player about whom I think these stats tell a particularly interesting story is Tigers rookie Brennan Boesch.

As a reminder, the four factors of hitting are BB%, K%, POW (XB/H), and BABIP. That is, walk rate, strikeout rate, power (as measured by extra bases per hit), and success on balls in play. I feel that these four statistics sum up extremely well four facets of hitting under which the batter has control.

Let’s take a look at how Brennan Boesch fares under these four measures.

Boesch, to date, has excelled in both power and success on balls in play, performing at a level nearly 130% of the league average in both factors. He’s slightly above average in strikeout rate and a bit below average in terms of walk rate. There’s no doubt that he has been excellent so far this season; his .426 wOBA is right between Joey Votto and Kevin Youkilis on the leaderboard – certainly impressive company for a rookie.

Of course, when a young player with no MLB track record posts these kinds of numbers over any significant period of time, we have to wonder if it’s sustainable. Simply due to the nature of regression, even if a player has ridiculous minor league numbers (which Boesch doesn’t), we would never expect a .426 wOBA to stay that high. What can we reasonably expect out of this extremely hot hitter as the season winds down?

Unfortunately, ZiPS doesn’t have a projection for him in the system. CHONE, however, in its July update, projected Boesch for a .259/.300/.438 line, worth about -7 runs per 150 games. That’s a marginally over replacement level player with average defense in the corners.

To see why CHONE is so down on Boesch, we need to look no further than the four factors. Take a look at how quickly each of the statistics involved here stabilize:

K%: 150 PA
BB%: 200 PA
ISO (presumably, POW would stabilize at a similar time): 550 PA
AVG: >650 PA

Boesch is only 267 plate appearances into his MLB career. For that reason, we can be relatively confident on his below-average walking ability and his above-average ability to avoid the strikeout. However, the two aspects of his game that have him at the top of the MLB leaderboards – power and balls in play – just simply don’t show themselves this early in a player’s career. Boesch showed solid power in AA (0.84 POW) but hasn’t ever showed the kind of BIP skills that would necessarily lead to a .384 or even a .320 BABIP in the majors.

Right now, it’s simply too early for us to conclude that Boesch is so much better than his minor league performance would suggest to even say that he projects as an average hitter going forward. He has certainly impressed in his time on the field in 2010, but his power and success on balls in play are likely to drop. Given the rest of his skills, he simply can’t maintain the elite hitting if this drop occurs. It’s certainly not impossible that this is just a breakout year for Boesch, but the Tigers shouldn’t act as if Boesch is another Miguel Cabrera in their lineup as they plan for the second half.

Overview

The Reds were a sort of sexy surprise pick entering the 2010 season, but I don’t think too many people around baseball predicted they would be in this good of a position at the break. Cincinnati currently holds a one game lead on the St. Louis Cardinals and at least eight games on the rest of the division. Not only that, but it has all come without Edinson Volquez, who has missed the entire season due to Tommy John but should return sometime soon after the All-Star Game.

That said, there are still some questions about the Reds. They have a solid +45 run differential, but their 49-40 record entering the final day of the first half was over three games better than their 45.9-43.1 3rd order mark. The Cardinals are probably a more talented team right now, but the Reds have talented pieces of their own with a promising future. Right now, however, we focus on the present.

Buy or Sell?

Not only are the Reds locked in a battle for the NL Central, but the Wild Card race also figures to include them if the Cardinals take the NL Central. The Reds are in a position to make the playoffs for the first time since 1995 – a playoff appearance would do wonders for the city and the franchise. Any team in the position of the Reds has to go for it, especially given the fact that the Cardinals are probably a superior team if the Reds stand pat.

Then, the question becomes, what to go after. The two glaring weaknesses of this team are the lack of a shortstop and the lack of a top-flight starting pitcher. Orlando Cabrera has been terrible – a .278 wOBA has him at roughly replacement level so far this season. The Reds have gotten good pitching performances thus far from Jonny Cueto and Mike Leake, but, as a whole, the staff FIP is .33 runs higher than the staff ERA, and the staff xFIP is .48 runs higher than the ERA. At 4.44, the Reds starting rotation has a below-average FIP, meaning that perhaps the easiest way to add wins would be through a high level starting pitcher, even with the imminent return of Volquez.

At SS, one potential target would be Diamondbacks shortstop Stephen Drew, whose name has been mentioned quite a few times this season. The difference in fielding ability is probably negligible at this point, and Drew is a much better hitter, projected for a .338 wOBA for the rest of the season, a big improvement over the projected .314 wOBA of Cabrera and the .295 projected for Paul Janish, which could be a difference of about half a win for Cincinnati down the stretch.

For a player that could have a much larger impact on the Reds, look no further than Drew’s teammate Dan Haren. Haren is under contract until 2012 with an option for 2013, meaning the acquisition wouldn’t be limited to a rising team’s first season in contention. Haren is also simply one of the best pitchers in the league. His 4.8 K/BB ranks in the top 5 in the league and his 4.36 ERA this season is a product of bad luck, in the form of a .346 BABIP with a 70% strand rate. Haren would probably cost Yonder Alonso and one or two other significant pieces, but with Joey Votto looking like a superstar at 1B, Alonso would be blocked. If Haren could be had for that kind of a package – not a certainty – that would be a fantastic move for the Reds, both short term and long term.

On the Farm

The aforementioned Alonso is only one of the big prospects in the Reds farm system. There’s Cuban sensation Aroldis Chapman, of course, who is among the most intriguing prospects all across baseball. INF Todd Frazier isn’t a big time bat but has a good glove and enough of a bat to be a very good prospect, and we can’t forget about Carson Cistulli All-Star Juan Francisco. The Reds, however, have been graduating a significant amount of talent recently, such as Mike Leake, Chris Heisey, Travis Wood, and Matt Maloney. The Reds added catcher Yasmani Grandal in the first round of the 2010 draft.

Budget

Money could be an issue for Cincinnati. They do have about $20 million coming off the books after 2010, but Votto, Volquez, Cueto, and Jay Bruce will all hit arbitration next season. That could be expensive for Cincinnati, and may preclude an addition like Haren who would come with a significant price tag. The Reds haven’t had an opening day payroll over $80 million since 2004. The Reds had $76.1 million in player salaries on opening day this year, and so ownership would likely have to approve any significant buy on the Reds part, which, unfortunately for their fans, might mean that the Reds will have to ride it out with what they have.

Everybody thought earlier today that Cliff Lee would be on his way out of Seattle. They were right. Instead of heading to the visitor’s clubhouse in Seattle to join the New York Yankees, however, he joins the division rival Texas Rangers, along with RP Mark Lowe. Coming back to Seattle will be Justin Smoak and three others according to this Joel Sherman tweet. This deal has also been confirmed by Ken Rosenthal, who adds that the Mariners will be sending cash to the Rangers to help cover the $4M that Lee is owed over the rest of the season.

Earlier today, some thought that Jesus Montero was a solid haul for Lee, along with the rest of the package. In that case, the return of Justin Smoak has to be seen as an absolute steal. Smoak had an .885 OPS between three different leagues in 2009. Smoak then posted a 1.010 OPS in 15 games with AAA Oklahoma City before receiving a call-up to the big leagues. His power hasn’t really materialized at the big league level (.145 ISO), but a 13.8% walk rate in 275 PAs is incredibly encouraging, and his .238 BABIP is bound to see a boost.

Smoak was the #13 prospect by Baseball America entering the season, ranking below Montero’s rank as #4. However, Smoak is obviously closer to the big leagues and his position is clear; I feel that Montero’s #4 rank may be influenced by an unrealistic projection of him as a catcher. Smoak is probably better than Matt LaPorta was at the time of the Brewers acquisition of CC Sabathia in 2008, the gold standard of pitcher rental deals. Given that Smoak is already in the big leagues and carries tons of promise with him, the Mariners have to be exceptionally happy with this deal. The deal also includes RHP Blake Beavan, RHP Josh Lueke, and 2B Matt Lawson going to Seattle.

For the Rangers, they pick up the man who has obviously been the best pitcher in the American League. It’s a large boost for a rotation with a meager 4.54 FIP and 4.66 xFIP. Cliff Lee gives them the legitimate ace that just isn’t there with Rich Harden, Scott Feldman, Colby Lewis, C.J. Wilson, Tommy Hunter, Derek Holland, and the others that have inhabited the Rangers rotation this season. Lee could ostensibly be a three win gain for this team down the stretch – likely unnecessary for making the playoffs, as I don’t think the Angels would’ve been able to make up 7.5 games, but this is another nail in the Angels’ coffin. Still, Lee has to increase the Rangers’ chances of making a deep run in the postseason, as he showed he can put his mark on a series last season.

This trade also has the interesting dynamic of being an intradivisional trade. Picking up Lee means certainly avoiding him in the remaining games that Texas has against Seattle. At the same time, though, the Rangers traded an exceptional hitting talent to a team that they play 20 times a season for the next six years. My initial reaction is that this trade is a dangerous proposition for the Rangers. With Lee only on their team for the next three months, the Rangers have to hope for instant gratification, in the sense of a World Series victory, as this trade has the potential to bite them for years to come.

Martin Prado will be starting at second base in the National League, thanks to the spot opened by Chase Utley’s injury. There’s no question that Prado deserves the appearance – he has been a fantastic hitter this season by any metric, slashing .336/.375/.500, with a .378 wOBA and 137 wRC+. Prado plays a little bit of everything and UZR doesn’t seem to think 2B is his best position – he has a -8.7 career mark at the keystone – but he has a +2.5 mark this season, easily the season in which he’s played it the most. Prado is providing a tremendous amount of value for Atlanta, with 3.4 WAR in 395 PA.

Prado is, however, the type of hitter who may seem prone to regression, particularly on balls in play. He doesn’t walk much – in any stint with at least 100 PAs at any level, he’s never posted a walk rate above 10%. His power is solid, but not fantastic – his career ISOs range from .140-.165, with about 15-20 HRs in a full season. The minimal power doesn’t sound like the profile of a hitter that’s over 35% better than league average. It sounds more like the league average profile, with a little more power and less discipline.

The key is Prado’s ability, at least so far, to reach base on balls in play. In 1139 ABs so far, Prado has racked up a .344 BABIP. Given how long it takes for BABIP to stabilize, we have to assume that it will drop in the future. The longer Prado can keep it up, however, the more we have to figure that his ability to produce high a BABIP is real, and his excellent 20.9% LD rate is certainly evidence in his favor.

So, to answer the question, Prado is quite good. The fact that his playing time is way up and the fact that he’s played at an all-star level, however, lead us to another question. Is he getting better this year, at least at the plate?

Basketball has four factors for a team’s success – shooting, turnovers, rebounding, and free throws. I think that there is an excellent analog in hitting – walks, strikeouts, power, and balls in play. I’ve been using the Custom Dashboard to visualize this since its inception, using BB%, K%, ISO, and BABIP. Ideally, I’d prefer POW (XB/H) instead of ISO, but this does the job just fine. Here’s how Martin Prado has fared in the Four Factors of Hitting in his three seasons with more than 250 plate appearances.

His walks began around average and have been steadily slipping; his strikeouts are still far below average but climbing. The power has been steadily increasing to the point where, especially given the power drop across baseball this year, it can be called “above average.” Still, the key remains balls in play, which haven’t even seen much of a jump since 2008. It doesn’t appear that, really, in any of the factors, that Prado has really shown a significant step forward, and it shows in the wOBA/wRC+ numbers. The real step forward is the playing time that has opened up for him in the Braves roster, and he has jumped into his new role and is showing that he can be a great player in the Major Leagues.

Ryan Franklin’s outing last night was historically bad. Given that the worst possible WPA for a pitcher in a single inning is -1.00, Franklin — with his -.99 WPA last night in Colorado — came dangerously close to setting a record that could never be broken. However, there have been three pitchers since 2002 to eclipse the -1.00 WPA mark in relief appearances spanning two innings.

Click on the game graphs below for the entire FanGraphs game logs, box scores, etc.

June 5th, 2002: Hideki Irabu, Texas Rangers

Hideki “The Fat Toad” Irabu entered this game against the Angels up 4-2 in the bottom of the 9th inning, looking to close it out. Back-to-back solo homers by Brad Fullmer and Tim Salmon tied the game, but Irabu managed to get out of the ninth inning with the game tied. At this point, Irabu already had a -.410 WPA.

The Rangers took the lead in the top of the tenth, thanks to a Herbert Perry RBI triple. The Rangers had a terrible bullpen in 2002, with a 4.99 ERA and a 4.76 FIP. Only Francisco Cordero, C.J. Nitkowski, and Joaquin Benoit posted FIPs below 4.00 in the Texas bullpen that season. That only slightly explains why the team would send Irabu out for the 10th.

A Darin Erstad RBI fielder’s choice scored Adam Kennedy, tying the game at 5-5. With Erstad at first, Troy Glaus homered off of Irabu to end the game. Irabu racked up another -.801 WPA in the 10th, and finished with an unenviable total of -1.211 WPA on the game.

June 1st, 2007: Todd Jones, Detroit Tigers

Todd Jones entered in the 8th inning of a 9-5 contest against the Cleveland Indians after Wil Ledezma gave up two straight two out hits, putting runners at the corners and two outs. Back-to-back hits by Trot Nixon and Josh Barfield scored two runs, making it 9-7 before Jones could get out of the inning. The Tigers still had an 91.7% chance of winning despite the scoring; Jones’s WPA was a mere -.036.

Thanks to RBIs by Mike Rabelo and future all-star Omar Infante, the Tigers had an 11-7 lead and a 97.8% chance of victory entering the bottom of the 9th. Despite getting the first batter to ground out, Jones got into trouble quickly, as the next two batters reached and then scored on a Victor Martinez home run. A Jhonny Peralta double and then back-to-back singles by Barfield and David Delucci plated the final two runs of the game to give the Indians a 12-11 victory. Jones’s WPA in the 9th was -.978 for a total of -1.014.

April 7th, 2009: Brandon Lyon, Detroit Tigers

Yet another Detroit Tiger, this one came on Brandon Lyon’s first appearance with the team. Edwin Jackson ran out of gas in the 8th inning of a start against the Blue Jays, and between Jackson and Bobby Seay, the Tigers had allowed two baserunners in a 3-1 game. Lyon entered and immediately allowed a home run to Aaron Hill, putting the Jays up 4-3. That would be all the damage against Lyon in the 8th; his WPA was -.712 at the time.

The Tigers tied it in the top of the 9th against B.J. Ryan, and Lyon was given the chance to get the game into extras. After getting a groundout to start the inning, the next three batters reached via the walk, single, and intentional walk. Rod Barajas then hit the game-winning sacrifice fly, closing out easily the worst relief pitching debut this decade. Lyon’s WPA in the 9th was -.358, and his total for the game came in at -1.070.

The loss for the Cardinals last night was heartbreaking, both for their fans and for Ryan Franklin as well. At least Franklin can take solace in the fact that these guys had worse nights than he did in Colorado last night.

Pitcher wins and losses are poor statistics to use when evaluating pitchers, as many readers here surely know. Wins and losses give full credit to the pitcher for the performance, or lack thereof, of the whole team. As such, it can often miscredit pitchers, such as the 5 IP, 6 ER performance in a 17-8 victory or the CG, 1 ER loss when the offense is shut out.

In Colorado last night, however, the loss was completely deserved – or at least 99% deserved. Cardinals closer Ryan Franklin entered the ninth inning with one out and two on but a 9-4 lead. Despite the threat of runners on base, the leading team will win this game 99% of the time – even a home run leaves the trailing team with a mere 5.5% chance of winning the game.

That means that even after Chris Iannetta, the first batter Franklin faced, went deep, the Cardinals were still in good shape. Dexter Fowler doubled to keep things interesting, but a Brad Hawpe groundout seemed to signal that the end was near for the Rockies, who had already plated one run off of reliever Dennys Reyes before Franklin entered the game. A Carlos Gonzalez single scored Dexter Fowler and made the game 9-8, but with two outs and Gonzalez out of scoring position, the Cardinals, even after allowing four runs in the inning, were still sitting pretty, with an 88.9% chance of victory.

Given the lead of the story, what follows is obvious. Jason Giambi singled, and an error allowed Gonzalez to score, tying the game and giving the Rockies the upper hand, with a 57.2% win expectancy. Miguel Olivo singled to push that number up to 64.2%. The Cardinals could’ve gone on to win the game in extra innings, but Seth Smith squashed any such thoughts with a three run blast to end the game.

Ryan Franklin managed to get one out. He faced seven batters. The Cardinals went from an all-but-assured victory to a loss. Ryan Franklin earned the loss on his record tonight.

Over two months into the season, the OPS leader in the International League is Kila Ka’aihue, and it’s not particularly close. Ka’aihue’s 1.073 OPS is 60 points better than Omaha Royals teammate Alex Gordon, and only J.P. Arencibia joins them with a OPS above 1.000.

Kila Ka’aihue is 26 years old. In over 2800 minor league plate appearances, Ka’aihue has compiled an OBP above .400 and an .880 OPS. Last season at AAA, Ka’aihue walked his way to a .392 OBP and a .825 OPS – Ka’aihue walked over 100 times in less than 600 plate appearances. He had a poor .272 BABIP, too – adjusting for luck and park, according to Minor League Splits, gives him a 2009 line of .293/.424/.474.

He’s made a huge step forward this year. The BABIP is up to a more typical AAA number of .341. He’s walking even more – Ka’aihue has walked 74 times in 307 plate appearances, a 24.1% walk rate which is easily the highest in all of professional baseball, easily eclipsing MLB leader (>100 PA) George Kottaras’s 18.6% rate. The power is up as well, as Ka’aihue has 32 XBH including 16 HRs, good for a .283 ISO.

Ka’aihue has been, simply put, the best hitter in the minor leagues in 2010. At age 26, it’s unlikely that he has much left to learn, and the Royals have been the third worst power hitting team in the league, with a .120 ISO. Ka’aihue (along with Gordon) would seem to be a perfect shot in the arm for a struggling offense.

There are two possible reasons for the Royals leaving Ka’aihue in the minors: first, they simply don’t believe that he’s good enough to hit major league pitching, or second, they don’t believe he fits in the roster as currently constructed.

Given Kila’s fantastic season to date, I find the first to be hard to believe. There was certainly an argument to leaving him in the minors to start the season – ZiPS projected a mere .319 wOBA, and CHONE projected a .333 wOBA, neither of which is good enough given Ka’aihue’s position and questionable defensive skills. However, given Kila’s massive step forward in AAA, there’s reason to believe he can put up a solid, .350+ wOBA in the Major Leagues. His updated ZiPS projection is already up 16 points since the season started.

With many of these AAA players that we rave about (Alex Gordon, Matt Murton, etc.), the damning evidence against them is typically a season or two or marginal MLB performance. That excuse simply isn’t there with Ka’aihue – he’s received a total of 28 Major League plate appearances. At 26, he should still be on the good side of his peak. Yes, there’s a possibility that he flames out in the Major Leagues, but perhaps he rakes and becomes a stalwart .380+ wOBA first baseman – even a .350 wOBA Russell Branyan type would have value.

The second reason carries a bit more weight: Billy Butler and Jose Guillen, the primary 1B and DH, have two of the three best batting lines on the team. Butler’s .376 wOBA is only second to David DeJesus, and Guillen’s .349 comes third. Ideally, the team finds a trading partner for Guillen, but that probably won’t happen given his awful contract. It’s possible that the team could bench Mitch Maier and his .312 wOBA in CF, shift DeJesus there, play Guillen in right, and let Ka’aihue DH. However, this would leave the Royals with a terrible defensive outfield with Scott Podsednik in left field.

The solution for the Royals really isn’t that simple. Guillen is playing too well to simply jettison, and Butler is one of the team’s best players. It seems that Ka’aihue will have to continue paying his dues in Omaha, even though he’s clearly among the best hitters in the league and well deserving of a legitimate shot in the Majors. Still, it’s getting late for Ka’aihue, at 26, and the Royals should do whatever they can to get him in their lineup at this point.

One rumor that has been flying around twitter is that the Twins have offered outfield prospect Aaron Hicks and catcher prospect Wilson Ramos for Cliff Lee, which would be a solid haul for only half a season of Lee, as Aaron Gleeman outlines over at Hardball Talk. Hicks is a top 20 prospect according to Baseball America and Ramos is top 60. Gleeman calls giving both away for merely a rental to be “uncharacteristic” for the Twins.

Dan Wade of TwinsMVB tweeted the following upon hearing the rumor:

Losing Hicks and Ramos in the Lee deal would forever taint my opinion of Bill Smith. Beyond stupid to part with Hicks for a rental.

David Brown of Big League Stew then asked the obvious question: “What if the Twins win the World Series?”

I think the answer would be clear for most Twins fans. “Flags fly forever” – The World Series is the ultimate goal for the organization (outside of the business side, of course), and so a couple of good prospects and some future wins could easily be sacrificed to attain a World Championship. Praise would almost certainly be heaped upon Bill Smith for bringing in that key piece that would bring the Twins up past the level of the Johan Santana teams which simply couldn’t escape the first two rounds of the playoffs.

How should we evaluate Smith’s part of this potential trade and situation, though? His job is to put the Minnesota Twins in the best position to win as many World Series as possible, while working under a certain amount of restraints. I don’t know enough about Hicks and Ramos to say for sure, but given their lofty rankings in prospect circles, there’s a good chance that they could be major contributors for the Twins in the coming seasons. We could potentially run simulations, based on how good Ramos and Hicks project to be, and see how many World Series victories we would expect from the Twins with them and instead how many we would expect if the Twins execute the trade. The attitudes of people like Wade and seemingly Gleeman suggest that the Twins would likely win more World Championships with the two prospects as opposed to obtaining Lee for the 2010 stretch run and playoffs.

Consider that hypothetical situation – a Twins franchise with Ramos and Hicks is likely to win more World Championships than the Twins with Cliff Lee.

If that is indeed the case, even if a Lee trade results in a World Series victory, the trade would be a poor decisions on Bill Smith’s part. It all comes back to the “processes over results” mantra of sabermetrics, and this would be the ultimate result. The trade is still a bad trade, process-wise, despite the fact that the ultimate goal of the franchise for 2010 is reached. There is no doubt in my mind, however, that this trade would be constantly listed among the best deadline deals ever, simply because, as above, flags fly forever.

The heartless mathematician and economist screams at me about the potential loss of utility from this trade. Apart from a mathematician and an economist, however, I’m also a human being, and perhaps more importantly, a baseball fan. I was along for the Brewers ride to the postseason in 2008, largely fueled by a rental of CC Sabathia, which cost the Brewers Matt LaPorta, Michael Brantley, and Rob Bryson. The Brewers were eliminated in the first round, and a top-half farm system is now consensus bottom ten. But I don’t care that the Brewers sacrificed a large amount of talent and likely some wins in the future – that playoff ride was a phenomenal emotional experience, especially given the fact that my hometown team had never won anything in my lifetime. Forget the revenue and other tangible benefits that the playoff appearance brought the team – it was fun. Every time I think back to the trade for Sabathia, I always decide, once again, that it was the right move, because I can’t imagine that 2008 season without the magical playoff run, and I certainly give a large part of the credit to Doug Melvin, whether objectively right or wrong, for pulling the trigger.

Wade’s reaction makes logical sense given his estimation of the talent levels of the three players involved in this deal – it appears that it would be a heist for Seattle, despite how supremely good Cliff Lee has been this season. Still, if we see the Twins raising the Commissioner’s Trophy in November and a new World Series Championship banner in Target Field, I’m not sure that his current attitude towards the trade and Bill Smith will remain.