Did the Red Sox Really Overpay for Drew Pomeranz?
Last week, when the Red Sox jumped the starting pitching market — surrendering Anderson Espinoza, their best pitching prospect in the deal — to acquire Drew Pomeranz from San Diego, the general consensus was that the team overpaid, like they did in acquiring Craig Kimbrel some months earlier, as the team tries to take advantage of David Ortiz’s last year in baseball. After all, Pomeranz was traded for Yonder Alonso a few months earlier, and despite a great start to the year with the Padres, no one really knows how well he’ll hold up down the stretch, given that this size of workload isn’t something he’s handled before. And just days before the trade, Baseball America had rated Espinoza as the #15 prospect in baseball, 24 spots ahead of Manuel Margot, the primary chip the Padres acquired from the Red Sox in exchange for their closer over the winter.
Giving up a top-15 prospect for a guy with as many question marks as Pomeranz comes with is certainly a gamble, as the deal will look disastrous if Pomeranz can’t hold up through October and Espinoza reaches his upside. But I can’t help but wonder if this deal is perhaps an example of how public prospect ratings and a player’s current market value can diverge pretty significantly.
I talked about this a bit during last week’s trade value series, as the order of the prospects that appeared on that list differed from the order they appear on most of the prospect lists published at various outlets. This isn’t meant as any kind of criticism of public prospect evaluators, but simply an acknowledgment that their mandate is a bit different from MLB teams, and producers of public prospect lists can afford to take on a bit more risk in order to maximize their chances of identifying as many future stars as possible, as early as possible.
We can see the results of this risk-seeking behavior in the results of how variously-ranked prospects have turned out over the years. Earlier this year, Kevin Creagh and Steve DiMiceli updated their prospect valuation model, and included in that post, they showed the expected average WAR and bust rates for different types of prospects. To show the differences in outcomes for pitchers and hitters in each range, I’m going to reconstitute their table slightly, and present hitters and pitchers in the same tier of ranked prospects next to each other.
| Tier | Number of Players | Avg. WAR | % Less than 3 WAR | % Zero WAR or less |
| Hitters #1-10 | 54 | 15.3 | 13% | 7% |
| Pitchers #1-10 | 22 | 14.6 | 5% | 0% |
| Hitters #11-25 | 42 | 13.0 | 26% | 7% |
| Pitchers #11-25 | 43 | 8.3 | 44% | 28% |
| Hitters #26-50 | 89 | 8.1 | 47% | 29% |
| Pitchers #26-50 | 85 | 6.4 | 41% | 24% |
| Hitters #51-75 | 102 | 4.9 | 57% | 46% |
| Pitchers #51-75 | 104 | 3.7 | 69% | 44% |
| Hitters #76-100 | 102 | 4.5 | 64% | 39% |
| Pitchers #76-100 | 113 | 3.5 | 65% | 43% |
I’ve highlighted the line showing pitching prospects ranked 11-25, since that’s where Espinoza was most recently ranked; note the stark difference between the outcomes for a pitching prospect and a hitting prospect in that same tier. #11-#25 hitters perform only slightly worse than hitters ranked in the top 10, but pitchers in that group have performed significantly worse than the top-ranked pitchers, with a huge spike upwards in the percentage of pitchers who provide little or no value at the big league level.
In fact, the outcomes for a pitching prospect ranked in the #11-#25 range are almost exactly the same as they are for a hitter ranked in the #26-#50 range. This is the result you’d expect if those lists were weighting upside significantly more than downside, as pitching prospects have more variance in their outcomes; this is the natural effect of discounting risk a bit more than teams would. It’s a perfectly rational decision to make, given that prospect analysts are judged mostly on how often they hit on the big names, and no one really holds pitching injuries against their credibility.
But teams don’t really get to make that same calculation; they aren’t judged based on how many stars they correctly identify, but by how many wins their big league team puts on the field. And having a bunch of highly rated prospects end up producing zero value is a significant detriment to that goal, so teams can’t afford to be as optimistic with pitching prospects as the public outlets can be. As such, even if Espinoza is considered a top-15 prospect based on current rankings, his value to a club has to be diminished, more in line with a #26-#50 hitting prospect based on recent outcomes.
And there’s actually an argument for discounting Espinoza’s trade value a bit beyond that, because he’s much further from the big leagues than most pitching prospects ranked in that #11-#25 range. For instance, Jose Berrios is the closest-ranked pitcher to Espinoza on Baseball America’s midseason Top 100, coming in at #20; Josh Hader is at #22, and Jose de Leon is at #25. All three of them belong to the same bucket as Espinoza, in terms of Creagh and DiMiceli’s valuation system is concerned, but they’re all in Triple-A, knocking on the door to the big leagues, and each will likely finish the year in the majors.
With Berrios, Hader, and de Leon, you could look at that ~+8 WAR projection and see the fulfillment of that value coming from 2017-2022; with Espinoza, you’re probably looking at his value coming from 2019-2024 if he develops well and avoids injury. And the further out you push a player’s contribution, the less valuable it is. When teams are looking at the trade value of a particular prospect, they have to take the timeline of expected production into account, and they will pay more for players closer to the big leagues than guys who aren’t going to show up in the majors for several years.
How much you discount for proximity to the majors depends on each organization. Given the Padres current situation, they’re probably correct to not discount for proximity to the majors that heavily, given that their road back to the big leagues is going to be a long one. This isn’t a knock on their side of this trade at all; betting on long-term upside is probably the right play for them. But for other teams that aren’t looking as far off, Espinoza may not have had the same kind of appeal as other pitching prospects in his tier, given his distance from the majors.
So, realistically, the Red Sox gave up a pitching prospect that, based on where he was most recently placed on the prospect lists, projects for something like +8 WAR over his controllable years, and has a 50-50 shot of producing less than +3 WAR during that time; he’s about as high-risk as a prospect gets, and even if he lives up to the hype, he’s at least two years away from contributing in the big leagues, with three or four years a more realistic expectation.
In Pomeranz, certainly, the Red Sox didn’t get any kind of safe bet either; they traded a risky minor leaguer for a risky big leaguer. But even at only 150 innings per year, given his current projections, Pomeranz is forecast for something like +2.5 WAR per season, and he’s under control for the next couple of years beyond this season. Realistically, Pomeranz should probably be forecast for something like +5 to +6 WAR before he reaches free agency, and he should provide that value at fairly low salaries, given his low number of career innings pitched, which will hold down his arbitration awards.
The free agent market has already shown it will value high-risk, average-to-above-average starters; Scott Kazmir got $48 million and an opt-out last winter, Brandon McCarthy got $48 million and Francisco Liriano got $39 million the year before. Pomeranz has put himself in that class of pitchers, and pretty clearly has a good amount of value above and beyond what the Red Sox will have to pay him over the next couple of years. Pomeranz will make a fraction of that over the next few years, and since he’s going to get his salaries through arbitration, the Red Sox will be taking on less risk, since the money won’t be guaranteed.
In terms of overall value, Creagh and DiMiceli put Espinoza in a bucket of prospects worth about $40 million; accounting for his distance to the majors, I’d probably push that down to $30-$35 million; Yadier Alvarez, who Eric Longenhagen put a similar 60 Future Value grade on, signed for $16 million last July, and with the 100% tax they paid, he cost them $32 million.
Given what Pomeranz would be probably worth on the open market right now, he probably has at least $30 million in surplus value; if he were a free agent this minute, and could sell his remaining 2.5 years of service, I’d guess he’d land something close to $50 million, and that’s in guaranteed money; the Red Sox get additional value from having non-guaranteed arbitration years.
To me, this looks like the Red Sox and Padres identified the prospect in Boston’s system that was worth something very close to what Pomeranz is worth, and settled on a reasonable swap that makes sense for both sides. This one doesn’t look like Dombrowski undervaluing prospects to me; Espinoza is fun to dream on, but when factoring his risks in, he’s probably not as valuable as his “#15 ovearll prospect” status makes him sound. He’s a good get for the Padres, who should be betting on upside, but this is the kind of prospect that the Red Sox could afford to move. And for Pomeranz, this looks like the right return for both sides.
Dave is the Managing Editor of FanGraphs.
If it is true that There Is No Such Thing As A Pitching Prospect, then the Red Sox did not pay anything for Drew Pomeranz.
Might as well not have any pitching prospects in any system. Bad news for the pirates
I’m going to take a risk of getting some downvotes here talking about my fantasy simulation team, but I’ve been wondering just how valuable Espinoza is myself. Rostering him will take up a spot for a couple of years without getting any value. Do you cut him and use the spot on a guy closer to or in the big leagues? Upside is future Pedro, downside is two years of nothing.
I dunno anything about Espinoza in particular, but:
“Upside is future Pedro”
To quote my fellow commenter, the erstwhile equine John Elway: NEIGH!
(I mean *conceivably* any pitcher could turn into Pedro or Greg Maddux or Bob Gibson and any hitter could become Barry Bonds or Ted Williams or Willie Mays. But the likelihood is so small that it’s not really worth mentioning.)
“Upside is future Pedro”
I read that somewhere; I thought it was here in FG, but it may have been KLaw. Anyway, obviously best case scenario, but Farnswort did describe him as highest ceiling in the system.
But in general, I thought it was an interesting question… what kind of value could a guy who has super talent with a really high ceiling, but is 2-3 years from even hitting the majors, much less be productive. I can see where people think it’s an overpay… but I also see the point that there’s a good chance SD gets nothing out of this.
What about a future Ramon?
I’ll take his first couple of years…
Now that I can abide!
Depends on what kind of league this is. The one and absolutely only one kind of league he’s worth keeping in is a dynasty league, and it’d have to be a relatively deep one at that.
If you’re a rebuilding team in a dynasty league, he’s useful long term. If you’re a contending team, he makes for good trade bait. I myself picked him up in the offseason and he was a piece I moved in pretty big acquisition.
But in any redraft or keeper league, he’s utterly pointless. At absolute best, he may get a cup of coffee in 2018. Realistically, with the Padres years away from contention, they’ll probably take him along slowly to avoid blowing out his arm or burning too much service time before they’re ready to contend.
bravo on your risk taking!
thanks 😉
I’ll upvote you, buddy!
Proof of bias towards Red Sox prospects. In the BA ranking linked in the article for Espinoza it shows the organization as “Red Sox (traded to Padres)” Why not just list Padres? Doe they have to list the Red Sox?
Well what they’ve put gives more information, the performances that resulted in his ranking were when he was a red sox so that fact has to be in there somewhere. Say you looked at the list some time later for research purposes if it just said padres it would be misleading.
It’s a fairly standard practice in writing. Although sometimes they will put the new team first and the old team second: Padres (traded from Red Sox). But like Cub said, it fits with the description.
I guess there are a lot of Red Sox fans on Fan Graphs.
I’m a Cubs fan, but I can see that the Red Sox are pretty stacked. I love Betts and Xander and if I was a Red Sox fan, I’d be excited about Benintendi and Moncada as well. I’m personally surprised they traded Espinoza, but after reading other comments, I can understand why they did. I think ESPN is totally biased towards the Red Sox and Yankees, but I don’t feel the same way about FG.
I like that multiple people offer you factual, informative explanations. And you respond with “derp.”
Trolls gonna troll, I reckon.
There might or might not be many Red Sox fans, but there’s clearly one moron as long as you stay around.
BA published their list before he was traded. After the trade, they updated it to reflect he’d since been traded. That’s not bias. That’s how updating previously published stories works. And it’s what they’ll do if other players on their top 100 are traded.
I actually find it hard to understand how people could think the Red Sox overpaid. I mean, obviously it’s a real possibility that Espinoza ends up with more surplus value in the long run, but the downside risk and time value of money put the expected value about even, as Dave demonstrates. But on top of expected value, you need to risk adjust and factor in the fact that buyers should pay a premium for deadline deals because it helps them fill an acute need. When you do that it seems to me that the Red Sox won the deal. At least, the argument seems to be between the Red Sox winning it and it being fair. The only way you conclude the Padres won is to severely underestimate the role of risk in these transactions.
One thing people forget with these kinds of trades is the value of winning, going deep into the playoffs will actually net you a good chuck of change so a move like this could be very much worth it considering the volatility of pitching prospects
The question of whether they overpaid seems really reasonable, just based on your level of optimism for each of the players. If we choose not to look at the #15 rank as close to #20, as Dave did, but see it as closer to #10 (since it is just as close…), then it’s not hard to imagine that Espinoza could be worth closer to 10 or 12 or 14 WAR in his first few years.
Similarly, Dave says that we can project Pomeranz for 2.5 WAR/year for the next couple of years, but what if I’m skeptical of his performance this year, and think the 1.3 WAR he put up last year is closer to his actual value? Now suddenly Pomeranz is worth something like $25 or $30 million on the open market for his 2.5 years, while Espinoza has something like $60-70M in surplus value. Total overpay.
The timing point is really the valid one, and is the best way to think about it. The Red Sox traded wins from their 2020 team for wins now. The Padres did the reverse. That’s fine.
Last point: the question of overpay, to me, is always about the market, and is hence unknowable. If the Padres had no other bidders that were close to what the Red Sox offered, or if they had been willing to accept a lesser prospect, but just negotiated well to get Espinoza, then yes, it was an overpay. But we’ll never know that.
What it amounts to is whether or not one believes Pomeranz is for real (I see him as regressing from what he’s been this year, but still as a valuable mid-rotation arm) coupled with whether the Red Sox could’ve gotten something better for Espinoza.
For as far away as Espinoza is, he’s a consensus top 20 prospect and those have very real trade value. If one believes that Pomeranz will turn into a pumpkin, trading any top 20 prospect for him is an overpay.
I don’t share that view and my only problems with the deal are purely sentimental (Espinoza is one of my favorite prospects), but I can see the sense behind the position if one ignores Pomeranz’s peripherals and addition of a new pitch in the offseason and just assume that he’s going to regress based on outdated notions of Petco being a hitters’ park (It’s roughly on par with Fenway in terms of run environment this season).
One aspect of this trade I felt would be a possible plus (if it ever became the case) is what is the floor value of Pomeranz if he either A) Doesn’t hold up at the end of this season? And/or B) Organization realizes his arm is fragile going down the road?
The Sox in a worse-case scenario would still have a long-relief/specialist arm that they’ve been missing since they dealt off Andrew Miller, and have gone through horrible luck with the FA acquisitions (Bailey, Hanrahan). Pomeranz was pretty decent as a specialist, and would be fit to be their best one if he implodes as a starter over the next couple of months.
As well, the AL East has been harsh even on the best pitchers in the league. Jake Arrieta and Jon Lester had their team’s doubt their top-rotation status, only to leave the division and look like Cy Young winners. Humbug with park adjustments! There have been many, many great pitchers who have had trouble sustaining success in this division.
Noting this issue, topping with the mediocrity of Red Sox recent pitching prospects (who have barely survived out the bullpen and unsure if any have sustain 1+WAR years), what were the chances that Espinosa’s talent would flourish here? Even with his talent and growth, what are his chances he can hold this confidence in 2020 when the Yankees and Orioles restock their lineups with the likes of Bryce Harper or Eric Hosmer?
Good number of pitchers have had to leave this division to grow, unless they had some safety in Tropicana Field. There are great prospects now (Bundy, Gausman, ERod, Severino) who seem to be stunted by how punishing their young mistakes can be.
What are #14 and #15 prospects of 2014’s WAR currently (Bundy, Gaus)? This isn’t even to say that they are busts, but the ability to maximize pitching in this division isn’t linear to the talent you build on the farm. Espinosa might be a sure thing in any other environment, but there’s a good chance he could still be mediocre in this division.
He has a better chance of becoming a solid confident pitcher elsewhere. But there should be more detailed analysis on pitching prospects’ growth in the AL East; I’m sure the average WAR of top-20 is much lower for the ones who get stuck on these teams. I’ll take Pomeranz floor as a poor-man’s Andrew Miller over the success rate of can’t miss pitching prospects surviving Fenway.
I know Espinosa looks the part. So did the ones currently struggling right now.
The reality is there are very few comparisons to Espinoza that make sense, Espinoza is a 11-25 consensus prospect but is far away from big leagues and has thrown with success in the minors. Guys like him happen very few times. If I remember right Felix was ranked 30th on BA’s list after a breakout year as a 17 YO. If anyone has guys like Espinoza/Felix around that area, I’d like to know. This isn’t to compare him Espinoza to Felix, just the prospect situation is somewhat similar.
As I said before this isn’t the overpay that Rodney or Kimbrel deal was by the other team, but it is an overpay. Pomeranz is having a great season but is most likely one of the 25-50 best pitchers in baseball going forward. Landing a huge upside arm for Padres is a very good get, and Pomeranz himself has a real “bust” factor as a starter.
With respect, this is a good example of what isavage and I are talking about in comments and what Cameron is talking about in the post: focusing on the upside without adequately discounting for risk or factoring in the premium that is paid for an immediate upgrade during a pennant race. When you factor in those things it’s very hard to find an overpay here.
Oh I’m not discounting risk, Espinoza has quite a bit, but so does Pomeranz (not saying it is equal). Pomeranz has half a season of starting like a number 3 or better, is 27, with a rough IP/Injury history. It’s very easy to see the overpay, it’s just not a drastic one to the extent of Shelby deal
My point is that you didn’t say anything about how you were factoring in the downside risk (or the trade deadline premium). You just said Espinoza is a rare prospect, therefore the Red Sox overpaid. Fine, if Espinoza is better than the consensus among talent evaluators, then that is true. Not just for this trade but for any trade involving prospects: if the prospects are better than people think, it’s a good trade for the team that got them. But that’s an exercise is talent evaluation, not trade analysis.
“Pomeranz is having a great season but is most likely one of the 25-50 best pitchers in baseball going forward. Landing a huge upside arm for Padres is a very good get, and Pomeranz himself has a real “bust” factor as a starter.”
A top 25-50 starter in MLB is a pretty big get, Max Scherzer falls into that realm by FIP right now. That aside, both FIP and xFIP like him as a top 25 starter, which is rather predictive.
I’m really not sure how any reasonable person could make the argument that one pitching prospect in low A-ball is an overpay for Pomeranz. I think if you are making that argument you are highly overvaluing prospects and under-selling the risk for any prospect. The Indians traded Pomeranz and Alex White for Ubaldo when Ubaldo had the same years of control left that Pomeranz has now. That was 2 top 50 prospects, Pomeranz was #24 going into 2012, and both guys were much closer to the majors than Espinoza is now. Ubaldo was a much more established pitcher than Pomeranz is now, but was in the midst of a so-so year that was in fact a sign of things to come. The track of Pomeranz and White after that trade is a pretty good reason why you are unlikely to regret a move for current and more certain value. The Indians ended up only getting 1 good year out of Ubaldo, and a draft pick when he left, but they’d also have apparently only gotten 1 good year out of Pomeranz to date and nothing out of White.
The trade I keep going back to is another DD trade, the one that got Cabrera for Miller and Maybin.
Wonderful stuff Dave.
I know this point has really nothing to do with the trade, but signing the best arm from the draft on the same day helps to lessen the blow. He is a year younger and so theoretically a bit more risky.
Kopech’s continual emergence also helps this trade seem less devastating.
EDIT: Is the chance of Pomeranz keeping this up for the forseeable future any worse than the chance that Espinoza being great for 2.5 years in the big leagues?
“Kopech’s continual emergence also helps this trade seem less devastating.”
I really hope that this didn’t factor into Dombrowski’s decision. Kopech is an extreme long shot to start. Keith Law couldn’t think of a single example of a guy who throws that hard that didn’t either wind up in the bullpen or blow out his arm.
“EDIT: Is the chance of Pomeranz keeping this up for the forseeable future any worse than the chance that Espinoza being great for 2.5 years in the big leagues?”
Not really. If scouts are to be believed, the only obstacle Espinoza faces in his future is whether his build will hold up to the rigors of a full season starting workload. That is, admittedly, a huge potential obstacle.
For Pomeranz, he has the benefit of having performed at the MLB level in a sustainable manner. The question for him, likewise, is whether he’ll hold up. Working against him is the fact that he’s never pitched a full season before, but for him is the fact that he’s the right age for it to be something he could do.
Both have risks, but I wouldn’t say it’s any less likely for Pomeranz to keep it up than for Espinoza to make it.
“EDIT: Is the chance of Pomeranz keeping this up for the foreseeable future any worse than the chance that Espinoza being great for 2.5 years in the big leagues?”
Bingo, I think that’s the key. The Red Sox, at the moment, are more interested in competing this season than seeing if this particular prospect pans out 2-3 years down the road. The calculus would be much different for, say, the Phillies or Twins (or look no further than their trading partner, the Padres). The Sox have a deep farm system that they can deal from to improve this year’s team. Of course they don’t want to overpay, of course that don’t want to trade away every prospect. But given where they are on the win curve, a couple of wins this year could be a huge difference between playing in October and not.
Just wanted to point out that his age shouldn’t be viewed solely as a value inhibitor. It also means he could continue evolving and end up a top 5 prospect as many scouts believe, rendering the table pretty pointless or even counterproductive to this argument.
Taking a snapshot ranking and basing result statistics on it seems really really bizarre, because even if it’s based on peak ranking, Espinoza shouldn’t be an example at all for it due to his being the same age as current draftees, and nobody is comparing their current rankings to Triple A prospects or guys who were ranked similar at age 24 and never planned out.
Having more information in the future always renders old information irrelevant. If Espinoza wallows in AA with control problems and falls off of prospect lists, that will also render the table irrelevant. The #15 ranking is the best guess we have of what he will be based on the information we have right now, and that is the information the Padres and Red Sox had to use to make their decision.
It’s not a snapshot ranking, its the most current ranking. If we knew, today, what Espinoza’s ranking will be next year, we would use that. Do you happen to have that on hand?
Yes they are. If there was a player in this years draft who could be considered, on draft day, to be a top-10 overall prospect, that kid is being taken 1-1. It’s standard practice to unite players with all different levels of risk (and yes, that includes risk of failure and chances of taking a step forward) onto the same prospect lists. It might make sense to have a “19-and-younger” list and a “20+” list, just to compare more similar players, but that’s not how it’s done. The way its done, some combination of risk and upside is considered, and as it turns out, player’s with Espinoza’s combination of those tends to be slightly overrated on prospect lists.
My point is that this type of historical data isn’t useful for younger prospects. If you want to apply the table to a guy when he’s called up and cite his current or even peak ranking, I totally see its value.
All the data points are after the fact on guys so it allowed them their entire minor league career to establish their ranking. Trying to draw off of those results for a guy currently in A ball makes no sense to me whatsoever. You aren’t comparing like situations then, in my book.
I highly doubt organizations they are using prospect rankings of BA or MLBpipeline or Baseball Prospectus to forecast the value of their prospects in the future or the present. Surely these organizations have their own valuation of prospects and this might contribute to decision making. I think any valuation based on prospect rankings from independent organizations like BA needs to be taken for what it is. These charts highly flux dependent on how a few talent evaluators feel at a given point in time, whose formula isn’t an exacting science and shouldn’t be credited as one. To say that Dave article presents all the information available is to greatly neglect the complexities of player evaluations and projections.
These charts highly flux dependent on how a few talent evaluators feel at a given point in time, whose formula isn’t an exacting science and shouldn’t be credited as one.
Can you find a single person here – or anywhere else, for that matter – that credits talent evaluation as an “exacting science”?
To say that Dave article presents all the information available
Again, who said this? I don’t see what arguing against these artificial positions accomplishes.
I agree with every sentence in this article, Dave. The unstated reason that people will not like this trade from Boston’s perspective is because Dombrowski is now actively shortening the team’s long-term window to give them a better shot in the short run. Reasonable people can disagree if this is the best strategy, but it’s also hard to imagine that the Red Sox will still be good in several years without initiating a rebuild. Call it Big Money ball.
I’m not even sure he is shortening the window. If we’re saying a prospect won’t be in the majors til 2018, the idea that a team with the Red Sox muscle couldn’t restock with a very similar player in the intervening time is an odd one.
this article assumes he’s even deserving of that kind of ranking, when imo he’s really not.
and at the very least, I’m sure that though all pitching prospects have high variance outcomes, that’s truer of 18yr olds with just ok stats in A ball than it is of most others.
but man oh man, Dave sure likes to flip flop on his prospect lovin’ philosophy when it can spin positive for the red sox.
reasonable comment reasonable comment BOOM accusation of red sox bias which clearly does not exist by a guy who clearly IS biased against the red sox
hmm. red sox recent performance disagrees with your assessment.
Scouting the stat line for an 18 yo pitcher in A ball is pretty close to the definition of short sighted.
Was a no-brainer for the Sox. Talk about about them overpaying was ridiculous hysteria coming from the prospect wing. Pomeranz is good, controllable AND cheap. What more can you ask for?
First time post.
Man, can you just picture how good the Sox would be today if we hadn’t stupidly traded away can’t miss prospects Nick Hagadone and Casey Kelly
Or what a waste it would have been to hold on to flameouts like Anibal Sanchez and Anthony Rizzo.
The relative success, or lack thereof, of pitching prospects in one organization is not an accurate representation of all top pitching prospects. While many top Boston pitching prospects have bombed, the Sox also received immense surplus value over the past 10 years from Lester, Papelbon and Buchholz.
I like that you said “first time post”. It hearkens to the world of radio – “Hi I’m Gertie from Poughkeepsie, first time caller, long time listener!”
At any rate, welcome. May your stay be a long and fruitful one.
Well its a no-brainer right up until Pomeranz falls apart. Which I would bet money on happening.
You’re looking for g’tees, go join the post office. I thought the discussion was about the fairness of the trade.
And you weigh his chances of falling apart as higher than those of an 18 year old with <140 career innings…how?
Where did I ever say Espinoza was less likely to fall apart?? You are making the assumption that me thinking Pomeranz is playing over his head means that I must think the opposite about Espinoza. Which is not true at all.
He is probably even more likely to fall apart based on the failure rate of pitching prospects. But Espinoza wasnt going to be on the Red Sox this year (or probably next year either) so what he does is irrelevant to the Red Sox chances of winning this year.
Pomeranz was brought in to help Boston win this year. The question isnt “Is Pomeranz less risky than Espinoza” the question is “how much will Pomeranz help them right now”. And obviously him falling apart would not be good towards the outcome of winning. Espinoza is totally irrelevant to this equation.
.
Question about one line from the piece: “And the further out you push a player’s contribution, the less valuable it is.”
Why is this the case?
It’s not like contributions experience inflation, right? A 5 win season in 2017 feels as valuable as a 5 win season in 2020?
Dave, fellow commenters, enlighten me.
Think of it like the time value of money. Wins now (especially given where the RS are on the win curve) are more valuable than wins when they don’t know where they’ll be.
Additionally, the risk increases for each year out on a projected value. Saying Espinoza projects to 5 WAR from 2019-20 has larger error bars than saying Pomeranz projects to 5 WAR in 2017-18. And because of the nature of a prospect, pitchers especially, that error margin/distribution is going to be heavily skewed towards downside (easier for him to be worth 0WAR than 10WAR).
It’s the economics way of saying a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.
How about we use the Red Sox as an example:
In 2020, Ortiz will be long retired, Pedroia will be turning 37 and Price turning 35. Xander Bogaerts will have hit free agency the previous offseason.
They know that they’re good in 2016, and that the marginal value of a win is high. They could quite easily be a 70 win team in 2020, and the marginal value of those wins would therefore be much lower.
(Posted on 7/20/2012): In 2016, Adrian Gonzalez will be 34, Carl Crawford will be 35, and the Red Sox will have a starting rotation featuring Buchholz, Felix Doubront, and Daniel Bard. This team might win 60 games.
It would be really cool to create a poll asking this question but this format will have to suffice. Rank, if you would be so kind, the following players from the one you would most like to have to the one you would least like to have at the time they were traded, taking into account contract and team control: a) Cole Hamels (and Diekman), b) Craig Kimbrel, c) Drew Pomeranz, d) Shelby Miller e) Ken Giles (and Arauz). Now rank the following propsect packages based on which you would most like to have (again, when they were traded accounting for control: a) Eickoff, Asher, Harrison, Alfaro, Williams b) Margot, Guerra, Asuaje, Allen c) Espinoza d) Swanson, Enciarte, Blair e) Appel, Eshelman, Oberholtzer, Velasquez, Arauz.
I would rank the first group a, c, b, d, e (at time of trade) and the second group d, b, e, c, a.
First group: a b c d e (b and c are close)
Second group: b a d e c
Alfaro and Williams are being seriously underrated, I think, and I’ve never liked Alfaro all that much. I’ll take them over B and C, especially with Eickoff in the offer.
Good article, but I think the “overpay” theme has more to do with Pomeranz than Espinoza.
If we remove the name Pomeranz and instead speculate about a trade of Espinoza for a #2 starter with 2.5 years of affordable control, I expect most of the overpay conversation never arises. Espinoza is a *fantastic* prospect, but by the numbers alone most people understand the relative value of a present-day #2.
But almost nobody is accustomed to hearing Pomeranz and thinking #2 starter. Whether you believe in him or not, his track record as a #2 is short.
As good as this article is, I think a more persuasive piece against the overpay notion would be one focused on why we should believe Pomeranz is a #2 (or #3). I think there’s an interesting argument there that goes deeper than “he throws a cutter now”, which matters but is not really convincing on its own.
What I do find fascinating is for all the struggles Pomeranz had in his early years, he has a career 4.35 ERA in Coors field, giving up just 76 hits in 80 innings.
And his base stats in AL East stadiums are pretty darn good too. Some used as reliever, which I’m okay with this trade. Worse-case is we have a great specialist-K arm in the bullpen. Something the Red Sox haven’t even gotten their failed starters to perform well.
And it seems durability will be an issue with many pitchers in general, but converted starter arms seem to have longer, better runs than general relievers (Wade Davis, Hochevar, Koji, Andrew Miller). So I look at this trade as hopefully he is stable in the bandbox division, or he stabilizes a consistently injury-prone bullpen for a couple years. With the Red Sox luck with pitching I think the persuasive piece should add all possible outcomes for Pomeranz, since he could possible be successful even if he fails as a starter long term.
I would also add, that Pomeranz may be much more valuable than 5 -6 WAR over 2.5 seasons.
Pomeranz currently owns 2.5 WAR thus far this season. You can’t just throw away the idea he actually has broken out and is a legit 4-5 win top of the rotation arm. Actually, the chances of Pomeranz being this good are probably better than Espinoza reaching his upside because Pomeranz is actually doing it right now. The Padres could of held onto Pomeranz. If he pitched good in the 2nd half, he probably would had fetched far more than one pitching prospect in A ball. Of course, if he didn’t pitch well post all star break, than he probably doesn’t get Espinoza. If Pomeranz finishes the season with +4 WAR of what not, this would seem like a solid deal for the Redsox, getting 2.5 years of a really good pitcher for one pitching prospect so far away.
Thats of course not to say we should bet on Pomeranz being this good, but we should also not bet on Espinoza being any where near as good as his prospect pedigree.
Yes, but overpaying is fine as long as it also accomplishes your goals. If Pomeranz stays a solid #3 starter at a reasonable cost for 180+ innings for the next three seasons then Boston doesn’t really care how good Espinoza becomes. If Pomeranz helps them win a championship in that period, the same is true even if he doesn’t meet those seasonal qualifiers.
It does, just not in the way you’re suggesting. People keep describing Espinoza in the comments section as a lottery ticket and lumping him in with other highly rated pitching prospects who didn’t actually share his profile. This is the kind of thing where specific familiarity with these prospects matters. Espinoza is not your typical highly rated pitching prospect who has a high chance of flaming out. People who have seen him and followed him and heard him discussed by scouts know that he’s special, even moreso than your standard ~15th ranked prospect in the minor leagues. People who have only seen his ranking and his age do things like you did by referencing Creagh and DiMecili’s prospect groups, then further downplaying his value based on the perception of how far he is from the major leagues and therefore how many things could go wrong to undermine his value. Essentially what I’m saying is that the only reason he’s rated as low as 15th is his age and distance from the major leagues. In terms of talent, he’s a young Giolito without the injury history (Giolito’s curve is a 70 and clearly better than Espinoza’s 60, but Espinoza has a 60 changeup compared to Giolito’s 50).
And again, this is precisely where familiarity and context matter. A pitcher on the cusp of the major leagues with great stuff and poor command will often be in that 11-25 range, and they do have a wide variance in potential outcomes with a significant percentage never becoming even replacement level starters. That’s not Espinoza. He is not only a high ceiling pitching prospect, but also a high floor one. Possessing three plus pitches and above average command for his level (although below average by major league standards) makes him genuinely special. That’s no guarantee of major league success by any means, as it’s not only possible that he gets injured before he reaches the bigs but also that his stuff changes for the worse as his body changes. But even if that happens, you’re looking at a back of the rotation starter instead of a front of the rotation starter.
This is the mistake in reasoning that I mentioned above. Espinoza’s distance from the major leagues is already baked into his ranking. On talent, he is a top ten prospect, but he’s currently ranked at ~#15 overall because of his distance from the major leagues. You’re devaluing him for something that he has already been devalued for.
That depends entirely upon the team that he’s contributing to. Being able to contribute right now for the Padres would be less valuable than having those contributes made several seasons from now, right? That’s the reason why Jeff wrote that “The Braves should be motivated to trade Julio Teheran.”
This paragraph specifically is what made steam come out of my ears, as it is chock-full of specious reasoning. Anderson Espinoza absolutely does not project “for something like +8 WAR over his controllable years.” The average #11-#25 pitching prospect does, but Anderson Espinoza is not the average #11-#25 pitching prospect as I explained above. And honestly, how can you even make a statement like “he’s about as high-risk as a prospect gets” based strictly on his age and prospect ranking? This is “scouting the stat line” at its absolute worst. This: http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/scouting-anderson-espinoza-newest-padre-prospect/ is an actual analysis of Anderson Espinoza’s skills. Eric Longenhagen covers some of Espinoza’s flaws and addresses the things that could go wrong in the years between now and a potential major league appearance, but read that and then tell me how you can justify calling Espinoza “as high-risk as a prospect gets” based on his age and prospect ranking.
To reiterate, I am not saying that Anderson Espinoza is guaranteed to be a great major league pitcher. There is significant risk in any pitching prospect, and Espinoza’s age does add additional uncertainty to the picture. What I am saying is that taking his prospect ranking, then plugging that in to Creagh and DiMiceli’s model and presenting that as a legitimate assessment of Espinoza is incredibly misguided. Creagh and DiMiceli’s model is intended to help us develop a better conception of the prospect rankings themselves; it is not intended to project value of specific individuals. You are misusing their model.
The flaw in your logic is that you cannot just assert that he isn’t like other pitching comps in this article. The whole “prospect ranking” system is supposed to take that into account.
I could see an argument that the #15 ranking is silly, assuming you think he’s a special talent. But history is not kind to this type of prospect.
Another way of putting it: at the time, who didn’t think Todd van Poppel was a special talent?
There were no comps made in this article. Dave’s column is based on the general attributes of the #11-#25 ranked pitching prospects, not any individual comparisons. Creagh and DiMiceli’s work was never intended to suggest that all #11-#25 ranked pitchers are similar because they aren’t. It’s broad commentary on what that ranking usually means, it is not intended to be used to say that any one particular pitching prospect will fit the average for that ranking.
I am not in any way saying that Espinoza’s ranking is silly. I think it’s appropriate. I am saying that all #15 prospects are not created equal, and that applying a one-size-fits-all projection for them is grossly inaccurate. Some #15 prospects are going to be high ceiling, high risk prospects. Some #15 prospects are going to be medium ceiling, low risk prospects. Some #15 prospects like Espinoza are going to be high ceiling, medium to low risk prospects who have to be discounted a bit because they’re still in the low minors.
Actually this specific profile has done very well historically.
Van Poppel was a special talent, but he had serious command issues throughout his minor league career. I have been writing for years that great stuff, poor command prospects have been overrated in prospect rankings and that they typically don’t live up to expectations. Espinoza is exciting precisely because he has above average control and command for his level along with elite stuff.
the rankings take all of that into account.
basically you just wrote an epic essay to argue that the 15th rank is underrating him, without actually saying it.
everyone understands the differences between high upside/high risk prospects and high floor/low risk prospects and every variation in between, and that all 15th ranked prospects aren’t the same.
No, they absolutely do not.
*facepalm* You’re responding to a post where I explicitly said that the 15th ranking is appropriate and now pretending that I’m saying it’s underrating him.
If you understand that then you would agree that this column where Dave applied a one-size-fits-all WAR projection and success rate to 15th ranked prospects was a terrible mistake.
Let’s be absolutely clear here, Damaso. You have established yourself as the most biased, least rational commenter on all of FanGraphs now that the Free_AEC guy is gone. You have repeatedly made dismissive comments toward Anderson Espinoza without ever having seen him perform once, all because he happened to be signed with the Boston Red Sox organization. Believe it or not, I happen to despise the Red Sox as well (Orioles fan), but I don’t let my fandom influence my opinions the way that you do. You’ve let it cause you to make absolutely absurd statements to the point where you’re considered a complete joke on this site. Your bias against the Red Sox is the one and only thing you’re known for. You have repeatedly claimed that Espinoza is overrated not for any rational or informed reason, but simply due to who he signed with.
give your face a rest from your palms.
You realize all you are saying is that “he deseves the 15th rank but is actually worth more than other players ranked around there”?
which of course doesn’t make sense?
If you think that he is worth significantly more than other ~15th ranked prospects, then you are saying he should be ranked significantly higher than them.
period.
Have a nice day. 😀
If Espinoza was closer to the big leagues he probably would be ranked even higher than he is. His distance from the big leagues is factored in the prospect rankings, so I don’t think you shouldn’t penalize him for it much more.
Eh, the way it accounts for that is pretty much what Dave describes, though.
He does have a much bigger chance at busting than Berrios. He’s also much more likely to put up a 6+ WAR season.
No, it does not account for that at all. jgraves is correct.
What are you basing this comment on?
Please stop and think about the absurdity of basing future WAR projections and bust chances solely on prospect ranking, with absolutely no information included about the actual player. Because Player X is a pitcher ranked between 11th and 25th, he’s going to do _________. That doesn’t immediately strike you as ridiculous? It is ridiculous, and it’s absolutely not what Creagh and DiMiceli intended their work to be used for.
all you are saying is that all prospect rankings are ridiculous and meaningless.
you realize that, no?
all the rankings are is our best attempt to rank prospects according to their future value. that is all they are. they serve no other purpose.
what do you think these rankings are for, if not to assess relative value?
3 WAR is kind of arbitrary as an upper limit for busts. I would consider 6 WAR over 6 years to be a bust as well, at least for a highly touted prospect
Not sure of how many pitchers would get the luxury of averaging 1 WAR per season for 6 straight years. Or somehow getting a 2+WAR year followed by a 0 WAR? Then given his job back?
I would consider a 6 WAR over 6 years for most players to be a bust unless they are in strictly role/specialist/bench guys, or the team is run by Rachel Phelps.
Reading the comments, I’m a minority of one: upon reflection I think it was a good trade for both teams.
You are not alone. I agree. Both teams took on some risk. Both teams hope for some reward, ideally a substantial one. Both teams took on these risks and dreamed on these rewards at an appropriate time given their respective positions on the win curve. A win-win trade in my view. Of course it could turn out to be a loss-loss trade. Or a win-loss. Or even a loss-win. But that’ll be fodder for another article down the road:)
I think it was overpay given Pomeranz as a volatile pitcher.
When we got him for a oft injured Brett Anderson I was alright given that Anderson was into his final controllable year but wasn’t expecting much. He started with a run of 8 wins before breaking his hand and after that his career was sporadic at best.
I don’t like the Yonder/Scrabble deal but of late maybe since June Yonder alonso is hitting like 322/350 so that is more investable considering Alonso is pretty much a career 280/350 110WRC+ type guy and Pomeranz is very unpredictable and may blow up in the East
Doyle Alexander for John Smolz. The Tigers, like the Red Sox, were recent WS champions trying to get back in. Alexander totally pushed the Tigers into the playoffs, where they were immediate eliminated by the Twins. Smolz was recently elected to HoF.
Was it worth it?
A few years later, the Jays traded Jeff Kent, who was already in the major leagues, for David Cone, and of course he was pivotal to that WS Chmpion team. Was it worth it?
I feel like this Red Sox team is too flawed to be pushing in all the chips. If you make the playoffs then get wiped out, and making the playoffs itself isn’t all that special, then sacrificing a potentially great player is too much. Esp when the acquisition is not even certainly going to push you into the postseason.
You simply cannot cherry-pick two trades from the past 30 years as proof positive that the deal was a bad one, just as it would be equally useless to find two veterans-for-prospects deals in which the prospect never even reached the majors to support the deal (from Boston’s vantage point). Two cherry-picked examples don’t help to prove or disprove *anything*, particularly when you’re able to evaluate the Smoltz and Kent trades by knowing exactly how every player panned out over the course of their entire careers. OBVIOUSLY Boston isn’t looking to trade away a 50 or 60 WAR player and potential franchise cornerstone, but neither Boston nor San Diego has that magical crystal ball.
This is a great article Dave, especially on the heels of the trade value lists. This is exactly why I couldn’t understand all those guys later in the trade value lists that have produced little or no MLB level stats. Guys wash out, even uber prospects.
But back to this article, I think the conclusion is probably correct – good value both ways. Red Sox are more in a position for now value, Padres for later potential value.
The Red Sox have a horrible record when it comes to developing promising pitching prospects – which suggests that Espinoza was worth less to them than to other teams. On that basis, a trade was indicated. Their record with ex-prospects (e.g., Andrew Miller) is better, and Pomeranz is that, kinda.
My benchmark for such trades is Curt Schilling and Brady Anderson for Mike Boddicker in 1988. This was decisively one-sided long-term and didn’t really work out short-term (the Sox won the division but were swept), but has generally been seen as a justified move.
Yeah the Boddicker for Brady and Broke Bloody Sock is undeniably relevant here. Can’t believe Dave Cameron failed to include it. Poor form Dave.