Drilling Down into a Bunt Situation

Mitch Moreland led off the bottom of the sixth inning Monday night with a single and stood at first with the score knotted at zero. Elvis Andrus was at the plate with Michael Young and Josh Hamilton due next. Given the pitching duel seen so far and expectation for the remainder of the game, an Andrus bunt would not have shocked many people.

Followers of win expectancy rightfully agree with that call not being made. Sacrifice bunts rarely increase a team’s chances to win. It is, however, a bit more complicated to apply the tenets of win probability to an exact situation than it is to speak in broad concepts.

For one, win expectancy is blind to the specific players involved which can play an important part in skewing the numbers. But there are more subtle assumptions present as well that are worth delving into. A pertinent one in this case is that the markov chains inside win expectancy are calibrated around a run environment. Typically, we use the average run environment for the park in play, but on an individual game basis the environment can vary quite wildly due to the two pitchers in the game.

Examining whether a bunt call might have been proper involves figuring out the expected run environment of the game going forward. Based on the pitch counts of Cliff Lee and Tim Lincecum, the strength of the bullpens behind them and the venue, the number I roughly calculated pegged it at 3.4 runs per team per nine innings. Ignoring the chances of a failed attempt and a fielding error and making the simplistic assumption that a sac bunt would move Moreland to second 100% of the time, that presents a bunt play as being worth -1.4% of a win to the Rangers.

So even with the lower run environment, the call is still overall a bad one, but how low would the run environment need to be before a bunt would result in a positive change in win expectancy?

Change in WE per run environment

The break even point is around 1.1 runs per team per nine innings, which should give you an idea of how far off the bunt was from being profitable due to the run environment. One point one runs is not a realistic assumption under almost any condition.

How about the timing though? If the same situation presented itself later in the game, with fewer innings left to play, would that make it profitable? It certainly increases the benefit of the bunt play, but it turns out that it still never gets it past the 0% barrier.

Change in WE per inning of bunt

There are times that sacrifice bunts are called for probabilistically. Nearly all of those,however, have to do with moving a runner from second to third. To justify moving a runner from first to second, a manager would need it to be late in the game and the run environment to be abnormally low.





Matthew Carruth is a software engineer who has been fascinated with baseball statistics since age five. When not dissecting baseball, he is watching hockey or playing soccer.

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B N
13 years ago

“Ignoring the chances of a failed attempt and a fielding error”

Does this basically mean ignoring the possibility of an unproductive out and a hit (by any means)? Or does it just mean eliminating the possibility of an unproductive out and 2 men on due to a fielder’s error? I assume it’s the first, but it’s not quite made clear.

Because if it’s the second option, I have a hard time believing it has a negative win contribution- unless Andrus is just a horrible bunter. Thinking about it logically, if Andrus is a good bunter (a maybe), I would think he would have a decent chance at legging out a good bunt. In that respect, bunting would be very much like him just trying to get a slap hit.

In fact, without that possibility, I’d have trouble imagining why any team would put down a sacrifice bunt unless they had the most incompetent hitter at the plate (see: pitcher). For example, see:

http://stats.masslive.com/mlb/getleaders.asp?rank=018

A rather unsurprising trend emerges: guys that have a lot of sac bunts are very fast, as a group. While the outcome may be classified as a sac bunt, they probably had a fairly typical BABIP chance of getting on base. In that light, it’s hard to see why a bunt by Andrus would have such an impossibly negative win expectancy- unless we’re basically distoring the situation just to prove (for the 100th time) that pure sacrifice bunts kind of suck.

B N
13 years ago
Reply to  B N

In fact, judging from this:

http://hardballtalk.nbcsports.com/2009/09/29/stat-of-the-day-infield-hits-bunt-hits/

“great “bunt for hitters” are generally in the 40s as far as reaching first when they get a bunt down. Cabrera (50), Bourn (47) and Ellsbury (47) are the best of the guys on the leaderboard.” (2009)

One could make the argument that players are attempting too few bunts. A BABIP of 40% is pretty solid. As long as you can make contact reliably so you can send the runner at first, a bunt is as good as any other type of batted ball. (Also interesting that guys like Pena and Ortiz don’t bunt more. Guys bunting against the shift have had very good odds, > 50% in many cases. You’d think they’d bunt until defenses had to be more honest)

Bhaakon
13 years ago
Reply to  B N

There’s some huge selection bias in there. Not only are those guys all speedy and exceptional bunters, they’re almost certainly waiting for spots when the defense is not defending the bunt. If they started laying down a bunt every 10 or 15 at bats at bats, defenses would adjust and that BABIP would plummet..

tarlinian
13 years ago
Reply to  B N

Seems like a rather obvious case of professionals failing to play minimax. I’m almost 100% sure that wOBA on non sacrifice bunts for most player is higher than for all other plate appearances. You would think that bunt rates would increase. I have a hard time believing that increasing bunt rates even slightly would drastically reduce the effectiveness of an attempted drag bunt.

B N
13 years ago
Reply to  B N

@Bhaakon:

However, right now they’re showing a better BABIP with one type of hit than another. This would seem to indicate that they’d be better off taking more chances at bunts, until either:

A. Their BABIP for bunts and regular hits are closer together.

B. The defenses adjust, allowing them an advantage in hitting the ball over the defense when it’s pulled in.

Getting the defense to move in is an advantage itself for hitting. See the same issue about bunting into the shift. If you can get on base bunting, the defense can’t shift as much. To me, this indicates that people aren’t bunting enough.