It wasn’t that long ago that the Pittsburgh Pirates were a laughingstock. They experienced two decades of losing seasons from 1993 to 2012, but getting that proverbial monkey off their backs in 2013 didn’t exactly free them from the pain baseball can inflict.

In fact, the Pirates found a way to be simultaneously great and depressing. They’ve hosted three consecutive wild-card games, winning the first one and losing the last two. Not only have they failed to advance past the Division Series despite averaging over 93 wins a year, they have had to endure the madness of the coin-flip game three times in a row. Needless to say, the Pirates and their fans desperately crave a longer October stay in 2016.

To do that, they’ll either have to be better than the powerhouse Cubs or they will have to secure a wild-card spot and win a one-game playoff. The Pirates are perhaps the team at the steepest spot on the win curve because the best team in baseball is in their division, they’re projected to be competing among a tightly bunched group of contenders, and the indignity of another wild-card defeat might be too much to handle. 

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Catcher defense is all the rage, at least for some. For those of us who care deeply about catcher defense, this year has brought us glimpses of Statcast and Baseball Prospectus’ recently gathering of enough data to extend their pitch framing, blocking, and throwing metrics back as far as 1950 in some cases. We’ve always known about catcher defense, but our ability to measure and understand it has improved greatly in the last five years, and more advances are likely on the horizon.

This ability to measure something affects our perceptions not just of that thing, but of all other things related to that thing. As Ben Lindbergh recently noted, Mike Piazza was known as a horrible throwing catcher during his career and that colored his entire defensive perception. Yet our modern metrics look back favorably upon his blocking and framing. It’s important to note that we didn’t just learn about blocking and framing in 2015. It’s not as if baseball fans couldn’t conceive of their value in 1997, it’s just that the only thing we had rudimentary numbers for at the time was his arm. We could measure that and see it most clearly relative to the other skills, so it did the heavy lifting in our minds.
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Comparing positions is a tricky business. We’d like some sort of magic formula that could compare exactly how much harder it is to play average shortstop than average left field, but such magic does not exist. Instead, we estimate the difference by looking at how players do when they play new or multiple positions, and how offensive performance varies by position. We think that we have a decent set of positional adjustment estimates, but there is a lot of room for error in those marks.

In a basic sense, those adjustments tell us how much value a player provides by holding a particular spot on the field. Over the course of a season, an average shortstop provides about five runs more of value than an average third baseman (we think), so the logic dictates that if that average shortstop moved to third base he would be about five runs better than the average third baseman when we compare their UZR or DRS figures. Nothing is perfect, but that’s the basic understanding.

But there are a couple of places in which that logic breaks down (even if we were to accept it as flawless otherwise). First, left-handers can’t play second base, shortstop, or third base. This means that certain left-handers will wind up playing in a corner-outfield spot or at first base even when they are theoretically a middle infield-caliber defender. Second, catchers. The job of a catcher is so different than either of the other two classes of players that there’s really no comparing them directly for scientific purposes. But that doesn’t mean they don’t occasionally play other positions.

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During the most recent baseball season, 389 players received at least 150 plate appearances. That’s a low and arbitrary threshold, but it will serve to make an important point: Austin Hedges was a terrible hitter. Among those 389 hitters, Hedges was dead last with a 26 wRC+. Taylor Featherston, Rene Rivera, David Ross, and Christian Bethancourt were the other members of the under-40 wRC+ club last year, if you’re looking for some indication as to its infamy.

To put it mildly, Hedges did not deliver at the plate. He slashed .168/.215/.248. By comparison, National League pitchers hit .132/.159/.169 (-16 wRC+). Hedges didn’t hit like an average pitcher, but he didn’t exactly hit like a position player either. Fortunately for the young catcher, baseball is a robust competition and there are other aspects to the game beyond hitting. While Hedges failed to provide value at the plate, he had occasion to provide value behind it, which he seemed to do. But when digging into some of the particulars on Hedges’ season, an odd fact surfaces: teams tried to steal many, many bases against the Friar backstop.

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You have a choice. I’ll give you $100 right now, or you can let me flip a coin. If it lands on heads, I’ll give you $250. But if it lands on tails, I’ll give you $20. I’m using a fair coin, so the expected value of flipping the coin is $135 based on the 50/50 odds it lands on heads or tails. If you like risk or are a risk-neutral person, it’s an easy decision to take your chances with the coin because the odds are strongly in your favor. If you’re a risk-averse person, however, you’re more likely to take the sure thing because $135 isn’t a whole lot more than $100, and $100 is a whole lot more than $20.

Let’s add another wrinkle. It’s the same choice, but if you choose the coin flip, you have to wait a month. The dollar amounts are the same, but now there’s a time component. To get the value of the coin flip, you need to apply a discount factor to the $135. For some people, that discount factor is pretty close to one, but it might be much lower if you’re strapped for cash and the $100 would dramatically improve your life in the present.

Major league players face a much higher stakes version of this decision when their club comes to them with a contract extension. Do they take a sure thing now, or do they wait and gamble on themselves? While we’re focusing a lot on the 2015-2016 free-agent class this month, there are eight players who could have been free agents for the first time this year but instead chose to cash out early by signing extensions. Did they make the right decision?

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Given the competitive nature of the baseball industry, teams don’t go around spilling their secrets. If a team had a perfect formula for predicting injuries, it wouldn’t be in their interest to give that jewel away to the teams they are trying to beat on the field. The same is true, to a lesser extent, with player evaluations. If a team thinks the league is overrating one of its prospects because the league doesn’t have complete information, it doesn’t benefit the team to tell the league why it’s wrong.

As a result of this dynamic, we always have to take public comments from clubs with a grain of salt. Comments from team officials are designed to serve the team’s interest and that means they don’t always reveal the complete truth. We accept this as part of life, but generally expect teams to be somewhat constrained by things that sound true. For example, if the Braves had discovered some type of flaw with Shelby Miller, they wouldn’t have told everyone they were shopping him because he was due to break down. They would say they were shopping him because he’s a valuable player and they’re looking to rebuild. The latter isn’t totally untrue, it’s just not the full truth.

Teams know things they don’t want to share and we assume they only share things that serve their interest. Sometimes it’s about public relations, sometimes it’s strategy, and sometimes it’s to build good will with the media. There are lots of reasons that teams might choose to share information, but in most cases they’re not forced to say anything at all. Most of the time, teams say what we expect them to say. A lot of the time it’s largely the truth, but sometimes it isn’t.

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Remember life before Mike Trout? There was less joy in the world and the Angels didn’t have to spend so much money on new baseballs. There were also different expectations placed on young players. Because of Trout, though, and the era of players he ushered in, the way we look at prospect timelines has changed. Trout was the best player in baseball at age 20 and has been great ever since. Bryce Harper, Manny Machado, and plenty of other newcomers have taken the sport by storm with awesome debuts. Carlos Correa! Kris Bryant! Francisco Lindor! Top prospects now burst onto the scene and are immediately awesome. It’s fun to watch.

But it can also be distracting. The Trout-led immediacy has moved us to forget about players who don’t excel right away. I’m not just talking about mid-level prospects who aren’t getting their due, I’m thinking about good prospects who don’t have four-win seasons prior to their 23rd birthdays.

There’s an attention gap between the year you lose prospect status and the year you show up near the top of the leaderboards for the first time. Once a player loses his rookie eligibility but before he’s fully reached his cruising altitude, we sort of lose track of them unless they play for our favorite team.

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Three winters ago, we got into a lot of arguments about James Shields. He was at the center of a very polarizing trade and people took sides. You remember it, so I won’t rehash things other than to remark on how funny it is that the James Shields-Wil Myers blockbuster has actually become the Wade Davis trade. Wade Davis! The guy who gave up 5.92 runs per nine in the season following the deal.

Life’s little insanities aside, Shields was very good for the Royals during his two seasons in Kansas City. He was worth 4.0 and 3.3 WAR, respectively, and helped push them over the hump and back into relevance. Would they have gotten there without him? It’s entirely possible, but he was a key player on the team during their renaissance and deserves some recognition for it. You will note, however, that Shields signed elsewhere after the Royals lost the 2014 World Series and then the team won the 2015 title without him.

One of Shields’ hallmarks, and one of the main reasons the Royals acquired him, was his consistency. You were pretty much assured more than 200 innings of good, non-elite run prevention and above-average fielding independent numbers. Shields was as predictable as a person could be in baseball. Then he signed with the Padres.

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Think of some facts about Joey Votto.

Chances are that your brain just made a number of connections. The first things that came to mind were an image of Votto, the fact he plays first base for the Reds, and perhaps his number and his contract. He’s also Canadian, which you may have known. Once your brain had covered some basic personal data regarding Votto, you probably moved to a summary of him as a baseball player. His elite on-base skill, his patience, his power (when healthy) and the whole controversy about how aggressive he should be at the plate. Beyond that, perhaps you considered his WAR, his freakish ability to avoid pop ups and maybe even the fact he’s known as a contemplative guy.

The preceding paragraph is a flyover view of Votto. It’s the kind of thing an average fan of an American League team might be able to recite about him. He’s the Reds’ really good left-handed-hitting first baseman who has a big contract and is known for his high on-base percentage.

So while I hardly expect the average person or even the average FanGraphs reader to be a Votto scholar, there is one significant component to his game that doesn’t seem to receive enough attention: Joey Votto is extraordinarily good against lefty pitching.

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This is an oversimplification, but to be a successful starting pitcher in the current era, you have to maintain some reasonable level of effectiveness for something like 25 batters per start. If you can’t pitch into the sixth and seventh innings with regularity, you aren’t going to remain a starting pitcher for very long. In the past that number was higher and in the future it might be lower, but if you don’t have the tools to remain effective for two or three turns through the order, you’re destined for the bullpen.

Pitching is multidimensional, which means that in order to pitch well enough to remain a starter, you need some combination of skills which push you across that threshold. Command, endurance, and stuff all play into the equation. Command is the ability to throw your pitches where you want them and endurance is the ability to maintain your command and stuff over multiple repetitions. Stuff is more complicated because it is partially a measure of individual pitch quality (defined in many ways) and the number of pitches you have at your disposal.

In other words, if you have average command, decent endurance, and the world’s greatest fastball, you can probably get by if your other pitches are only okay. But you can also get by without a great fastball if your command is elite and you have three solid pitches. There’s no single path to success.

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