In case you missed the excitement last week, here it is: according to reports, there’s a very good chance that Japanese star Shohei Otani will be posted this offseason and appear in a major-league uniform next year. Part of Otani’s great appeal — and the source of his reputation as the Japanese Babe Ruth — is his capacity both to pitch and hit at a high level. Two-way players are intriguing to us: in an era of ever increasing specialization, the probability of a single player excelling on both sides of the ball is low. Forget the ace who also serves as his team’s cleanup hitter: even a player who could function competently as both a fourth outfielder and mop-up man would open up roster possibilities that many teams would love to exploit.

However, being a two-way player is hard. Beyond even the question of talent, a player faces other concerns: finding adequate rest, scheduling his throw days as a pitcher, and cultivating sufficient stamina to last a whole season in a dual role. Addressing these concerns successfully requires a great degree of planning on the part of a team. And while there’s speculation as to how a major-league organization might answer all those questions adequately, one team is already implementing that level of infrastructure with a highly coveted prospect.

Prior to becoming the fourth-overall pick by the Tampa Bay Rays this past June, Brendan McKay had starred as both a weekend starter and middle-of-the-order bat at the University of Louisville for three years, winning numerous player-of-the-year, All-American, and two-way-player awards along the way. With his clean lefty swing, level-headed approach, and prowess on the mound, he was often favorably compared to John Olerud. Rays leadership was quick to state that, despite being announced as a first baseman at the draft, McKay would continue to be developed as both a pitcher and hitter.

Back in February, I had the opportunity to see McKay open the college season against two teams in Clearwater, Florida. Over the two games, against admittedly overmatched competition, he went 2-for-4 with a home run and three walks while striking out nine over six scoreless innings. He greatly impressed me with his skill and calm demeanor both on the mound and at the plate, never overreaching, not becoming too aggressive, working with what pitchers and hitters gave him. At the time, the question for most people in the stands was, “Which way will he play in pro ball?” So far, McKay is making the question “Why can’t he do both?” a legitimate one.

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Even though they’re only five games removed from a playoff spot in the American League, you could be forgiven for not having dedicated much thought recently to the Kansas City Royals. Prior to the trade deadline, they were playing a little over their heads, exiting July in possession of a 55-49 record and the second Wild Card spot — this, despite having recorded roughly equal runs scored and allowed totals. They became moderate buyers, picking up Melky Cabrera and holding on to soon-to-be free agents Lorenzo Cain, Eric Hosmer, Mike Moustakas, and Jason Vargas.

In the meantime, however, they’ve struggled, going 18-27 since August 1st. With a .490 winning percentage, the club now possesses just a 1.8% chance of making the playoffs.

Because the Royals have likely flown under your baseball radar, it’s quite possible that this bit of news did, too:

The Minor to whom Flanagan refers here is Mike Minor, a name that, prior to this April, hadn’t graced a major-league box score since 2014. The last any of us had probably heard, Minor was signing a two-year deal with Kansas City last spring. At the time, the left-hander was coming off a torn labrum that led to shoulder surgery and, ultimately, his release from the Atlanta Braves.

The thought of Minor returning to form after such a serious injury was, while not ridiculous, still optimistic. However, despite some false starts and a rough stint in Triple-A Omaha last year, Mike Minor has reemerged as an effective relief option out of the Kansas City bullpen, exhibiting both increased velocity and a greater reliance on a reinvigorated pitch.

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As the only league among the four major North American sports to operate without some form of a salary cap, Major League Baseball has always been in somewhat of a unique position. Without the traditional ceilings on team salary, the sport has always left itself open to financial disparity and all the articles and opinions that go along with it.

For 20 years, baseball has tried to curb big spenders through the use of luxury taxes. Six teams paid a total of $70 million in taxes this past year, and baseball decided to continue hammering away on high-payroll teams in the new CBA approved last December. While the financial penalties maybe caused teams to think twice before spending on the free-agent market, the luxury tax never directly affected a team’s ability to access one key pipeline of talent: the Rule 4 (or, June amateur) draft.

This all changed last December. As noted by Baseball America’s J.J. Cooper, exceeding the luxury-tax threshold will result in draft-related penalties beginning in 2018. The full list of sanctions is described on page 110 of the 2017-2021 Basic Agreement, but for those who don’t have that kind of time, they can be summarized in two points:

• If a team’s actual payroll exceeds $237 million in the 2018 season (increasing to $250 million in 2021), their highest draft pick will be moved back 10 places.
• If the offending team’s highest draft pick falls in the first six picks of the draft, their second-highest draft pick will be moved back 10 places instead.

For the first time, Major League Baseball has tried to affect a team’s ability to acquire amateur talent after spending large amounts of money. If a team wants to devote an outsized quantity of money (compared to the rest of the league) to acquiring established players, they have to risk the potential of their future by seeing a major source of young talent dry up slightly. However, if you look closely at the new penalties, you see less of a leash on high-payroll teams and more of an inadequate deterrent that will fail to provide any checks at all.

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