Dave Roberts Pushes All the Right Buttons as Dodgers Take Game 5 and Series Lead

The pivotal and most crucial decision of Game 5 of the World Series was attended by a wave of boos, even as Dave Roberts got it right.

Amid the carnage and chaos at the end of Game 4 a scant 20 hours prior was the realization that the fulcrum of the series was now the left arm of Clayton Kershaw. That he would be the man on the mound was already known, as he’d been announced as the scheduled starter for Game 5 well before then, but the circumstances surrounding his turn swung as sharply as Game 4 itself. In the moments before Brett Phillips overturned the world, Kershaw was going to take the mound as the man to end Los Angeles’ three-decade run without a title. In the moments after, he became the man who would have to overcome his checkered postseason past to break the deadlock and put the Dodgers on the doorstep of a championship. If he couldn’t, Los Angeles would be facing the end of the road in Game 6.

It’s both unfair and tiresome that the playoffs always seem to swing around Kershaw, but he warps the series around him, a gravity well that sucks up matter and turns it into white-hot takes. There’s also the fact that the Clayton Kershaw Postseason Narrative™ has, for the most part, accurately reflected his October body of work, full of struggles and heartbreaking losses. The irony of these playoffs is that, one weak NLCS start aside, Kershaw has looked more like his regular-season self. Coming into Game 5, his 2020 postseason body of work consisted of eight runs allowed in 25 innings — a 2.88 ERA — and 31 strikeouts, and he was superb in Game 1, holding the Rays to one run in six innings. This is the Kershaw we all know and love.

But the reality of October Kershaw is that, good or not in the beginning, he rarely goes deep into games and, in fact, shouldn’t. With a fastball that struggles to get past 92 mph and a balky back, he’s a poor choice to face a lineup a third time. And yet in years previous, figuring out just when the needle on Kershaw’s gas tank has hit empty has been one of Roberts’ biggest struggles. The veteran lefty has often not pitched well, but his manager has frequently exacerbated the issue by leaving him out long past his expiration date. Compounding the problem is a Los Angeles bullpen that’s consistently inconsistent, usually taking leads that Kershaw gives them and making them disappear. That relief corps has remained a shaky bet this month, putting Roberts in a tough position: What should he do when his ace starts to flag?

It seemed like he’d have to answer that question early in Game 5, with Kershaw not nearly as sharp as he was in the series opener. Rays hitters swung and missed at just two of his 35 fastballs, which averaged a hair over 91 mph. His slider turned up seven whiffs but also nine foul balls and four put into play. Two runs scored in the third. In the fourth, two walks and a throwing error by Austin Barnes on a steal attempt put runners on the corners with none out, though Kershaw wriggled out of the jam by getting a pop-up, a strikeout, and a caught stealing at home by Manuel Margot. The fifth was an easy 1-2-3 frame with two strikeouts, and Los Angeles led 4–2, but at 83 pitches and with the meat of Tampa Bay’s order due up, the sixth loomed as a crisis point.

In the fevered minds of Dodgers fans, that inning probably played out in advance as a haunted house, each batter more terrifying than the last, each at-bat labored and exhausting. It didn’t help that the first man up was Randy Arozarena, the world-destroying force who’d knocked an RBI single off Kershaw in the third. Instead, Kershaw got through both Arozarena and Brandon Lowe on a pitch apiece (though Arozarena’s out was a 105-mph groundout smashed right at Justin Turner at third).

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And then out came Roberts, attended by boos, for a mound conference that turned into a pitching change, even as Turner was caught on camera telling all assembled that Kershaw could get this out. Roberts, though, was sticking to a preconceived plan, as the FOX booth explained: Kershaw would face 21 batters, no more and no less, and then give way to Dustin May. That blueprint is both oddly specific and inflexible, and it relied heavily on May — who has been an opener and a bulk guy, a high-leverage reliever and everything in between this postseason — doing what he hasn’t done all month, which is pitch well. But that was the plan, and Roberts stuck to it. Out came Kershaw to a standing ovation, while Roberts walked back to the dugout to a chorus of boos.

Was it the right call? Again, the trick with Kershaw is to figure out when he’s losing it, and understanding that there’s no reason to push him. And though those first two outs came easily (or at least quickly), why keep spinning the chamber of the revolver and pulling the trigger? The counterpoint is that, as Game 4 showed, Roberts has few if any relievers he can trust, and May, despite his ludicrous stuff, had spent the playoffs struggling to throw strikes and getting worked like a speed bag when he did. Damned if you do, damned if you don’t, and damned if you try to find a middle ground.

Here’s the funny thing, though: The plan worked. Roberts’ belief in May paid off, as the gangly righty whipped 101-mph fastballs by Margot to end the sixth, then set down the Rays in order in the seventh. Things got tricky again in the eighth, as May put the leadoff batter on, got the first out, then gave way to rookie lefty Victor González. That initially looked like a blunder by Roberts: González, slated to face pinch-hitter and fellow lefty Ji-Man Choi, instead had to contend with pinch-pinch-hitter and righty Mike Brosseau, who drew a walk to put two on for Arozarena. But a perfectly placed slider on the outside corner got a soft fly out from the Rays’ postseason MVP, and González finished the frame with a pop out to center by Lowe.

The end didn’t come easy either. Wary of using Kenley Jansen after his Game 4 collapse, Roberts turned to Blake Treinen, appearing in his third straight game, to close it out with a two-run lead. Margot’s leadoff single threatened to make things interesting, but Treinen quickly recovered, getting the next three Rays in order to give the Dodgers the 3–2 series lead, and the win to Kershaw.

No manager bats 1.000, as it were, and Roberts has made plenty of decisions this series and in the playoffs that have backfired or looked bad from the start. Yet it’s worth noting that, aside from Blake Snell’s excellent Game 2 start and the back half of Game 4 culminating in the Yakety Sax routine that was the final play, the Dodgers have been firmly in control of this Fall Classic. On Sunday night, it all came together as he planned, as all of his moves worked. The result is the Dodgers taking the field on Tuesday with 27 outs separating them from that long-awaited World Series win.





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Neutralluke
5 years ago

I actually think giving May that opportunity to get out of an inning without having to make 3 outs was a great play by Roberts. May’s been shaky but he definitely seemed to turn a corner after getting that strikeout of Margot and, given the Rays hitters’ difficulty with fastballs, May should be an excellent matchup for most of their lineup. We’ll see if Gonsolin can make the same kind of improvements that May did today.

sweepcut
5 years ago
Reply to  Neutralluke

It’s also worth noting that Roberts was advised of some mechanical tweaks that May made prior to the game, which were evident in how much better he was commanding his fastball. I was a little perplexed that Gonzalez was allowed to face Arozarena, but thankfully it worked out! Hopefully Gonsolin shows improved command of his splitter in Game 6

Sammy Sooser
5 years ago
Reply to  sweepcut

Gonzalez is solid vs lefties and righties. Obviously Arozarena has been dialed in, but it was still solid from a matchup perspective.

Sammy Sooser
5 years ago
Reply to  Sammy Sooser

The one move that puzzled me was not bringing in Gonzalez after Tsutsugo was announced.

FrodoBeck
5 years ago
Reply to  Sammy Sooser

Yeah at this point basically no pitcher is a ‘good’ matchup against Arozarena.

RonnieDobbs
5 years ago
Reply to  Sammy Sooser

You folks are obsessing over absurd samples. This isn’t rocket science in reality. It is rocket science on Twitter I guess where random people’s reactions are what matter.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  sweepcut

Gonzalez vs Arozarena makes a bit more sense if you followed the team closely. Gonzalez was by a wide margin the Dodgers’ most effective relief pitcher this season, and he had no significant platoon split and a 70% ground ball rate. As a former starter and with that highly effective slider, he’s always been the best bet of the Dodger lefty relievers to impact this series because he can be trusted to handle a right-handed bat or two in the course of getting some good matchups (like a LRL type scenario). I wouldn’t have picked him for Arozarena, but Arozarena has hit both sides well and sliders – Victor’s best pitch – have been the most effective pitch against him.

Overall the Dodgers had no clearly obvious decisions and had to make a bunch of choices that each had some flaws and I think they overall did a good job. The Kershaw choice was a great compromise between taking him out when he still had something to give when the ‘pen was tired and asking too much: it required a bet on Arozarena specifically (and again the slider question, Kershaw had mostly handled him OK over 2 games) in order to get the Lowe v Kershaw matchup. It went the best it possibly could, but overall it made sense as a calculated risk.

The Dodgers probably won’t win this series if Gonsolin and May cannot contribute anything, so finding an opportunity to use May that was meaningful but controllable also made sense, to make sure that the mechanical fixes were right, and his use was minimzied so he can likely help in G6 and the fact that he was still not entirely sharp (the 2 seamer was good, the slurve type thing was not, and you could see the Rays stop whiffing as they started hunting the fastball and fouling lots of them off) meant using him for a fairly short outing was good. Gonzalez is a good fit for the situation he was asked to face even though he didn’t resolve it the way you were thinking going in, and Treinen has pitched well overall this year, well overall in the postseason and had previously proven he could maintain his velocity and movement when pitching a 3rd day in a row, as he was used 3 straight in the Atlanta series.

All of those decisions had other options and involved calculated risks, but overall I think the plan made sense given the personnel and set the Dodgers up well for the future, as only Treinen would appear to have any kind of meaningful limitation for Game 6, meaning you can all-hands the game and still have the combination of Buehler, Treinen, and two starters (Urias, Kershaw) for game 7 on top of anyone who isn’t tapped too deeply in Game 6. Kershaw gave 60 pitches of 4 IP, 2H 0R 4K against the Astros in exactly this scenario in 2017 G7, on identical rest, and you expect Buehler to be good for some innings if it comes down to it.

At the end of the Atlanta series, Roberts made a series of good pitching choices that made his decisions early in the World Series all the more frustrating, because he had previously shown he could make the right ones (contrast how Baez was used in NLCS 6 vs WS 4, for example, Baez having a history of bad results w/ inherited runners and being an extreme FB pitcher who gives up HR as a sizable amount of his total hits allowed, prioritizing using him in clean innings is a very good strategy. They did this in the NLCS, and then did not in the WS – it’s that incongruity that is so frustrating. IMO, the Dodgers likely won the WS tonight if they had simply used Gonzalez in G4 where Baez was originally used (in the 6th with 2 on 1 out, in the GIDP scenario) and Baez for a clean 7th. Instead those guys all pitched in sub-optimal scenarios.

drew_willyMember since 2020
5 years ago
Reply to  mikejunt

Kolarek would’ve been the guy to go to for the 9th inning after allowing Gonzalez to face the first batter of the inning, I thought. The Rays were down to mostly lefties aside from Adames.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  drew_willy

I dont think there’s any reason to not just use Gonzalez there as he’s better than Kolarek and has consistently had outings over 1 IP in the regular season; he’s a former starter, and pitched 20+ IP in 15 appearances in the regular season.

Kolarek’s useful vs the Rays lefties but Gonzalez is just better at basically everything.

Gonzalez for the 6th inning jam; Baez for a clean 7th; Kolarek where Gonzalez did pitch in the 8th. Then you are probably fine with Jansen in the 9th because it’s probably not a 1 run game anymore, if you prevented the Rays from scoring 3 in the 6th, but if it is you also still have Graterol available (and imo they should have skipped jansen in 4 to save for 5, given he’s showing substantial dropoffs in velocity in back to back days. They should have tried to use him in G3 and G5, and intentionally skipped G4).

RonnieDobbs
5 years ago
Reply to  mikejunt

Trying to use guys is the root of all mis-management. The game increasingly revolves around it as opposed to the players playing baseball.

RonnieDobbs
5 years ago
Reply to  Neutralluke

Put guys in for soft match-ups and then pretend that they are valuable? Does not compute. Improvements lol. Everyone should be lucky enough to face the bottom half of the order. You can’t get smashed every time. The fact is that the Dodgers have gotten close to nothing from May throughout the playoffs. Has it come to putting him in soft spots? It has. He should be their #3/4 starter and he is currently a mopup guy / opener at this point. Not to mention the lack of development that is taking place. Partial innings take more of a toll than the simple number of pitches. That move was moronic. Kershaw most likely could have cruised through 7 or more innings. Heck, Kersh could have maybe gotten through 8 and we wouldn’t be talking about decisions at all.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  RonnieDobbs

I’m not sure what planet you’re on, but on this one the Dodgers can look at May’s pitch execution and learn whether or not he’s right. They had identified a specific problem (arm and lower half out of sync, possibly due to being too-amped up, and causing a lack of command), had worked with him to address it in bullpen sessions, and wanted to see it play out in a game situation. If May shouldn’t face the Rays best hitters but can dominate the bottom 2/3 of their lineup for 6 outs, that’s exceptionally valuable! Those were the exact parts of the lineup that scored 2 runs off Kershaw and threatened to score more in the 4th inning. Kershaw was far from sharp or dominant, and if he’d been left in for 7 and given up the lead you’d be in here dancing on the Dodgers for being dumb enough to let Kershaw history repeat itself even though it’s happened a dozen times before.

You act like the only acceptable way for the Dodgers to win the World Series is to force Kershaw to pitch 7-8 innings and for him to dominate them, and if he fails to do that they should not win. That’s not reality.

CJMember since 2020
5 years ago
Reply to  mikejunt

The last paragraph mikejunt wrote describes fairly well what Dodgers seemed to be doing all these years (and ask Kershaw to pitch in relief to boot), which has been driving me nuts certainly, and I don’t think I’m the only one.
I’m just pleasantly shocked, shocked Dodgers finally changed their approach. Even better that it worked.

Sammy Sooser
5 years ago

And the defense let Kershaw down at one point yet again. Kevin Kiermaier hit a weak grounder back to the pitcher, Kershaw fielded it, fired, and Kiermaier was safe by a whisker.

Muncy, who is a righty thrower, had his left foot on the bag, so as to be in a fielding position in the event of a bad throw, while limiting his ability to stretch. A damage control position. If his right foot is on the bag, and he is in a position to stretch to receive a throw, Kiermaier is out.

Kershaw is an excellent fielder. Thinking about him balking during Margot’s Mad Dash is nightmare fuel, but he didn’t. And, Muncy helped him. One debit and one credit. These weird things seems to happen in Kershaw postseason starts again and again. As a fan of Kershaw, I’m just glad it didn’t bite him this time around.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  Sammy Sooser

Kershaw is a good fielder, but the rushed throw from the pitcher on that kind of ball is probably the single highest risk of a bad throw on any play in MLB, and I think it’s hard to blame Muncy for taking the safe position. Even good fielding pitchers make sub-optimal throws in that situation all the time.

Sammy Sooser
5 years ago
Reply to  mikejunt

I’d certainly defer to people who have played a lot of 1B, but I think setting up in an in-between position, able to swap to either as you read the throw and react, would have been the correct move. Also tough with a quick throw that’s like 75′, and Muncy is solid, though not that good of a 1B. I think it’s the kind of advantage that a lefty throwing 1B offers that is often overlooked, you can be set up to field a bad throw and stretch for a good throw there simultaneously.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  Sammy Sooser

I’m not professional 1B or infield coach by any stretch but my first instinct is that MLB pitchers on the short rushed throw are the wildest throws in MLB in addition to often being among the hardest. I’d guess that you probably coach right handed 1b at that level to take the safe play because offline throws are reasonably common from pitchers without time to set their feet, and they often throw very hard to first as well.

I remember when I was young it was always a thing to have a left handed 1b for the better stretch and holding runners but MLB teams rarely have that kind of discretion since the position is about the bat.

You don’t see offensively questionable, great fielding 1B types in MLB anymore like, ironically, Bill Buckner

Sammy Sooser
5 years ago
Reply to  mikejunt

Then again, Kershaw hasn’t made an error since 2018, and only 9 in his career. Also, you’re right that the safe play was the right play for most pitchers. It’s hard, and maybe unfair, to expect someone to make the exception. As a Dodger fan who has experienced some disappointment, stuff like this gets to me. We overanalyze because we care!

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  Sammy Sooser

He has not, but you have to consider the possibility that the 1B being consistently prepared to receive a bad throw might be a contributor to that reality. Also, since 2018 is not actually very many chances; pitchers don’t make that many plays.

Since the start of 2018, Kershaw has only recorded 51 assists, so he’s only made the play 52 times: his one error in 3 years is the same as a shortstop making an error once every couple weeks.

Corey Seager, for instance, has made 33 assists in the 2020 playoffs so far. That’s more than Kershaw since the start of the 2019 season.

Cave Dameron
5 years ago
Reply to  Sammy Sooser

You can’t react to the throw and swap positions, there’s not enough time to do that. I’m not sure why you think Muncy messed up here. He’s doing exactly what every coach tells you to do on a play like that.

Travis LMember since 2016
5 years ago
Reply to  Sammy Sooser

Muncy did it exactly as it’s taught. Trying to switch feet will cause 1B to miss the bag, or get their feet caught up and miss the ball. Positioning like its taught givens a larger target to the thrower, so they don’t hit the runner. And it sets the receiver up better to handle a bad throw.

connjc
5 years ago
Reply to  Sammy Sooser

I didn’t see the play as I was listening on the radio, but often first baseman will have their left foot on the bag on balls in front of the plate so they can step out from the line and give the thrower a lane around the runner to throw to. If they have their right foot on the bag and try to step out away from the line they will be in an awkward position where their back to towards the throw. Of course I didn’t see the play so I’m not sure how far out in front of home Kershaw fielded the ball but the way you describe it sounds like that might be the case.

CheeseballMember since 2016
5 years ago
Reply to  Sammy Sooser

This is a an interesting debate, but personally I think the standard play for the first baseman and correct play for Muncy is to set up with his left foot on the base, ready to deal with a wild throw. That way, the pitcher has more margin for error in terms of accuracy, which allows him to release the ball faster and throw harder.

I’d argue the benefits from the extra juice the pitcher can put on his throw, plus the lower chance of the first baseman muffing the catch probably outweigh the costs of the first baseman having a poorer stretch.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  Cheeseball

Yep I don’t think it’s super close and I bet Muncy is coached this way for all balls fielded by the pitcher off the mound itself as those tend to be rushed plays throwing back across your body, very difficult throws to make. That’s why pitchers are trained to let 3Bs and Cs make the play when both can reach the ball: the pitcher has the worst momentum and throwing position (moving and facing away from 1B) of any infielder on balls overlapping with 3B and C. On balls to the 1B side, the pitcher is moving towards the base and has much easier throws.

TonyMember since 2017
5 years ago

Roberts gets booed for doing the correct thing, and if he’d left him in and lost Roberts would have been trashed. I can’t help laughing at that.

Doug LampertMember since 2016
5 years ago
Reply to  Tony

The manager always gets blamed. And if things go really badly, he’s the one that gets fired as the GM can’t fire the players.

Roberts presumably knew this when he took the job.

Heck, manager is a job where one of the most important things you do is “protect” your players by, when one is furiously angry enough that he’s doing something that would get him thrown out, rushing out and getting thrown out of the game as a way of giving the player a few more seconds to cool down.

sadhulkMember since 2020
5 years ago
Reply to  Doug Lampert

GMs can fire players. Being Designated For Assignment or Non-Tendered sounds a lot cooler than getting fired, but it’s basically getting fired.

Jason BMember since 2017
5 years ago
Reply to  sadhulk

Sure, but in the MLB that salary is guaranteed. Not quite analogous to private-sector firing.

(NFL, not so much)

Pirates HurdlesMember since 2024
5 years ago

Am I the only one that was expecting some kind of analysis in this article? Evidence that he did the right thing beyond it working out?

mikejuntMember
5 years ago

I gave a bit above but imo it’s very hard to do much analysis of these choices beyond to say that Roberts had no clearly correct choices and avoided the clearly wrong choices. The marginal ones worked out and there are relatively minor differences between what he did and the other options.

It is not like G2 or G4 where you can’t find a good explanation for why other paths were ignored or why they felt what they tried was a better plan. Here the logic is fairly easy to follow and the risks they had to accept are pretty obvious.

It helps that they worked out but I’ve been discussing most Dodger playoff games live and when things go wrong those of us who know the team well usually can identify the problems before they produce a bad result. This game, like NLCS 6, consisted of choices you could understand in the moment or beforehand if you’re very I knowledgeable about the team

kevininmotion
5 years ago
Reply to  mikejunt

are you on the FG live chat?

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  kevininmotion

I have been for some games and some of my comments get through. I’m also often discussing stuff on Twitter, usually with the great Cronk

It’s hard to type out or get accepted a long analytical comment about these kinds of moves in FG chat but a lot of my comments get thru especially when Dan and Ben are chatting

kevininmotion
5 years ago
Reply to  mikejunt

if you dont mind, what’s your twitter handle? love your comments on here, would be interesting to see your in game commentary.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  kevininmotion

I am @Junts. I dont have many followers so I mostly reply to other people. I’m in the EW facebook group as well from time to time.

The Duke
5 years ago

Roberts is constantly bailed out by a team that is deep in pitching and deep in hitting and versatile on defense. When I see an article saying Roberts made all the right moves, I just assume superior talent carried the day. Last night was no exception

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  The Duke

This is a bit of the Roberts conundrum. Its definitely true he doesn’t always put his guys in ideal positions to succeed. On the other hand he often does that because he’s trusting specific members of a highly talented roster and the reality is that when he trusts his players they usually justify his trust.

Some of his decisions are immediately and self evidently bad. But there’s also a lot of others that are only controversial because guys Roberts should trust and without whom the team won’t succeed have let him down when he’s trusted them. A good example of this was 2018 WS G4, where despite the miscommunication, removing Hill was understandable and potentially justifiable, but every single reliever Roberts used failed him. A couple extra outs from Hill wouldn’t have saved that game when all his most reliable relievers gave up runs.

Similarly Roberts has had no choice but to try and use May and Gonsolin and get them right despite their lack of performance for 2 series because there’s not much realistic path to a World Series win where neither of those guys contributes to the team. It’s possible now, with a heroic G7 outing by Buehler and a couple relievers, but having a couple rested relievers to follow Buehler depended on getting some innings from May and Gonsolin in G5 and G6. Most situations where those guys are bad for the whole series are series losses since that produces 2 Rays wins.

deuce26
5 years ago
Reply to  The Duke

Roberts’ biggest strength is his ability to relate to his players. Which creates his biggest flaw, which is the tendency to be overly loyal. Jansen hasn’t been a closer that a World Series contender should be trotting out there for the past two years. The Dodger roster is so deep that it often is able to mask Roberts’ bullpen mismanagement. No manager is perfect and I see signs that Roberts is learning from past mistakes. Hopefully he will continue to evolve.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  deuce26

I think Jansen’s situation is more complex than that. In 18 he was clearly not himself after the heart problem but given the rather unique nature of the problem you also have to give him some opportunities to see what’s going on because you really have nothing to rely on.

This year, the narrative is kind of borrowing a lot on 18-19 decline because in the regular season he was resurgent and much better than his previous couple years. He then got out of whack mechanically in exactly the last week of the year and looked shaky then and in the first playoff series, but also was quickly fixed through some work with his old coaches (notably Charlie Hough, who originally taught him to pitch when he converted from catching), and in his first appearances after the mechanical fix he was -good- and his pitches looked better than they had in years. In fact, we’ve seen that same thing play out since, which is that with rest, Jansen looks like a good version of himself, but he’s greatly diminished in back to backs. I think that part was predictable given recent history, but I can’t entirely blame Roberts for trying to find out at least once (the 2nd time, imo, is much more questionable). Similarly, having had G5 off and today, I think it would be totally OK for the Dodgers to rely on Jansen for big outs in ONE of G6 or G7, but once he’s been used he should be burnt for the series absent a crazy emergency like a 17 inning Game 7 scenario.

In Kenley’s G3 appearance he was really quite fine. His pitches were sharp and effective and while he gave up the HR to Arozarena, it was pretty transparent: at 3-2 count and with a 5 run lead and 2 outs, they threw an absolute dead center cut fastball in order to not give the free baserunner, since a decent portion of the time he hammers the ball it’s still an out of some variety. If you look at the catcher setup on that Arozarena HR, that ball wasn’t mis-located – they just chose to give Arozarena a pitch to hit in a situation where they couldn’t possibly lose instead of giving him a free base. He mashed it.

But as we saw bringing him back in G4, his velocity was down 2-4MPH over the previous night. He’s not capable of back to backs right now.

The Kenley we saw In G3 or NLCS G6, after a layoff, was an effective pitcher who can be used in leverage. The Kenley who has been used the previous day should be behind Alex Wood in the bullpen heirarchy.

deuce26
5 years ago
Reply to  mikejunt

“Good Kenley” is now a decent reliever. He isn’t an elite closer. He is especially shaky in one run save situations, as he doesn’t hold runners on. He should have a role in the Dodger pen, just not the one he is used to having.

Dooduh
5 years ago

Idk, I thought CK was cruising. This seems like a results over process argument… not that results aren’t important.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  Dooduh

It’s easy to get mislead by looking at the most recent inning instead of what really matters which is the last time he faced those batters. Kershaw had had a bad time with Margot etc in both previous trips, and that’s much more important than whether he’d looked good against Adames and Zunino in deciding whether he should face Margot again.

If he could have skipped to Adames and Zunino again, you’d let him stay in the game. But that is not an option.

duckybuckinfent
5 years ago

I’ve watched more of this World Series than I have any non-Yankee series I have in decades, man.
It hasn’t been the cleanest ball I’ve ever seen played?
But, it definitely has been entertaining.

I’m really curious as to the thought process behind the attempted steal of home. Was that called from the bench? Or is Margot one of those guys with a permanent green light? Jeeez, he *almost* made it & how cool was Kershaw in the moment?

I know small ball is passing away. I get why. But we’re seeing teams that not only value TTO guys but guys who can also run playing late in the season again. (Both the Astros and red sox had pretty good team speed.) I don’t need to ever see a bunt again.
I really don’t.
I concur these are a waste of an out.
And, I’d be hard pressed to remember a time when the contact play actually worked!

But seeing the aggression the Rays and Dodgers have shown on the base paths leads me to wonder if modern analytics aren’t undervaluing speed (heh… which never slumps. Or so it’s said.)

Last I’m not sure what MLB would do if the Twins made the Series in a “regular” year. Here in Minneapolis, it’s 27° and there is several inches of snow on the ground. More on the way. Which is great for grouse shooting & waterfowling but seems absolutely horrible for baseball.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago

It sounds like it was Margot’s play and not a managerial call and that he’s got the freedom to make that play

I think absent the yakety sax game 4 ending the teams have mostly played very clean and sharp baseball, with the caveat that the Rays seem to have determined that as an underdog they need to take some higher risk plays on the bases. Many of those have worked out but they’ve had a number of outs on the bases beyond the steal of home. All the plays have been close and you can see why they felt the risks might be worth it, but the net baserunnning outs have cost them.

Given the degree to which the Dodgers seem to control every game, I think it’s understandable. The Rays aren’t likely to win this series in a heads up confrontation so trying to create opportunities for bounces to go their way is wise and exactly that is responsible for one of their 2 wins.

The Duke
5 years ago
Reply to  mikejunt

Agreed. This is exactly what the Series looks like to me as well

duckybuckinfent
5 years ago
Reply to  mikejunt

Fair enough.
That makes a lot of sense, @mikejunt. The Rays base running *has* been good theater – even if it’s born from a bit of desperation or whatever.

Also, appreciate the insight on Margot, @sadtrombone. Pretty gutsy.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago

also fwiw we saw the contact play work in this very series, but I agree in general it’s a bad call in modern MLB. Contemporary MLB players make less errors than at any time in MLB history, and while it doesn’t seem like the difference between 99.2% and 99.6% of plays is huge, it’s actually cutting the error rate in half (0.8 to 0.4). the value of ‘pressuring the defense’ has never been lower.

I think too much is made of ‘green lights’ for baserunning and 3-0 counts and the like and my suspicion is that on most modern MLB teams, quality players primarily always have green lights and the situations where they ARENT given them is the exception and not the rule. Guys like Smoltz are always surprised when guys seem to have 3-0 green lights, but I’d be hard pressed to identify a Dodger hitter I believe is consistently not allowed to swing 3-0. If you’re good enough to play on that kind of team, you’re given the discretion to know how to look for your pitch on 3-0 and are probably only given a take sign in situations where the baserunner is an obvious need or the pitcher is obviously struggling.

I suspect this is equally true on the bases; guys who are good at stealing have the green light by default, and are only told not to steal in specific situations where there’s an overriding need to sae the baserunner (similar situations to when you’d give the 3-0 take sign; down 2 in the 9th so you need the baserunner, etc).

sadtromboneMember since 2020
5 years ago

According to Margot, it was his decision.

In some ways I’m kind of sad it wasn’t a 4-3 game (that there wasn’t another solo homer somewhere) because then that steal would be something we would be talking about a lot more. And it was very exciting!

Someone pointed out, I’m not sure who, that if they hadn’t been playing in an empty stadium he might have had a good shot. Apparently, Kershaw was alerted by Muncy what was going on, and with crowd noise it might have given Margot a split second more time to get there.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

A couple thoughts:

Muncy didn’t just yell, but also gesture. If you listen to Muncy and Kershaw’s interviews, they explain that Kershaw has prepared for this scenario. Clayton is an obsessive perfectionist and players have attempted this on him before (he specifically cited an attempt by Carlos Gomez in 2015, which people have found video of: its basically a copy of this play, and Gomez was also out). Kershaw explained that he has a practiced process with Muncy because he knows he cannot see the runner on 3rd, so he always looks to Muncy when he comes set, and Muncy knows it is his job in that scenario to watch the runner on 3rd for Kershaw and indicate if he should step off. Muncy immediately pointed home and yelled when Margot broke, and Kershaw was looking right at him for the cue. Its certainly possible that noise could have helped, though I’d guess Renfroe being in motion to potentially distract Muncy or Kershaw would have helped more. In general, I think the Rays made a nice tactical choice and deployed it against the worst possible opponent. If there’s any pitcher in this series I’d expect to be prepared for that play, it’s the detail-obsesssive Kershaw, who has one of the best pickoff moves in MLB and has the most practiced and smooth and cleanly executed throws to all bases. I think that this would have worked against virtually any other left handed Dodgers pitcher if they had attempted it with them. Kershaw’s the worst possible target, an experienced pitcher who obsessively prepares for even the most unlikely events. The play was still insanely close, of course, but I think it’s an easy run against Urias or Gonzalez or anyone else. Clayton just practices this kind of stuff more often and more consistently than pretty much anyone in MLB, and it showed.

As far as the earlier comment by ducky about baserunning, this is just a misunderstanding of the analytical value of baserunning. Baserunning plays are low strategic value: the value of individual events if all runs are equal is low, and the break-even rates needed are high. In the playoffs, however, baserunning can have extreme tactical/leverage value in situations where a single run or a single win are dramatically more valuable than normal. To a certain extent, the truth is that all regular season steals and baserunning are primarily valuable as practice for october scenarios.

With that said, you can see the very high break-even rates. The Rays probably have not broken even on their aggressive baserunning even before the Margot steal of home – they’ve had a number of caught stealings and other baserunning outs. They’re probably still net ahead in terms of tactical value, however. The Dodgers have been much more successful and still may not have hit break-even themselves, but definitely have capitalized on tactical value (even one of their outs had some tactical value, in that Bellinger’s supposed to go to 3rd in the bases loaded scenario to try and draw a cut throw to 3rd to ensure the runner scores w/o a throw, even if he ends up out in a rundown; that baserunning out was the result of good baserunning, not bad).

In the regular season, where the individual value of a win or a run is not magnified, the success rate you need for this stuff to be worthwhile is just very high and the risk of injury, etc are such that it’s hard to make the play worthwhile in volume. In these scenarios, where a single run has enormous impact (the championship leverage index of every PA in these games is 100+ times the value of a normal game’s plate appearance), the individual baserunning play can be decisive.

sadtromboneMember since 2020
5 years ago

One other thing I’ll say about this is that I have pretty much only seen one guy ever do a straight steal home in my life and that is Paul Molitor, although Jacoby Ellsbury also did it in two games I missed. Pretty much everyone who stole home played in the pre-war, pre-integration era–in fact, I think Jackie Robinson was one of the last all-time great home-stealers–but Molitor and Rod Carew stole home a whole bunch. Carew stole it seven times in a single season.

It’s sad that now that Jacoby Ellsbury is gone we’re not going to see a lot of it anymore.

mikejuntMember
5 years ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

What I want to know is why no one ever tried to take advantage of Jon Lester’s troubles throwing to bases with a steal of home. A much better payoff than dancing around off 1st like a moron.

RonnieDobbs
5 years ago

Pulling Kershaw when they did is indefensible. They wasted arms in game 5.

Jason BMember since 2017
5 years ago
Reply to  RonnieDobbs

Smash cut to: Kershaw laboring and coming out after giving up runs the 3rd time through the order. Over and over in postseason starts