Making a Player Out of Rusney Castillo
Late in the 2014 season, the Red Sox wrote a check worth $72.5 million and handed it to a stranger. The organization had barely missed out on prized Cuban first baseman Jose Abreu less than a year earlier, and they ensured they wouldn’t be topped in the international market again by giving Rusney Castillo the largest-ever deal to a Cuban defector. Castillo wasn’t a complete stranger, of course. They’d seen him play plenty of baseball, they’d met him in person; he was no more a stranger than any other international free agent coming to America. But with Abreu, there was the kind of raw power that can’t be ignored. With guys like Yoenis Cespedes and especially Yasiel Puig, the tools were off the charts. Undeniable freak athleticism.
With Castillo, the figures of the contract could be difficult to see through a thick layer of foggy uncertainty. The upside and athleticism were there, of course. Even the Red Sox don’t hand out seven years and $72.5 million without upside and athleticism. But there wasn’t the Abreu power. There weren’t the Cespedes and Puig tools. Instead, there were concerns of a swing deficiency, and “fourth outfielder” labels, and comparisons to Rajai Davis and Shane Victorino. It was uncertain what the Red Sox new Cuban investment might be, as is the case for any Cuban investment. It’s just that, with Castillo, the comps weren’t as rosy, especially in contrast of the instant success stories of Abreu, Cespedes, and Puig.
Which brings us to the present. Here we are, more than a year later, with Castillo having played in parts of two seasons, and the thick fog of uncertainty still looms, and now it’s shading our view of the Green Monster, locked into a place in left field on Opening Day for a team with hopes of contention and little in the way of a viable, everyday backup plan in the event that the fog happens to grow thicker, and darker.
What can we make of Rusney Castillo? What’s gone right? What’s gone wrong? Where are the points of optimism, pessimism?
Let’s begin with a positive. In 703 career innings in the outfield, spread pretty evenly across the three positions, Defensive Runs Saved pegs Castillo as a +17 defender. Ultimate Zone Rating says +12. Baseball Prospectus’ Fielding Runs Above Average has +9. These type of numbers are always meant to be regressed, especially in a limited sample like the one we have. But when they all agree, and they all agree on such an extreme figure, they’re trying to tell you something. And that something is: based on what we’ve seen so far, there’s little reason to be believe Castillo can’t be a truly elite defensive outfielder, and he just might be one already.
The range has graded well. The arm has graded very well. And, while Castillo is relatively unfamiliar with playing left field, and especially playing left field with the Green Monster behind him, early reports seem to indicate that he’s adjusting to his home park’s quirk with ease. Castillo looks to be an asset in the field, and the one thing every scout seemed to agree on was that Castillo has plus-plus speed, even if he doesn’t have great base stealing instincts. The thing about plus defenders with speed is that they don’t need to hit much to be valuable players, which is particularly relevant to this conversation, because Castillo is coming off a season in which he didn’t hit at all.
Castillo’s slash line through 329 major league plate appearances is .262/.302/.379, which is laughably similar to the .268/.308/.430 line that lead prospect analyst Dan Farnsworth predicted when he extensively analyzed Castillo’s swing last year. Excerpts from Farnsworth’s piece include “shoulders stay very level” and “bat flat as it comes into the zone” and “little natural lift in his swing” and “swing path is going to be the limiting factor in Castillo’s ultimate ceiling.”
To wit:
It’s not all bad; Farnsworth finds some positives in Castillo’s swing, but, from the get-go, there were scouting concerns with regards to Castillo’s swing plane, and now here’s a leaderboard of the highest rookie ground ball rates we have on record. The data stretches back 16 years, and I set the minimum plate appearance threshold at 200, because that’s when ground ball rates stabilize. In a sample of 571 rookie seasons, Castillo just posted the sixth-highest ground ball rate. Nearly two-thirds of his balls in play were on the ground. If you clicked the link to the leaderboard, you saw Castillo’s company, and if you’re a Red Sox fan, you cringed. Of course, there’s plenty more to a batter’s success than ground ball rate, but it’s been the most extreme part of Castillo’s game, and it mirrors the scouting concerns from before he’d ever stepped foot on a big league field.
I wanted to look at something. I wanted to look at some of Castillo’s company, and what his ground ball rate peers did after their rookie season. Did any go on to be productive hitters? Were any able to add lift to their swing, and tap into any power? Castillo’s ground ball rate was 2.8 standard deviations above the rookie mean. Setting the minimum at 2 standard deviations netted me a group of 15 ground ball rate comps:

| Name | PA | AVG | OBP | SLG | ISO | BABIP | BB% | K% | GB% | wRC+ |
| Christian Yelich | 1458 | .290 | .365 | .406 | .116 | .365 | 10.2% | 20.9% | 61.9% | 117 |
| Joey Butler | 297 | .274 | .330 | .412 | .139 | .383 | 6.7% | 30.6% | 57.4% | 109 |
| Jose Tabata | 1765 | .275 | .336 | .377 | .102 | .317 | 7.3% | 14.4% | 60.1% | 101 |
| Quintin Berry | 342 | .265 | .336 | .368 | .103 | .356 | 7.6% | 24.6% | 58.5% | 94 |
| Ben Revere | 2660 | .295 | .328 | .348 | .054 | .325 | 4.4% | 9.4% | 62.8% | 87 |
| Everth Cabrera | 2068 | .246 | .315 | .328 | .081 | .314 | 8.5% | 20.9% | 62.1% | 83 |
| Jonathan Villar | 658 | .236 | .300 | .353 | .117 | .322 | 8.1% | 27.4% | 57.4% | 82 |
| Pablo Ozuna | 702 | .280 | .317 | .358 | .078 | .309 | 3.3% | 9.7% | 58.1% | 75 |
| Jose Castillo | 2059 | .254 | .296 | .379 | .125 | .296 | 5.4% | 18.4% | 50.8% | 72 |
| Joey Gathright | 1329 | .263 | .328 | .303 | .040 | .318 | 7.3% | 16.0% | 68.4% | 71 |
| Alexi Casilla | 1893 | .247 | .302 | .331 | .084 | .279 | 6.9% | 13.0% | 54.6% | 71 |
| Eugenio Velez | 718 | .241 | .287 | .367 | .125 | .281 | 5.6% | 16.4% | 56.9% | 70 |
| Jerry Owens | 430 | .262 | .319 | .305 | .043 | .319 | 7.0% | 16.7% | 62.4% | 65 |
| Emmanuel Burriss | 806 | .245 | .307 | .271 | .026 | .282 | 6.8% | 12.5% | 61.4% | 60 |
| Tsuyoshi Nishioka | 254 | .215 | .267 | .236 | .021 | .263 | 6.3% | 17.3% | 58.8% | 38 |
| GROUP | 17439 | .264 | .319 | .348 | .084 | .313 | 6.7% | 16.3% | 59.5% | 82 |
Castillo, of course, is a very unique case. He’s a player with a far higher prospect status than most any player on this list, and is regularly facing American pitching for the first time in his life. To compare Castillo to this group based solely on ground ball rate is unfair. At the same time, when Castillo signed, we heard talk from scouts of 20 home run potential, and now it’s hard to ignore the ground balls, and this group. No player who entered the league hitting as many grounders as Castillo has ever developed much in the way of power, or even a productive skill set. It’s certainly not a death sentence, but it’s a cause for concern.
The name at the top, Yelich, is promising, but Yelich also walks twice as often as Castillo, and Castillo’s game has always been built on an aggressive approach. You’ve got to go a bit further down the rookie ground ball rate list to find another promising comp, but eventually you do see Alex Rios, who entered the league with a 57% ground ball rate as a 23-year-old, and four years later had dropped that by 20% while slugging 24 homers. It’s not that it can’t be done, it’s that it’s rare.
In August, there were reports of an adjustment by Castillo to alter his swing path. Just a couple weeks ago, more talk of an adjustment, to shorten the swing to better adjust to major league velocity. Castillo, Boston’s coaching staff, or both, understand that the current swing doesn’t seem to bode well for significant offensive growth.
Shortly after the first swing path adjustment article surfaced, Castillo hit an opposite field dinger, with this swing:
Look hard enough and you’ll notice some subtle changes; the hands start in a different place, the leg kick is a bit more pronounced, it’s got a bit more loft, and probably other things I don’t see because I’m speaking out of turn here. Point is: it’s a work in progress.
Bigger point is: in 90 career games, Castillo’s been worth 1.3 WAR as a pretty bad hitter. Given the tools, Castillo’s probably got a relatively high floor. Even if he goes the route of his rookie ground ball rate peers, the defense and speed keep Castillo an average player. An average left fielder might not be worth seven years and $72.5 million, but the money’s already spent at this point, so there’s no worth fretting. Now, the Red Sox just want to see how much they can squeeze out of Castillo. For the bat to turn Castillo into a real threat, there’s got to be some more power, or there’s got to be some more on-base. Something’s got to give, either with the swing, or with the approach. The work is being done. So far, it’s just been tough to see.
August used to cover the Indians for MLB and ohio.com, but now he's here and thinks writing these in the third person is weird. So you can reach me on Twitter @AugustFG_ or e-mail at august.fagerstrom@fangraphs.com.
He’s looking more like Chris Young than Mookie Betts.
He can hit lefties pretty well, but he has got to do something when facing righties.
Chris Young? The guy with 17 WAR, a .194 career ISO, 9.8 career BB%, and two 4-win seasons?
I’m not sure how Castillo looks anywhere near that good.
Thats a weird way of reading that comparison. I assume anyone reading that comp in 2016 would think of Chris Young, the good 4th OF who is RH, can play 3 OF spots, and has a career 120/80 wRC+ split, which is pretty similar to Castillo.
His 4 win seasons, Chris young had wRC+ of 102 and 109. Its not like anyone is calling him Mike Trout.
I understand the concern about the swing, and it’s certainly legitimate, but every now and then he does something that makes you see why the Red Sox gave him so much money. I was watching that game when he hit the oppo HR, and the thing was absolutely crushed. I don’t have the numbers but it isn’t often a RHH puts a ball into the bullpen out by the triangle.
The tools are there – he’s got power, he’s got speed, and his glove and arm are legitimate. Even if he never puts it all together he has an intriguing skillset. I still think he should be in RF, not Mookie.
Here is the video of that one.
http://m.mlb.com/video/v368241083/seabos-castillo-connects-for-a-tworun-dinger/?mlbtax=home_run
Watch the video and pay attention to the bullpen. oops.
Seeing Jose Tabata’s name on that list lit a light bulb over my head – Castillo has the potential to be a better fielding version of Tabata.
Funny thing is that Castillo is a year older than Tabata.
I find that extremely hard to believe.
I’d be much more optimistic if he were younger. 28 is a little late in the game to be the unpolished toolsy guy.
Yeah, but most 28-year-olds have been getting coaching from MLB organizations for the better part of a decade. You could make the case that Castillo’s more likely to have unrealized potential than most players his age. Especially if you figure they gave him his first year and maybe part of last year to acclimate and see how his tools played against big-league pitching, and only started seriously tinkering with his swing during last season. There’s certainly some potential that he’ll improve after an offseason working on his swing path.
Yes, I am a Red Sox fan desperate to justify that signing. Why do you ask?
There are plenty of toolsy players who never truly become polished, but manage to have decent careers anyway on pure athleticism alone.
I like the article, but one thing that bothered me was when you said he couldn’t be worth 72.5 million as a league average player. If the going market for a win is around $7-8 million on the free agent market, he’ll definitely outperform his AAV of $10 million as a 2 WAR player per year. Sure, he’s 28, but he shouldn’t start regressing for another 2-3 years. I think most teams would be very happy having a league average LF, who has potential to get significantly better, for $10 million a year.
OF R.Castillo (28)
MLB: 329pa, 4.9bb%, 18.2k%, .305babip, .262avg, .117iso, 83wrc+
AAA: 172pa, 8.1bb%, 16.3k%, .323babip, .282avg, .103iso, 110wrc+
AFL: 39pa, 7.7bb%, 15.4k%, .333babip, .278avg, .083iso, 94wrc+
CBL EQA: 0.18bb/k, .232avg, .267obp, .377slg, .644ops
There really is zero reason to think there’s any offensive potential there at all. He has never shown it, at any level.
1, How exactly is a 110 wRC+ zero offensive potential? If Castillo puts up a 110 wRC+ he’s a star with his defense.
2. Using a 39 PA sample size from the AFL is useless.
In another words, you don’t have an argument here.
110wrc+ for a 27yr old in AAA does not indicate mlb potential.
we have 550pa in north america and a career’s worth in Cuba telling us this 28yr old has never performed at a level indicating mlb offensive potential.
the industry consensus prior to his signing was as a speedy defensive 4th OF, and his performance since has demonstrated that.
why some observers suddenly changed their minds after boston signed him and projected him as a safe bet to be a 3war regular starter is as much a mystery now as it was then.
“The industry” being the nine drunk guys in your head with “RED SOX SUX” painted across their shirtless chests?
You certainly aren’t talking about the professional scouting industry. Starting with Kiley on this very site, *summarizing the scouting consensus*:
Most think Castillo has big league ability now, but will need a minor league period to adjust to game speed. The expectations are something around average hit/power tools (.260 to .270 and 15-20 homers) but this is a volatile enough situation that both tools could be below average or above average in the short term (and the long-term, too).
The surprising thing from Castillo’s recent workouts was that his added muscle didn’t cost him any speed. He’s not polished in the outfield, but should be able to stick in center with some work.
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/instagraphs/scouting-rusney-castillo/
Here’s Dan Farnsworth checking in, also on Fangraphs:
about a 2 WAR player with the potential for another win or two coming from his bat in a good year. To bet on the over offensively is to believe he is athletic enough to make hard contact at a near elite rate despite some swing deficiencies, which I cannot refute as a possibility. I would also not be surprised if there was another half win on the defensive side.
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/scouting-rusney-castillo-from-video/
But we all know fangraphs is just the Red Sox Illuminati, so we have to discard all of that. Give me someone independent, like Baseball America!
Here’s Ben Badler at BA, summarizing the perception of scouts:
After watching Rusney Castillo’s showcase this weekend, several scouts went back and updated their reports on the 27-year-old Cuban free agent.
Some scouts who had followed Castillo with the Cuban national team felt he would be a steady, everyday center fielder in the big leagues, while others felt he would fit best as a fourth outfielder, with good speed and defense in center field, a line-drive stroke, an aggressive hitting approach and occasional power.
When Castillo showed up on Saturday at the University of Miami, scouts saw a different physique, which has translated to more power. At 5-foot-9, 205 pounds, Castillo is 20 pounds heavier than he was in Cuba, and it’s in a good way, with plenty of muscle packed on to his athletic frame.
The biggest difference was in Castillo’s power. Scouts get to watch Cuban players take batting practice at international tournaments, and Castillo showed more juice in his bat than he had before he left Cuba.
…
Before Castillo’s rapid strength increase, he was a similar player to Rajai Davis, a 5-foot-9, 195-pound righthanded-hitting outfielder, when they were the same age. Davis, now 33, was another similarly-built speedster who could play center field with an aggressive hitting approach, a solid bat and occasional power, with an underappreciated skill set for a player who was often thought of as a fourth outfielder himself.
Davis might not be the flashiest comp, but during his age 27-29 seasons, Davis amassed 6.5 Wins Above Replacement (per Baseball-Reference.com), with a peak of 3.3 WAR for Oakland as a 28-year-old in 2008. That’s an average of a little over 2 WAR per season at the same age as Castillo, which is a league-average player.
That, however, was before Castillo increased his raw power. If Castillo can give teams comparable production to Davis at the same age with a little extra pop, he might not be a star like Yoenis Cespedes or Jose Abreu, but that’s a very solid everyday player, with no draft picks or prospects to surrender to acquire him.
http://www.baseballamerica.com/international/scouts-update-reports-rusney-castillo/
Dammit. The Red Sox conspiracy must have sucked in Baseball America, too. We have to find someone we know has no interest in helping Boston. Say, another teams General Manager. That’d do it.
Tigers GM Dave Dombrowski, on the Tigers attempt to sign Castillo:
We were looking at him as a CF, above average speed, 15 type HR power, real good overall player we projected
https://twitter.com/MLBNetworkRadio/status/502893660619694080
So no, there was never any consensus that he was a fourth OF. Ever. You completely made that up. Before the strength increase, the community was divided between fourth OF and starter. Afterwards, there was much more optimism. And all of this was prior to his signing.
The only one trying to change anything is you with a slash-line scouting report and a failed attempt to rewrite history.
What I’m getting from this is:
He looked like a 4th OF or a fringey starter, then he added some muscle and they decided he might be a starter without ever having seen him play a game.
Actually, no the industry consensus prior to him signing was he was that he could be a real sold 15hr/25sb type player with plus defense. The consensus wasn’t that he was going to be a star or a 4th OFer, the consensus was that he was going to be an above average regular.
John Sickels of minorleagueball had him rated an A- prospect and the #1 RS prospect, in a stacked system that included Moncada, Devers, Owens, Swihart, and Erod. Baseball America. Baseball America and Baseball Prospectus each had him in their top 100 rankings as well.
Referencing his age to the level in the minors is pretty useless given that he’s played his entire career in Cuba.
Bigger point is, even while being horrible at the plate in a small sample at the majors, he still posted 1.3 WAR in 90 games (or about 2.5 over a full season). This was a good signing for Boston. AT 10mil aav, he only needs to be worth 2WAR a season to have surplus value, and given his defense/arm/speed, he should surpass the 2 WAR total over a full season.
Consensus seemed to be that his floor was a 4th outfielder. Last season he showed he could be that at least.
weird post, Tom Dooley.
half of your links are from after the sox signed him.
ben badler’s updated report – which came before the signing but after it was clear the sox were the frontrunners and heavily interested – clearly states that he was generally considered a 4th OF rajai type until these late “updates”, all of which came after it was clear the Sox were all in, just like I said.
thank you for doing my homework for me.
Doubling down on your mistake and adding a dash of goalpost shifting. Nice.
Your comment is right there. You said everyone changed their tune after the signing, not “when it became clear the sox were all in”, which is a meaningless phrase designed to hide your error.
The Badler piece precedes the signing and could not more explicitly contradict you. Kiley’s piece precedes the signing and could not more explicitly contradict you.
Your theory that the Tigers GM lied about his scouting evaluation because Boston signed him is pants on head retarded. Par for your course.
as you clearly showed us, Tom, what I said was perfectly true – general consensus was that he was a 4th OF type, and that consensus suddenly shifted to him being a safe bet for solid starting material. that happened.
Now I have no proof of why that consensus changed – but it is a fact that it changed after it became clear that the vaunted red sox front office was all in as the frontrunner to sign him.
If it makes you feel better to argue that it matters when the actual signing date was, have at it.
And of course, his performace since coming to north america, at 3 levels, thoroughly supports the original assessment.
I don’t understand the rush to judgement on any of this. Swing analysis is great, but statistical analysis of a poor sampling of a unique situation isn’t very useful.
Why is it glossed over that Castillo lost a year of baseball, and that he was still shaking off the rust last season? Why overlook that 2015 was a mulligan given that he missed most of spring training due to injury, and then just when he was getting back into the swing of things in April he suffered another minor but nagging injury? Those things both slowed down his getting up to speed and made his performance worse.
I’m not saying this to argue that Castillo should be presumed to be an offensive producer soon (or ever), but rather that it is just as foolish to assume that he won’t get things going. Say it with me again: 2015 WAS A MULLIGAN. Start the evaluation this season.
While we’re at it, why also ignore that even Castillo’s relatively worthless performance breakdown was quite different than those of those other high GB players? Notice the much lower GB/FB ratio? And the higher HR/FB ratio (a sign of the physical power that he might not be tapping into with his current swing)? It never ceases to amaze me how quick people are to rush to judgement on players…and heck, Boston has another one in the same OF in Bradley (people love to forget just how little time he had spent as a professional before being rushed to the majors, but that’s a different story for another day).
The borderline (potentially negative) return on Castillo would be a non-issue if Boston hadn’t committed to $41 million a year for Ramirez and Sandoval. Taken together, it’s a problem for Red Sox in peak Price years. Has anyone ever tried to buy a good team and ended up in last place before? Didn’t get a lot of press last season — it was more like “what a late-season improvement!” — but that’s exactly what Boston did: $214 million for 5th place. Maybe that’s why Red Sox fans are so touchy here.