Earlier this year, Brian Burke of the fantastic Advanced NFL Stats site wrote a post in which he detailed and graphed a series of scatter plots that featured the power law distribution. If you have absolutely no idea what that means, click that link; his explanation is superior to anything I can offer. Anyways, he went on to address the idea of whether coaching job spans were a normal distribution or a data set that followed the power law. He found the latter, and I’ve finally gotten around to seeing how baseball managers compare.

First, let me detail my data set. I went team-by-team and collected each manager holding a position that was hired between 1995 and 2005. This means if a manager was hired in 1995, fired in 1996, and a new manager was hired then both count. If a team went through a manager per season they are all included. However I did not include interim managers who managed less than a season. So Bruce Kimm is out of luck, as are managers hired prior to 1995 or after 2005 – sorry Bobby Cox and Joe Maddon.

I ended up with 76 managerial cases. I then took down their organization, length of tenure, and win/loss record with that organization. With such I found the amount of seasons survived with that team by each manager, which was then used to create this graph:

For those who prefer charts:

Years Managers
15 1
12 2
10 1
9 1
8 2
7 4
6 5
5 8
4 15
3 21
2 14
1 2

The data set follows the power rule much like Burke’s examples. There are other questions to be answered though, which I’ll attempt to do now:

How long does the average managerial job last?

The mean of the tenures is 4.3 years, the median is 4, and the range is 14 years. So the mean is skewed to the right, but only barely. This matches up pretty well with what we see above since nearly 66% of the population falls into the 2-4 years group.

How does winning affect the lifespan?

It doesn’t:

That steep red line represents the .500 mark. Some were well below and lasted five or more years, some were well above and received the axe far earlier. That means to last as a baseball manager, you have to juggle player attitudes and egos, get along with management and ownership, and show competence at winning a fair share too. Most people would note that anyways and the numbers back it up.

To summarize, I think all of this is rather intuitive. Most managerial contracts seem to last 2-4 years, which is the average lifespan, and we can’t evaluate mangers well enough to say there’s a huge difference between any two skippers, which means firing a guy is more of a “gut” feeling. If the manager is friendly enough to the media he can probably buy time even if he makes questionable in-game decisions.

I’m not claiming this is a perfect measure and most people will probably read this and think “Duh“, but hopefully it did something for someone.

Mitchel Lichtman (MGL), the creator of UZR, has been setting the record straight on UZR, among other things, over and over and over again. Here’s his most recent interview, and some other links worth reading if you’d like gain more insight on UZR and baseball data in general:

Newsday: Bellmore’s Lichtman shows his baseball knowledge through UZR

Comment: The difference between offensive and defensive statistics

Answering: What kinds of factors skew statistical analyses of defense?

Comment: The differences between UZR and +/-

Sample Size and the Granularity of Data [John Smoltz]

This weekend I received enough e-mails about Mark Teixeira and his 2009 UZR of -0.8, that I thought it was worth discussing in a public post instead of answering each e-mail individually. I can only believe that this debate was spurred by a blog post on the New York Times website by Tyler Kepner:

[…] and his defense has been off the charts.

I say off the charts because I’m convinced there is no chart that accurately measures defense. The attempt is a noble one; defense is easily the most underrated ingredient in how games are won. But I don’t fully accept it.

People often cite Ultimate Zone Rating, a metric that tries to measure range and errors and how they affect runs allowed or prevented. But how can that statistic be valid when it says Teixeria has had a negative defensive impact?

Teixeira makes tremendous plays every game. He smothers everything near him, and his throwing arm is fantastic. Maybe he seems better than he is because the previous Yankees first baseman, Jason Giambi, was so adventurous in the field. But it would be hard to overstate the importance of Teixeira’s defense.

Kepner is quick to dismiss everything about UZR on what amounts to his own observations on one player. Then he leaves himself an opening in saying the equivalent of “maybe I’m biased because I’m not used to watching a good first baseman?”

What does UZR have to say about Jason Giambi then? He’s been -24 runs below average since joining the Yankees in 2002 (including his 2009 with the Athletics so far). Not a good defender. And what about Teixeira since 2002? He’s been +14.4 runs above average.

Well that’s strange. UZR agrees with what Kepner is absolutely sure he is seeing. That Teixeira is at the very least better than Giambi. And UZR actually thinks he’s considerably better than Giambi. I wonder what Kepner would say about that?

The quote that Teixeira has a negative defensive impact is a bit misleading too, considering he has a -0.8 UZR on the season so far. In my book, that’s pretty much average. He never even bothers to mention how negative it is and with the way he’s discrediting UZR, you’d think he was rated the very worst first-baseman out there.

In truth, Teixeira over the 2008 and 2009 seasons has been rated the #2 first-baseman by UZR at +9.8, so UZR has actually liked the guy a whole lot the past two seasons. But, I don’t want the point of this post to be for me to try and validate UZR.

Advanced baseball stats often paint a contrarian picture of baseball. Whether it be a player’s value or a player’s skill level, they often do not agree with popular and mainstream thinking. On the other hand, sometimes they do agree with mainstream thinking, but just because they don’t doesn’t mean anything is wrong with the statistic.

Imagine trying to gauge a player’s offensive value without using any stats. Do you think you’d remember all 600 plate appearances the guy had during the season? You probably wouldn’t. You might remember the big hits or the times he really screwed up and your opinion of the player would be biased based on a small sampling of what you could remember.

This is pretty much the same point I’m going to make with the state of fielding statistics. There is no way you remember every single play Teixeira or anyone else has made during the course of the entire season and you might only remember the big plays, or you might only remember the plays that killed your team. It’s also possible that Teixeira makes the easy plays look difficult and you’re just not realizing it. There’s really a number of areas where your memory of what Teixeira has actually done could fail you.

But this is not to say that what you see is completely useless. Studies like the Fan’s Scouting Report (by Tangotiger) have shown that through the wisdom of the crowds (many eyes and not just yours), you can get a good read on how a player is defensively.

If everyone out there agrees that Teixeira has been the absolute best first-baseman out there this season, then that’s fine, and there’s definitely value in that. The underlying data in UZR isn’t perfect and with time the imperfections get sanded out, but it’s perfectly reasonable to put some error bars on the 4 months of data used to calculated Teixeira’s -0.8 UZR on the year.

It’s also worth noting that UZR is not the only stat that thinks Teixeira has been basically average. John Dewan’s +/- (Fielding Bible) has him at +1 runs above average (also basically average in my book) and for those of you still holding onto Range Factor, he’s the 3rd worst qualified first-baseman.

In any event, when looking at these advanced fielding statistics, please use your brain and don’t be so quick to jump to conclusions just because your eyes tell you differently.

The moment we have all been waiting for is almost here. The 2009 MLB Amateur Draft will begin on Tuesday, June 9 at 6 pm Eastern time with the first round airing live on the MLB Network. MLB.com will be streaming the first three rounds of the draft (plus the supplemental rounds), all of which will occur on June 9. The remainder of the draft (the other 47 rounds) will be spread out over the following two days (June 10 and 11).

In 2008, the Tampa Bay Rays selected Georgia high school shortstop Tim Beckham with the first overall pick. Pittsburgh took Vanderbilt University third baseman Pedro Alvarez with the second selection, followed by Kansas City, which nabbed Florida prep first baseman Eric Hosmer.

The Washington Nationals organization has the first overall pick and is expected to take San Diego State right-hander Stephen Strasburg, the consensus best player available. University of North Carolina outfielder Dustin Ackley is expected to go second overall to Seattle. After that, things get murky. The Philadelphia Phillies will be the last organization to pick in the draft when it makes the 75th selection. The club gave its first-round pick (27th overall) to Seattle when it signed free agent outfielder Raul Ibanez, which has turned out pretty good for Philadelphia, so far.

For more than a month now, Fangraphs.com has been reviewing each teams past three drafts, as well as offering some insight into how each club might approach the 2009 draft. Links to each of those reviews is listed below in 2009 draft order (Just click on the team’s name). Be sure to check back with Fangraphs after the draft for post-draft analysis.

First Round
1. Washington Nationals
2. Seattle Mariners
3. San Diego Padres
4. Pittsburgh Pirates
5. Baltimore Orioles
6. San Francisco Giants
7. Atlanta Braves
8. Cincinnati Reds
9. Detroit Tigers
10. Washington Nationals (Compensation)
11. Colorado Rockies
12. Kansas City Royals
13. Oakland Athletics
14. Texas Rangers
15. Cleveland Indians
16. Arizona Diamondbacks
17. Arizona Diamondbacks (Compensation)
18. Florida Marlins
19. St. Louis Cardinals
20. Toronto Blue Jays
21. Houston Astros
22. Minnesota Twins
23. Chicago White Sox
24. Los Angeles Angels (Compensation)
25. Los Angeles Angels (Compensation)
26. Milwaukee Brewers
27. Seattle Mariners (Compensation)
28. Boston Red Sox
29. New York Yankees (Compensation)
30. Tampa Bay Rays
31. Chicago Cubs
32. Colorado Rockies (Compensation)

Supplemental First Round
36. Los Angeles Dodgers

Second Round
72. New York Mets
75. Philadelphia Phillies

2008 Draft Slot: 40th overall (Supplemental first round)
Top Pick: Brett DeVall, LHP, Florida high school
Best Pick: Zeke Spruill, RHP, Alabama high school (2nd round, 70th overall)
Keep an Eye On: Craig Kimbrel, RHP, Georgia community college (Third round)
Notes: The organization focused on pitching in the early rounds, taking three prep hurlers (Brett DeVall, Tyler Stovall, and Zeke Spruill) and one southern community college pitcher (Craig Kimbrel) before the fourth round. Kimbrel had a nice start to the year and earned a quick promotion to high-A but his control collapsed and he’s walked 18 batters in 10.2 innings of work (with 15 Ks too). Stovall is still in extended spring training, while DeVall was assigned to low-A in May. Spruill has been with low-A since the beginning of the year and he has a 1.91 ERA (2.73 FIP) in 42.1 innings.

2007 Draft Slot: 14th overall
Top Pick: Jason Heyward, OF, Georgia high school
Best Pick: Jason Heyward
Worst Pick: Jon Gilmore, 3B, Iowa high school (Supplemental first round, 33rd overall)
Notes: Jon Gilmore helped the Braves acquire Javier Vazquez from the Chicago White Sox, but the infielder has yet to hit more than .200 above rookie ball in two tries. Along with Jason Heyward, Freddie Freeman (78th overall) has the chance to develop into a special offensive player. This was a very unusual draft for the Braves because the organization usually focuses on pitching, but it stayed true to its roots by drafting mostly prep players.

2006 Draft Slot: 24th overall
Top Pick: Cody Johnson, 1B, Florida high school
Best Pick: Cole Rohrbough, LHP, Nevada community college (22nd round)
Worst Pick: Cody Johnson
Notes: With seven picks in the first three rounds, the organization mixed pitching and hitting while taking just one college player. The club shocked a lot of people by taking Cody Johnson with its first pick, as the youngster was known for his massive power – and high strikeout totals in high school. The club has had a lot of bad luck with the prep pitchers it took early in the draft. Both RHP Cory Rasmus (Colby’s brother) and LHP Steve Evarts have had surgery, and Evarts has also had disciplinary issues (which haunted him in high school too). LHP Jeff Locke (51st overall) has had the best luck (and success) and is currently holding his own in high-A. LHP Cole Rohrbough has been slowed by injuries this year, but he was an absolute steal in the 22nd round.

2009 Draft Slot: Seventh overall
Draft Preference (2006-08): Prep pitchers, then high school hitters
MLB Club Need: Relief pitching, Outfield
Organizational Need: Third base, Shortstop, Second base
Organizational Strength: Right-handed pitching, Left-handed pitching
Notes: The club has a lot of pitching depth, especially in the low minors. Triple-A starter Tommy Hanson (2005 draft) is probably the best of the bunch even though he’s been passed over for a promotion a couple of times. There is not a ton of outfield depth, but there are a few very promising young outfielders like Jordan Schafer (currently in Atlanta) and Heyward.

From the most recent Sports Illustrated: Baseball’s Next Top Models

This winter Lichtman, who left the Cardinals after the 2005 season, made UZR—considered by many to be the most comprehensive defensive metric out there—available to the public on the website FanGraphs, which will update player stats weekly during the season. “The funny thing is, all this information is now available free for anyone to see, so there’s really no reason for teams to do their own thing,” says Lichtman. “Yet it’s clear that half to three quarters of the teams still have no clue how to evaluate defense on that level and how to interpret that into a player’s overall value.”

It’s nice to see UZR and the others becoming more mainstream!

Tangotiger on insidethebook.com noted what I thought was a rather comical blog post column by Murray Chass on his outrage that the Red & Green league books will no longer be printed, but instead be available only in PDF format. As Tangotiger points out, you could print your own book from the electronic copy, but I suppose you won’t get any of the gloss of a professional publisher.

In any event, the last paragraph of Chass’ article is quite frankly, bizarre:

Younger writers, more attuned to the use of the Internet than their older colleagues, may not have a problem with the disappearance of the books. But in past years they didn’t have the Internet as an alternative reference site. They apparently just didn’t feel the need for any information the books provided.

That says more about them than it does about baseball’s decision.

I’m not even going to bother mentioning what I think is wrong with the above quote, but as a younger person who uses the Internet (and sometimes even writes about baseball), I actually do have a Green book from the 1970’s lying around somewhere which I purchased off ebay a few years ago. I can’t find it. It probably ended up in storage when I moved, but I recall there may be some interesting team record stats in it.

If anyone has one of these on hand I’d be interested in hearing from you if there is anything worthwhile in these books which can’t be found easily on the Internet.

The World Baseball Classic will kick off within the next few weeks, and in a few days preliminary rosters are due. At this point ,the United States team has 24 players listed, a few shy of their 2006 roster. Of course 2006’s results weren’t quite what the country had envisioned, and as we approach the second tournament, is the 2009 team better equipped to take home the trophy than in 2006?

Catchers
2006: Jason Varitek, Michael Barrett, Brian Schneider
2009: Brian McCann, Chris Ianetta

This seems more lopsided than it is. Nowadays Varitek is a shell of his former self, Barrett signed on a minor league deal, and Schneider is nothing special. Meanwhile McCann and Ianetta were two of the best offensive catchers in the National League last season. Using three-years wins values (so, for 2006’s team we’re talking 2003-2005, and for 2009 we’re talking 2006-2008) the 2006 catching staff combines for 8.3 wins on average. 2009’s team is at a bit of a disadvantage at the moment, but nonetheless combines for 6.3 wins. McCann figures to get most of the playing time, and he’s better than any catcher the 2006 American team could offer. Odds are another catcher will be added at some point.

Overall advantage: 2006
Individual advantage: 2009

Corner Infield

2006: Derrek Lee, Alex Rodriguez, Mark Teixeira, Chipper Jones
2009: Kevin Youkilis, Chipper Jones, David Wright

Much like with the catcher situation, the looks of things would suggest 2006 runs away, but not so fast. Again, we’re talking about one less player – although I suppose you could throw Ryan Braun into a reserve role, but whatever. Despite having A-Rod, a young Teixeira, and a fresh off 2005 Lee, the 2006 team only has a three win advantage over the 2009 grouping; 20.5 to 17.1. No player on this year’s team compares to Alex Rodriguez at the time, although David Wright comes closest.

Overall advantage: 2006
Individual advantage: 2006.

Middle Infield

2006: Derek Jeter, Michael Young, Chase Utley
2009: Dustin Pedroia, Jimmy Rollins, Derek Jeter, Mark DeRosa

I have the sneaking suspicion that Jeter will receive most of the playing time, despite Rollins being the better player at this point. Whether you classify DeRosa as an outfielder, corner infielder, or middle infielder, the 2009 team is still seeing an upgrade up the middle. Jeter has declined by a tenth of a win, Pedroia is a win better than Young, and Rollins is a better player than the young Utley. Throw DeRosa in and the 2009 staff has a 16.4 to 9.6 win.

Overall advantage: 2009
Individual advantage: 2009

Outfield

2006: Ken Griffey Jr., Matt Holliday, Vernon Wells, Randy Winn, Johnny Damon, Jeff Francoeur
2009: Ryan Braun, Curtis Granderson, Grady Sizemore, Brad Hawpe

The 2006 outfield looks loaded, but yet again looks are deceiving. Sizemore has averaged 6.6 wins, or as many as Griffey Jr., Holliday, and Francoeur combined. Hawpe is an odd choice, and as a bit of a Rays homer, I wouldn’t mind seeing a Carl Crawford/Grady Sizemore/Curtis Granderson outfield at some point with a flyball pitcher on the mound. Despite the difference in size, the 2009 quartet holds up favorably at 15.65 wins, but the 2006 team has the edge for now at 16.8.

Overall advantage: 2006
Individual advantage: 2009

Tomorrow we’ll look at the pitching staffs and reach a conclusion.

This is a few weeks old but I just caught Matthew McGough telling the hilarious story of his first day as the Yankees bat boy on The Moth podcast. It’s definitely worth a listen, especially if you’re a fan of one of the 21 teams already looking forward to opening day 2009.

Around this time of year those who write or analyze, be it in the mainstream media or the blogosphere, tend to get involved in posts discussing end of season award-winners. Heck, even Dave and I joined the fray yesterday in discussing the AL Cy Young Award with regards to Roy Halladay and Cliff Lee. In the comments sections of both of our articles, the conversation surrounding who will win the award vs. who should win the award began to surface. Conversations like this seem to sprout up all over the place so I figured a post was in order to attempt to figure out why they exist and where they come from.

For starters, the idea of someone who should win something vs. someone who will win the same thing implies that the eventual winner is not deserving of whatever it is he is winning. In our case, an award like the MVP or Cy Young. Those in the camp of the former are seceding that their guy is not going to win the award but that he should. And, when they say he should, it really means that if they were voting, the results would be much different.

This then implies those voting are wrong in their decisions.

Some of the time they are, but really, do those voting on the awards get it wrong all the time? And who is deciding the criteria with which to gauge their decisions? These awards are voted on by mainstream writers, ones who generally are not well-versed in much other than batting average or win-loss record. Most of the time, us in the sabermetrics community mock their lack of statistical prowess but, for me at least, I don’t truly get bothered unless the author blatantly misuses or quotes numbers out of context.

Saying, for instance, that Adam Dunn lacks value because he has a .230 BA annoys me because the writers are making a definitive claim about his worth while using a metric that does tell us something, but nowhere near enough to make such a claim. On the other hand, if someone says that Player X could win the MVP award because he made the most impact on a good team and has a lot of home runs, RBIs as well as a high batting average, I really do not get that bothered. Sure, I know that there are plenty of other, better metrics out there to truly measure worth, but I don’t really care much about the awards. It isn’t going to effect me if someone “undeserving” wins.

See, for us who analyze stats and base judgments on a series of metrics, awards just aren’t that meaningful other than for posts discussing, for instance, why David Wright or Matt Holliday was more deserving than Jimmy Rollins… or why Johan Santana should have won instead of Bartolo Colon in 2005. Do I wish those making these decisions were a bit more educated with regards to evaluating players? Of course… but I’m not going to let it ruin my day that they vote for the wrong person, unless of course the losing player had planned on splitting his award bonus with me.

I guess my point here is that those of us who understand how to evaluate a player better shouldn’t care so much about the awards and should leave it to the people who care more about impact on the game from what they see rather than what some numbers may suggest. As in, why get involved in something or get bothered by something we should care about very little, if at all? Leave the WPA/LI, VORP, BRAA, and UZR to us analysts to do our jobs and properly gauge the true talent levels of players, but let’s not bring them into MVP or Cy Young discussions when we know that the percentage of voters who utilize and understand these metrics is likely much lower than Adam Dunn’s percentage of hits/at-bats.