The Red Sox signed one of the Chris Youngs — the one who can hit. Terms haven’t yet been announced, or at least, terms hadn’t yet been announced when I first heard about this, and I haven’t bothered to check again since. It doesn’t really matter. He’ll get some millions over some years, and it will be neither great nor terrible, and whether Young is a success will probably come down to about five or ten swings per season. If they’re doubles or homers, terrific. If they’re outs, bad investment. So it goes with the role players. So it goes with everybody.

It’s fun that there are multiple Chris Youngs. It’s all the more fun they’re both weird and exceptional, extreme representations of ordinary profiles. The pitcher is unusually tall, and he throws unusually slow, and he generates an unusual amount of fly balls. The outfielder is also strange, and here’s a plot of part of his career profile:

Young hits a ton of balls in the air. A relative ton of those remain close to the infield. Young pulls the majority of his balls in play. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Young is sitting on a pretty low career BABIP, despite having a good amount of footspeed. Young isn’t the most difficult hitter to defend. You tend to know where the ball’s going, and then it’s a matter of covering as much of that limited ground as possible.

So, yeah, both Chris Youngs are fly-ball machines. They both get pop-ups and run low BABIPs. These are neat and coincidental fun facts. But let’s focus on that pull rate. Also, on the inversely-related opposite-field rate. Young does his damage hitting to left and left-center. He’s the worst opposite-field hitter we have on record.

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There’s a difference between saying a pitcher has a changeup, and saying a pitcher throws a changeup. Pretty much every pitcher has a changeup — all it takes is once or twice having messed around with the grip and the delivery. If a guy has thrown a changeup, and remembers what he did, it could be said the same guy has a changeup. But to say a guy throws a changeup — that’s something active. That says, not only does the pitcher possess a changeup in his arsenal, but he could throw it at any point. It’s a part of his approach. The pitcher has a fastball, a changeup, and a curve, say.

I don’t know where the point is where one becomes the other. I don’t know how many times a pitcher has to use a pitch before it can be said the pitch is a part of the pitcher’s attack. Here’s what I can tell you about Craig Kimbrel: for years, he’s had a changeup. Now he’s closer than ever to regularly throwing one.

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When Dave Cameron wrote up the Athletics’ signing of Rich Hill yesterday, he titled it “A’s Sign Rich Hill, Because Of Course They Do.” He focused more on the fact that Hill was a resurgent pitcher that represented a low-risk, high-reward, low-money signing — a bit like Scott Kazmir before the 2014 season. That makes a lot of sense, given Oakland’s budget constraints and past practices.

There’s another way Hill is the perfect major league acquisition for the Athletics, though. He’s a fastball/curve guy with an iffy changeup. He’ll fit right in.

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Last week, MLB saw two of their first big trades of the winter, as both the Red Sox and Angels gave up significant pieces of their farm system to acquire upgrades to their big league roster; Boston acquired closer Craig Kimbrel, while Anaheim landed shortstop Andrelton Simmons. In both cases, the acquisitions are not rentals, as Kimbrel is signed for two more years with a team option for a third, while Simmons is under contract through the 2020 season. To get high-quality players with multiple years of team control, both teams had to give up significant prospects from their farm system.

For the Red Sox, that meant parting with a pair of consensus Top 100 prospects in outfielder Manny Margot and shortstop Javier Guerra, along with a couple of lower tier add-ons. For the Angels, the cost was left-handed pitcher Sean Newcomb, the team’s first round pick in the 2014 draft and the most coveted player they had in the minor leagues; they also sent along with a second pitching prospect and shortstop Erick Aybar, who had been their everyday player at the position for the last seven years.

Both teams surrendered talent they would rather have kept, but felt strongly enough about the players they were receiving to make the trades anyway. And both teams did get very good players, among the best at their respective positions. But in terms of what these deals did to the remains of their respective farm systems, the situations could not be more different.

In making the Kimbrel deal, Dombrowski referenced the Red Sox loaded farm system, which has regularly been seen as one of the best in baseball.

“You don’t ever like to give up young talent,” Dombrowski said. “We think they’re very talented individuals. But I do think that (because of) the good job that the people at player development, scouting, international operations have done, we do have some depth at those positions. And we do have some other quality young players that we were asked about repeatedly.”

Those quality young players Dombrowski is referring to? They are almost certainly Mookie Betts and Xander Bogaerts, the team’s pair of 23-year-old big league cornerstones, who happen to play center field and shortstop, respectively, the same positions that Margot and Guerra are playing in the minor leagues. With those positions locked down at the Major League level for the foreseeable future, Margot and Guerra were seen as somewhat extraneous to the team’s long-term plans, and were likely going to be traded at some point. The primary justification for paying a very high price for Kimbrel is that the team’s depth of prospects allowed them to make a trade like this, because even after surrendering good young talent, they have other good young talent to help them keep their future looking bright.

The Angels are in a very different situation; Newcomb was essentially their only prospect of significance, now that Andrew Heaney has too much time in the majors to qualify as a prospect. Roberto Baldoquin, the team’s top-rated prospect after Heaney and Newcomb heading into the 2015 season, just hit a meager .235/.266/.294 in A-ball, to give you some idea of the organization’s current crop of hitting prospect. With Newcomb, the team’s farm system would have been rated as one of the worst in baseball; without him, it unquestionably is so.

So, relative to their stock of future utility to the organization, the Angels probably gave up a greater percentage of their inventory than the Red Sox did, even though it’s pretty clear the package San Diego got for Kimbrel is a better one than the Braves got for Simmons. But even though Newcomb had more utility to his own organization than Margot or Guerra did, I can’t agree with the notion that highly talented prospects should be viewed as having significantly diminished value to an organization simply because of the presence of other highly talented players, even other talented players at the same position.

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Anyone who’s ever tried to analyze baseball has had the occasions of coming away fairly humbled by the experience. I’ve been made to look stupid at least dozens of times, but one that really sticks out is a blog entry from May 2007, when I figured a mid-30s Raul Ibanez was about out of bat speed and power. From the date of that entry through the end of his career, Ibanez batted more than 4,000 times, drilling 166 home runs while posting a 112 wRC+ and making something like $50 million. Ibanez remained with the Mariners, left them, came back more than a half-decade later, and that year was the best hitter on the team. He was never toast until he was. It’s hard to look into the toaster.

Next season is going to be David Ortiz’s last. The official announcement is apparently coming Wednesday, but the word is out now, and it’s unlikely Ortiz is suddenly going to reverse course next November. So 2016 will bring another farewell tour for another franchise icon, and at every stop, people are going to share their memories. We all have our own, and if we’re being honest, we all have several. Among mine is that, time and time again, it’s been speculated that Ortiz was about at the end of the road. It’s a perfectly reasonable position to take with a player getting up there in years, but to Ortiz’s credit, there have been slumps, but he still hasn’t actually declined. He turns 40 tomorrow.

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The sabermetric movement has grown up over the last decade. A thing that you regularly hear now that you maybe wouldn’t have heard 10 years ago is this: I don’t know. So that’s where we start today. We don’t know what the going rate for ace relief pitchers is. That said, we do have one strong data point following this weekend’s trade of Craig Kimbrel by the Padres to the Red Sox, and it suggests that the cost to grab one of the best relievers in baseball is now substantial, akin to what it might have cost to get an ace starter some years ago.

Kimbrel is an elite relief pitcher, but it was surprising to see Boston acquire him for four prospects, including two top-50 prospects in outfielder Manuel Margot and shortstop Javier Guerra. On top of that already substantial talent the Red Sox tossed in starting pitcher Logan Allen and infielder Carlos Asuaje. That’s a ton of young talent to give up for anyone, let alone for three years of a reliever. It looks quite possibly as though the Red Sox have reset the cost for acquiring a top reliever. But have they?

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The Padres and Red Sox swung a deal on Friday night that sent Craig Kimbrel to Boston in exchange for a quartet of prospects: outfielder Manny Margot, shortstop Javier Guerra, second baseman Carlos Asuaje and left-handed pitcher Logan Allen. As Dave Cameron noted immediately following the trade, the Red Sox coughed up quite a package for the rights to Kimbrel. Not only did San Diego receive a high-quality prospect in Margot, but they got quantity as well. Here’s what my fancy computer math says about these prospects. The numbers next to their names refer to their projected WAR totals through age 28 according to KATOH.

Manny Margot, 10.2 WAR

The Red Sox signed Manny Margot as a 16-year-old out of the Dominican back in 2011, and he’s hit at every stop since then. He put himself on the prospect map in 2014 with a strong showing in Low-A, but he outdid himself in 2015 by essentially replicating those numbers in both High-A and Double-A. Margot makes a ton of contact, hits for modest power and runs wild on the base paths. All of that bodes well for his future in the show, especially considering he’s always been very young for his levels. Here are some comps that were generated using a series of Mahalanobis distance calculations.

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The Red Sox are primed to make some moves this off-season, but not much is known about what those moves will be. They might sign a big money pitcher, they might not. They might trade a bunch of prospects, but they might not. They’re very likely to do something, probably, but what that something is, nobody has any idea. That’s all true, with one exception, an exception you’re likely aware of if you read the title of this post. Hanley Ramirez, lost puppy, needs a new home, and the Red Sox would very much likely to give him one.

It was only last season that Hanley showed up in Boston, skinny, hungry, wet from constant proverbial rain. The Red Sox took him in, scratched him behind the ears, and gave him shelter, food, and $88 million on a four-year deal with a $22 million vesting option. Then he spent the better part of the season pooping on the carpet.

Ramirez’s 2015 season was so bad he cost the Red Sox two wins. For $22 million and the promise of $66 million more, Boston got -1.8 WAR. The Red Sox would literally have been better off had Ben Cherington given one of those “we just signed a new player” press conferences and then, like Clint Eastwood, spent the time talking to an empty chair. Or maybe he could have talked about the team’s prospects for the coming season while casually lighting 20s on fire and tossing them over his shoulder while subordinates ran around frantically with fire extinguishers. Had he done that, it might have been the end of Cherington’s job, but if so it only would have sped up the process by about six months.

Now Boston is run by Dave Dombrowski and Dombrowski has moved Hanley from left field, which he can’t play, to first base, which he probably can’t play but we can’t be sure yet. Instead of putting him there for the final month of the season to see if he could, you know, do it, Boston sent him home. This is known as the writing being on the wall. Instead of getting ready for next season when getting ready for next season was all that was left, Boston said, “Nah, you know what, Hanley? Just get out of here. No, no, it’s fine, we’re good. Sure, sure we are. Have a great holiday!” So Hanley needs a new place to play. The Red Sox don’t want to go into next season with a total unknown at an important defensive position, let alone one they perceive to be a player who wasn’t interested in putting out maximum effort to learn a new position. No, they’re going to try to dump him on someone else.

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Since we don’t have much more than velocity readings from Japan, it can be difficult to rely on anything but scouting reports when evaluating pitchers coming over from Nippon Professional Baseball. And now that 27-year-old Kenta Maeda is once again rumored to be coming to America through the posting system, we’re once again left wondering how to place him in context.

We have his Japanese strikeout and walk rates, which we can compare to recent postings to find comparable countrymen. We also have his velocity readings and a general sense of the quality of his pitches that we can use to compare him to pitchers beyond just ones that have come from Japan. We even have one game of PITCHf/x data to help us look at the movement of his pitches.

And the few comparable players we produce might be the best we can do from out here in the public sphere.

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No, we aren’t just going to do a leaderboard sort for best movement in each direction and call it a day. It’s a little bit more complicated to figure out the best changeups by shape and speed, mostly because it’s all relative. The changeup, as the name implies, functions off of the fastball, as a change of pace and movement. So we need to define anything the changeup does relative to the pitcher’s fastball.

Then we can do a sort and call it a day.

In order to define fastball movement, let’s just group together all of the fastballs thrown by a pitcher. It’s probably more nuanced than that; the concept of tunneling or sequencing shows that pitchers can pair their changeup with one fastball or the other for different results. But some of this comes out in the wash: by averaging movement across fastballs, their selection of different fastballs will weight the movement in the direction of the pitcher’s usage.

So then our x and y movement, and velocity, are defined against this average fastball for each pitcher. Using a minimum of 50 changeups thrown, and z-scores to sum up the values, we can get a list of best changeups quickly.

First, the relievers.

Best Reliever Changeups by Movement, Velocity

Pitcher	FB (pfx_x)	FB (pfx_z)	FB (velo)	CH (pfx_x)	CH (pfx_y)	CH (velo)	Sum Z	CH swSTR%
Brad Boxberger	-3.3	10.6	92.6	-7.8	2.0	79.8	6.7	14%
Shawn Tolleson	-2.6	11.0	92.9	-4.8	4.0	79.8	4.9	15%
Josh Fields	0.1	11.5	94.1	-0.6	3.7	81.4	4.5	8%
Roberto Osuna	-4.2	10.7	95.5	-8.0	6.9	82.3	4.0	16%
Josh Smith	-4.1	7.6	89.9	-8.4	1.9	79.4	4.0	8%
Chasen Shreve	7.3	10.6	91.4	6.3	1.5	82.6	3.5	18%
A.J. Ramos	-3.0	8.6	92.4	-7.5	1.0	85.5	3.5	35%
Jeff Ferrell	-4.1	10.2	93.0	-7.4	4.9	82.4	3.5	20%
Danny Farquhar	-5.0	8.5	92.7	-7.5	1.0	84.5	3.2	24%
Fernando Rodney	-6.7	7.1	94.7	-9.6	3.3	82.7	3.1	17%
Andrew Schugel	-7.9	7.8	91.6	-9.6	2.3	80.5	3.1	23%
Joaquin Benoit	-6.5	8.9	94.2	-7.5	1.9	84.1	3.1	24%
Tyler Thornburg	-0.8	11.1	92.2	-5.8	6.3	83.8	3.0	19%
Arnold Leon	-5.1	9.8	91.6	-4.6	2.8	80.2	2.9	22%
Pat Neshek	-8.5	4.9	89.9	-4.6	3.7	68.4	2.9	9%
Tommy Kahnle	-1.9	7.4	94.8	-7.6	2.8	87.2	2.8	23%
Mike Morin	-4.7	8.9	92.3	-0.5	6.8	71.7	2.8	25%
Deolis Guerra	-5.1	10.0	90.8	-6.7	4.0	80.7	2.8	15%
Daniel Hudson	-6.6	8.3	96.0	-9.9	4.9	84.8	2.7	18%
Erik Goeddel	-3.9	9.2	93.0	-4.7	2.0	84.3	2.5	32%

SOURCE: PITCHf/x

pfx_x = horizontal movement
pfx_z = vertical movement
Sum Z = sum of the z-scores for the differentials between fastball and changeups in x, y movement and velocity
swSTR% = swinging strikes over pitches for the changeup
Minumum 50 changeups thrown in 2015

If you listen to The Sleeper and The Bust, you know I talk about this all the time and do the math in my head. Now the math is there for us on the sheet of paper.

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