The Tim Lincecum arbitration saga has been perhaps the most interesting story of the offseason. As soon as the possibility of Lincecum asking for $23,000,001, or one dollar more than CC Sabathia’s salary, surfaced on the internet, the speculation began and the questions spilled out. What would Lincecum ask for? Would he do the unthinkable, as mentioned above? Would the Giants call his bluff and give a low offer? What will his case mean for future pre-arbitration stars?

There is no doubt that he is a special case. With two Cy Young awards in his first three seasons, the only player to even compare to Lincecum in terms of pre-arbitration hardware is Ryan Howard, with a Rookie of the Year award and an MVP. Howard came away with $10M in his first arbitration hearing – obviously a far cry from $23M, but also a number that most players don’t see in their third arbitration hearings.

Tim Lincecum’s camp came in at what some thought to be a conservative number, at $13M, making the Giants submission of $8M seem meager in comparison. Given the drop in free agent salaries the last two years, the dollar value of a win is almost certainly lower than the $4.5M we saw in 2008, these numbers compare favorably to Howard’s first reward.

Despite all the questions, it seems almost universally accepted that Lincecum will be a bargain at either price. Relative to his value on the free agent market, that is certainly true. As a 6 WAR pitcher, as projected by CHONE, Lincecum would be worth roughly $21M in this market, which has been paying about $3.5M per marginal win. Both totals submitted to the arbitrators are far less than this amount.

Remember, though, that we expect Lincecum, as a first year arbitration player, to only receive 40% of his market value. As a $21M free market value player, Lincecum should receive about $8.4M from the arbitrators.

So what does this mean? First of all, don’t be surprised if the Giants win their case, as it would be right in line with what the arbitration market has done in the past. Still, I wouldn’t be surprised if Lincecum wins the case, either. Much like Howard, it’s possible that the arbitrators will award Lincecum a dollar amount above his true value due to his superstardom and his awards. If Lincecum wins his case, he wouldn’t be a bargain in comparison to other first-year arbitration cases. This isn’t to say that he’s not an asset – even at a market value contract, Lincecum is still an asset due to what he could fetch via trade and the fact that he can be worth six or more wins in any given season.

Regardless of what happens, it will be fun to watch.

The Rockies added Melvin Mora on Sunday, signing the aging third baseman to a 1.3 million dollar contract for the 2010 season. It appears that Mora’s primary role will be as a backup to Ian Stewart.

The signing itself isn’t terribly noteworthy. Mora is an average defender whose bat fell off a cliff last year at the age of 37. With that kind of profile, Mora projects as a roughly 1.0-1.5 WAR player per 600 plate appearances, or about a .75 WAR player off the bench. Given the high probability of injury and collapse with a 38 year old player, 1.3 million seems about perfect for Mora.

What is notable about this move is that it seems to signify that the Rockies do not view Clint Barmes as a utility type player, and instead view him as the opening day starter at second base. Perhaps he would move to the bench if Eric Young Jr. plays well enough to earn the job in spring training, but right now it is Barmes’s job to lose.

Barmes’s 76 career wRC+ certainly does not suggest starter ability, especially on a playoff team. He has performed better recently, particularly in 2008, where even adjusting for Coors, Barmes was an above average hitter. The 30 year old did slip in 2009, but some of that was BABIP based. His numbers should rebound slightly, into the 85-90 wRC+ range.

His true value comes from his glove. Barmes has played all over the infield. He’s only average at third, and quite good at SS, with a +6 UZR/150. The Rockies, however, are giving him an opportunity at his best historical position. At second base, Barmes has put up a +10 UZR/150 in just over one full season, but these numbers are supported by the fine two seasons he’s played at SS. As a +8 2B, as projected by CHONE, Barmes is a slightly above average player. Even at the +5 level projected by fans, he’s only slightly below average.

Rockies GM Dan O’Dowd’s willingness to stick with the light hitting Barmes over historically better hitters on the free agent market such as Felipe Lopez and Orlando Hudson is a good decision, regardless of whether or not it siginifies that the employers of Brad Hawpe understand defensive numbers. Lopez and Hudson both would represent a marginal improvement over Barmes once you factor in Barmes’s far superior glove. As such, the decision to upgrade the bench at 3B for a much cheaper payroll hit is almost certainly the correct one.

As the Reds’ rebuilding efforts move closer and closer to contention in 2010, one remaining roster hole was at SS, where incumbent Paul Janish failed to impress in 2009. The Reds attempted to boost the position on Monday, as the team agreed to a one-year contract with Orlando Cabrera that will pay the 35-year-old 3.02 million dollars.

Cabrera is a known quantity when it comes to his batting. Respectively, over the last two years, Cabrera’s put up 88 and 89 wRC+ totals against a career average of 90. Bill James, CHONE, Marcel, and the Fans all have him between 87 and 89. Over 600 plate appearances, that’s about 8 or 9 runs below average.

What will define Cabrera’s productivity in 2010 will be his defense. After consistently posting great fielding numbers in the UZR era, including a +30 overall total and +8 and +14 totals in 2007 and 2008, O-Cab hit a wall in 2009. In split time between Oakland and Minnesota, Cabrera put up an atrocious -15.3 UZR in 2010. It’s hard to imagine a player collapsing that quickly, especially one as durable as Cabrera (700+ PAs in three straight seasons). Given the measurement error possible in one season of UZR, it’s probable that Cabrera isn’t a -15 fielder now. However, given his age, it is also quite possible if not likely that Cabrera is now a below-average fielder.

Depending on if you think Cabrera is as bad as he is last year (0.5 WAR), just below average, or about -5 UZR (1.5 WAR), or still above average, or about +5 UZR (2.5 WAR), Cabrera is either a steal at $3M or a terrible signing. To the Reds, what’s more important than this signing in a vacuum is the kind of upgrade he represents over Janish.

Paul Janish may be most famous for his 90 MPH fastball, which he flashed in two Reds games last year en route to a 49.50 ERA. Janish put up a stellar +12 UZR last season in a mere 82 games (63 starts), a number backed up by excellent Fan’s Scouting Report numbers. It’s hard to believe that he’s the +24 UZR SS that his 2009 UZR numbers suggest, but +5, as CHONE projects, is very reasonable and better is possible if not probable.

Janish just can’t hit. He hasn’t hit in the minors since A-ball and hasn’t put up a .700+ OPS in AA or AAA, and in 300 major league PAs, he posted a meager 60 wRC+. His BABIP was atrocious last year, at .240, but as a fly ball hitter with minimial power (only above .100 minor league ISO once) and with many infield flies (16.0% IFFB, 7% of total PA). Even with BABIP improvement, CHONE projects a slight increase, to a 77 wRC+, but that’s still brutal. As a +5 SS, that sort of hitting perfomance makes Janish worth about 1.3 wins. With room for breakout and better fielding numbers, Janish could approach 2 WAR, much like Cabrera’s upside.

From a resource standpoint, it doesn’t appear that this is the best use of the Reds’ money. On the surface, Cabrera doesn’t appear to be a major upgrade over Janish. However, we can’t evaluate this deal in a vacuum. The Reds don’t have any other major holes in their roster, perhaps apart from depth. Given the lack of game-changing talent left on the free agent market, both at the SS position and overall, Cabrera should be a good addition. Cabrera won’t be a significant overpay unless his fielding collapse is real, and the depth added by this move could be key if the Reds find themselves in contention this year.

Here’s another three players who’ve moved around in the last few days. Today, we’d like you to project Jim Edmonds, Rich Hill, and Randy Winn

Edmonds was signed by the Brewers to a minor league contract with an invite to spring training. He is coming out of retirement after a 0.9 WAR season split between the Padres and the Cubs. Will his age affect him? Can he still hit? And perhaps more importantly, can he still play defense?

We went over Rich Hill’s issues in a post yesterday. The question is simple: Can he find the strike zone?

Randy Winn’s move to New York basically means Johnny Damon’s Yankee career is over. How will Winn fare in his place?

It’s amazing what can happen in but two short years. Coming into the winter of 2008, Rich Hill looked like he could be the real deal. His 2007 season wasn’t stellar – his FIP was only 4.32 due to a high home run rate – but there were great signs, especially from a 27-year-old left-handed starting pitcher. Most notably, the 8.45 K/9, especially given Hill’s lack of electric stuff, had Cubs fans expecting great things for years to come.

Now, we know it just wasn’t meant to be. Hill’s 2008 was derailed after only five starts, after a terrible 18 walks in 19.2 innings resulted in a demotion to AAA. Once in Iowa, the struggles only continued, as Hill walked over a batter per inning there, as well. He got another chance in Baltimore based on the potential he showed in 2007, but again, Hill couldn’t find the strike zone, and walked 49 batters in 61 innings between Triple-A and the majors.

In 2010, the Cardinals are going to hope to strike gold with Hill, giving the lefty an invite to spring training. It seems like Hill could be productive – CHONE projects him to have a chance to be worth roughly 1 WAR and to compete for a job as the 5th starter. Hill certainly seems like the perfect non-roster invite candidate, as the risk here is minimal and the reward could be great.

We must remember, however, that the projections presented here are “50th percentile projections.” With Hill, it seems like we have two possibilities: either he finds the strike zone and returns to 2007 form, or he remains a walk machine and is a below replacement level player. When we see “9” in the RAR category for CHONE, that’s combining the possibility that we get the +31 player from 2007 and the possibility that he remains the below replacement (certainly, if you include his time in AAA Iowa) player from 2008 and 2009. We’re probably looking at a 20% chance of a 4.00 FIP and a 80% chance of a 5.00 FIP, leading to the roughly 4.80 FIP being projected by both CHONE and Marcel, or something along those lines.

With the price of the dice roll merely a non-guaranteed contract with an invite to spring training, St. Louis should be applauded for taking this chance. Given Hill’s constant problems, however, expectations must be tempered – any sort of major league results out of Hill in 2010 will be a bonus to a Cardinals team that is already favored to win the NL Central.

The Dodgers brought in Brad Ausmus last year as a mentor to young catcher Russell Martin. Apparently, they were happy with that arrangement, as the club agreed to continue its relationship on Tuesday, signing the 40-year-old (41-year-old in April) to a contract guaranteeing one million dollars this year with a mutual option for 2011.

Simply put, Brad Ausmus is a terrible hitter. A horrible hitter. Adjectives struggle to describe how bad of a hitter Brad Ausmus is. Even with his extremely lucky 2009 – a .370 BABIP, 80 points above his career average resulted in a .322 wOBA in 107 PAs, just below average – Ausmus has compiled a stunning -51.8 wRAA since 2006. CHONE projects him for a ridiculously bad 52 wRC+. Yes, that’s right – Ausmus is projected to be half as productive as the average MLB hitter. Basically, that means that Ausmus is no longer an MLB hitter.

Of course, it’s only one million dollars for a large market club and it’s just a backup catcher role. What does it really matter? Still, roster spots have value, and the Dodgers are far from the point that the Yankees are where another marginal win holds little sway over their playoff fate. Even with Russell Martin’s general health in 2009, Ausmus still saw 100 plate appearances. At the level that CHONE projects him, that’s about a 6 run loss versus an average hitter, and a 5 run loss versus the projected offensive level of AJ Ellis, for whom CHONE projects a 94 wRC+.

I’m going to give Ned Colletti the benefit of the doubt and assume that he isn’t fooled by Ausmus’s performance last year and is instead bringing him back to continue his mentoring of Russell Martin. Martin, at 27 and entering his 5th season, can probably be considered a veteran at this point. Even if you buy that Martin still needs to be treated like a rookie, consider this: After three straight 107 or higher WRC+ seasons, the addition of Brad Ausmus coincided with a substantial drop in power and Martin’s worst season yet, with an 88 wRC+.

This is nowhere near enough data to suggest that Ausmus is responsible for this decline, and to make such a claims would be irresponsible. What’s more likely is that Brad Ausmus’s presence has not and will not affect Martin’s skill in the slightest – after all, Martin is a better hitter than Ausmus ever was in his career – and the Dodgers are wasting an important roster spot at a time when they need all the wins they can get as a playoff contending team.

As mentioned in the comments section of yesterday’s post regarding Gabe Gross, the idea of a player being limited to a platoon player seems to limit his perceived value. That leads me to an obvious question – does this perception agree with reality?

The crux behind many of the arguments against players with these high platoon splits is that their vulnerability to pitchers of the same hand makes them a worse value. A manager can merely put in a decent left-handed pitcher, in the case of Gross and, for example, Curtis Granderson, and the otherwise good hitter is reduced to a shell of his former self.

However, this doesn’t account for the ability for a manager to now leverage the situation. If the team has a right handed hitter with good or even normal platoon splits, by replacing the left handed hitter with that batter, the team could be in an equivalent or better situation. This is especially notable when facing a starting pitcher who would have the platoon advantage against your team’s hitter, as the pinch-hitting penalty wouldn’t be in play here. Overall, by taking the advantage in a vast majority of platoon situations, the team will get more wins out of that position or lineup slot than if the player did not have a large platoon split.

MGL puts it best, I think.

In fact, having good overall numbers with a horrible split is a POSITIVE and not a negative! If it turns out that he is truly (true-talent wise after accounting for small sample performance) poor against LHB, then you would be able to platoon him, sit him against tough (high splits) lefties, or pinch hit for him against lefties in high leverage situations, which would provide even MORE value to his team than his overall or historical numbers would suggest!

We can also infer, as MGL goes on to say, that we can apply this to anyone who has a large split in any sort of numbers – such as offensive value and defensive value, for example.

This isn’t to say there aren’t disadvantages to platoon players. If you can’t find a player with comparable defense to your platoon player, the gain from pinch-hitting or spot-starting another player could be minimal or even negative. We also are forced to deal with the limited number of roster spots. With 25 roster spots, we can only see so many players of this type on one roster, as eventually you run out of the roster spots for the players who cover their weaknesses. This is certainly at the center of the debate over whether teams should carry 12, 13, or 14 position players, and why many sabermetric writers implore teams to carry as many position players as possible.

In the end, though, what matters more than whether or not a player has leverageable platoon or defense or any other kind of skills is his overall talent. The decision of who to play becomes easy when one player is just clearly better than the other. Despite that, these issues will probably come into play for years to come as MLB teams attempt to squeeze every last possible run out of the resources that are available to them, and the smartest teams will properly leverage their platoon players.

Interestingly enough, one name that hasn’t seen any play whatsoever this offseason is that of Gabe Gross. Surely, Gross isn’t anything approaching a household name, as the roles he’s played on first the Milwaukee Brewers and then the Tampa Bay Rays have been relatively minor. Still, in only 935 plate appearances over the last three years, Gross has compiled 3.8 wins above replacement, combining well above average fielding with an average bat in the corners of the outfield. So why hasn’t his name popped up at all?

Honestly, it’s hard to say. Gross will be 31 for most of this season, which is probably his biggest red flag. He’s also coming off his worst hitting year since he joined the Brewers in 2006, as his .306 wOBA was only good for a 86 wRC+. Also, his excellent glove (+21 UZR in RF over 196 DG since 2007) is not as valued in a corner outfield spot as it would be at a premium position like CF or 2B.

And yet, even in this down season, Gross still was worth a pro-rated 1.5 wins per 600 plate appearances. CHONE and Marcel both expect for him to return to roughly average with the bat, and even accounting for regression on defense, Gross is a good bet for another 1.5 WAR/150 G season. It seems we are no closer than when we started to answering our question.

It’s possible that Gross or his agent are holding out for a contract with some sort of significant guaranteed money similar to or greater than his 2009 salary of $1.3M. With teams still waiting to hear about their arbitration hits and the fact that on many teams he would be relegated to a 4th outfielder position, all combined with the continued downturn in the market for wins, Gross is in a poor position to ask for even a semi-large contract.

Eventually, some team will land a great asset in Gross, as no raise he gets will approach the $5M-$7M value that he is likely to provide. It’s only a matter of time until we find out which team that is.

With their rotation consisting of Yovani Gallardo, Manny Parra, Dave Bush, Jeff Suppan, and Nobody entering this offseason, it was clear that the Brewers would have to make at least one move. Given the lack of talent in the rotation and lack of depth outside of it, a second move would probably be required. The first move was the Brewers acquisition of Randy Wolf in December. The second came on Wednesday as the Brewers picked up Doug Davis on a 1 year, 4.25M contract with a mutual option for 2011.

Davis is an underwhelming talent, but he’s managed to get outs over his career. Despite a fastball that averages 85 MPH, Davis manages to get a decent number of strikeouts – at least 6.5 K/9 since 2004. He does tend to nibble, and as such he gives up quite a few walks, usually somewhere in the 3.75-4.5 range.

As such, since his K/BB ratio tops out around 2.0 and is usually closer to 1.5, Davis has to keep the ball in the park to be effective. He doesn’t give up many fly balls – 35.4% last year versus a 34.7% career average – and as such, his 1.11 HR/9 rate was the highest he’s seen in years. With some regression, that should lead to an FIP in the 4.60-4.70 range, as projected by both CHONE and Marcel. That makes Davis about a 1.7 win player in 160 innings pitched.

More importantly to the Brewers success will be how the rest of the pitching staff is handled. The first three spots will certainly go to Yovani Gallardo, Wolf, and Davis. Parra, Bush, and Suppan will then compete for the last two spots. It will be tempting for the Brewers to hand the two spots to Bush and Suppan, who will receive a combined 17.75M (roughly, based on Bush’s arbitration case) in 2010, and either start the 400,000 dollar man Parra in AAA or the bullpen.

This would be a deadly mistake for a team with playoff aspirations. The Brewers are roughly an 80-82 win true-talent team with the addition of Davis. That’s about the lower bound for any team to have a chance at the playoffs. What the Brewers will need, then, is luck in the form of health and players developing at the major league level – Ryan Braun and Prince Fielder to continue to improve as sluggers, Alcides Escobar and Carlos Gomez to add some hitting to their tremendous gloves, and, most pertinent to the subject at hand, improvement out of their league-worst starting rotation from 2009.

Suppan is projected for 1 run above replacement by CHONE. He hasn’t had an FIP better than 4.40 since 2004. His fastball has lost 0.5 MPH since he joined Milwaukee. His walk rates have been steadily increasing. He is 35 years old. Upside does not exist here. Bush is just simply better, although he has had struggles with home runs recently, and Parra has tremendous upside, and even at the lower bound of his projections, he’s about equal to the 50th percentile projection for Suppan.

The Brewers need to put their most talented team on the field without worrying about who is receiving what paycheck. The Brewers have little hope of reaching a wild card berth without the talent of Manny Parra on the field, and Doug Melvin must not let the mistake of signing Jeff Suppan haunt him any further than it already has.

Rumors have been floating around for most of the offseason that former Milwaukee Brewer Ben Sheets is looking for a contract that would eclipse 10 million dollars before incentives were included. Unfortunately for Ben – I’m a big fan, as he was the first true ace pitcher for whom I watched nearly ever start – he (or more likely, his agent) is likely not going to get what he’s seeking.

Ben Sheets, during his prime with the Brewers, was inarguably an excellent pitcher. After a rough rookie year, Sheets settled in as the Brewers ace for the next 7 years. Injuries were an issue, but he still put up at least 140 IP in all but one season, and when he was on the field, he was great. He has a career 3.56 FIP and totaled a whopping 29.8 wins from 2002-2008, an average of 4.3 wins per season.

Unfortunately, just as the Brewers were making a playoff run that will be remembered for ages in Milwaukee, Sheets injured his elbow, and ended up missing the 2008 playoffs and all of the 2009 season. Now, he’s ready to return, but given his injury history and the fact that he missed a year, what kind of performance can we expect from him?

Every time Sheets has returned from injury (every year since 2005, basically), he’s pitched well the next season. His worst year since was 2007, where he still posted a 4.11 FIP and was worth 2.2 wins. He’s going to strike guys out – a 7 K/9 is probably the lower bound for him, and his control is excellent – a 3 BB/9 is probably the upper bound. The question mark for Sheets isn’t so much performance, but how many innings he can pitch.

Fan projections have him at 132 IP for 2010. CHONE has him at 114. These two projections have him at 2.7 WAR and 2.0 WAR respectively. Even if you generously project him for 150, you get something in the 2.6-3.1 WAR range as a projection for Sheets. Given the roughly $3.5M/WAR figure we’ve seen this offseason, a fair range for a dollar amount would be 9-11 million dollars, and that’s at the very top end of the projections.

A more likely range for Sheets’s production is 2.0-2.5 WAR, and based on how the offseason has gone for Rich Harden – better and more recent production, actually pitched last year – and Erik Bedard – no contract yet and limited rumors surrounding him – he’d be lucky to get that $3.5M/WAR rate. Harden’s contract – 1 year, $7.5M – came in at
roughly 3M/WAR by CHONE, and that’s only projecting 132 innings for Harden. Based on this, Sheets could be looking at something closer to a contract worth $5M or $6M.

Sheets could get something in the 9 million dollar range, but that’s only after incentives are included. With the number of openings for expensive starting pitchers closing as clubs inch closer and closer to their maximum payrolls, Sheets will have to face the realities of the new market and settle for closer to half of what he’s looking for.