Andie Anderson wants to do serious journalism, but instead she’s stuck writing how-to columns for a women’s lifestyle magazine. The 2003 feature film, How to Lose a Guy in 10 Days, follows Andie (played by Kate Hudson) as she attempts to demonstrate that even a conventionally attractive straight woman will find herself single in a hot minute if she commits all the common faux pas known to drive straight men away. The subject of her journalistic experiment is Benjamin Barry (played by Matthew McConaughey), who coincidentally is running an experiment of his own. He claims to have a foolproof formula to make any woman fall in love with him in 10 days flat. The premises of both endeavors rely heavily on traditional gender stereotypes, but eventually the pair realize their situation is more nuanced, both in terms of the circumstances and the individuals involved (or at least as nuanced as a movie that came out in 2003 can muster).

Here in 2024, Kevin Brown recently noted on a MASN broadcast that Orioles shortstop Gunnar Henderson had grounded into only two double plays all season. That felt startlingly low for a roughly 150-game sample, but I’ll admit to not habitually tracking the GIDP leaderboard. What is a “good” number of GIDP for a full season? Has anyone ever posted a perfect, no-GIDP season? What makes players particularly good or bad at avoiding GIDP?

These questions have intuitive answers, but this is FanGraphs; we like to test our assumptions around here. Andie Anderson thought she knew all the obvious ways to get dumped, but in practice it wasn’t as easy as she thought. It turns out two is a good number of GIDP. Only Masyn Winn, with one, has fewer than Henderson this season, who is tied for second place with Daulton Varsho, Riley Greene, and Jackson Merrill. Going back to 1949 (the earliest season with GIDP data), and omitting 2020, there have been nine players with GIDP-free seasons, most recently TJ Friedl in 2023. Read the rest of this entry »

Heading into the year, everyone thought this would be the season that Shohei Ohtani, rehabbing from elbow surgery and DHing only, stepped aside and yielded MVP to someone else before resuming his place as the de facto favorite for the award in 2025. Instead, Ohtani decided to make a run at the first ever 50-homer, 50-steal season. The other primary competitor for NL MVP is Francisco Lindor, who isn’t chasing any statistical milestones and plays for a team whose most interesting narratives involve an amorphous fast food mascot, the musical endeavors of a part-time utility infielder, and the failure to extend Pete Alonso. And yet, Lindor’s position atop the NL WAR leaderboard demands consideration.

The marginal difference between Lindor and Ohtani’s WAR totals (7.4 and 7.0, respectively, at the time of this writing) creates a virtual tie to be broken based on the personal convictions of voters and anyone else with an opinion and an internet connection. For most, the choice between the two distills down to whether Ohtani’s 50/50 chase overrides his DH-only status. I’m not here to disparage Ohtani for not playing defense, but if you find that disqualifying for MVP recognition, I feel that. Then again, WAR includes a positional adjustment that does ding Ohtani with a significant deduction for not taking the field, and he’s still been keeping pace with Lindor on the value front anyway, so there’s not much more analysis to do there.

Instead, I want to explore how Ohtani’s one-dimensional role interacts with the value of a roster spot and the limitations that it places on how Los Angeles constructs and deploys the rest of its roster. In a two-way Ohtani season, he brings tremendous value to an individual roster spot as a frontline starter and an elite hitter who takes 600 or so plate appearances. But this year he contributes only as an offensive player. Read the rest of this entry »

In the pre-PitchCom era, major league teams had more rigorous protocols for protecting their signs than your bank has for securing your account. It wouldn’t surprise me to learn that some teams’ custom PitchCom audio clips are read in a modified pig latin created by a pitching strategy staffer. That the hitter doesn’t know what pitch is coming is considered a huge advantage for the pitcher. And it’s not only pitchers who think so — just ask the 2017 Astros.

Sign-stealing aside, hitters stand in the box pondering which pitch might come hurtling their way mere seconds later. What that pondering looks like depends on the hitter. There’s Nick Castellanos and his “glorified batting practice” approach, in which he looks for the ball and hits it as hard as he can. But there’s also Carlos Correa, who starts his day studying pitcher tendencies in the video room.

For their part, pitchers set the difficulty level on the hitter’s guessing game. That terms like “fastball count” and “pitching backwards” exist tell us that pitchers follow (and, at times, purposefully upend) conventional tactics to sequence their pitches, and believe that certain pitch types are optimal in certain counts. Strategies become standard practices because they’re effective, but an over-reliance on one or two strategies can lead to predictability. Become too predictable and a pitcher effectively sets their opponents’ guessing game on “easy” mode. But does making it easy for the hitter to sit on a certain pitch automatically make the overall task of hitting easier? Does keeping a hitter guessing always ensure effective pitching? Read the rest of this entry »

Previously on Dragon Ball Z, we discussed whether it’s better to run hot and cold like a reheated frozen burrito or show up at the plate with the comforting and consistent warmth of a hearty helping of mac and cheese. Specifically, when you’re a hitter trying to microwave some offense in the playoffs. The tl;dr of that article: When comparing streaky hitters to their more consistent colleagues, the streaky hitters came closer to replicating their regular season numbers in the postseason. Despite the fluky nature of playoff series and their bite-sized samples that leave no space for slumps, hitters prone to slumping still bring enough electricity when they do get hot to maintain a charge in their individual numbers.

But individuals don’t win the World Series, teams do. In the context of a team playing a sport where the superstars don’t necessarily factor into every plate appearance, individual performances don’t carry the same weight that they do in other sports. Not only do teams need contributions from multiple hitters in the lineup, but the sequence of those contributions matters too.

In my last article, I used wOBA, which is derived from the run values associated with specific events (i.e. walks, doubles, home runs), to measure individual output. In turn, run values are historical averages of the number of runs scored following the given event. Those historical averages assume that what follows a given plate appearance is a league-average hitter doing whatever is most statistically likely. But that’s not how it works irl. The player on deck might be better or worse than league average, might have distinct tendencies toward hitting the ball on the ground or in the air, might be 0-fer their last eleventy-billion, or might be hotter than soup in the summertime. Read the rest of this entry »

As the man who inspired Brad Pitt’s most memorable role once said, “My shit doesn’t work in the playoffs.” Assuming Billy Beane wasn’t explaining an October Metamucil purchase to a grocery store cashier who simply asked how his day was going, what Beane likely meant was that the statistics used to construct his major league rosters don’t accrue large enough samples during postseason series to eventually even out in his favor. Over the course of 162 games, a team’s production settles into a reasonable representation of the squad’s true talent. But zoom in on any random seven-game stretch and the team on the field might look like a bunch of dudes in baseball player cosplay.

What applies to team outcomes applies just as well to player outcomes. A player with a perfectly respectable stat line in the regular season might morph into a pumpkin as the calendar shifts to fall, or on the flip side, an unlikely hero may emerge from the ashes of a cruel summer and put the whole team on his back.

With the law of averages in mind, I’d always assumed that the more consistent hitters would be better positioned to perform well in the playoffs. My thinking went like this: The natural variation in these hitters’ performances would never wander too far from their season-long average, making them the safer, more predictable options. Whereas streaky hitters — the ones with high highs, low lows, and steep transitions between the two — would be too reliant on “getting hot at the right time” to be the type of hitter a front office should depend on in the postseason.

Reader, I was incorrect. Read the rest of this entry »

The other week, I was talking to a friend as she fretted over her lack of productivity. Her struggle wasn’t with laziness or a lack of motivation, but rather a severe case of burnout, following her around the way No-Face follows Chihiro in Spirited Away. In the moment, I could see her desperately reaching for more energy to get through the day, like when the chip bag is nearly empty, so you bring it to your mouth and tilt your head back to suck down whatever salty goodness remains.

But instead of encouraging her to power through, I went a different way.

“Y’know, it’s okay to take a break.”

She laughed and said, “That’s what my therapist keeps telling me.”

If you’ve ever described yourself as a perfectionist or a people pleaser, or tied your self-worth to your measurable output, you know taking breaks can be hard.

Athletes learn from the beginning to idolize hard work. Hard work is the salve for every ailment. Wanna get stronger? Work harder. Wanna play better? Work harder. Wanna go pro? Work harder than everyone else. The hardest workers earn their own dedicated titles and recognition, separate from their actual production. Cal Ripken Jr.’s consecutive games played streak earned him the Ironman title. MLB gives out a Heart and Hustle award to whichever player’s heart tells him to hustle the hardest. And every year, we read stories about players and coaches who are the first to arrive to work each morning and the last to leave at night. Read the rest of this entry »

The Pittsburgh Pirates spent part of deadline day sprucing up their offense by acquiring outfielder Bryan De La Cruz from the Miami Marlins and infielder Isiah Kiner-Falefa from the Toronto Blue Jays. Neither hitter provides the superstar impact to fully rehabilitate Pittsburgh’s fixer-upper lineup. Instead, they yield an effect similar to tearing out the wood paneling, scraping the popcorn ceilings, and applying a couple coats of paint in a shade called something like Chantilly Cream to zhuzh up the place. Perhaps this offseason, Pirates’ GM Ben Cherington will put in a call to Chip and Joanna Gaines to facilitate a full renovation, but until then, this certainly makes the space the Pirates currently occupy nicer.

De La Cruz and Kiner-Falefa join the Pittsburgh clubhouse amidst a handful of other additions and subtractions over the last few days. The team acquired two lefty relievers in Jalen Beeks and Josh Walker alongside Nick Yorke, a post-hype hitting prospect who is ready to compete for big league playing time, according to Eric Longenhagen’s breakdown of all three acquisitions. Additionally, the Pirates dealt from their starting pitching depth by sending Martín Pérez to the Padres in exchange for Ronaldys Jimenez, an 18 year-old left-handed pitcher currently in the DSL.

On the whole, Pittsburgh’s deadline activity amounts to a series of one-for-one trades that marginally improve their current situation, without upsetting their long-term construction plans for building Barbie’s Dream Roster in the future. (Or because it’s the Pirates, whatever ownership deems is Kenough.) Read the rest of this entry »

Have you ever had a friend enthusiastically recommend that you watch a TV show and then say, “It takes a few episodes to get going, and the timeline gets weird at the end, and one or two of the main characters can be kind of annoying, but other than that it’s SO GOOD.” And initially you might be put off, thinking that a truly good show wouldn’t require that many qualifiers. Sometimes you’re right about that, but sometimes it turns out the show is Parks and Recreation and even though the first season is about as appealing as living in a pit, the rest of the show is an absolute treat.

Sometimes small components of a larger body of work do a poor job of representing the work as a whole. The oddities that occur in small samples are likely not a new concept to FanGraphs readers, nor will it shock anyone when I note that what constitutes a small sample depends on what exactly we want to measure. Recently, the fine folks at MLB Advanced Media gifted us with a handful of new metrics that make use of Statcast’s bat tracking technology. Every time we dig into a new metric, we must consider the appropriate serving size to satiate our hunger for knowledge, lest we find ourselves hangrily generating takes that we later regret.

For this article, we’ll attempt to determine appropriate sample thresholds for measuring a hitter’s average bat speed; so that players without bats don’t feel left out, we’ll do the same for sword rate from the pitcher’s perspective. For many metrics, the sample size is measured in pitches or plate appearences, but since both bat speed and sword rate are tied specifically to bat movement, their samples will be composed of swings. To determine reasonable sample sizes, I used the split-half correlation method. The idea is to randomly select two samples of size X from a player’s collection of swings, calculate the player’s average bat speed or sword rate for both samples, lather/rinse/repeat for a bunch of players, then take the full set of two-sample pairs for all players and see how well they correlate. We complete the experiment by repeating the process for progressively larger sample sizes. And just to be super thorough, we’ll re-run the experiment several times and average the correlation values. Read the rest of this entry »

Remember back in 2021 when Gen Z tried to tell everyone to move their side parts to the middle and swap their skinny jeans for a looser variety? While most Millennials responded with outward indigence, offline they begrudgingly tried on high-waisted mom jeans and posted up in the bathroom blowing out their hair in a new direction. But before long they let their hair go back to lying in the manner to which it had become accustomed and eschewed jeans completely in favor of athleisure-wear. Even as many of us considered complying with the directive of our teenaged overlords, it felt absurd that people who haven’t even finished developing their prefrontal cortexes are left in charge of dictating what’s cool. As it turns out, though, that’s exactly why teenagers decide what’s cool. Teenagers are the only members of society with the time, energy, and lack of rationality to care so deeply about something that matters so very little.

Those who stuck to their dated stylings and weathered the petty hail storm of Zoomer mocking were vindicated a couple of months ago, when the celebrity and influencer cohort brought back the side part, declaring it on-trend once more. Around that same time another trend was taking hold among the baseball commentariat: Using strength of schedule to determine which teams had actually earned their W-L records. Mostly, this meant arguing that the Phillies weren’t a top team in the league because they’d played a soft schedule. The discourse eventually spawned multiple articles arguing that while yes, Philadelphia hadn’t exactly been slaying dragons while walking a tightrope, its act wasn’t entirely smoke (generated by the clubhouse fog machine) and mirrors either.

Strength of schedule is not typically a prominent talking point when comparing MLB teams. It might occasionally come up when comparing September schedules in a tight postseason race, but as a phrase uttered in May, it’s typically part of a college baseball discussion, or because you’ve wandered into a BCS-era college football forum. College sports need strength-of-schedule metrics because teams don’t all play one another and the variation in team quality spans the Big Ten’s new geographical footprint. But in the major professional leagues, the schedule is fairly balanced, and even though the White Sox and Rockies exist, dominating the worst teams in MLB presents a tougher task than rolling over the University of Maryland Baltimore County Golden Retrievers. Read the rest of this entry »

By June of 2013, Baltimore’s beat writers had established their favorite in-season stat to track: Manny Machado’s rapidly rising doubles count.

Machado was in the midst of his first full season in the majors and on pace to make a run for the single-season doubles record. He finished the season with 51 (a several-way tie for 51st all-time), but in the moment, he represented a rookie with sky high potential, standing in the shadow of a mountain representing his own potential peak.

As he dumped double after double into the outfield, Orioles broadcasters noted for fans that the 20-year-old Machado was still developing physically, so his power tool was poised to level up as his career progressed, and when it did, some portion of those 51 two-baggers would convert to round-trippers. The Doubles to Dingers developmental arc is a real phenomenon. After hitting a double once every 14 plate appearances and a home run once every 50 in 2013, Machado followed up that performance in ’14 by doubling just once every 25 PA while upping his homer rate to once every 30. More recently, the current Baltimore broadcast booth has applied the Doubles to Dingers arc to Gunnar Henderson, another promising second-year player on the left side of the Orioles’ infield. However, as Henderson has increased his home run rate in his second full season by over 50%, his doubles rate has held steady, suggesting he’s leveled up his hit tool alongside the power surge, which doesn’t quite fit this narrative arc.

So which players have best exemplified the Double to Dingers storyline, and how did their stories play out afterward? We don’t need to rely on broadcasters, who have a tendency to fuel fan optimism, because this is extremely quantifiable. To identify players on this path, I started the search in 1988 and looked only at players who at the time had three or fewer seasons of at least 100 PA in the majors. I compared their ratio of dingers to doubles during the season in question to their career ratio for all seasons prior. Only samples of at least 300 PA were considered when calculating the ratio. Players also needed to be hitting doubles in at least 4% of their PAs prior to unlocking the next level of power, and after leveling up, their new homer rate should settle in above 2% of PAs (thresholds chosen are round numbers at or just below league average because this really only matters for hitters producing at a baseline level of competency in both key categories). To further ensure that the change in their dingers-to-doubles ratio is caused by a somewhat proportional change to the frequency of both doubles and dingers, their homer rate needed to increase by at least half a percent; likewise, their doubles rate must have decreased by at least half a percent. Read the rest of this entry »