How Should We Evaluate a Manager?
I’ve got a vote for American League Manager of the Year this season and I’m terrified. My first vote as a member of the Baseball Writer’s Association, and it’s the impossible one.
Maybe impossible is too tough a word. I’m sure I’ll figure something out in time to submit a vote. But evaluating the productivity of a manager just seems so difficult. We’ve seen efforts that use the difference between projected and actual wins, or between “true talent” estimations for the team and their actual outcomes. But those attribute all sorts of random chance to the manager’s machinations.
I’d like to instead identify measurable moments where a manager exerts a direct influence on his team, assign those values or ranks, and see where each current manager sits. So what are those measurable moments?
As far as I, noted idiot, can figure, it’s these variables that define a manager:
- When he uses his best relievers.
- How rigid his approach to the bullpen is.
- Where he puts his best hitters in the lineup.
- How often he bunts with non-pitchers.
What follows is a difficult, probably error-laden, and almost certainly futile effort to score managers on how they’ve done in these four categories. And the worst part is that, when it’s done, not only can I not reveal my vote, but the work won’t really be done — because there’s no doubt that managers are also in charge of personalities and shepherding a clubhouse full of athletes into a cohesive unit. We won’t find a number for that one, and it seems a necessary moment of chaos that threatens to upend our best efforts.
For the first of the above variables, however, what we’d like to do is have a measure of the reliever’s true talent, and then we can match it up with leverage index, which tells us how important the moment is in the context of the game. We’ve got two ways to do this.
The first, called Bullpen Management Above Random by creator Tim Kniker, uses weighted on base average allowed to lefties and righties to judge their true talent. Kniker was kind enough to run this year’s BMAR for us.
| Manager | Manager above Marcel | Optimal above Marcel | % of Optimal | Runs Above Marcel | WAM |
| Bryan Price | 0.018 | 0.091 | 19.3% | 34.2 | 3.5 |
| Buck Showalter | 0.019 | 0.084 | 22.4% | 33.0 | 3.4 |
| Joe Girardi | 0.020 | 0.100 | 20.5% | 32.8 | 3.3 |
| Ned Yost | 0.017 | 0.066 | 25.4% | 28.5 | 2.9 |
| Pete Mackanin | 0.016 | 0.081 | 19.7% | 27.5 | 2.8 |
| Bob Melvin | 0.015 | 0.071 | 21.7% | 27.3 | 2.8 |
| Brad Ausmus | 0.016 | 0.053 | 31.0% | 27.0 | 2.8 |
| Mike Matheny | 0.017 | 0.084 | 20.1% | 26.9 | 2.7 |
| Andy Green | 0.015 | 0.061 | 24.3% | 26.8 | 2.7 |
| Clint Hurdle | 0.014 | 0.063 | 22.4% | 26.3 | 2.7 |
| Jeff Banister | 0.015 | 0.073 | 21.0% | 25.7 | 2.6 |
| Kevin Cash | 0.016 | 0.064 | 24.6% | 25.4 | 2.6 |
| John Farrell | 0.016 | 0.059 | 27.0% | 23.9 | 2.4 |
| Joe Maddon | 0.015 | 0.068 | 21.6% | 21.9 | 2.2 |
| AVERAGE | 0.012 | 0.109 | 11.2% | 20.8 | 2.1 |
| Craig Counsell | 0.012 | 0.061 | 19.0% | 20.6 | 2.1 |
| Terry Francona | 0.013 | 0.061 | 21.1% | 20.4 | 2.1 |
| Chip Hale | 0.010 | 0.081 | 12.7% | 19.9 | 2.0 |
| Robin Ventura | 0.012 | 0.061 | 20.2% | 19.4 | 2.0 |
| Don Mattingly | 0.011 | 0.068 | 15.6% | 18.7 | 1.9 |
| Paul Molitor | 0.009 | 0.068 | 13.9% | 17.8 | 1.8 |
| Walt Weiss | 0.010 | 0.093 | 10.6% | 17.5 | 1.8 |
| A.J. Hinch | 0.009 | 0.084 | 11.0% | 15.5 | 1.6 |
| Terry Collins | 0.009 | 0.072 | 12.3% | 14.3 | 1.5 |
| Fredi Gonzalez | 0.027 | 0.109 | 24.6% | 13.3 | 1.4 |
| Dave Roberts | 0.007 | 0.069 | 9.7% | 12.0 | 1.2 |
| John Gibbons | 0.008 | 0.077 | 10.1% | 11.8 | 1.2 |
| Mike Scioscia | 0.006 | 0.069 | 9.3% | 11.3 | 1.2 |
| Bruce Bochy | 0.007 | 0.067 | 10.7% | 10.9 | 1.1 |
| Brian Snitker | 0.007 | 0.079 | 9.3% | 10.2 | 1.0 |
| Scott Servais | 0.005 | 0.067 | 8.1% | 8.9 | 0.9 |
| Dusty Baker | -0.003 | 0.062 | -4.9% | -4.6 | -0.5 |
Many Cards fans don’t respect Mike Matheny’s bullpen management, so perhaps this passes the sniff test. For the purposes of my later vote, I find it interesting that John Farrell is second in the league in the percent of optimal usage, and that Buck Showalter has a really good bullpen and uses it well. Terry Francona is above average by percent of optimal, but third in this trio.
However, wOBA allowed may not be the best way to judge a player’s true talent. Rob Arthur and Rian Watt developed Weighted Reliever Management score to judge the same thing, and he used Baseball Prospectus’ Deserved Runs Allowed as the measure of talent. He’s a generous person, so he ran a one-year version of wRM for this year for our benefit.
| Team | DRAcor |
| Brewers | -0.88 |
| Red Sox | -0.82 |
| Pirates | -0.80 |
| Astros | -0.70 |
| Yankees | -0.68 |
| Braves | -0.66 |
| Royals | -0.66 |
| Padres | -0.65 |
| Phillies | -0.62 |
| White Sox | -0.61 |
| Mets | -0.60 |
| Tigers | -0.54 |
| Giants | -0.52 |
| Rays | -0.51 |
| Indians | -0.49 |
| Orioles | -0.43 |
| Reds | -0.41 |
| Athletics | -0.41 |
| Twins | -0.40 |
| Mariners | -0.36 |
| Blue Jays | -0.35 |
| Angels | -0.32 |
| Rockies | -0.25 |
| Marlins | -0.25 |
| Nationals | -0.22 |
| Dodgers | -0.17 |
| Rangers | -0.15 |
| Cubs | -0.15 |
| Diamondbacks | 0.00 |
| Cardinals | 0.05 |
Arthur wanted to point out that these are not the same as the wRM+ scores in the article, because they aren’t based on multiple years and regressed in the same way. Instead, shown here is the raw correlation between DRA and the leverage index of the relievers on the team, weighted by innings pitched. More negative means that the better relievers are being used with the most leverage, which means the manager is doing well.
By this measure, Farrell does well; Matheny, not so much.
Finally, there might be a third way, a better way to evaluate reliever usage — namely, by using projections instead of true-talent estimators. Because Arthur used full-season DRA and leverage numbers in his analysis, he was more answering the question “Looking back, did the manager make the right decisions?” It might make sense, however, to ask “Based on the info he had then, did the manager make the right decisions?” We have the benefit of looking at the results here, but since we also don’t have the full season or multiple years of regression, there’s more uncertainty with these rankings than the ones he published.
I’m a big fan of flexibility in approach. Flexibility, to me, is the sign of a supple mind, one that allows for considerations beyond one’s own worldview. So it’s fun that Ben Lindbergh and Dan Brooks developed a stat that measures the rigidity of reliever usage. He looked at the number of outs the team had recorded before a given reliever came entered, and the variation in that number, to see if some managers were less flexible in their usage. Lindbergh was kind enough to run this stat for 2016, leading up to September, which is fine for me because September baseball is played on the moon by aliens.
| Team | Team Reliever Role Rigidity |
| ANA | 3.64 |
| MIN | 3.57 |
| OAK | 3.52 |
| CIN | 3.33 |
| TBA | 3.26 |
| SLN | 3.22 |
| CLE | 3.16 |
| LAN | 3.12 |
| BOS | 3.10 |
| HOU | 3.09 |
| SDN | 3.05 |
| PIT | 3.02 |
| ARI | 3.00 |
| CHA | 2.99 |
| MIL | 2.94 |
| KCA | 2.93 |
| SEA | 2.92 |
| MIA | 2.89 |
| ATL | 2.87 |
| WAS | 2.85 |
| BAL | 2.84 |
| CHN | 2.82 |
| NYA | 2.82 |
| TEX | 2.78 |
| PHI | 2.77 |
| COL | 2.73 |
| NYN | 2.68 |
| SFN | 2.68 |
| DET | 2.64 |
| TOR | 2.29 |
Here, a lower number means a more rigid approach to the bullpen. Brad Ausmus scores poorly even as he tried to find the right combination of relievers to lead up to closer Francisco Rodriguez. The Indians have been better at moving the pieces around once they got the right pieces — that was the reason Lindbergh brought out RRR this year, since Cody Allen has been moved around more than most closers.
For the next piece, Jonah Pemstein helped assess the ability of a manager to put the right players in the right spots in the lineup. What he did was look at the projected daily wOBA for each player in each lineup slot for each team, which was awesomely provided by Matt Hunter and SaberSim. Pemstein then ranked those wOBAs on the team, and then correlated their actual lineup slot to their ideal lineup slot, using Tom Tango’s The Book as a guide for the best way to put a club’s assorted players into the lineup.
What we have here, then, is a correlation between actual and ideal lineup slots. The closer a team is to one, the closer they were to putting out an ideal lineup every night.
| Team | Correlation of Actual to Ideal Lineup |
| Pittsburgh | 0.836 |
| Anaheim | 0.806 |
| Chicago (N.L.) | 0.751 |
| Baltimore | 0.724 |
| Miami | 0.716 |
| San Diego | 0.715 |
| Toronto | 0.707 |
| Boston | 0.676 |
| St. Louis | 0.674 |
| Washington | 0.672 |
| Houston | 0.668 |
| Cincinnati | 0.667 |
| Colorado | 0.652 |
| Detroit | 0.647 |
| Arizona | 0.641 |
| New York (N.L.) | 0.639 |
| San Francisco | 0.637 |
| Tampa Bay | 0.634 |
| Philadelphia | 0.617 |
| Cleveland | 0.611 |
| Milwaukee | 0.611 |
| Atlanta | 0.607 |
| Seattle | 0.605 |
| Minnesota | 0.598 |
| Texas | 0.593 |
| Los Angeles (N.L.) | 0.571 |
| Chicago (A.L.) | 0.515 |
| Oakland | 0.480 |
| New York (A.L.) | 0.444 |
| Kansas City | 0.426 |
To see what these distributions look like, Pemstein also created some visuals. Let’s look at the extremes and find the distribution of lineups for Pittsburgh and Kansas City. Clint Hurdle has his team’s lineups bunched up over by the right side, the ideal side, while Kansas City has a whole lot of Alcides Escobar at the top of the lineup.
For the purposes of my vote, Showalter gets some more love, while Farrell and Gibbons also do well. Francona, though, takes a little hit. Looks like SaberSim liked Tyler Naquin better than other projection systems, and he batted eighth for most of the year.
We’ve saved the easiest for last. Rather than going through each bunt situation in a granular way, I thought we could say something wide-ranging that should still ring true — namely, that it’s rarely a good idea to bunt with a non-pitcher. They should be good enough with the bat that it lowers win expectancy to trade their out for a base.
The American League plays the National League enough that a simple leaderboard tweak should give us what we want. Which teams bunted the least often with their non-pitchers? Answer: the Red Sox, with the Orioles in third, and the Tigers and Blue Jays in fifth and sixth.
In sum, we have some arguments for the managers who will be on the short list for American League Manager of the Year. John Farrell, John Gibbons, and Buck Showalter do well across the board, while Jeff Banister and Terry Francona have their strengths and weaknesses. Picking between them will be difficult. Almost impossible, even.
Thanks to Ben Lindbergh, Dan Brooks, Tim Kniker, Jeff Zimmerman, Jonah Pemstein, Rob Arthur, Rian Watt, and Matt Hunter for their help in putting this together.
With a phone full of pictures of pitchers' fingers, strange beers, and his two toddler sons, Eno Sarris can be found at the ballpark or a brewery most days. Read him here, writing about the A's or Giants at The Athletic, or about beer at October. Follow him on Twitter @enosarris if you can handle the sandwiches and inanity.


Not only is clubhouse management a necessary moment of chaos that threatens to upend our best efforts, it MIGHT be the biggest thing a manager has to do. Not to mention his share of organizational decisions about how to handle near-MLB ready prospects and roster decisions generally.
Dusty Baker is an incredibly confounding example. His entire career is making quantifiably questionable strategic and tactical decisions … and winning a crapload of games anyway.
I would say that a good manager absolutely needs someone on his staff who has a good handle on in-game tactics. That could be the bench coach, however, or the hitting or pitching coaches. But that’s a resource just the same as a bench bat or a LOOGY reliever, to be leaned on when needed but not necessarily every single time.
Agreed I think the most important part of being a manager is how they manage a clubhouse. Personally I think the pitching coach is the one who makes a lot of the pitching changes decisions. Dusty Baker would not have a manager job if it weren’t for his amazing way to make guys feel good about themselves.
Right there with you. It comes down to leadership. Can you get your guys to walk out there and give more effort than they would give if you weren’t there? Do you create a positive culture where players and fans are smiling more often than they are not? Do your players love you and would they do anything for you and the team? Why don’t you interview a lifetime rental player like Jose Guillen, Matt Stairs, or Octavio Dotel and ask them about their favorite managers. Interview some current young stars who have already played for 3 managers and get their opinion. Not everything in this game can be broken down into a statistic even though sometimes it feels that way.
I agree that clubhouse management is a vital part of managing. The big question I can’t begin to answer is how to assess and factor in the degree to which each clubhouse is hard or easy t manage.
#FireFarrell
He’s merely an above-average strategist who is also able to keep together a complex clubhouse in one of the most pressurized markets in baseball. I’m sure the Sox could do better.
Perhaps there’s a retread out there who had limited success in 90s, is noted for his quirky character, is cozy with ownership and willing to really show these players what’s what. Yeah, that’ll be better.
Are people actually making this argument? I haven’t heard it.
Good luck securing the services of this wonderful mystery man. Clearly you aren’t factoring the heavy competition for said managerial candidate from the seemingly intentional trainwreck that is the Arizona Diamondbacks.
Would FG actually explode if Bobby V got hired to turn the D-Backs around?
Well, I would sure stop following the D’Backs.
Not sure I’d put any stock in that “flexibility” metric without analyzing the specifics of the situation.
A manager moving his best relievers into the highest-leverage situations, whenever they come, is flexible. A manager who puts guys into roles where they fail, and then need be switched back to different roles is hurting his team. Not sure that stat makes the distinction.
For that matter, I question the abstract valuation of flexibility. I get it in theory, but players are human beings, and many, many people thrive on routine. If your best relievers perform their best when used rigidly, flexibility may be a net negative.
This x 100,000,000. Bill James did a study on his web site massively showing that pitchers especially thrive in regular, predictable roles. I think you can tweak that the way Francona’s doing (‘come the latest innings you’ll get hitters such-through-such’), but flexible, by definition unpredictable, reliever usage will otherwise work out awful.
Exactly. The human factor.
Keith Law last year on a Baseball Tonight broadcast was, well, sort of ranting about the Papelbon/Storen closer conflict in Washington.
Former long time actual major league player Eduardo Perez calmly explained to Law that no matter how much you THINK a professional pitcher should be able to pitch with the same exact effectiveness in every situation, it just Does. Not. Work. That. Way.
Roles aid in preparation — both physical and psychological.
Do you have a link to the Bill James study?
Can’t wait for the first team to use AI as their manager and forego humans all together.
It’ll be the Padres.
Yeah, this is definitely the toughest, because, as you mentioned, the most important job of the manager might not even be the strategic part of the game. There’s just no way to quantify how these guys managed egos (hint: I expect Robin Ventura failed somewhat here) and kept 25+ guys strongly motivated. Even trying to quantify the strategy is fraught with problems; I think you’re still not wholly satisfied with this despite the valiant attempt. Well… best of luck, Eno!
On a side note, I’m somewhat surprised by Gibby, and his “butt” feelings, ranking so highly, though, to be fair, I thought his bullpen management was much improved this year.
Arnold Leon with the bases loaded, Venditte going multiple innings with the game on the line vs rival Orioles, using Cecil in high leverage spots vs RHH or switch hitters when he hadn’t shown his curveball was remotely good…the list goes on. I thought his bullpen management regressed, if anything.
Eh, he did things like that last year, but at least this year he was willing to use Osuna in the highest leverage situations, and properly used Biagini, abandoned Storen eventually. It wasn’t entirely his fault that Cecil was awful at the begining of the season, though I agree he went to him too often in the first half.
Who said anything about the first half? I’m talking as recent as the Cleveland series, when Cecil was still awful. I’ll have to agree to disagree about his use of Osuna. Many games he could and should have brought him in the 8th, instead of wasting him in games with a 4 run lead (which might have cost them a recent game against Baltimore, with him not being rested). He didn’t “properly” use Biagini, who has one of the lower entry leverage of Jays relievers.
He did an awful job managing the bullpen. The talent wasn’t always there, which kind of exposed his lack of creativity and inability to manage when he didn’t have guys who needed “defined roles”. And even then, it hurt him as he never realized 8th inning guy Grilli sucked vs LHH.
Another one I suggest is who is in the lineup. For example, the number of at bats given to below replacement level players, as a measure of talent recognition.
“a lower number means a less rigid approach to the bullpen.”
I think you got that backwards. At least according to Lindberg’s article you linked to, “RRR calculates the standard deviation, or spread, of each of those out totals: The lower the standard deviation (and the less spread out the entrance times), the more rigid the role.”
fixed, sorry.
The explainer under the chart is still saying that a lower number means less rigid.
was in the midst of changing the table and the auto sort on it, thanks!
As an aside, wouldn’t Gibbons’ super rigid bullpen approach take him of the MoY short list?
I have no idea for whom I would vote… that being said, I am 100% sure that I wouldn’t trade (my) Rangers’ Bannister for anyone else in the game.
Other than scoring well enough on your various metrics AND crushing the old (and tired) performance versus run differential test, his relationship to his players seems second to none. He has dealt with a host of issues that are outside of “normal” metrics — injuries, managing players with substance abuse issues (Bush, Jeffress), rookies (Mazara), integrating key pieces at the deadline, integrating players who were effectively thrown away (Gomez, Desmond.)
Oh — and I would also take him in a fight over any other manager!
Good thing Molitor is being kept around….
As a Cardinals’ fan, I find it amusing the use of Matheny as red cabbage.
As a Redsox fan I wouldn’t give John Farrell a great deal of credit for not bunting. Who bunts with that lineup?
Orioles and Blue Jays both also suffer from some of this. No really weak hitters got all that many at-bats with any of these three. The Tigers had Iglesias, McCann, and Saltalamacchia getting at bats, so for them it may have been a real temptation. (Combined 1178 PA, wRC+ 66-78 between them.)
Edited to add: I’d have no objection to voting Farrell, I didn’t see him do anything really horrible. But not bunting isn’t something that takes much skill when your team wOBA is 346.
There are certainly opportunities to bunt even with that lineup. Sox got a 75 wRC+ out of C and a 79 wRC+ out of 3B.
In 2014, Farrell’s Sox had a 89 wRC+, but still ranked 28th in bunts. In 2011-12, Farrell’s Blue Jays had a 92 wRC+, and ranked 26th in bunts. So I think not bunting is very much a Farrell thing
He pinch ran Steven Wright for no good reason and lost him for the year.
An inexcusable decision even without the benefit of hindsight. Horrible.
To answer the question “who bunts with that lineup” I give you Ron Washington. As I recall, in the 2011 World Series he called for a sac bunt (non-pitcher) in the 3rd inning (can’t remember which game). This was on a team that regularly batted Nelson Cruz 7th. SEVENTH!!!
And then there’s this: http://www.cbssports.com/mlb/news/ron-washington-loves-his-precious-bunts-but-hes-wrong/
Expect him to interview with the Diamondbacks this winter.
So, by the first metric above, 3 of baseball’s 5 worst managers were Bochy, Baker, and Scioscia, all three of whom will likely wind up in the Hall Of Fame.
And by the second metric, 2 of MLB’s 3 worst managers were Joe Maddon and Mike Matheny, who are both on HOF paths themselves.
I think we should consider the possibility that either (1)these metrics are not coming close to measuring what they purport (truly optimal bullpen management) or (2)optimal bullpen management v. mediocre bullpen management affects a team’s W-L record very little.
Wanna know who had a good year? Check preseason projections. Combine them with the Vegas line. Then see who beat “the number” by the most, while factoring in mid-season acquisitions and injuries. That’ll make at least a good foundation for M.O.Y voting.
agree with the first part, but don’t agree with the ending. That measure probably just gets at how many players on the team were healthier and/or better than projected.
Love the thought process in this! And nice execution too!
This, though:
“…namely, that it’s rarely a good idea to bunt with a non-pitcher.”
Come on, I’ve written about this enough and The Book is almost 10 years old. It is patently untrue. Can we stop perpetuating this myth? Please?
How about this instead: It’s rarely a good idea to generalize about when it’s a good idea to bunt with a non-pitcher.
Moreover, a manager has to also be willing to retract the bunt order and direct his batter to swing away if, say, the defense is charging from both corner spots. As in football, inflexible strategic ideologies are a luxury you cannot afford — you take what the defense gives you.
Terry Collins used a sub optimal lineup almost every game this season. Can we measure this some how? I’m not an expert on metrics by any stretch but I know that De Aza, Ty Kelly and Kelly Johnson are replacement level guys who started with clearly better options healthy on the bench.
You only offered half the sales pitch, CJ. Who were the “clearly better options”? (Bear in mind, the notion of “best option” can be a fuzzy one, esp. as a team transitions from one starter to another (e.g. Aubrey Huff & Baby Giraffe a few years back). Also, platooning can enter in to the equation, and health.
I strongly believe that most managers really don’t self-sabotage as often as we like to think they do.
Jay Bruce? Michael Conforto?
You cannot vote for Farrell in good conscience after he made the single dumbest move of the year: Used Steven Wright as a pinch runner when he had real position players left on the bench and lost his #3 SP for the season.
#Stupid
At least it’s only the dumbest move of the regular season now. Thanks Buck!
The other major variable is whether he plays players when they’re hurt.
Your piece from last week: “Carlos Correa, Playing Through Injury, and True Talent”, seemed to indicate that injury-related performance drops were noticeable and significant. The best managers, ideally, would notice this and not compound the problem by getting subpar performance from their players and likely impairing their recovery.
The best managers consider “The Grind”: http://www.baseballprospectus.com/article.php?articleid=25065
Edit: also: “Paul Moliter”? Molitor
scotman144 And pinch ran for the best hitter in his lineup in the fifth inning
How much should projected W/L factor in? For example Girardi and the Yankees have annually out played their projections, even making the playoffs in a year when they allowed more runs than they scored. That has to count for something.
couldn’t you run every critical Situation through a WPA calculator?
Seems that nobody has mentioned how a good manager deals with injuries. Francona and Collins come immediately to mind. They have completely revamped their pitching staffs and are still in the post-season. Don’t know if something like this would be quantifiable at all.
@Eno—I find it really odd as a Pirates fan who’s watched so many games that Clint Hurdle does so well here. If you ever happened to revisit these numbers by manager tenure in aggregate, I’d be really curious what the outcome/trends looked like. I get the feeling that many Pirates fans think a dartboard decides the Bucs lineups and we also seem to believe he manages pitchers for the win/save.