How to Fix Arbitration for Relievers
Last week, Dellin Betances lost his arbitration case after his agents attempted to argue that he should be paid like an elite reliever, which, of course, he is. But because arbitration is based on historical comparisons and mostly rely on traditional metrics, Betances wasn’t able to overcome his lack of saves, which is effectively the deciding metric for how much a reliever will get in arbitration.
This is a problem for Major League Baseball. The ideas about traditional bullpen usage are finally breaking down, and increasingly, teams are looking to deploy elite relievers in situations before the ninth inning. But if you’re a young pitcher, and you know that the system the league uses to value your performance depends almost entirely on how many saves you rack up, there isn’t a good incentive for you to agree to that kind of role. The way the system is setup, the best young relievers are financially motivated to try and move into the closer’s role as quickly as possible, because that’s the only bullpen role that arbiters put a significant value on. The arbitration system is effectively propping up 1990s-style bullpen usage, and it’s going to hinder the buy-in from players on a better way to deploy relievers during the season.
As Ken Rosenthal wrote, maybe the best answer to this problem (and the many other problems with arbitration) is to just get rid of the process entirely, which costs both teams and agencies thousands of hours of work for no real purpose. As Rosenthal notes, it wouldn’t be that difficult to design an algorithm that could determine the salaries of pre-free-agent players, and could take into account more meaningful metrics than the ones generally considered by the arbiters making the decisions now.
But at this point, that’s a pipe dream. Dumping the arbitration system might be a long-term reality, but Dellin Betances probably won’t still be pitching by the time that actually has the chance of happening. So how do we fix arbitration before one of the game’s truly great relief pitchers spends the next three years getting his pay docked simply because he’s not pitching the ninth inning? It’s probably easier than we might think.
As a quick bit of background, both sides are allowed to use any piece of data that appears in The Bill James Handbook; the league and the MLBPA have agreed that the numbers published in that annual publication are sufficiently credible to be presented during the case. Arbiters are given access to the BJH, and it’s on the table in the room when arguments are presented.
Helpfully, leverage is one of the metrics in the BJH, so both sides can actually fix the reliever valuation problem without overhauling the current arbitration system. All that has to happen is the league and the PA jointly encouraging the arbiters to move from saves to leverage index as the metric of determining whether a player was an important reliever or not.
Leverage index is already brought up in the arguments; it’s not a foreign concept to the arbiters. But as their rulings show, they’re still leaning heavily on save totals to determine comparisons. By simply moving the arbiters off of saves and onto leverage index for finding comparisons, the results would improve dramatically.
For instance, Betances had an leverage index of 1.77 when he entered the game last year, which was the 19th highest in baseball. He had a higher entrance leverage index than Aroldis Chapman or Kenley Jansen, for comparison. And that wasn’t a one year fluke; his 1.64 pLI from 2014-2016 ranked 28th highest in baseball.
And because Betances wasn’t just working one-inning stints, he’s actually been even more valuable than just the average of the leverage when he’s come into the game. Over the last three years, Betances ranks 9th in MLB in high-leverage innings pitched, and his .240 wOBA allowed in high-leverage situations ranks 12th-best of the 79 relievers who have thrown at least 30 high-leverage innings since 2014.
Leverage index isn’t some scary voodoo, but because it currently takes time to explain to the arbiters why it’s an important number, agents have to determine how much of their 90 minutes they want to allot to educating non-baseball-experts on a number that isn’t as common as saves. And because teams like the Yankees are individually incentivized to try keep their payrolls down, they’re not going to simply concede to using leverage index as a save-replacement metric when it works against their argument.
But overall, the league would benefit from flattening the payscale between pre-free-agent relief pitchers, rather than simply letting closers collect a lion’s share of the arbitration rewards. If both sides collectively agreed to tell arbiters to use leverage index as the primary way to find usage comparisons, mediocre save-compilers — I’m looking at you, Shawn Tolleson — wouldn’t end up making more money in arbitration than a truly elite reliever like Betances. Closers whose numbers relied primarily on saves would get a bit less, and elite setup guys used regularly in high-leverage situations would get a bump up, reflecting the reality of how baseball teams actually value these guys.
This wouldn’t even cost Major League teams more money, as they’d simply be redistributing money given to ninth-inning specialists to their entire bullpen, so we’re not even arguing that MLB teams should increase pre-FA reliever salaries in total. But by switching from saves to leverage index (or even just high-leverage innings totals), the arbitration system could more accurately reflect the game as it’s being played in 2017, and teams could ask their young relievers to pitch in ways most beneficial to the team without also asking them to limit their earning potential in the process.
It’s an easy switch, using a number already published in the book that both sides have agreed to use in arbitration. In 2017, there’s no real reason to still be using saves as a way to determine which relievers pitched in the most important spots. Everyone has better data, and there’s a simple way to move the arbiters off of saves for determining reliever salaries. Let’s just use it.
Dave is the Managing Editor of FanGraphs.
Would it be possible for MLB and the PA to agree that saves cannot be brought up at all? As in arbitration salaries for relief pitchers would be based on run prevention and innings pitched.
Excellent piece.
Short. Sweet. Undeniable.
I just want to put a myth to rest: both sides are able to use whatever data they want; they are not restricted to the Bill James Handbook. I’m not sure if that’s what Dave says in the article or not but I just wanted to clarify.
It’s a bit of a weird fix because it’s still conditional on managerial decisions: great relievers can still be stuck in purgatory despite elite performance, especially if they’re in a strong bullpen or have a short record of dominance.
Arbitration is supposed to be team-neutral and therefore should be role-neutral. Probably best to simply look at context-free performance.
I get that leverage is important. And I get that coming in with bases loaded in the seventh with one out and the #3 hitter up is tougher than starting the ninth. But the arbitration rules are what they are and That’s Just The Way It Is. Nothing needs to be “fixed” here.
Consider two half innings from the batting team’s point of view
Team A:
K
Pop-up
Solo HR
Weak grounder to first.
Team B:
Single
Single
Walk
Pop-up
Inning ending DP
For some reason, even though only one batter got the ball out of the infield, Team A is credited with a Run. Despite three out of five of Team B’s batters doing something good (reaching base), Team B is not credited with a Run.
No one is clamouring to “fix” this to be fairer to Team B.
Arbitration is supposed to compensate players according to the value they provide to their teams. If the process does this incorrectly, it either needs to be fixed, or its goals need to be altered. A baseball game is not supposed to perfectly measure the best baseball team; if it was, we would end the baseball season after the regular season and not have a postseason whatsoever.
Arbitration is not supposed to compensate players fairly except as an ancillary effect. It is supposed to settle divergent claims without costly litigation.
Dave has asserted the changes he advocates would be a zero-sum game, one that would simply shift how resources are allocated but not increase the total amount spent.
But Dave has not presented evidence to support his hypothesis. That doesn’t mean he is wrong, of course, but it makes his argument less convincing.
I think the opposite hypothesis seems more reasonable. MLB clubs know current arbitration rules lower the costs of paying highly-effective relievers used in high-leverage, non-save situations, and many of those clubs use that knowledge to shape how they use talented young relievers who are eligible for arbitration. So rather than using such pitchers in the 9th, those clubs use them in non-save situations that reserve instead for a less effective veteran whose costs are already locked in.
The current arbitration system then benefits those MLB clubs in two ways: The utilize their best, young relievers in high-leverage, non-save situations, which increases team wins, and those teams save money they’d otherwise have to spend if they were to use those same relievers to accumulate saves.
If this MLB clubs were to agree to what Dave suggests, there would be an added cost, especially in the near-term: The cost of the best, young relievers would increase. That adde costs only grows as more teams shift from using their best, young relievers in high-leverage rather than save situations.
To overcome that sort of added cost and natural resistance from MLB clubs, it might be best to phase in a change during arbitration that would provide time to those clubs to adjust future contracts for veteran relievers.
I think the more specific problem is teams tend to pay their closers more than the setup men, even if if a setup man is more valuable than the closer. It’s hard to argue that an elite setup man should be paid more in arbitration when they are not paid like that in free agency. When relievers are paid on their true value instead of role, then this problem will go away. Dellin is an unfortunate victim of a transition that is underway.
Of course, if teams keep using free agents as the closer and the arb guys as the relief ace then that may take some time to self-correct.
“Fixing” the arbitration system is a matter left to the MLBPA and MLB. It’s not your money and it’s not your business, nor is it some grave social injustice calling for external intervention.
“It doesn’t affect me so I shouldn’t care.”
What a terrible way to live your life.
Big difference between something not affecting you and something being none of your business.
Yes, how dare the editor of a website dedicated to the valuation and analysis of players write about a flawed process in which players are analyzed and valued.
If this isn’t the business of Fangraphs, wtf is?
This is the most amazing comment ever. It’s like the opposite of a “stick to baseball” comment.
You’re basically advocating for arbiters to be smarter and more informed. These are people who use BA and hits to make judgments; you think they’re going to look at leverage index?
“As Ken Rosenthal wrote, maybe the best answer to this problem (and the many other problems with arbitration) is to just get rid of the process entirely, which costs both teams and agencies thousands of hours of work for no real purpose”
Ken, Ken, Ken…there is a real purpose for arbitration let’s not be facetious. Your a reporter, give me facts, not opinions…in your opinion its a good idea to wear a bow-tie…so yeahhhh
Ken Rosenthal dedicates his bow-ties to a charity and advertises for them every single week. So yeah, it is a good idea for him to wear them.
it was obviously in jest….
damn, what is it with the readers(trolls) on this site
sexual repression is real folks
Obviously a joke …
What the hell, for God’s sake troll on this site
the sexual pressure is real people
No, you’re just an ass.
hahahahhahaha, dang i really make some people mad
#getalife
Losers like you are the reason a site like this has to beg for memberships. If you do love this site like I do than try to see the big picture.
Players should hold off on any changes until they get rid of Clark. He sells them out for the common ground, rather than fighting for the rich fertile ground that the players should get
…and because the two sides have learned to compromise, there’s been labor peace for 22 consecutive years now. That’s more important than trying to muscle their way into getting a “rich fertile ground” without giving the owners anything in return and causing another work stoppage.
I agree that leverage index (or even just ERA, WHIP, K, and BB) over saves would make for a more fair arbitration process for relievers, but I really wish you wouldn’t make the argument that it better matches the way the game is played today. We have yet to see any teams actually eschew the traditional bullpen roles during the regular season, and most of them probably won’t change their bullpen usage in such a dramatic way for at least the near future.
I don’t see this as a problem in need of an arbitration fix. The current system benefits the team – and the team has the power cuz anti-trust – and therefore there is no problem.
If the players, via collective bargaining, want to equalize things a bit then the strategy is not to change arbitration rules but to eliminate pre-free-agency (ie arbitration) years.
If a (emphasis singular) team wants to change things, then this is a market inefficiency. Closers are overpriced, non-closers are underpriced. Therefore stop paying for exclusive closers and use some of the savings to spread the saves around the bullpen (which probably means multi-inning saves). Whether that works IDK.
Arbitration could and should improve how it measures reliever value. But AGE is an even bigger systemic bias against Betances’ future earnings, and maybe that’s why he took a shot at an unlikely arb award.
The service-centric CBA model implies that everyone gets a decent chance to cash in at free agency. But late bloomers are disadvantaged in that model, and relievers form the biggest component of that group.
Betances turns 29 next month, so the odds are that he’s already peaked. By age, the number of 3-bWAR relief years in MLB history:
– Age 28 … 37 seasons of 3+ bWAR
– Age 29 … 30
– Age 30 … 29
– Age 31 … 28
– Age 32 … 16
– Age 33 … 14
– Age 34 … 12
Betances would be 32 in his first possible year on a free-agent deal. He topped 3 bWAR at 26-27, but fell to 1.1 last year. He’s worked the most relief innings over the last 3 years — 6% more than #2, 20% more than #11 — and last year was his worst by WHIP, ERA and WPA. His free-agent payday is no sure thing.
Matt Bush and Tony Barnette were outstanding rookies at 30 and 32 last year; they’d be lucky just to reach free agency. Dan Otero ranked 9th in reliever bWAR last year, but he settled pre-arb for just over $1 million this year, at age 32; he’d be 35 in his first FA deal.
Even closers face this problem, despite getting favor from arbitrators. Sam Dyson, #3 in AL saves last year and #13 in reliever bWAR over the last 3 years, settled pre-arb for $3.5 million. He’d be 33 in his first FA year.
I think this is a bigger issue for salary fairness than improving the valuation method for players of like service time.
The concept of what traditional bullpen usage is should be clarified to say that this is traditional bullpen usage only since Tony LaRussa changed the definition in 1988. The impending alteration of that concept is closer to a return to the first use of a clearly defined bullpen which began just after World War II. Up until then most pitchers were hybrids. A perfect example is, well-known Dodger, Carl Erskine, who, in the memorable 1951 season, went 16-12, started 19 games and finished 18. Joe Page, followed by Jim Konstanty in his memorable 1950 campaign, and then quickly by Joe Black and Hoyt Wilhelm in 1952 were exclusively relievers. They were soon joined by many more pure “relief” pitchers. These were good pitchers, not just the failed stiffs who, before they came along, filled the end of pitching staffs. There was no such thing as a one inning man. Staffs were eight or nine deep and there was no place for one. The names changed to some who are much more recognizable to the present generation of fans, Gossage, Fingers, Mc Graw but the form of the bullpen was the same. This didn’t change much until LaRussa and Eckersley popularized the one inning closer. I cannot see a return to the previous form of bullpen usage but Terry Francona’s brilliant use of Andrew Miller may bring back some type of multi-inning super-reliever such as Konstanty, Black, Wilhelm, Gossage or Fingers.
Francona’s use of Miller is not sustainable over the course of the regular season. Miller is still just a one-inning guy who could only be used for multiple innings in the playoffs because there are more off days built into the playoff schedule.
Guys go one inning now because they can throw max effort if they know it’s just going to be one inning, and the resulting increased velocity delivers (all things being equal) better results.
The one inning guys are here to stay – they’ll (hopefully) just become more flexible about which specific inning they pitch.
Probably everyone agrees that saves are not a great measure of relief pitcher performance. However is Leverage Index any better? Leverage Index is team dependent since teams that play a lot of close games have more innings with high LI. Even poor relievers are forced to pitch in high LI situations on teams that play a lot of close games. On the other hand, elite relief pitchers on very good teams will throw a lot of low LI innings just to get their work in.
“agents have to determine how much of their 90 minutes they want to allot to educating non-baseball-experts on a number that isn’t as common as saves. ”
Are the same general sets or arbiters used for all cases and generally recurring year-after-year?
If not, why not? If so, then when you go through it once at least that person or group is now familiar with something new. You don’t necessarily need to go through it on every future case.
I guess I’m not sure why you’d want arbiters who are largely uniformed anyways. I’m sure my podiatrist might have some pretty valid opinions on Non-Lymphoma Hodgkins, but I’d still prefer to go to an Oncologist if I can…