Julio Urías Shows Up in the Playoffs
When recording a segment with Ben Clemens for FanGraphs Audio last week, our Dodgers conversation naturally delved into their at-times off-kilter pitching usage, particularly in regards to rookies Dustin May and Tony Gonsolin. After following a mostly straightforward (for 2020, that is) pitching arrangement — both spending the year in the starting rotation — the two were shoved into very different roles in the postseason. May was asked to start, follow, take over the middle innings, or anything else the Dodgers needed of him. Gonsolin, meanwhile, was suddenly less a starter than an opener, and never quite got settled into a typical rest schedule. The result of this constantly evolving usage were postseason performances filled with several unpleasant memories for both young pitchers.
We did not talk about Julio Urías during this part of our conversation, even though Urías is younger than Gonsolin, just a year older than May, and had seen his role tinkered with just as much during the postseason. He didn’t come up because we were talking mostly about the pitchers on the Dodgers’ staff who had been struggling, and Urías had been great. He was great when he started, he was great when he was asked to throw in the middle of games, and he was great on Tuesday, when he closed Game 6 of the World Series by retiring all seven batters he faced and striking out four to clinch the Dodgers’ first championship in 32 years.
Urías’ 2.1-inning save in Game 6 came just three days after he started and threw 80 pitches in Game 4, during which he allowed two runs in 4.2 innings with four hits, a walk, and nine strikeouts. His role was similarly fluid prior to the World Series. In the NLCS, he made a five-inning start with one run allowed in Game 3, then closed out the final three innings of a one-run victory in Game 7. In Game 3 of the NLDS, he entered the game in the second and pitched for five innings, and in Game 1 of the Wild Card series, he entered in the fifth and pitched for three.
The six appearances Urías made during this postseason bring his career playoff total to 18, an impressive number given he just turned 24 years old in August. In fact, according to Sportsnet Stats and Information, Urías is just the fifth pitcher in baseball history to make at least 18 playoff appearances before turning 25, with just two others surpassing him. What’s most unique about Urías, however, isn’t just the raw total of postseason appearances he’s made — it’s the fact that he’s racked those appearances up while making a fraction of the regular season appearances his peers have.
| Pitcher | RS Games | Playoff Games | Total | Playoff% of Total |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Roberto Osuna | 310 | 27 | 337 | 8.0% |
| Trevor Rosenthal | 165 | 21 | 186 | 11.3% |
| Francisco Rodriguez | 268 | 18 | 284 | 6.3% |
| Neftalí Feliz | 162 | 18 | 180 | 10.0% |
| Julio Urías | 74 | 18 | 92 | 19.6% |
Essentially, one out of every five major league games Urías has ever pitched in have been playoff games, which is bananas. The rest of these guys are closers who were throwing 60 or 70 games for their teams in the regular season, then were naturally leaned on just as hard when their squads made the playoffs. But Urías is not a closer. He’s a starter, except for when he was a reliever in 2019, or when he hardly pitched at all in 2017-18. Regardless of his role though, the Dodgers usually find a way to position him prominently in their postseason pitching plans.
Let’s think about this another way. The Dodgers have played 660 regular season games since Urías debuted for them on May 27, 2016. Urías has pitched in 11.2% of them. In that same span, the Dodgers have played in 64 postseason games — Urías has appeared in 28.1% of those. The title of this article isn’t meant to be some clichéd claim about how clutch he is when the season’s on the line or anything like that. It’s meant to be taken literally; If you’ve wanted to watch Urías pitch over the last five years, your best bet is turn on a playoff game.
To be clear, this part of the story is about a statistical oddity rather than anything special Urías has done or some odd strategy the Dodgers have decided to deploy with him. Urías has thrown this many playoff games before turning 25 because he debuted when he was just 19, and he happens to play for one of the most successful teams of any generation. There are several factors that have prevented Urías from better establishing himself on the Dodgers’ pitching staff in recent seasons, some of which are the sole responsibility of Urías himself. His regular season game log would make up a much larger portion of his career resumé had he not lost the second half of 2017 and the first half of 2018 to shoulder surgery, or served a 20 game suspension in 2019 after he was arrested on suspicion of domestic battery.
Because such a large share of Urías’ appearances have come in the postseason, however, his playoff stats can tell us much more about who he is than is typical for a player who just wrapped up his fifth big-league season. Ordinarily, a particularly great playoff resumé might look good on a Hall of Fame plaque, but besides that, we largely discount a player’s numbers in the postseason. If a team were trying to acquire Yandy Díaz, for example, his .280/.364/.418 career batting line in 201 regular season games is going to be much more useful than his .212/.349/.385 line in 18 career playoff games. In the case of Urías, however, removing his playoff stats from the equation means cutting out a fifth of all appearances he’s made in the majors. For a player who was once considered one of the sport’s elite prospects, that’s a significant portion of data.
The good news for Urías is that his playoff numbers — not unlike his performance in the regular season, mind you — have been rather excellent. Baseball Savant hasn’t updated its search function with Game 6’s numbers, but even before recording his perfect seven-out save, Urías already had the lowest postseason batting average allowed and wOBA allowed of anyone who threw at least 150 pitches this October, was second in xwOBA, and ranked third in slugging allowed.
| Pitcher | PA | BA | SLG | wOBA | xwOBA |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Julio Urías | 77 | .151 | .288 | .206 | .262 |
| Ian Anderson | 77 | .164 | .194 | .223 | .280 |
| Framber Valdez | 90 | .175 | .313 | .255 | .272 |
| Clayton Kershaw | 114 | .211 | .367 | .258 | .217 |
| Walker Buehler | 104 | .196 | .293 | .261 | .312 |
| Gerrit Cole | 73 | .188 | .391 | .261 | .262 |
| Charlie Morton | 86 | .234 | .312 | .267 | .262 |
| Cristian Javier | 38 | .156 | .313 | .271 | .279 |
| Blake Treinen | 44 | .214 | .405 | .273 | .299 |
| Diego Castillo | 46 | .189 | .243 | .274 | .295 |
Urías — acting not as a starter, closer, or swingman, but all of those things rolled into one — may have been the best pitcher in the postseason this year. He’s been quite good in other postseasons, too. In 38.2 career playoff innings, Urías owns a 2.79 ERA and 3.54 FIP. He’s done that while being moved in and out of the rotation and up and down in the bullpen pecking order, just as he has been in the regular season over the past five years.
If you had told the Dodgers after Urías’ rookie season as a teenager in 2016 that the young lefty would throw just 162 regular season innings over the next four years combined, they would assume things had gone seriously wrong. And indeed, much has. Yet somehow, Urías managed to play a key role in his team finally winning a title, and he still appears to have a lot of success ahead of him, health permitting. We are five seasons into his career and it still seems we’ve seen so little of him, but when glancing at the Dodgers’ future, his presence looms large.
Tony is a contributor for FanGraphs. He began writing for Red Reporter in 2016, and has also covered prep sports for the Times West Virginian and college sports for Ohio University's The Post. He can be found on Twitter at @_TonyWolfe_.
Urias improved quite a bit once the coaches convinced him to pitch out of the stretch full-time.
Urias has always been pretty good with a few too many walks, and he really sharpened in the postseason and stopped doing that. It was something to see
I also think there’s a degree to which those outings let them leverage his strengths. He probably didn’t have to use all 4 of his pitches in his shorter outings, and they also got to set him up with some platoon advantages. For example, if you look at the entire WS Game 6, you can see that the Rays started all their LHB platoon guys against Gonsolin, and the Dodgers then mostly attacked those guys with their many left-handed bullpen arms (Wood, Gonzalez, then Urias). The Rays were in a quandry, because if they subbed in their RHB platoon bats, they’d be stuck with them, and the Dodgers could then lean on the right-handed part of their bullpen instead. The Rays instead chose to save the platoon RHBs for high leverage situations which never arose, and Gonzalez and Urias and Wood got to carve through a bunch of left-handed hitters who are on the Rays because they’re not full-time players. When you look at it that way, it’s kind of not a wonder their offense performed so poorly. All the Rays righty platoon guys (Brosseau, Renfroe, and Diaz) each only got 1 PA in the game, whereas Choi and Wendle and Meadows each got 3.
But overall, it was really striking how much better his command was in the postseason than the regular season, and how much that reduced his walk rate and improved his K rates, which were kind of mediocre (and always bugged me) during the regular season. Urias went from 20% K to 34% K and from 8% BB to 4.8% BB. That’s a huge upgrade.
This is similar to something I had thought about previously, which is that in this season, the aggregate postseason+regular season statistics for a lot of players are likely to be more relevant than just their regular season stats, because it accounts for so many of their games played. The postseason increased the Dodgers and Rays seasons by 30%. Even the teams that lost in the LDS, like the Padres, had their seasons extended by an extra 10%. When we’re already dealing with a smaller number of games to evaluate players, that extra information is very helpful. Even after accounting for the greater strength of competition, you’re a lot better informed about Nick Anderson or Max Muncy or Randy Arozarena or Will Smith by looking at the aggregate results than tossing the postseason aside as we usually do.
It’s been interesting to see much of the internet and media forget that Urias debuted for the Dodgers as a 19 y/o, 65fv prospect. I think the rise of Buehler, management’s risk adverse usage strategies, his injury, and the dv incident did a number on his reputation and, imo, cast undue doubts upon his longevity and mental makeup. Not many (any?) championed him outside the organization. Not anymore! Not after that run! Cue the Roy Jones Jr “Y’all Musta Forgot!”
Why do the projections seem to always forecast Urias and other Dodgers pitchers to have career worst numbers? Is this a common characteristic of the projection systems or something related to these pitchers? I cant find the 2020 projections but I remember similar discrepancies for him, May, & Gonsolin and less tragic but still career low numbers for Buehler and Kershaw.
Current Urias Projections:
Career Reg Season: 239ip, 3.20era/3.47fip/4.37xfip
Projected 2021(STEAMER & DC): 203-213ip, 4.34era/4.59fip/4.79xfip
Wild IP estimate aside (for him or any Dodger), if Urias produced those numbers next year, the next FG article would be trying to figure how he fell off!
I think a thing that’s worth considering is that many Dodgers pitchers consistently beat their projections in part due to something projection systems can’t account for: their defense has been consistently great and they allow low BABIPs very consistently, which is not usually a thing teams can do. I doubt projection systems are accounting for that very well.
With that said, Steamer in particular is sort of known for heavy regression to mean, and Urias’s ratio stats (like the regular season K/BB) don’t really support his overall performance.
Right now the DC are all steamer until 2021 ZIPS is released.
FWIW I also wouldn’t get excited about playing time projections. The Depth charts are almost certainly still set up for playoff playing time ratios, where better pitchers get dramatically higher shares of IP than they do in the regular season.
I got to watch a lot of dodgers games and all the World Series games. Most of the talk was about Snell, Arozarena; Turner, kershaw, Seager etc but the guy who stuck out for me was Urias. Throws strikes, keeps people off balance, passion, quick outs. I loved watching him pitch – i see a 20 game winner if he could get out there every 5 days. If I were trading for anyone on their roster I would want him.
The real challenge is the durability. Because of his major shoulder injury at 20, which cost him most of 2 seasons, and now this season’s abbreviated length, he’s never had the opportunity to pitch even close to a full season’s starter innings. They want him in the rotation, but it might be a couple years before he can be there full time, as he’s never exceeded 100 IP in a season.
The version of him we saw in the playoffs is the best one I’ve ever seen, and if he retains that command he will be elite. He’s typically been just a bit less than that, as his command hasn’t been quite so sharp and his BB and K rates have both suffered accordingly. But he’s always been good.
You’re def wrong about taking him if you trade for anyone on the team, though, since the team has Buehler on it if you really want a pitcher, and Walker’s just absolutely better.
K-Rod, Urias and Osuna….yikes
Somewhat related: are Dodger pitchers actually *better* with Barnes behind the plate than with other catchers (disregarding batting value)? Kershaw clearly isn’t going to throw to Will Smith anytime soon (did he call him ‘Kershy’ just once? That’s my guess), but Smith was more or less the DH by the WS.
Smith has generally been regarded as a solid/above average framer but he was really bad at it this year, whereas Barnes is an elite framer. Thats how that situation came about; I think Kershaw has grown accustomed to having a framer who secures those strikes hes capable of painting to the extreme edges, and the Dodgers decided that those extra strikes were very valuable in the postseason because they could have enormous leverage value. In the playoffs they paired him with both Kershaw and Buehler initially, and as it went on I think they decided that it also benefitted the rest of the staff. In particular, if you look at the statcast framing metrics, Smith struggled at the bottom of the zone, especially what is the low/inside corner to right handed hitters, which is exactly where Kershaw throws his slider all the time. Barnes is also somewhat better regarded in terms of pitch selection/etc, and that was something he sometimes got the nod over Grandal for as well. Barnes is a really tremendous defensive catcher, and his improving his offense enough to manage relevant OBPs meant that moving him into the lineup instead of Hernandez had relatively low offensive cost.
Its worth thinking about how framing isn’t just about stealing strikes on things that should be balls, it’s also about -securing- strikes that should be strikes but sometimes will be called incorrectly. Kershaw, with his notoriously elite command, capitalizes on the edges of the zone better than most pitchers, and I think he has adapted his ‘post peak’, lower velocity, slider-based attack plan around those parts of the plate, as he’s had elite framers for many years now (grandal, then barnes).
Since it was kind of that RHH bottom part of the lineup that performed most poorly for the Dodgers in the postseason (hernandez/pollock), bumping one of those guys for Barnes became much easier to do.
The NLCS made me think about how the ability to make great defensive plays is similar to baserunning in some ways, in that it can have exceptional leverage value. You do not, however, control the opportunities to make them – but if you get the opportunity, it can swing a game. Framing is also like that, except it’s an actually reliable skill. Getting a critical strike that puts someone behind in the count, much less securing a strikeout, can really change an inning and make the difference in a game. So why not put the player in you know is most likely to get you that advantage? If Barnes is an extra 2-4 strikes per 100 pitches better than Smith, that’s a few strikes per game. It will reliably make an impact.
If you think about it you can probably remember some borderline strike calls that Kershaw got against Rays hitters with Barnes behind the plate. Maybe he gets those calls anyway, but Barnes is an elite, elite framer – he’s consistently top 3 or so in MLB on a rate basis, going back to ’17. Just a couple of those kinds of calls going differently can change a game.
There was also some consternation, I think, on the game-calling end, such as Smith calling the fastball and not the changeup from Baez to Lowe that resulted in the 3 run HR that made game 4 close enough to be won on the crazy play at the end. Baez was brought in to throw Lowe changeups, and then Smith kind of didn’t have him do that. I think they decided that while Smith is generally adequate in those areas, it made sense to maximize the things that benefitted the pitching staff as that was the part of the team that was struggling more at times in the series.
If Barnes continues to be able to be within spitting distance of league average offensively, he’ll probably continue to draw a couple starts a week. Kershaw’s famously routine-driven, so having a catcher who is familiar with his routines and who optimizes his arsenal makes a certain amount of sense. The Dodgers also timeshared Barnes with Yasmani Grandal, who was a top 2 or 3 catcher in MLB at the time, in previous seasons. Catching is really a high-wear position, and a lot of catchers are playing through injuries even when they are on the field. I think the Dodgers concluded some years ago that having two catchers and splitting the time evenly helps both perform better because they’re not battling through injuries, and also improves their odds of having a catcher who isn’t dealing with some kind of injury come the postseason; they can just run with whoever is healthiest. It’s not out of the question that’s what happened here, too, and that Smith was dealing with some of those bumps and bruises you take as a catcher after the very many games in a row of the NLCS and they consequently decided that the difference between Smith and Barnes was smaller than usual. You don’t usually hear about catcher injuries unless a guy is actually missing time or he suffers the injury in a very visible way on the field. But they’re almost always playing through damage from foul balls and that kind of stuff, and being able to ride the healthy hand seems like a pretty big advantage. 80% of Will Smith isn’t that much better than 100% of Austin Barnes, after all, if it’s better at all.
Mike, you really need to write for FG next year or please start your own blog. I feel like your comments cover parts of the Dodgers that no one else does and you write in a manner that makes baseball strategy accessible without dumbing it down. For someone that has never played but been a longtime fan it’s illuminating. Either way thanks for enhancing my Dodgers post season experience!
On the Smith/Baez pitch selection question, it was Baez demanding the FB. The LA Times covered Smith’s post game presser:
“Smith called for another changeup, but Baez shook off the catcher and went to another 95-mph fastball, which Lowe drove 399 feet over the left-center field wall for his third homer of the series.
“Yeah, Petey was convicted in the fastball,” Smith said of the sequence. “He went with it and … it didn’t get elevated enough, and [Lowe] put a good swing on it.”
Smith said he was trying to get Baez to throw the changeup, “but in that situation, whatever the pitcher is most convicted in, you’re going to go with.”
I think part of the point is that Barnes may have gotten a different response from Baez or may have known to go out and talk to him about it if he was sure it was the wrong pitch call that was not the plan. In general, very few pitchers, especially relievers, are responsible for their own pitching plans and it is the catchers who are prepared for this stuff. Would Baez have trusted Barnes more? Maybe, I don’t know. Would Barnes have gone out to talk to him about it? Possibly. It was pretty clearly evident that it wasn’t a good pitch call and wasn’t the way they wanted to attack Lowe, and so that situation is a problem no matter who was insisting on the FB.
That Baez wanted to throw the FB doesn’t necessarily mean it settles the issue, especially in this kind of scenario. You may defer to the pitcher in most situations in baseball, but World Series games aren’t most situations, and at the very least you probably need to make sure he’s shaking the changeup because he doesn’t feel he has the command for it or whatnot.
I follow the team pretty closely so I feel like I have a pretty good handle on them and how they operate, but I can’t claim I could provide that level of insight into any other team. I’ve been a Dodger fan all my life, and followed them with varying levels of intensity. The McCourt divorce fiasco (and that I was working a late-shift schedule where I couldn’t watch games) lead to me following the team more distantly for the earlier part of the decade, but the 2016 playoff team was so fun to watch that I decided to follow them closely the subsequent season, and so I’ve watched every game they’ve played since the start of 2017.
IMO the framing and potential health stuff is more likely to have been decisive. We’d previously see it play out over 2 seasons in 17-18 where one of Grandal/Barnes had basically been the starter all season, but was banged up and ineffective at the end of the year and the other took over full-time starting roles in the postseason. The two-headed catching monster approach is really valuable to the Dodgers (in ’17, C-Dodgers was the most valuable position in MLB in any WAR metric that included framing), and when Barnes can manage a .340-.350 OBP, even if he never hits for any power again, his defensive value is enough to make that dynamic work again.
Most teams can’t get one valuable catcher on their roster (see: Mike Zunino, sry Rays fans), the Dodgers have had the luxury for years of having two (and more coming, with Keibert Ruiz)
Yeah, completely agree with your take on Smith. Seemed like the the Dodgers had a game plan, Baez abandoned it, and Smith needed to exercise leadership in that position to keep things on track.
FWIW, baseball seems to be a pretty regional sport and the fact that you only follow one team doesn’t diminish your value, maybe the opposite. I wish FG had more Dodgers content. I’d love to read detailed analysis of our fringe bullpen arms, our matchup strategies for various series, and other stuff that isn’t available outside your comments and the odd FG article. I dont really care about other teams unless its VERY compelling. If someone did a FanGraphs, Dodgers edition, or FG created more Dodgers content, I’d be all about it.
Yes Kevin, I always find Mike’s comments to be very thoughtful.