The Baseball Hall of Fame and Museum will release its list of  soon-to-be inductees on Monday. Some discussion has focused on Bernie Williams and how much his postseason performance should count towards his hall candidacy. I’ll look at a simple way to add postseason plate-appearances into a player’s career WAR.

Of all the candidates eligible for the hall of fame in 2012, Williams had the most postseason plate appearances — and by a large margin. He had 545 of them, which is more than twice as many as any other hall-eligible player. Javy Lopez is second with 225, and Fred McGriff comes in at 218. Impressively, 141 of Williams’ 545 plate appearances came during the World Series. For reference, Williams’ World Series total is nearly three times as many as  Mark McGwire, who had 53.

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Tuesday, I began looking into how the differences between WPA and WAR may influence the seemingly odd (at least through the lens of fWAR) pattern of free agent spending on relief pitching. The discovery that one marginal WAR means nearly one marginal WPA for relievers as opposed to just half of one marginal WPA for hitters and starters partially explains why teams pay roughly three-to-four times more per marginal WAR for relievers. However, in order to accept this as a legitimate reason for MLB teams to do so, one has to give full (or nearly full) credit to relievers for the leverage of the situations they pitch in — this is how pitchers like Tyler Clippard (+5.01 WPA) can finish second in the entire league behind just Justin Verlander despite pitching a fraction of the innings.

Relievers cannot directly decide the situations they pitch in — that is up to management — but is there some sort of innate characteristic of relievers which tends to decide when they enter games?

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Over the last decade, much of team behavior has, sooner or later, matched up with new sabermetric discoveries. The Athletics’ “Moneyball” focus on on-base percentage is no longer a secret; teams have begun to quantify the value of defense and spend accordingly; arbitration-eligible players have become more valuable on the trade market. But there is one area in which sabermetric findings quite clearly do not mesh with team behavior, regardless of general managerial regime: spending on relief pitching. At least using Wins Above Replacement, it just doesn’t make much sense. Whereas every non-pitching position on the diamond — as well as starting pitchers — make roughly the same amount per WAR, relief pitchers are on another level, frequently making three to four times more per WAR than other players.

This only doesn’t make sense, however, if we think of teams as buyers of WAR. They aren’t. The teams with the most WAR, although typically in a very, very good spot, will not necessarily win the most games. Teams buy real wins, and the best way we have to measure real wins is with Win Probability Added.

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Sometimes there seem to be two separate branches of saber-oriented blogging: one that uses sabermetric tools to analyze current events (player transactions, in-game strategic choices, etc.), and another which focuses on more theoretical issues (e.g., specific hitting and pitching metrics). Obviously, the latter is supposed to ground the former, but there still seems to be something of a disconnect between the two levels in popular perception. I say this because I was recently part of a discussion in which some were pointing out the superiority of linear weights run estimators for individual hitters to the approach of Bill James’ Runs Created. Someone then made a comment to the effect that this was simply a nit-picking preference for a “pet metric” that really did not make that much of a practical difference.

Sabermetrics is far from being a “complete” science in any area. Debates about how best to measure pitching and fielding are obvious examples of this. With respect to run estimators, there is a greater level of consensus. However, because of the progress (at least relative to pitching and hitting) that has been made with run estimators for offense, that also means there is less of a difference between the metrics. However, it does make a difference. Rather than arguing for one approach to run estimation over another, I want to simply look at a few different free agents from the current off-season to see what sort of difference using one simple run estimator rather than another would make on a practical level.

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With Prince Fielder and Albert Pujols hitting the free-agent market this offseason, there have been many discussions on how the two of them will age. Lots of work has been done on how an average player ages, but Pujols and Fielder aren’t your average players. Which begs the question: How do stars age, compared to the rest of the league?

One of the hardest aspects when looking at elite players’ aging curves is knowing when to consider them elite. Several hitters who are playing right now appear to be sure-fire hall-of-famers — just as long as their careers don’t do an Andruw Jones nose-dive toward uselessness. To generate a list of players who seem headed toward stardom, I selected players since 1980 who had a total of 20-plus WAR during a three-year span. Also, I took the players who generated WAR of 9.5 or more in a single season.

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Mayhaps this is the season of hiring the un-experienced?

Last October, the White Sox announced a surprise decision to hire Robin Ventura — a once-great third baseman who had been hired four months prior as a special assistant. Ventura, who played some high quality baseball in some three decades, has managed nary a single MLB or MiLB game in his life.

Then, weeks later and a few dozen hours ago, the St. Louis Cardinals hired Mike Matheny — a once-illustrious catcher and he of the ne’er .300 wOBA — to replace likely first ballot Hall o’ Famer Tony La Russa. Like Ventura, Matheny has not yet scribed a professional-league lineup card or even tossed a base in anger. He enters the 2012 MLB season a complete unknown to fans and writers and presumably of good number of his own players.

But then again, what do fans and writers really know about even Tony La Russa? He made some strange decisions, he made some smart decisions, and he made some bad decisions. He gave a good interview, and he presided over a few championship teams.

But what does that really tell us? Where does that leave the ledger? For years we have debated the veracity of certain managers, but what measures and records can we go to?

One thing is for sure: The world of managing needs more statistics.

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Yesterday afternoon, Jayson Stark considered the question, “Is the MLB’s competitive balance a joke?” His answer was a rather blunt no:

MLB’s competitive balance is NOT a joke.

It beats the NFL.

It beats the league formerly known as the NBA.

And … I can prove it.

Stark’s method of proving it — plucking facts from the recent playoff series and comparing them generally to the NFL and other major leagues — was less than rigorous. In general, I agreed with his assertion: Parity in the MLB exists naturally far more than any other sports league.

HOWEVER, if my foot has less gangrene than your foot, does that mean I don’t need a doctor? No. I probably still need a doctor, and I probably need to stop playing barefoot tag on Rusty Nails Pier.

Relative success does not necessitate absolute success. And frankly, I feel the “parity” in the MLB indeed has a gangrene of sorts, a disease that is causing only specific segments of the league to rot while the rest hum along uncaring.

Of course, it is one thing to suspect something and demand more research, but it is another to pull the sabermetrician stocking over your head and answer that suspicion with a Falcon Punch of data.

Let’s do just that.
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Last off season, I looked at the chances of a SP going on the DL. I have finally had time to go back and look at how my predictions fared.

The predictions used logistic regression to find the percentage chance that a pitcher would end up on the DL. I used age, games started in the previous 3 years and how many of the previous 3 years did the pitcher go on the DL. The equation I ended up with was:

1/(1+e^(-z))
where:
z = (.2209)(Years with Trips to DL)+(-0.0040)(GS in last 3 year)+(0.0509)(Age in previous season)-1.7692

Using the equation, I projected the chance that a starter would go on the DL and here is a list of those projections.

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Sometimes announcers state that a player is not able to catch up to a fastball. Common sense states that the faster the pitch the harder it is to hit. I decided to look at the results of every fastball swung at to see how the results changed as the speed increased or decreased.

Fastballs generally have a 20 MPH difference in speeds (80 MPH to 100 MPH) at the major league level, so a baseline of what happens at every swing needed to be created. I took the results of every fastball over the last 4 years. I divided them up by in 1 MPH intervals (except for those >100 MPH which were grouped together). Then, I divided up the results further into those pitches missed, fouled off, hit into an out or hit for a hit. Taking all the data, I got the following results:

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“The Astros sale so far has none of the drama that came with the Rangers last year.” That’s from an Associated Press story written in mid-May.

Five months later, we have drama. According to the prospective buyer, Houston-based businessman Jim Crane, Major League Baseball is pressuring him to move the Astros from the National League Central to the American League West. Richard Justice and others have reported that there might be other issues preventing MLB from approving the deal.

I’d rather not speculate about what is or isn’t true, but both sides seem to be doing all they can to intimidate the other into acquiescing. Just this week, a flurry of stories came out suggesting that Crane could walk away from the deal if he isn’t approved by the Nov. 30 deadline stipulated in his agreement with Drayton McLane. Meanwhile, MLB continues to dig into Crane’s past, perhaps sending Crane the message that his options are the American League or no team.

But whatever the reasons for the hold-up, the bottom line is that if the Astros move from the NL Central to the AL West, the team should receive some compensation. In addition to the concerns that Crane has expressed — more 9 p.m. start times and the addition of a designated hitter to the payroll — the real issue is that the American league is the stronger league. And switching leagues will have a direct effect on the Astros’ win total.

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