Built Different or Skill Issue? A BaseRuns Game Show: Offense Edition

In a post yesterday, I wrote about the BaseRuns approach to estimating team winning percentages and how it attempts to strip away context that doesn’t pertain to a team’s actual ability, so as to reveal what would have happened if baseball were played in a world not governed by the whims of seemingly random variation. In this world, a win-loss record truly represents how good a team actually is. Try as it might, the BaseRuns methodology fails to actually create such a world, sometimes stripping away too much context, ignoring factors that do speak to a team’s quality, or both.

I delayed for a separate post (this one!) a deeper discussion of specific offensive and defensive units that BaseRuns represents quite differently compared to the actual numbers posted by these teams. To determine whether or not BaseRuns knows what it’s talking about with respect to each team, imagine yourself sitting in the audience on a game show set. The person on your left is dressed as Little Bo Peep, while the person on your right has gone to great lengths to look like Beetlejuice. That or Michael Keaton is really hard up for money. On stage there are a series of doors, each labeled with a team name. Behind each door is a flashing neon sign that reads either “Skill Issue!” or “Built Different!” Both can be either complimentary or derogatory depending on whether BaseRuns is more or less optimistic about a team relative to its actual record. For teams that BaseRuns suggests are better than the numbers indicate, the skill issue identified is a good thing — a latent ability not yet apparent in the on-field results. But if BaseRuns thinks a team is worse than the numbers currently imply, then skill issue is used more colloquially to suggest a lack thereof. The teams that are built different buck the norms laid out by BaseRuns and find a way that BaseRuns doesn’t consider to either excel or struggle.

Let’s go ahead and approach door number one, which will kick off a series of offenses that BaseRuns is down on. The Tigers have thus far scored 4.96 runs per game, while BaseRuns estimates that number should be closer to 4.61. Detroit reaches base at a decent clip and doesn’t undercut that work by getting caught stealing or grounding into a bunch of double plays, and sits 10th in the league in home runs. But the Tigers are scoring only 4.96 runs per game, more than just four other teams, and in order to really own that, BaseRuns wants to see more batters getting on and more homers. And yet when the host of this game show (Bob Uecker, obviously) signals to open Detroit’s door, we see in flashing orange lights, “BUILT DIFFERENT!”

The reason for that is baserunning. As Mike Petriello detailed in a piece at MLB.com earlier this week, the Tigers are taking extra bases at an historic rate. They lead the league in advancing from first to third or home on a single, in going first to home on a double, and in going second to home on a single. They’re also aggressively stretching singles into doubles and doubles into triples. This particular type of baserunning prowess is a known blindspot of the BaseRuns approach, and for that reason, BaseRuns fails to properly size up Detroit’s offense.

The next door belongs to the Brewers, who thus far have averaged 4.68 runs per game, while BaseRuns figures they should be sitting around 4.36. Let’s forgo the suspenseful build up and reveal that Milwaukee, too, is built different and for similar reasons as the Tigers, but the flashing light behind this door is a bit dimmer. The Brewers have 25 fewer home runs compared to Detroit, and they’ve also had the good fortune of hitting a disproportionate number of them with runners on base. But like the Tigers, the Brewers add value on the basepaths, though their baserunning philosophy includes more stolen base attempts than Detroit’s. Their 97 stolen bases is the second highest of any team, as is their 27 times caught stealing. Both the stolen bases and caught stealing are accounted for in BaseRuns and creating those unnecessary outs is part of why BaseRuns is skeptical of this offense. However, the Brewers also create additional scoring opportunities by stretching for extra bases where they can. They’re less aggressive about it than the Tigers, and as a result, more efficient. And while Detroit’s charge is led predominantly by three or four players, Milwaukee gets contributions from basically everyone not named Rhys Hoskins or William Contreras. So while BaseRuns may have a point about the Brewers’ lack of thump, their willingness to pound the basepaths limits how much regression can really come their way.

The final overperforming offense belongs to the Rays. Like the Brewers, the weak link in the Tampa Bay offense is power, and it, too, has benefited from an unusually high ratio of multi-run homers. Unlike the Brewers, the Rays are less likely to compensate by scooting around the bases. They do roster a few players capable of snagging an extra bag, such as established burner Chandler Simpson, seen fully ablaze in the video below as he converts a single into a double through sheer force of will. But since that behavior is far less common for the Rays, when their door swings open on stage, it declares a skill issue and prescribes more power-hitting to prevent their 4.74 runs per game from dropping to 4.49.

Coming out of the break in our game show, we turn our attention to the teams that BaseRuns is more stoked about moving forward. That brings us to the Royals. Though admittedly the Royals aren’t getting on base a ton and have hit the second-fewest home runs, BaseRuns still believes they should be scoring more. However, what BaseRuns can’t see lurking behind Kansas City’s door is a team that is built different and in a wonky way. As the Tigers and Brewers work to swiftly clear a path around the bases, the Royals repeatedly clog the basepaths with Salvador Perez and Vinnie Pasquantino. See: Exhibits A-F.

But Kansas City’s baserunning woes do not rest solely on the shoulders of Perez and Pasquantino. Here are a couple more lowlights from Drew Waters and Maikel Garcia that demonstrate why the Royals find it difficult to score even when runners get on.

The next door belongs to the Mets, who currently sit at 4.44 runs per game, while BaseRuns has them at an estimated 4.77 runs per game. As an offense, the Mets get on base plenty, and despite erasing a decent chunk of those baserunners by hitting into the fourth-most double plays in the majors, they make up for it by jacking enough home runs to put them in sixth place on that leaderboard. Given how much traffic they generate on the basepaths and the number of homers they hit, BaseRuns is right to think they should score more runs. And unlike the Royals, they aren’t damaging their own chances with poor baserunning. (In fact, as Davy Andrews noted yesterday, New York is one of the most efficient teams ever at stealing bases, which makes up for its overall lack of speed.) Rather, the Mets have hit an absurd number of solo home runs, none of which followed a bases-clearing double play, suggesting that unfortunate sequencing really is the reason for their lighter-than-expected run scoring. It’s a skill issue for the Mets, in that the skills are there and the issue is not seeing those skills fully reflected in the results.

And then we have the Rockies, who muster just 3.55 runs per game, but BaseRuns is convinced their actual average should be more like 3.85. They do not get on base a ton, and when they do, they give back a lot of opportunities to score by getting caught stealing and grounding into a shocking number of double plays, given that the lack of baserunners grants them fewer opportunities to do so. That said, an above-average proportion of their hits are extra-base hits, which improves their odds of scoring when they do reach base. The ability to hit more than just singles gives BaseRuns some standing to argue that the skills are there for Colorado to score more runs. However, the Rockies do feel like a team built to defy expectations, but in the negative direction. The flashing purple sign behind this door could go either way, and as we swing it open, it does in fact say, “Both?” as the audience gasps. Because here’s the thing: Like the Royals, the Rockies are not stellar baserunners, and despite its name, BaseRuns isn’t great at accounting for all forms of baserunning, but while the Royals suffer from a combo platter of concrete feet and misguided aggression, Colorado’s baserunning struggles are just a grab bag of weird.

Michael Toglia has contracted a rare form of ennui that leaves him disinterested in advancing more than 90 feet at a time.

But he will make an exception to try for his first triple of the season.

Brenton Doyle gets surprisingly bad reads on fly balls, considering he’s an outfielder.

And then there’s whatever this is.

Ultimately, the Rockies probably land somewhere in between what they’ve posted so far and how BaseRuns views them.

Next up: the Pirates. The BaseRuns argument in favor of the Pirates scoring 3.53 runs per game instead of 3.26 is tied almost entirely to the number of batters that reach base. The problem, though, is an overwhelming ratio of their batters who reach do so on singles and walks, then stall out on first because the batters behind them aren’t getting enough juice in the ball. They’re hitting into the second-most double plays, and as is a recurring theme here, baserunning is not a strength.

One problem — they’re not taking a lot of extra bases.

And when they do, bad things happen.

The Pirates feel more “built different (derogatory)” than the Rockies, but BaseRuns is probably right to believe in their skill leading to at least a little bit more scoring.

And finally, we have the Athletics. Even though they are the best in the league at grounding into double plays, they overcome it by sitting right around the top 10 in doubles and home runs. And unlike several of the teams listed above, they’re not held back by their baserunning. Currently, the A’s rank 22nd in runs per game at 4.17, while BaseRuns would have them ranked 13th and scoring 4.42 runs per game. Opening the door and digging into the offense reveals the A’s rate in the top third across most categories, and it is only in the resultant run scoring where they rate in the bottom third. Thus, the BaseRuns evaluation of their skill is likely accurate and the issue is poor sequencing preventing those skills from manifesting positive results.

That’s all for this week. Tune in next time for the defensive side of the ball!