It’s been a relatively quiet offseason for the San Francisco Giants, who signed outfielder Mitch Haniger but have come up empty on bigger names including Trea Turner, Kodai Senga, and, most notably, Aaron Judge. On Sunday, though, they got back in action, inking a deal with left-handed pitcher Sean Manaea for two years and $25 million, with an opt-out after 2023.

At age 30, Manaea tested the open market as a free agent for the first time in his career. In 885 career innings, he has almost defined what it means to be a league-average pitcher, with a 4.07 ERA (99 ERA-) and 4.06 FIP (98 FIP-). While he’s made 30 starts in a season just once and missed almost the entire 2019 season with injury, he’s been consistently available throughout his career and has averaged over 5.5 innings per start, well above average in today’s game. While Manaea had a very good 2021 season, during which he set a career high in strikeouts while walking a minuscule 5.4% of batters and posting an 88 FIP-, his performance largely regressed after being traded to the Padres just before Opening Day this year. His strikeout rate fell, his walk rate went from elite to average, and his home run rate spiked, leading to a career-worst 4.96 ERA even in a lowered offensive environment.

So what caused this significant regression in performance? First, let’s examine Manaea’s pitch mix. The bread and butter of his arsenal is a low-90s sinker that he throws over 60% of the time, but its true shape lies somewhere between that of a sinker and a four-seam fastball. In 2022, the pitch had 2.4 fewer inches of drop than other sinkers thrown in the same velocity band, with about an inch less horizontal run. Read the rest of this entry »

The A’s have made no secret of their intentions to spend as little as possible. Per Spotrac, they entered the offseason with a grand total of zero guaranteed dollars of active payroll, outside of arbitration and pre-arb salaries. Of the 39 players on their 40-man roster, only four are arb-eligible, and Tony Kemp, with all five years and 98 days of big league service time, is by far the most-tenured player on the team. They’ve traded nearly every productive major leaguer over the past calendar year for prospects and players making the minimum. But at the Winter Meetings, Oakland finally made its first signings of the offseason, agreeing to terms on two-year deals with utility player Jace Peterson and former Astros utility man Aledmys Díaz, the latter worth $15 million.

Originally drafted by the Padres in 2011, the 32-year old Peterson has made plenty of stops throughout his career, from Atlanta to New York and Baltimore; he spent the last three seasons with the Brewers before becoming a free agent this offseason. In 2022, he appeared in 112 games, starting 81 of them. Utilized almost exclusively as a platoon player, he racked up 293 plate appearances against right-handed pitchers, only stepping into the box 35 times against lefties. His primary platoon partner this year was Mike Brosseau, who posted a 117 wRC+ in 160 PA, about two-thirds of which came against southpaws. Peterson came up as a second baseman but has spent the bulk of his career as a super-utility player, in most seasons making starts at first, second, third, and both corner outfield spots. This year with the Brewers, he primarily played third base, making 67 starts there as everyday players took the bulk of playing time at the other positions he has usually manned.

Peterson’s biggest strength on the offensive side has been his disciplined approach at the plate. During his three-season stretch with the Brewers, he walked in 12.4% of plate appearances, and his 24.6% chase rate ranked in the 90th percentile among major league hitters, placing him in company of Joey Votto and Mookie Betts. He’s affectionately earned the nickname “On Base Jace” (he’s had three postseason plate appearances and drew walks in all of them) and slashed .238/.337/.373 with a 98 wRC+ during his time in Milwaukee. While his raw power grades out at about average, he has never hit double-digit homers and has a below-average ISO for his career, largely because he hits more ground balls than average and doesn’t pull the ball at a high rate. Despite these middling offensive numbers, he’ll likely slot into the heart of an Oakland lineup that had just two hitters with at least 300 PA and an above average wRC+, and with backstop Sean Murphy likely on the move in the near future, that list is cut to just Seth Brown. Read the rest of this entry »

Free-agent reliever Carlos Estévez has signed a two-year contract worth $13.5 million with the Angels, continuing a busy offseason in Anaheim that has already seen Tyler Anderson, Gio Urshela, and Hunter Renfroe join the roster.

#Angels sign Carlos Estevez to a 2-year deal for $13.5-million.

Don’t know yet if they plan for him to close, but Bud Black just said he has closer stuff and a closer mentality.

— Jeff Fletcher (@JeffFletcherOCR) December 5, 2022

Estévez, who turns 30 next month, has spent his entire professional career with the Rockies, playing his first six seasons in the hitter’s paradise of Coors Field. His 4.59 ERA and 4.21 FIP in 302 career innings appear a bit inflated, but they’re actually a touch better than league average (94 ERA- and FIP-). His 2022 campaign, while normal-looking on the surface, was statistically odd in many ways. Despite earning fewer strikes than ever, he set a career best in terms of overall run prevention with a 3.47 ERA, making him the second-most effective reliever on Colorado’s staff.

Wait — a .247 BABIP allowed while pitching in Coors, a stadium whose .323 BABIP ranked highest among all parks? And an above-average 10.1% HR/FB rate in the sixth-most homer-friendly park in baseball? And that was despite it being easier to make contact against Estévez than at any other point during his career? Read the rest of this entry »

Take a look at the Astros’ bullpen in the ALCS against the Yankees. Do you see anything odd about it? And no, this isn’t an article complaining about the fact that they rostered nine relievers in a seven-game series with multiple off days. Rather, it’s the fact that all nine relievers are right-handed that sets them apart from every other playoff team this season, and nearly every playoff team in recent memory:

This trend was largely true during the regular season as well. Despite leading the majors in bullpen ERA and FIP, just 48.1 of their 495.1 relief innings came from southpaws. Back in April, their Opening Day roster included 10 relievers, only one of whom, Blake Taylor, is a lefty. Taylor pitched just 19 innings with an average ERA, but walked more batters than he struck out. In June, he was placed on the IL with an elbow injury and pitched the rest of the season in Triple-A after he recovered. Aside from a cup of coffee from rookie Parker Mushinski, the remaining lefty innings came from deadline acquisition Will Smith, who posted a solid 3.27 ERA and 2.66 FIP in 22 innings down the stretch. But all three have been absent from their playoff rosters so far, with the Astros opting for right-handed pitchers instead.

This dearth of lefties clearly hasn’t inhibited the Astros’ success – through seven games, their bullpen has allowed just three runs in 33 innings, including a dozen scoreless frames to clinch their final victory of the ALDS. So how have the Astros dealt with their opponents’ left-handed hitters? For starters, it helps that no one they’ve had to face so far has been particularly vulnerable to lefties. Hitters in the opposing Division Series like Josh Naylor are great against righties and unplayable against lefties, but that hasn’t been the case with the Astros’ opponents so far:

While hitters like Rizzo and Carpenter don’t have career reverse splits like they did in 2022, they’ve only been marginally worse against left-handed pitching in their time in the big leagues. In other words, neither team had hitters that might inspire a manager to call on a lefty specialist. But the Astros’ effectiveness against lefties doesn’t just come from the tendencies of the hitters they’ve faced. Houston’s relievers are also well equipped to neutralize both left- and right-handed hitters. Consider the 2022 platoon splits of each reliever on the roster:

Seven of the nine righties in Houston’s bullpen actually fared better against lefties than righties in 2022, and the only one with a pronounced weakness against lefties – Martinez – has yet to appear in a postseason game. Lefties slashed just .207/.269/.341 against this group during the regular season, posting a .270 wOBA compared to the .284 wOBA right-handed hitters produced against them. Both of these numbers are significantly better than the league as a whole – across the majors, right-handed relievers allowed a .310 wOBA to lefties and a .307 wOBA to righties in 2022. But the fact that the Astros’ top five relievers by innings pitched all ran reverse splits during the regular season is particularly important, and shows the value in relievers who can deal with any type of hitter, especially in the era of the three-batter minimum.

Now, we know that reverse splits can sometimes be unreliable in a small, single-season sample. But in addition to the fact that four of these pitchers – Pressly, Montero, Urquidy, and Abreu – have career reverse splits over a multi-season stretch, it’s still valuable to consider the methods the Astros use to make their relievers so effective against potent lefties.

Much of the Astros’ success in opposite-handed matchups comes from their relievers changing their pitch mix depending on the handedness of the batter. One way that pitchers attempt to limit their platoon splits is by throwing multiple fastballs. Cutters and four-seam fastballs tend to be close to platoon-neutral, but the horizontal run of a sinker often directs the ball into the barrel of opposite-handed hitters, giving it one of the largest splits of any pitch type. Three members of the Astros’ bullpen – Montero, Neris, and Martinez – threw both a four-seamer and a sinker during the regular season. The trio combined to throw 582 sinkers, just 13 of which were thrown to a left-handed hitter. While many pitchers with multiple fastball types throw more sinkers to same-handed opponents, few take it to the extreme levels these Astros do.

Sinkers aren’t the only pitch types that can generate platoon splits, though. Sliders can generate splits just as large – we know that sweepers are ridiculously effective against same-handed hitters, but can be risky against opposite-handed hitters for the same reason sinkers are – with their horizontal movement moving towards the opponent’s barrel. Sharper sliders with more gyroscopic spin also run platoon splits, albeit less extreme ones. The Astros’ bullpen throws a variety of different slider shapes – Garcia and Martinez dominate the horizontal movement charts, while Stanek’s moves like a bullet, and others like Pressly and Abreu have a more hybrid shape, with high marks in both sweep and velocity.

All nine Astros relievers throw a slider, ranging in frequency from Neris’ 6.6% usage rate to Abreu’s 44% clip. Combined with a few of them also throwing sinkers, everyone in this bullpen has a clear plan to get righties out. But how can they succeed with a lefty in the box? Offspeed pitches tend to run the most neutral, or even reverse platoon splits, and it’s no surprise that the Astros selectively throw their offspeed selections to lefties. These offspeed pitches consist of splitters from Neris and Stanek — it’s each pitcher’s most-used secondary — and changeups from nearly everyone else. When looking at their offspeed and slider usage in tandem, we can see very stark differences based on the batter’s handedness:

In 2022, right-handed pitchers threw sliders to right-handed opponents about 28% of the time, as compared to just 13.6% for lefty hitters. In other words, righties roughly doubled their slider usage in situations with the platoon advantage. For changeups and splitters, there’s an even larger difference. Righty hurlers used their offspeed stuff 18.4% of the time against lefties, but largely shelved those offerings against righties, dropping their usage to just 6.9%. The Astros have taken this to the extreme, almost completely ignoring their unfavorable pitches in certain matchups. Montero, Neris, Stanek, Garcia, and Urquidy use their sliders as real weapons against righties, but throw them under 3% of the time against lefties. On the other hand, Montero, Martinez, and Garcia throw tons of slowballs to lefties but almost completely ignore them when their sinkers and sliders get the job done. Replacing sliders with changeups and vice versa is far from a novel concept, but the Astros’ optimization of their relievers’ pitch usage is on another level. Of course, it helps that they don’t have to face the order multiple times (unless they’re Luis Garcia), but they’ve still managed to collectively run reverse splits as a unit all season.

While Houston has good reason to put their trust in their righties, Smith is still waiting in the wings and should be available if the Astros want to add him to their World Series roster as a specialist. It’s pretty clear he shouldn’t face a string of righties – his .362 wOBA allowed to them matches the full season performance of Carlos Correa – but is there a use for him in a situation with two outs, a lefty up, and no great pinch-hitting options, possibly in the early innings? Smith had a very solid .278 wOBA allowed to lefties in the regular season, though that actually makes him worse than all of the Astros’ high-leverage arms, only besting lower-leverage relievers like Martinez, Garcia, and Urquidy.

Let’s consider Philadelphia’s roster for a second. Houston didn’t sweat the lack of left-handed relievers on the roster the past two series because the Yankees and Mariners didn’t have any lefties who were dangerous with the platoon advantage and pedestrian without it. What about the lefty hitters on the Phillies? In addition to measuring the magnitude of their platoon splits, we should also look at their ability to handle the pitches being thrown at them. Smith is a slider-heavy lefty, especially against fellow southpaws — he throws them about two-thirds of the time. If they decide to leave Smith off the roster and continue to lean on their righties, the Phillies will likely see a lot of changeups and splitters. Using Statcast’s run values, we can measure exactly how well each hitter performed against a given pitch type to see whether the Astros would rather go with Smith or a righty against any of these hitters:

Schwarber and Marsh had sizable splits during the regular season, and both find far more success against right-handed changeups than left-handed sliders. However, in late-game situations, the Phillies have right-handed outfielder Matt Vierling, who could hit should the Astros use a lefty. Vierling has started over Marsh against lefties, and has come in for Schwarber as a defensive substitute. The red-hot Harper has a platoon split of his own, but handles breaking pitches from lefties quite well, while Stott actually ran reverse splits during the regular season. With Vierling available off the bench and the three-batter minimum to contend with, it’s hard to see a case where Smith would clearly be better than someone on the current roster. However, three relievers – Garcia, Martinez, and Urquidy – didn’t appear in a single ALCS game. While Garcia and Urquidy are likely there to provide length and potentially an emergency start, Smith could replace Martinez as the ninth reliever in the unlikely event that his services are needed. I don’t think there has ever been a bullpen with six relievers that allowed wOBAs of .240 or lower against the batter handedness they should be weaker against, and the fact that we can’t find a clear and likely use case for a lefty specialist on such a large roster is a testament to this staff’s complete control over left-handed hitters. The Astros are four wins away from a World Series championship, and the fact that they’re dominant even in areas where teams aren’t meant to be is a huge reason why.

Watching an elite starting pitcher at his best can be one of the most exciting things in baseball. Many are familiar with the feeling that no matter who the batter in the box is, the pitcher’s stuff is simply too much to handle, and he’ll be easily set down. But as we all know, not every start ends in a shutout or no-hitter; it can quickly go south no matter how long the hurler has been cruising. After setting down the first six Phillies he faced in NLDS Game 3, Spencer Strider looked more unbeatable than ever. But just a few hitters later, his night would be over, with the game — and potentially the series — out of reach for Atlanta.

The Braves’ announcement that Strider would be the Game 3 starter with Charlie Morton getting the ball for Game 4 said a lot about their expectations from the pitching staff. Strider last pitched on September 18, missing the past month with an oblique injury; starting him the day after Thursday’s scheduled off-day suggested Atlanta might be strictly managing his workload. After all, with relievers like Raisel Iglesias and Collin McHugh who have made multi-inning high-leverage appearances in the past, the Braves were set up well to have their bullpen eat up lots of outs in a close game.

Through the first two innings on Friday, Strider looked like the ace we had seen all season. His fastball touched triple digits, he struck out three, and most impressively, he racked up ten swinging strikes in just six batters. But he opened the third inning with a four-pitch walk to Brandon Marsh, then fought through a long matchup with Jean Segura, who struck out on eight pitches. Next up was nine-hole hitter Bryson Stott, who fouled off four consecutive fastballs in a two-strike count before smashing a slider for a double into right field, scoring Marsh and giving the Phillies a 1–0 lead. Throughout, Strider was showing signs of slowing down. While he sat in the 98–99 mph velocity range for the first two innings, his first three pitches to Stott were thrown at 96, and he missed his spot outside five times. Read the rest of this entry »

Coming into last night’s win-or-go-home game for the Mets, the biggest question concerned ace Jacob deGrom. In his last four starts of the season, he tossed 21 innings with an incredible 39-to-4 strikeout to walk ratio, but when he got hit, he got hit hard. He allowed 14 runs in those starts, mostly coming off of six home runs allowed, including three in his last start against Atlanta that ended up deciding the division. Perhaps more importantly, deGrom had averaged just 21.7 batters faced in the regular season, with abysmal results when facing the order a third time. While he looked like normal Jacob deGrom through his first 18 batters of any given start, he allowed a .936 OPS his third time through the lineup, with five homers in 42 plate appearances. What would the Mets do with deGrom if the game entered the later innings in a close situation?

Perhaps unsurprisingly, this exact situation occurred. After setting down the first seven batters in order while touching 101.8 mph on his fastball, Trent Grisham took a triple-digit heater on the outer edge deep into center field for a homer. But deGrom wasn’t out of the inning yet. He allowed Jurickson Profar and Juan Soto to reach base with two outs, but struck out Manny Machado on a perfect slider to escape the jam. deGrom got through the fourth inning unscathed, but it was clear that he didn’t have the near-robotic command that led him to historic success in 2021, especially on his slider. He spiked a few of them, and threw many more off the plate in noncompetitive locations.

Those command issues came into play as deGrom began the fifth inning by walking Grisham on five pitches, three of them sliders low and inside. After a successful sacrifice by Austin Nola, deGrom had to face the Padres’ lineup for the third time. Profar, the Padres leadoff hitter, saw four sliders in the same place before a fifth leaked out over the middle of the plate and singled, driving in the Padres’ second run of the game. The next batter, Soto, lined a 2-0 changeup down the pipe into right field for his second hit of the game. With runners on the corners and just one out in a tie game, deGrom was in a tight spot. But he kicked it back into gear after that. Four consecutive sliders perfectly located on the low and outside corner resulted in three swinging strikes from Machado, and deGrom ended the threat with a 99.4 mph fastball that got Josh Bell whiffing, his hardest-thrown pitch of the inning. Read the rest of this entry »

The Wild Card Series opener between the Rays and Guardians was quick-moving from the beginning. Rays ace Shane McClanahan worked around a few weakly hit singles in the early innings. Cleveland starter Shane Bieber’s only baserunner in the first four frames — Ji-Man Choi, who walked — was quickly erased by a Manuel Margot double play. The first five full innings were completed in just an hour and nine minutes despite playoff-length commercial breaks, largely due to the lack of offense and Bieber’s ridiculously quick pace on the mound. The matchup of two premier starters — the AL’s fifth- and seventh-best qualified pitchers by ERA — seemed to be everything fans were hoping for.

Bieber’s start was masterful, matching his MO from the regular season: steal strikes with four-seam fastballs, then get hitters to chase his cutter and slider off the plate. The Rays’ righty-heavy lineup couldn’t figure it out for the entire game, coming up empty on 17 of their 27 swings against those two pitches. Unsurprisingly, every single one of those swinging strikes was located down and to his glove side. Bieber’s impeccable placement of pitches on the outer half was especially noteworthy against the chase-happy Christian Bethancourt and Randy Arozarena, who went a combined 0–6 with five strikeouts, four of which came on breaking balls off the plate. Bieber’s 7.2 innings of one-run ball made for the longest playoff start by a Cleveland pitcher in 15 years and will likely be among the longest starts of any pitcher this postseason. That’s a continuation of the impressive volume he put up in the regular season; he was one of just three AL pitchers to cross the 200-inning threshold. Read the rest of this entry »

Every year, the first few weeks of the season bring exciting and memorable performances from previously unheralded players. In recent memory, Trevor Story set the world on fire by hitting seven homers in his first six big league games despite not being on a top 100 prospect list that year. This season saw Seiya Suzuki quickly adjust to American baseball, posting a 234 wRC+ in his first two weeks. Steven Kwan saw 116 big league pitches before swinging and missing for the first time. And folks who aren’t regular readers of this site might have heard Connor Joe’s name for the first time when he had an OPS north of 1.000 through his first 15 games of 2022.

But how do we know if these performances are sustainable? Story never reached those heights again but he still became an excellent big leaguer. Kwan is a Rookie of the Year candidate, but his teammate Owen Miller has fallen off after hitting .400 in April. Joe, meanwhile, has had a pedestrian .230/.334/.323 slash line since the beginning of May. We know that stats like OPS can take nearly a full season to stabilize, so how can we separate the Millers from the Kwans?

This is where plate discipline metrics come in. Because the average batter sees nearly four pitches per plate appearance, plate discipline stats reach a reliable sample size much more quickly than the surface-level stats that are tracked on a plate appearance basis. The primary plate discipline stat we’ll be examining here is chase rate (listed as O-Swing% on the site). To my mind, chase rate is probably the best single stat to use when assessing a hitter’s swing decisions. Some hitters have outlier levels of plate coverage that allow them to do damage on pitches in specific spots out of the zone, but in general, chasing less is almost always better than chasing more. A quick glance at the relevant metrics will show you exactly why:

For a variety of reasons, swing decisions are quite difficult to improve at the major league level. The average hitter’s plate discipline metrics don’t change by more than a few percentage points over the course of their career. Still, many of the most patient hitters in baseball have managed to make improvements. Mike Trout’s evolution from young phenom to the best hitter of his generation involved a steady drop in his chase rate throughout his mid-20s, while others make adjustments during their time in the minors that enable their breakouts as big leaguers.

When we see a player go ballistic during the first couple months of a season, it’s exciting. But when these big performances are backed by noticeable improvements in the player’s swing decisions, they have much greater potential to be sustainable. So who were the biggest early-season plate discipline improvers of 2022? To answer this, I looked at every hitter with at least 200 plate appearances in 2021 and compared their chase rates that season to their chase rates through the end of May this season. The biggest improvers can be seen below:

Despite his excellent 24.7% chase rate through the end of May, you won’t see the aforementioned Steven Kwan here, as he debuted in the majors this season. Because minor league pitch data is largely unavailable for most players, we’ll solely be analyzing players who made swing decision improvements compared to previous major league seasons. There’s a wide variety of players on this list, but something they all have in common is that even when we look at a larger sample over the full season, they all have lower chase rates in 2022 than they did in ’21. Let’s take a look at a few of these players to see how their plate discipline development has impacted their overall results.

One player who made Herculean improvements to his plate discipline was Taylor Ward. Ward was one of the biggest stories of the early season, putting up a Barry Bonds-like slash line of .384/.505/.744 with eight homers through his first 25 games. Equally impressive, though, was the fact that he walked just as much as he struck out; his chase rate of 17.9% ranked first among all hitters with at least 100 plate appearances over that stretch. ZiPS absolutely bought into the breakout, forecasting a 20-point increase in projected wRC+ as compared to previous seasons. And while his 1.249 OPS in the early season (aided by a .439 BABIP) didn’t last, he’s still kept up an excellent level of production in his first season as an everyday player. He has a 131 wRC+ with a very reasonable .318 BABIP, and at 3.2 WAR, he’s surpassed his ZiPS projection for the year.

More importantly, Ward’s elite plate discipline gains have been sustained over the full season. He’s walked in 11.2% of plate appearances, and his career-best 23.4% chase rate ranks in the 93rd percentile of all hitters. According to Statcast’s swing/take leaderboard, Ward has created 23 runs by laying off pitches in the “chase” zone, pitches that are out of the zone but still close enough to make hitters swing often. Tied with Ward near the top of the leaderboard is fellow plate discipline improver Christian Walker, whose combination of swing decisions and raw power have led to his best season on record.

Taylor Ward started the season with less than a full season’s worth of major league playing time under his belt; by making the necessary adjustments to his approach, he’s locked down a roster spot for the foreseeable future. But what about players who have been everyday big leaguers for the better part of a decade? Are they also capable of significantly slashing their chase rates? In the case of White Sox first baseman José Abreu, the answer here is yes. In his age-35 season, Abreu has the fewest home runs of any season in his career (including 2020) while posting a career-low isolated power. However, he’s on pace to post his best wRC+ in a full season since 2017. Abreu came into the majors in 2014 after lighting up the Cuban National Series (seriously, just look at his stats). In his early days with the White Sox, he was known as a free swinger with huge pop, clubbing 36 homers and finishing second in the league in OPS, while swinging at 41% of pitches out of the zone. Since then, he’s spent most years in the mid-30% range, including a chase rate of 36.4% in 2020, when he won American League MVP. After nearly a decade of big league experience, it was surprising to see Abreu’s chase rate go down to just 30% through May of this season. His current rate sits at 33.6%, the second-lowest chase rate of his career, while his 0.56 BB/K ratio is the best he’s ever posted. So how do we know these late-career gains are real? Let’s take a look at how he’s been pitched to this year as compared to previous ones:

It’s easy to hypothesize that Abreu has just been getting more pitches in the dirt (which are far easier to lay off of), but it turns out the opposite is true. Statcast’s attack zones were created to understand how hitters make swing decisions in four discrete regions, ranging from down the middle (heart) to nowhere near the zone (waste). Abreu has been seeing a lower proportion of pitches in the waste zone, but a similar number of pitches in the shadow and chase zones, where out-of-zone swings can realistically occur. All of this is to say that these improvements are no fluke. Abreu isn’t being pitched differently, he’s simply improved his swing decisions and is likely to finish the season with career-best strikeout and walk rates. Making these changes has proven to be especially helpful at Abreu’s age. We know that a hitter’s offensive production tends to crater when they enter their mid-30s, and many superstars have quickly become mere mortals after losing some of their speed, barrel control, and bat speed (see: Albert Pujols). Abreu’s 43 plate appearances per home run is the worst of his career (by a lot), but despite this, his overall production is even better than it was last year when he hit twice as many homers. Becoming a free agent going into their age-36 season is scary for many players, but Abreu’s improvements in the approach department may significantly lengthen his career.

What about players who significantly worsened their chase rate in the first couple months of the season? Using the same method as before, let’s look at the players who swing at far more bad pitches than last season:

There are many interesting players to analyze among this bunch, including Bryce Harper, whose newfound aggression at the plate may actually be beneficial, but there’s one guy I want to look at specifically because swing decisions are such a huge part of his profile – Joey Gallo.

The quintessential Three True Outcomes player, Gallo has walked, struck out, or hit a long ball in over half his plate appearances every year of his career. As a hitter who puts few balls in play, Gallo’s ability to succeed offensively relies strongly on his ability to demonstrate patience at the plate. Last season with the Rangers and Yankees, Gallo had his best full season with a 122 wRC+ and a career-high 4.2 WAR despite hitting below the Mendoza line. His elite 18% walk rate was supported by a 22.1% chase rate, seventh-best among qualified hitters. In 2019, Gallo missed half the season but had a 144 wRC+ when healthy, and swung at just 24.2% of pitches outside of the zone. In the first two months of 2022, that number ballooned to 33%, near the league average rather than elite. As a result, his walk and barrel rates fell while his strikeout rate rose compared to his career averages. Gallo’s performance this year has significantly declined from last, slashing .166/.288/.364 while maintaining this elevated chase rate all year long.

Going back to Statcast’s swing/take runs, there’s one key area where Gallo made a noticeable change. Last year, Gallo swung at 44% of pitches in the shadow of the zone, a region containing pitches within a few inches of the edge of the plate. This season, that rate has jumped to 55%. While this isn’t necessarily bad for all hitters, Gallo’s elevated whiff rate hurts him when he swings at borderline pitches. While the league as a whole comes up empty on 26.4% of their swings in the shadow area, Gallo whiffs 48.5% of the time. As a result, his chase rate has climbed without him doing any additional damage to pitches in the zone.

These are just a few of the many players whose changes in production this year have been caused by an improvement or decline in their swing decisions. Whether conscious or not, changes in a player’s approach can often have career-altering effects. In Taylor Ward’s case, we’ve seen how a leap forward in approach turned a bench outfielder on the fringes of the roster into an above-average everyday regular, while José Abreu has used his newfound skills to prolong an already sensational career. The fact that sustained reductions in chase rates are so uncommon makes the stories of players whose careers were made or revitalized from swing decision improvements all the more interesting. While we like to imagine what many players would be like if they could make the right adjustments, only a select few can actually do it.

All statistics through September 27.

This is Kyle’s first piece as a FanGraphs contributor. Kyle is a lifelong baseball fan who has always been enamored with the numbers and analytics behind the game. He has written for PitcherList on the pitcher GIFs team and for his own personal blog, covering topics from player analysis to the draft, mostly focused on the Angels. Kyle is a senior at the University of California, living in the Bay Area and studying education and math. As an aspiring teacher, he wants to think and write about the game of baseball from the perspective of an educator.

From 2017-20, Jakob Junis was a below-average starter for the Royals, posting a 4.78 ERA and 4.77 FIP. After a poor 2021 that saw him pitch out of the bullpen, he was non-tendered by Kansas City and signed with the Giants. Fresh off a 107-win season that was bolstered by career resurgences from hurlers like Johnny Cueto, Anthony DeSclafani, and Alex Wood, San Francisco clearly saw a path to improvement for Junis. Mostly serving as a member of the starting rotation, Junis has done just that – his FIP has improved by about a full run (3.83). While he hasn’t thrown harder, landed more strikes, or added movement to his pitches (his sweeping slider has actually lost about an inch of break), he’s made one important change, and it’s one that is emblematic of pitching philosophy in the modern age.

Read the rest of this entry »