It’s that time of year again, everyone. Read the introductory post detailing what this is all about if this is your first rodeo. If this is not your first rodeo, welcome back! Here’s a graph of projected WAR for third basemen this year — you’ll note that there are no teams with negative WAR, which makes me feel like I’ve won some sort of Positional Power Rankings lottery.

Now, onto the ranks of the hot corner, and the listing of a legion of men who field bunts and throw off balance across the diamond. It’s a three-team party at the top, folks, with Toronto, Baltimore, and Chicago (NL) leading the charge. There’s been some talent drain at the position compared to this time last year, as Ryan Zimmerman (now a first baseman) and Evan Longoria have been left off/downgraded due to a pair of rough campaigns. Still, third base remains one of the most exciting positions on the diamond, as a glut of elite, young talent and a 2015 American League Most Valuable Player count themselves among the ranks. Indeed, it is also one of the most talented positions, as four of the top 20 position players by projected 2016 WAR are third basemen. Now, onto the specifics! Read the rest of this entry »

There’s a lot to like about spring training. Hey, it’s baseball! Sort of. Games end in ties, Will Ferrell gets to play all the positions. That’s fun. Also, there’s a lot not to be thrilled about during spring training. Games end in ties! And games don’t actually count.

Although, if you’re a fan of the Cubs, Pirates, and especially the Orioles, you’re probably happy about that last point so far this March. Those teams are a combined 3-23 in spring-training play. Fortunately, we’re just finishing the first full week of baseball games, just getting our first real look at starting rotations, and many teams (like Baltimore, with their 0-9 record) have been marching out many unrecognizable and/or split-squad rosters (which would at least partly explain the zero in the wins column). But what does spring training mean for the season ahead? Can we really glean anything from March performance, especially team-wide? It’s good to remind ourselves of what this means.

We’re mainly going to be looking at the very obvious: how do team win-loss records correlate between spring training and the regular season? Is there any sort of relationship between terrible March teams and terrible regular-season teams, or vice versa with good teams? Take a look at a plot of the spring training and regular season records of all teams between 2006-2015 — and feel free to mouse over the chart:

This chart is all over the place: lose more games than you win in spring training? Doesn’t mean you’re going to do so during the regular season. Win more than you lose? Doesn’t mean you’ll be successful. A month of games in March is the same as a month of games at any other point during the season — a relatively small sample, prone to all the pitfalls we see in any other small sample. If we tried to glean something from this 10-year sample, there are examples warning us not to be woefully awful in spring training. If a team covers that — finishing above .300 — our data provides evidence that the team probably won’t be unrecognizably terrible. Then again, we simply don’t see teams lose more than ~110 games very often during a regular season, whereas finishing with a winning percentage that low is doable in one month of baseball.

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In absolute terms, we know that strikeouts are at an all-time high. We see it in box scores, talking heads consistently discuss and lament the phenomenon on broadcasts, and in truth, it’s been going on for years. We’re left to wonder and analyze where the ceiling is for this trend, and exactly where the line between passable and unacceptable strikeout totals for batters begins and ends. For pitchers — whose velocity is a main factor in the increased strikeout numbers — going to work must be that much more enjoyable. And, in 2015, it was most enjoyable in terms of strikeouts for the rotations of the Chicago Cubs and Cleveland Indians.

If we look at strikeout rates for individual team seasons over the course of baseball history, no one struck out batters at a higher clip than the rotations of the 2015 Indians (24.2%) and 2015 Cubs (23.9%). That isn’t really surprising given the strikeout trend of recent years, but in mid-June of last season, the Indians’ rotation was actually on pace for the third-highest league-adjusted strikeout rate since 1950. At that point in time, they were striking out a historic rate of batters in a historic strikeout period, which is the sort of thing that tends to lend itself to positive team results. It didn’t, but most of that wasn’t the rotation’s fault (hello, team defense!), and the ridiculous strikeout pace didn’t quite continue into the second half of the season.

In the end, they finished as the 41st-best league-adjusted strikeout rotation, which really isn’t too bad: they ended up striking out almost 27% more batters than the league average starting rotation in 2015. Here’s the 2015 Indians compared to the best 15 league-adjusted strikeout rotations since 1950 by K%+ (percentage points above average compared to a given year’s league average strikeout rate):

In case you’re wondering, the 2015 Cubs finished 105th-best, with a K%+ rate of 120. Also not bad, but it’s illustrative of just how many strikeouts a team has to amass to make a run at breaking the record. And so I wondered: what strikeout rate would it take in 2016 to break the league-adjusted rate? And do the Cubs or Indians (or another rotation) have any realistic shot at breaking it?

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For many irrational reasons, I have consciously decided to put myself through the experience of being an Oakland A’s season-ticket holder for the past three years. Every year since I joined this small, delusional, and fanatical club, the price of season tickets has gone up by a sizable amount. I say “sizable” as an intentionally unscientific term, as I realize there’s a lot that goes into it, but the increases have been more than noticeable for my section of the stadium, which is not one of the highest-priced nor one of the very-lowest. The A’s were really good between 2012 and 2014, so I understood that the increase was probably just the price of success, and left it at that. We all know what happened to the A’s in 2015, however: they lost 94 games. It was a woeful, terrible year. You can’t come up with a superlative to represent what trading Josh Donaldson and then losing 94 games is like. It felt — and feels — exactly what it sounds like reading that sentence.

It was with some confusion, then, that I looked at the prices of tickets this January and saw that the prices had stayed steady or increased, especially for those teams or dates that are denoted as top tier. As most teams now do, the A’s have adopted a dynamic pricing model for their ticket sales, which assigns higher pricing to favorable matchups, promotions, days of the week, etc. It’s a complicated and flexible model, and there’s the chance that holding off on buying tickets now might actually save money if certain circumstances arise. The possibility of the opposite is true, however, which is the point (for the A’s) of adopting the model. The fact remains, however: the A’s were one of the worst teams in baseball during 2015, yet one wouldn’t know it from the ticket-price differences between 2015 and 2016.

My own personal situation with the A’s is secondary to what we’re going to be looking at today, however, as it was simply the spark that caused me to ask a myself a few questions: what is the relationship between winning, losing, and ticket prices? How much do new stadiums increase ticket prices? What role does the larger economy play? And, on a deeper level — whether it’s actually the case or not — should teams have a moral obligation to own up to their team’s recent failures by adjusting ticket prices? With all those questions and a few more in mind, I set out to try to answer them.

The data for this sort of undertaking is inherently scattershot. There isn’t a great repository of, say, the lowest-priced ticket for every team over the past 10 years. At least not one I could find. The best resource I found was a site called Team Marketing, which assembles a yearly “Fan Cost Index” for each team and the league as a whole. In addition to factoring in the cost of beer, food, etc. into this index, they also log the cost of an average ticket — that is, the cost of a non-premium ticket based on season-ticket prices. The average is weighted to weed out the discrepancies of more or fewer seats in areas that don’t cost the same, so it’s actually a pretty representative figure of a strictly average ticket. The only knock against it is that the teams get to decide what is “general” seating and what is “premium,” but that’s splitting hairs a little bit, and this information is great in that it is one of the few available datasets not based on the secondary market for tickets. The data goes back to 2007, so I’ve pulled everything and assembled them in some tidy graphs for us to look at. For reference, here’s the source: 2015 Team Marketing MLB Report. It’s worth a look.

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The 2015 season represented something of a banner year for position players pitching. That viewpoint assumes, of course, that you, as a baseball fan and reader of this website, consider position players pitching to be a good thing. For me, there’s also the sense, when a left fielder or second baseman — or any position player — takes the mound, that the game has reverted to a time and place when baseball was actually just a game. For some, that state might be viewed as an affront to those players who are seriously trying to win a spot in the big leagues. For others, it’s a time when the sport can shed its heavy cloak of seriousness and indulge in a rare bit of goofy self-deprecation. While I tend to align with the latter viewpoint, I respect and understand the former.

What can’t be argued is the increase in position players pitching over the past couple of years. With Cliff Pennington taking the mound in Game 4 of the ALCS last season, baseball logged its very first instance of a position player pitching in the playoffs, and it actually looked pretty good. In terms of raw appearances, 2015 was something of an apex for the non-pitcher pitching phenomenon. Jeff noted in June that 2015 was projected to equal 2014’s single-season record for the number of non-pitcher appearances on the mound; at the end of the season, 2015 had actually smashed the record (20 in 2014 vs. 27 in 2015).

What we’re after today, however, is how those non-pitcher pitching appearances actually went: what were the highlights? The lowlights? Who seems like he actually might be able to pitch? It behooves us, with the appearance of a new and fabulously interesting trend in major league baseball, to undertake a thorough review of said trend’s 2015 installment, with all the grace and seriousness we might give to potentially far more important subjects. What follows below is an attempt to do just that.

To begin with, let’s look at the overall stat line for the year in non-pitchers pitching compared to all of the “real” starters and relievers in 2015:

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Today we’re on a quest of sorts. It’s not a holy grail-type of quest, but then again, in a way we are looking for a grail: it’s just the grail of never walking. That’s not the actual intention of these hitters, because walks are a good thing if you’re a batter, and at some point you simply have to walk — no matter how hard you try not to — because a pitcher is going to come along and throw you nothing but junk. The lack of walks for these guys are just a product of their approach, and hitters with this kind of approach either quickly lose their job or are really good at other aspects of the game.

Take, for instance, the hitters we’re going to discuss today: Jean Segura and Salvador Perez. You might not have visited their player pages recently, but take a look at a few select categories in their stat lines from this past season:

A few things jump out. Holy moly those walk rates. Below average (in one case, very below average) offensive numbers. And finally: solid defensive ratings. That last point is the main reason these two players garnered a combined 1137 plate appearances this past season despite their woeful offensive production: Segura is an above-average defensive shortstop (also providing speed on the base paths), and Perez is one of the best defensive catchers in baseball. Even though Segura’s playing time will be in question following his trade to the Diamondbacks, this goes to show you the kind of bat that can stick at these thin positions for most or all of a season.

The walk rates are the thing on which we really want to focus today, however, because they’ve rarely been paralleled in the past century. If we look at individual season walk rates going back to the start of the live-ball era (1920), we find Segura and Perez at the extreme end of the leaderboard among qualified hitters: in 2015, Segura tied for the 23rd-lowest walk rate since 1920 at just 2.2%, and Perez (with a walk rate of 2.4%) tied for the 40th-lowest mark. We could go into the hundredth decimal place to break some of those ties, but we won’t. We could even go further and factor in intentional walks, noting that Segura had two and Perez had four, but that seems unnecessary. We get the point: in relation to average full-time major league hitters, these two basically never walk.

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Most of the discussions surrounding the Cincinnati Reds during the past calendar year has centered around what to do with an aging core of players that are careening toward free agency on a club with little chance of competing. That’s the right type of conversation to have in the Reds’ situation – a situation in which Joey Votto had a historically great season on a last place team. We’ve known for a while what the Reds should do, and they’ve already started the rebuild by trading Aroldis Chapman and Todd Frazier. There is unquestionably more to be done, and more that will be done. There’s another interesting angle to their 2015 season, however, and it’s an issue that turned a season that was expected to be not-so-great into the second-worst record in baseball: the issue of clutch hitting.

“Clutch” — as we are discussing it today — is the measure of how well a player or team performs in high leverage situations vs. context-neutral situations. I implore the interested reader to examine the full rundown on our glossary page, but what we’re really talking about is the importance of the situations in which players produce or don’t produce. There has been some evidence that a “clutch skill” might exist – that some players are simply better in certain situations than others – but there is usually a lot of variability for players from year-to-year, and any true skill is likely to have a small impact.

Take, for example, Josh Reddick: he had a Clutch rating of -3.89 in 2012, the worst since Bob Bailor in 1984 (-3.84). That means he was responsible for “losing” his team almost four games due to his performance in high leverage situations. The next year (2013), Reddick had a Clutch rating of just -0.18, or right about average. Poor fortune, bad timing – these things happen, and sometimes they happen an extreme number of times in the same year. Because of this, Clutch isn’t really predictive, and is much better utilized as an indicator of what has already happened.

That brings us to the Reds, and measuring team-wide Clutch statistics. There are two versions of Clutch for teams: pitching Clutch and batting Clutch. The Reds were actually above average when it came to pitching Clutch, sitting just below the middle of the pack with a 1.16 rating. For comparison, the Oakland A’s were the worst Clutch pitching team in 2015 at -6.05; this is one of the reasons why they were so terrible in one-run games, and it’s the main reason why they were the biggest underperformer in recent BaseRuns history.

However, on the other side of the ball, the Reds were historically terrible in Clutch situations. How terrible? Let’s just cut straight to the chase — here are the 15 worst Clutch hitting teams since 1974 (the first year we have Clutch data available):

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The Oakland A’s had a nightmarish season in 2015. They had the biggest difference in Base Runs vs. actual record out of any team since 2002. Their bullpen had historically-bad timing. And, finally, their defensive issues were on display most of the year, especially in the early stages of the season when they were on pace for a record-breaking number of errors. The infield was mostly to blame for the last problem, with Brett Lawrie and Marcus Semien routinely exhibiting the sort of lapses that have mostly been excised from players by the time they make it to the majors. It was ugly, and it was a part of why the A’s buried themselves in a hole in the AL West standings before the season was even a third of the way through.

Through May 21st of 2015, the A’s were on pace 169 errors, which would have been the most since the year 2000 by a fairly wide margin. Here’s a graphic from the previously-linked post from May 22nd of last season that shows the error gulf we were witnessing:

The A’s finished with only 126 errors, missing out on a particularly ignominious title. However, much of the defensive blame fell squarely on Semien during the early parts of the season, and for good reason: at the time of the May post, he had accounted for 16 of Oakland’s fielding and throwing errors. By the end of May, some were claiming that the A’s might not be able to afford to keep his glove at shortstop, despite his strong production at the plate. But the team did something about it: they hired Ron Washington to tutor the young shortstop on defense, and he started doing so on May 22nd. They got right to work, with Semien doing throwing mechanics drills, and often fielding ground balls with a plank-like glove to soften his hands:

His pregame fielding routine begins by taking grounders with a “flat glove.” Rather than a soft pocket, it has a flat surface, which forces a player to field the ball with soft hands. Semien fields balls to his left, then his right with the flat glove. Only after that does he slip on his regular glove.

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Before I wrote for FanGraphs – in what might be considered the dark ages – I was in a small grocery store in my Oakland neighborhood. I was in line to pay, A’s hat perched forlornly on my head, when I struck up a conversation with a guy in line who looked to be in his 60s. We talked about baseball for five to ten minutes, and, toward the end of the conversation, he introduced himself as Mike Norris: a former screwballer who pitched for the A’s during the ‘70s and ‘80s. It was a fluke meeting — a simple coincidence, if there ever was one — but looking back on it, the meeting was somewhat of a turning point for me in respect to writing about baseball.

I ended up putting together a few articles about him for The Hardball Times during the past couple of years, and the hours of interviews I’ve conducted with him form the basis of a large project about social issues in baseball and the state of the game in urban America. Every couple of weeks, I sit down with him and he tells me stories, like the time he almost killed/got killed by Dave Winfield. It’s strange how things work out.

This article is peripherally about Norris. He’s the historical basis for what we’re talking about today, because he threw what can only be described as a dying (or dead) pitch: the screwball. There’s a mythological lifeblood to baseball – it courses through every home run and every outfield assist to the plate, popping up to offer its comparisons to the longest, the fastest, the hardest, the immeasurable. The screwball lives in this mythology, somewhere among its fellow defunct and rare pitches: the Spitter, the Eephus, the Gyroball.

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On Wednesday, we took a look at the anomalous offensive outcomes of 2015: we had oppo homers from batters who have never hit them before, some of the slowest men in baseball hitting triples, and a guy with below average ISO marks hitting an almost 500-foot home run. It was a great reminder that baseball is really, really weird, and every season there’s at least few events that you will rarely — if ever — see again.

Today, we’re going to revisit that same idea except with defense. We can always watch highlight reels of the best defensive plays of the year, because watching Mike Trout perch on top of the wall in center field to rob a home run is a singular pleasure. It’s simple human nature to enjoy that. What highlight reels lack, however, is the context of the players making the plays: we expect Andrelton Simmons to go in the hole at shortstop to pick a ground ball, leap in the air, and fire a bullet across the diamond to get the runner at first. We do not expect Jhonny Peralta to do the same. That’s why if Peralta made that exact same play (he didn’t, but just suspend your belief for a moment), it wouldn’t necessarily be more impressive on an overall level, but it certainly would be on a personal one. For Simmons, that’s business as usual. For Peralta, it’s a once or twice in a career event. That deserves recognition — and celebration.

The usual caveats apply, given that we’re looking at only one-year samples of defensive data. There’s a lot of noise here — we know that. The aim of this post is to find the joy in that great mixture of noise and talent. There are a spectrum of posts on this illustrious website: toward one end we find incredible batted-ball breakdowns of pitchers and hitters that stretch our understanding of baseball; toward the other, we find the carnivalesque atmosphere of a GIF-addled home run post. This piece will stumble gleefully, Mardi Gras crown askew, in the direction of only one end of that spectrum.

On the technical side, we’re employing a few types of data for this pursuit: UZR/150, DRS, and Inside Edge fielding data, the latter of which ranks each defensive play made on a six-step scale of how often an average fielder at the position would make the play in question — from the categories of “Impossible” to “Almost Certain.” I’ve also used Baseball Reference’s always useful play index, as well as some Baseball Savant. Now onto the findings!
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