This morning we revisited yesterday’s action, noting that three different pitchers recorded complete games in the same day, a particularly odd feat given the rarity of pitchers finishing what they start these days. Curious as to just how rare it was for three CGs to take place in the same day, I coded my Retrosheet database for complete games, summed the occurrences together and grouped by the date in order to generate a list of the total number of such outings for each day from 1954 to the end of last season.

Looking for 3+ complete games from 1954 on returned 2,038 different days. As we discussed earlier, however, complete games were much closer to the norm in past generations. Change the initial year to 1964 and 1,561 days are returned. That figure is practically halved when the initial year is adjusted to 1974, with 861 days. From 1984-2008 there have been 245 days with 3+ CGs and just 46 days in the post-strike 1995-2008.

Strictly probing this decade, there have only been 13 dates from 2000-2008 in which three or more complete games were recorded. Twelve of these days included exactly three full outings while one, 9/6/2002, featured four complete games. The last 3+ CG day took place on 8/20/2008, when Mike Pelfrey, Brett Myers, and Kevin Millwood all went the distance.

Here is the complete list for 3+ CG days this decade, including Easter Sunday 2009, with the pitchers in parenthesis:

7/23/2000 (Pedro Martinez, Denny Neagle, Andy Ashby)
8/08/2000 (Russ Ortiz, Albie Lopez, Brian Moehler)
8/20/2000 (Randy Johnson, David Wells, Pedro Astacio)
9/21/2000 (David Wells, Dustin Hermanson, Jeff Suppan)
5/25/2001 (Hideo Nomo, Kerry Wood, Greg Maddux)
7/29/2001 (Steve Sparks, Freddy Garcia, Rick Helling)
9/06/2002 (Brad Radke, David Wells, Andy Benes, Kevin Millwood)
9/26/2002 (Jeff Suppan, Randy Johnson, Esteban Loaiza)
4/18/2003 (Barry Zito, Aaron Cook, Bartolo Colon)
4/15/2005 (Derek Lowe, Bruce Chen, Aaron Heilman)
5/22/2005 (Aaron Sele, Matt Clement, Mark Prior)
4/27/2008 (Vicente Padilla, Paul Maholm, James Shields)
8/20/2008 (Mike Pelfrey, Brett Myers, Kevin Millwood)
4/12/2009 (Aaron Harang, Kyle Lohse, Josh Johnson)

As you can see, before Padilla/Maholm/Shields accomplished this feat in April of last season, nearly three years had gone by since the occurrence of 3+ CGs in the same day. What is even more interesting, and perhaps disappointing in a sense, is that yesterday could have seen even more complete games. Imagine if Erik Bedard and his 8.1 innings were left in, or if Johan Santana and his 98 pitches toed the rubber for just one more frame (the Marlins were at home so there was no 9th inning for the Mets in the field). In that scenario, 5 CGs would have been recorded on the same day, a feat that has not occurred since 6/24/1995.

With the way things are going these days it may very well be another three years before yesterday’s activities are repeated, which is kind of sad. I’m not advocating a return to the pitcher usage patterns of the 1920s, but it is a bit annoying when pitchers like Bedard do not finish their games and a reliever records the final one or two outs, or when a pitcher gets lifted after hitting the supposedly magical benchmark of 100 pitches thrown. Things are unlikely to change very much–save for members of the Texas Rangers–but hopefully this data sheds some light on just how rare the complete game derby on display yesterday happens to be.

With the increased prominence of specialized bullpens, a much heavier reliance on pitch counts than several decades ago and the constant monitoring of health and fatigue, complete games have become somewhat of a rarity. Back in the early part of the 20th century, pitchers routinely finished what they started but nowadays it is considered a spectacular feat to complete five or more games in a season. Which makes yesterday’s action particularly interesting in that three different pitchers all tossed complete game gems.

Josh Johnson burst onto the scene in 2006 with a very solid rookie season. Injuries hindered his availability and progress in 2007 but he returned last season and put up great numbers in limited duty. Against the Mets and Johan Santana yesterday, Johnson showed the ability to dominate and why, when healthy, he can be as good as anyone else in the league. Throwing 113 pitches, 77 of which were strikes, Johnson went the distance, surrendering five hits and one run, walking one hitter and fanning seven. That brings his seasonal total to 15.2 innings, 12 hits, 1 earned run, 1 walk, 15 strikeouts.

Meanwhile, over in St. Louis, Kyle Lohse allowed a leadoff hit to Kazuo Matsui and then proceeded to retire the next 24 batters. Lohse, whose contract extension was largely ridiculed this offseason, finished with the tremendous line of 9 IP, 3 H, 0 ER, 0 BB, 4 K. On the season, Lohse has surrendered just 8 hits in 16 innings and has issued only one free pass.

As dominant as Lohse looked, however, he didn’t best Aaron Harang’s line. On the heels of a first inning 2-run homer from Brandon Phillips, Harang had all the support he would need, giving up just three hits while walking none and fanning nine Buccos. Harang has now given up 10 hits and 1 earned run in 14 innings of work this season, walking three while recording 11 strikeouts.

All three of these pitchers worked efficiently with their pitches which is likely the only reason they were allowed to stay in the game so long. Especially in the case of Johnson given his aforementioned health issues. In terms of WPA, Johnson slightly edged out Harang, 0.571 to 0.569. At 0.460, Lohse clearly dominated his opponent but not necessarily to the same degree as Johnson and Harang, at least via win probability added. Then again, Lohse pitched in the least stressful of the three games, with a pLI of 0.79; Harang recorded a pLI of 0.94 with Johnson at 1.25.

Regardless, all three of these pitchers dominated and it was great to see them finish their games instead of being lifted for setup men and closers simply due to the specialized nature of the positions. Three complete games in the same day is very rare, especially over the last few decades, and I will have more on just how rare it is later tonight, calling my Retrosheet database into action.

The Detroit Tigers took Rick Porcello at #27 in the first round during the 2007 amateur draft out of Seton Hall Prep in West Orange, New Jersey. The Toronto Blue Jays selected Ricky Romero at #6 in the first round during the 2005 amateur draft out of Cal St. Fullerton. This past Thursday, April 9th, both made their major league debuts despite somewhat drastically different routes to the big leagues.

More interesting is that they made their debuts against one another, which according to the MLB Network happens to be a baseball first, in that this matchup marked the very first time two rookies previously drafted in the first round made their debuts while squaring off in the same game.

Porcello surprisingly earned a spot in the Tigers rotation out of spring training after never pitching above A-ball. On top of that, a strict development program instituted last season specifically called for Porcello to work on his secondary offerings at the expense of some performance based indicators. Though he failed to fan more than six batters per nine innings in a low level of minor league baseball, many scouts remarked that Porcello was merely toying with the hitters, capable of dominating at any point if the Tigers shortened the leash on his throwing program.

In his debut, Porcello lasted five innings, walked one, fanned four, and induced grounders on 64% of his balls in play. Essentially, though his actual pitching line will not earn him the Game Score of the year, Porcello performed as advertised, recording strikeouts, showing solid poise and control, and keeping the ball on the ground.

Romero has a bit more seasoning, having attended Cal St. Fullerton from 2001-05 before spending the next three seasons in the minor leagues. The last year and a half of his minor league career is particularly intriguing in the sense that Romero performed better against tougher comptition. In 2007, after 4.1 innings in High A-ball, Romero posted a 8.2 K/9 and 5.2 BB/9 in Double-A. His first 121.2 innings in 2008 came in Double-A, where the aforementioned rates regressed to 5.8 and 4.1, respectively. 41.2 innings of Triple-A competition later and Romero was striking out 8.0 batters per nine while walking just 4.2 over the same span.

Though his pitching line appears much better than Porcello’s, specifically the 6 IP-2 ER part, both had very similar outings. Romero walked two, fanned five, and induced grounders on 59% of his balls in play. Both even throw their fastballs at very similar velocities. The major difference in their debuts can be found in pitch distribution, as Porcello, perhaps happy to once again have free range with the fastball, threw the pitch 74% of the time. Romero, as is the case with seemingly all Blue Jays starting pitchers, threw under 50% fastballs and incorporated more of his offspeed pitches.

Romero is not likely to have as much wiggle room as Porcello given his age and that the Blue Jays passed on Troy Tulowitzki and Matt Garza to acquire his services. Unfortunately, I fear that even if he becomes capable of holding down #3-starter status in the big leagues–which is no easy feat–Romero may be viewed as a disappointment. Both of these pitchers will forever be linked by the historical nature of their debuts and our eyes should be kept on each as the season progresses.

The Atlanta Braves beat the Philadelphia Phillies this past Sunday, on national television, to start the entire major league season. For all intents and purposes, Derek Lowe dominated the Phillies en route to a 4-1 win. On Tuesday, sophomore Jair Jurrjens toed the rubber and held the defending champs scoreless throughout his 5.2 innings of work. Yesterday, Javier Vazquez made his Braves debut and pitched very well outside of a 2-run homer surrendered to Raul Ibanez. The bullpen that looked sharp in the first two games of the season fell off a cliff in the game, however, which helped turn a 10-3 deficit in the seventh inning into a 12-11 win for the Phils.

The poor decision belongs to Bobby Cox, for using his ace relievers in the first two games when they were not needed at all and then not being able to use them in a game that merited their services.

In the first game of the season, Lowe was cruising and the Phillies looked beaten at the plate. In fact, the Braves led 4-0 at the time of Lowe’s exit, and the Phillies only scored when Gonzalez came in and gave up an RBI single to Jayson Werth. Other than simply wanting to get his designated closer into a game, there was no reason to go with Gonzalez in the ninth inning. Not to say that Lowe needed to complete the game, which he seemed perfectly capable of doing, but a 4-0 lead is usually pretty safe in the last frame of a game, as shown by The Book.

In the Jurrjens game, the Phillies threatened on several occasions but ultimately failed to score a run. After Jurrjens left in the sixth, Jeff Bennett and Eric O’Flaherty held down fort in the sixth and seventh innings, sustaining the shutout. Then, with a 4-0 lead, Cox used Rafael Soriano in the eighth, and Mike Gonzalez once again in the ninth.

I can understand the usage of Soriano especially given the offday between these games and the fact that he had not pitched in a bit, but did Gonzalez really need to pitch again? A closer does not need to follow these age old usage patterns with leads greater than three runs and he probably should not even appear in a lead of exactly three runs. Are you telling me that Blaine Boyer or Peter Moylan could not have handled that ninth inning?

Yesterday, Cox wanted to get the remaining members of his bullpen yet to appear into the game, which ultimately led to an absolutely horrible loss. Boyer, Moylan, and O’Flaherty combined for 0.1 IP, 3 H, 8 ER, 4 BB, 0 K. Jorge Campillo completed the inning but did not get an out in the eighth, meaning this foursome combined for 1+ IP, 5 H, 9 ER, 6 BB, 0 K over the seventh and eighth innings. Bennett came in and relieved Campillo in the eighth, but you might have noticed that neither Soriano nor Gonzalez got into this game.

I can understand the need to get pitchers work over the course of a season and why that would merit relief aces appearing in 4-0 games, but hopefully this situation teaches the Braves a lesson. Relief aces are used for situations that really require top-of-the-line pitchers to get the job done. Moylan or O’Flaherty likely could have handled end of the game work in the first two meetings, and if they got into trouble then you turn to Raffy or Gonzo. Yesterday, when all of these pitchers did get in trouble, both Raffy and Gonzo were nowhere to be seen. Bobby Cox is a tremendous manager but he dropped the ball here by steadfastly sticking to the idea of a specialized bullpen.

My mornings have become quite routine over the last several months: wake up, deoderize, brush teeth, check e-mail, re-read the morning post I scheduled here the night before for errors, and head over to MLBTradeRumors to see if anything noteworthy has happened or is in the works. Well, I could have sworn my eyes were deceiving me the other day upon reading that Jeff Zimmerman had signed a minor league contract with the Seattle Mariners after a tryout this week. Alas, what I read proved true, and Zimmerman is on his way to the Mariners farm system.

I wouldn’t be surprised if most readers here do not remember Zimmerman as he has not thrown a major league pitch since the 2001 season. Heck, I probably would not remember him if not for playing in APBA leagues growing up and owning the Rangers. Now 36 years of age, Zimmerman has a chance to put his two Tommy John Surgeries in the past and get back to the major leagues.

From 1999-2001, Zimmerman was a pretty effective reliever, for the most part missing bats, keeping walks in check, and limiting damage from home runs. He logged 65, 65, and 66 games in his three seasons with a career 3.27 ERA and 3.96 FIP. In his final season back in 2001, Zimmerman struck out 9.1 batter per nine innings with a 4.50 K/BB ratio. Unfortunately, our win values do not extend back past 2002, so Zimmerman’s tally is unavailable, but his WPA/LI marks of 3.09, -0.28, and 2.56 show that he definitely showcased the ability to succeed at the major league level.

This signing differs from the low-risk acquisitions of players like Mark Prior, Shawn Hill, and Matt Clement, all three of whom have been active in the majors or minors over the past three seasons. Zimmerman has been out of the game for almost eight years now. Will Carroll summed this move up best in his Under the Knife piece today: “This isn’t the same as taking a shot on a post-surgical Chad Cordero; this is a Disney movie if it works.”

I couldn’t agree more, and here’s hoping that one of the reputed good guys can get his long forgotten career back on track.

Tom Verducci has made a tremendous career for himself, writing for Sports Illustrated, appearing on the MLB Network, and penning Joe Torre’s book to name a few components of his resume. He garnered plenty of fame over the last several years for what has since been termed “The Verducci Effect,” a theory that pitchers under the age of 25 are significant injury risks the year after they exceed their previous year’s innings pitched total by 30 or more frames. If Pitcher A was 22 years old, threw 100 innings in 2006 and 175 innings in 2007, he would be considered to be a risky asset.

The theory makes intuitive sense and studies have been attempted to both confirm and deny its validity. Still, because of the logic involved, it has become our nature to suspect that pitchers meeting the aforementioned criteria are in fact injury risks.

Last February, Verducci predicted that Ian Kennedy, Yovani Gallardo, Chad Gaudin, Fausto Carmona, Tom Gorzelanny, Ubaldo Jimenez, and Dustin McGowan would fall prey to his self-named effect. As he pointed out in an SI article yesterday, all but Jimenez suffered injuries in one form or another last season. Verducci acknowledged in his article that not all of the injuries were arm-related, but the idea that he was a successful prognosticator and that said predictions were correct is a bit questionable, especially given the acknowledgement that not all of the injuries were arm-related, and because I see no proof of how the injuries not related to the arm were caused by the taxation of pitching.

How would pitching 30+ innings cause Yovani Gallardo to tear his ACL? Or how it hurt Fausto Carmona’s hip while covering first base on a routine play? Or, perhaps how it caused Chad Gaudin to slip off of a curb and smack his back on a dumpster… and yes, you read that correctly. I am in no way criticizing the theory itself but rather the idea that these guys were correctly predicted simply because they happened to get injured at one point or another throughout the season.

We need to get more specific and look for pitchers to have arm issues, like McGowan and Gorzelanny did. The pitchers with injuries not related to the arm should not be touted, unless they are somehow proven to have been related to the act of pitching. This doesn’t rule out all all injuries not related to the arm but it does merit much further investigation on such injuries. Kudos to him for identifying the likes of Kennedy, Gorzelanny, and McGowan, but Gallardo, Gaudin and Carmona fell victim to other forms of injury, not the conditioning problems suggested by the 30+ innings idea. They may have fallen prey with more innings if not injured previously, but that is not the point here. These guys do not need to be touted if they are not proven victims of the theory.

Matt Clement signed with the Toronto Blue Jays in the offseason hoping to get his injury-plagued major league career back on track. The deal was not guaranteed and his chances of cracking the rotation were slim at best, but the 34-yr old righty had been successful in the past and seemed like a solid low-risk signing with the potential for high reward. Though the right shoulder which had been bothersome since 2006 felt better this spring, Clement did not show JP Ricciardi and the Blue Jay brass enough to merit a spot on the pitching staff. After pondering over whether or not to accept an assignment to AAA, Clement instead decided to hang up his cleats after nine seasons.

After three seasons with the Padres and a lone year with the Marlins, Clement found himself shipped to the Cubs for prospect Dontrelle Willis. Our win values for pitchers begin in that 2002 season which happens to be when Clement came into his own. Over the next four seasons, three of which were spent on the Cubs with the other coming as a member of the Red Sox, Clement ranged from 181-205 innings pitched, posted FIPs between 3.34 and 4.14, and averaged +3.6 wins/yr.

In 2006, he was limited to just 12 starts due to the issues with his right shoulder, and he has not pitched in the major leagues since then. Clement spent the entire 2007 season recovering before signing a minor league deal with the Cardinals last year. Things did not necessarily go as planned as he could not pitch effectively enough to merit a callup. After fighting hard to get back to the point where he could pitch comfortably, Ricciardi remarked that Clement just seemed tired of fighting, thus providing insight into the decision to retire.

Clement, virtually the posterchild for the phrase “wildly effective,” missed plenty of bats, kept the majority of his balls in play on the ground, but definitely struggled with control, finishing his career with a 7.8 K/9, 4.1 BB/9, and 4.24 FIP. Pitching is a very unnatural bodily action and injuries are bound to surface all the time, which makes the Maddux’s of the world look like freaks not just based on performance but rather durability. Matt Clement had a very solid four-year span from 2002-05 and while I’m sure many of us were rooting for him to get another chance, it just was not in the cards. If he changes his mind, though, Marcel sees Clement capable of a 4.61 FIP in 60 innings.

This will not be a lengthy or detailed post discussing what sample sizes are or why they carry importance, but rather a personal plea for fans and readers, especially of this site, to avoid overestimating talent based on a few good games in April. While we can deny ever falling prey to this issue, it is human nature to try and glean information from any and all angles, for whatever reason, be it an edge in a fantasy league or an article claiming why Player A should get more playing time/get a contract extension/get a date with Alyssa Milano.

Last night, Jordan Schafer kickstarted his major league career with a home run in his first at-bat. He followed it up with a single to centerfield. On the night, the 22-yr old rookie went 2-3, with an intentional walk. Seeing as the Braves/Phillies matchup was the first of the season, on national television, I would not be surprised in the least if fantasy players flocked to free agent pools to put in a claim for Schafer’s services. Now, Schafer may very well be a fine major league player but situations like this arise all too often, and they are particularly annoying. A player starts his season off on the right foot, fantasy players get all gooey-eyed, and then call the player a fluke upon dropping him in June on the heels of a .230/.310/.360 slash line.

Schafer could defy his projections and post excellent numbers this season but that is not the point. The point is that decisions should not be based on small sample sizes and we need to admit this is a problem before ever moving past it. It is one thing to discuss how a player has performed in a certain 10-game span, like during Lance Berkman’s ridiculous stretch last season but it is a completely different animal to use such discussions or small samples as the basis for definitive performance claims. On a teamwide level, going crazy over Schafer right now would be equivalent to trying to decipher what is wrong with the Phillies. One measly game has been played. Let’s not go crazy over players until we at least know a little bit about them.

In fact, as Dave mentioned this afternoon, the Nationals decided to forego placing Elijah Dukes, their best player, in the starting lineup because he had a poor spring training. I honestly don’t even know how to respond to that decision. But anyways, there you have it, my plea to avoid overestimating value based on small sample sizes. Waiting until the 50 game mark might be too much to ask, but at least get past 20 games before you claim having advanced knowledge about the causes of a player’s performance this season.

Last week, Dan Novick of Statistically Speaking wrote a post discussing the current relationship of sabermetrics and the mainstream in an attempt to figure out why advanced statistical analysis is not more popular. Dave Cameron responded here, largely pointing out that sabermetrics have in fact been integrated into the mainstream, with links to our posts popping up at ESPN and the Wall Street Journal, and teams reaching out to hire very solid analysts in order to bolster their operations staff.

Even further, the MLB Network is using ERA+ in their Prime 9 series, and ESPN showed OPS numbers in their lower-third graphics in last night’s Phillies-Braves season opener. It is undeniable that great strides have been made but I still do not believe that sabermetrics are necessarily mainstream… and, to be quite honest, I am glad.

This might seem like a counterintuitive statement from an analyst like myself, but I look at things differently than others. I’m not in this game to prove a greater knowledge than the casual fan, nor am I in this field to constantly berate mainstream analysis or the opinions of commentators who still think batting average is the mecca of number-crunching. Certain members of the sabermetrics crowd certainly fall into this category, but my goal has always been to increase the wisdom of anyone willing to listen. If there is one thing I have learned in my 23 years on this planet, it would be that convincing someone to agree with you while they steadfastly hold onto their own belief is incredibly futile. I’m not going to waste time trying to convert batting average advocates into the wOBA faithful.

If sabermetrics were truly ingratiated with the mainstream, the wonderful analysis found here, at The Book Blog, The Hardball Times, Baseball Prospectus, and all of the other analysis-oriented blogs/sites might not exist. We could instead turn to Sportscenter to find out Win Values leaders, or listen to Joe Morgan discuss the benefits of UZR. I get as ticked off as anyone else when announcers ramble on about RBIs or when Harold Reynolds and Barry Larkin express their desire for quality .215 hitters, but I love being able to analyze the game from a different perspective. If sabermetrics were the norm, the outlets to do so would be few and far between, and would instead be hogged by the Plaschke’s, Mariotti’s, and Paige’s of the world.

I thoroughly enjoy receiving random Facebook friend requests from readers of my work, or looking over in a computer lab at school and seeing someone reading posts on this site. In a relatively small group, one can not only make a real difference in the field in question, but can also truly feel the impact.

People have very specific comfort zones which is the primary reason I feel sabermetrics are not more popular. When the “old-time” baseball people scoff at the idea of analysis, they are criticizing change moreso than the information itself. It gets pretty ridiculous when they go onto criticize those providing the information, which is where much of the hullabaloo of stats vs. scouts is derived.

Sabermetrics are definitely finding their way into more mainstream outlets, but they are not fully accepted by the bigger piece of the population pie, and this particular writer is perfectly fine with that fact. For anyone interested and willing to listen, thereby increasing their knowledge of the game and understanding of how players actually contribute from a production standpoint, all of us here at Fangraphs will always do our best to provide top of the line advanced statistical analysis. For the uninterested parties who will never read these words, all I ask is that you accept the benefits analysis like this can provide even if you choose not to utilize such information.

Ultimately, this plea may go unheard for quite some time. Before sabermetrics can truly get to its mainstream apex, those opposing the form of analysis need to get past their own personal aversions to change. Human nature says such a conversion is unlikely to take place, but before we list all of the baseball-related reasons for sabermetric resistance, look first to those actually resisting, as their reasoning likely deals much moreso with personal makeup than anything like fantasy baseball. For now, we just have to deal with the fact that the wonderful pool of statistical analysts and the loyal readers who flock to our sites hoping to increase their wisdom are in the minority, and we need to understand that being in this minority is in no way a bad thing.

Back in 2003, the Detroit Tigers went 43-119, narrowly avoiding a tie with the expansion 1962 New York Mets for the most losses since 1900. Dmitri Young proved to be their top hitter with just +2.1 wins added, and Nate Cornejo led the pitching staff at +1.9 wins. At most, their top two players were league average. Hope sprung eternal in the motor city, however, thanks to the promising young arms of Mike Maroth, Nate Robertson, Nate Cornejo, And Jeremy Bonderman. Suffice it to say, none of the four have lived up to the hype sent their way several years ago. They might have a better track record than the Bill Pulsipher/Jason Isringhausen/Paul Wilson triumvirate of the Mets in the mid-90s, but the fearsome foursome has not met expectations.

Maroth became famous for losing 21 games, becoming the first pitcher to surpass the 20-loss plateau in over two decades. Many felt his varied repertoire, precision control, and ability to induce grounders would lead to a long and prosperous career. They were wrong, primarily because his putrid strikeout rates never factored into the equations. Throughout his career, Maroth’s K/9 has topped out at 4.95, though his career rate is lower at 4.34. He performed quite well in 2004-05, producing a sum of +5.2 wins, but injuries and the inability to miss bats finally caught up with Maroth in 2006, and he is yet to regain form. After splitting time with the Tigers and Cardinals in 2007, Maroth spent last season in the Royals farm system. He figures to repeat the act with the Blue Jays this season, though surgery may in fact end any chance of making the roster. This could very well be his last hoorah.

Teammate Bonderman graduated with a Masters in Underperforming from the JVIOSPBPR – the Javier Vazquez Institute of Solid Peripherals But Poor Results. From 2003-07, Bonderman never made less than 28 starts or pitched fewer than 162 innings. With a K/9 comfortably above 7.0 Bonderman also decided to limit free passes, reducing his walk rate from 3.5 to 2.5 per nine. Because of this, his win values have overstated actual contribution, similarly to Vazquez himself. Not that Bonderman has struggled, but his average of +3.4 wins/yr might not be a completely accurate depiction of his performance. Last season, things ironically went in reverse, as his 4.29 ERA bested a 5.18 FIP. He missed most of the 2008 season with injuries, however, and his return date is still up in the air.

Cornejo, the aforementioned top pitcher of that 2003 squad, managed just five appearances the following season, largely ineffective, before injuries got the best of him and forced an early retirement. His first name doppleganger, Nate Robertson, seems to be a mix of Maroth and Bonderman, posting average strikeout and walk rates, keeping balls on the ground, throwing strikes, and matching up ERAs and FIPs more closely. After struggling in 2003, Robertson averaged approximately +2.3 wins/yr from 2004-07, showing signs of improvement in a few areas but consistently serving as that slightly above average pitcher capable of toeing the rubber and logging innings with regular consistency. His performance dropped to just +1.2 wins last season in 28 starts thanks to a .343 BABIP, a reduced strikeout rate, increased walk rate, and higher home run rate. In actuality, the HR/9 of 1.39 is much closer to seasons past; the 1.11 in 2006 is the outlier.

Robertson recently stated that his time with the Tigers may be nearing its end given his demotion to the bullpen, meaning that Bonderman could be the lone remaining member of this particular prospect quartet. Hopefully he can brush aside the injuries that hindered last season’s production and get his career back on track, but this definitely goes to show how nothing is ever a sure thing. For every solid pitching prospect there are likely 3-4 that fall by the wayside. For Tigers fans everywhere, here’s to hoping that Rick Porcello kid does not fall into the same category as any of these four pitchers.