Maybe Hitters Should Just Stop Swinging
It’s difficult to be a major league hitter right now, maybe more than ever. For one, pitchers are filthier than ever, with mere relievers averaging velocities that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. Teams have also become crafty with how they configure not only their infields, but also outfields, to great effect: League-wide BABIP on grounders and line drives has declined steadily over the years. It’s no wonder some hitters are left frustrated.
But that doesn’t mean hitters are without options. “They may take away our base hits, but they’ll never take away our plate discipline!” Joey Gallo might cry, if Braveheart is ever remade as an epic battle between a small nation of sluggers and a tyrannical pitcher-state. That really is motivating, though, because if you think about it, a hitter has complete control over when to swing. He may be influenced by the opposing pitcher’s sequencing, deception, and so on, but the decision itself can be traced back to his synapses firing off commands or staying put, all in a matter of milliseconds.
With that in mind, I want to direct your attention to another way pitchers have remained a step ahead. At FanGraphs, we have plate discipline metrics dating back to 2002. Back then, pitchers located inside the zone 54% of the time. Fast forward to 2021, and that rate is down to 41.9. Over time, pitchers realized they didn’t have to throw as many strikes; they could bury a curveball in the dirt, and hitters would still chase after them, especially if said curveball possessed good movement, or throw a powerful fastball high above the zone and induce whiffs. Reflecting this change in thought, here’s how the league-wide zone rate has evolved from 2002 to the present:

There are a few fluctuations here and there, but the overall decline has been consistent. Once it became viable to challenge the traditional tenets of pitching, the league didn’t look back. But while it’s true that pitchers adopted a seemingly foolproof strategy and ran with it, it’s also true that hitters haven’t been keen to find a countermeasure. They’ve seen a rise in pitches outside the zone, so it makes sense to anticipate them and respond with patience. But hitters today aren’t so different compared to their predecessors; the league-wide swing rate has remained virtually stagnant since 2002. As a consequence, hitters are chasing after pitches outside the zone at an alarming rate:

In defense of hitters, it is, again, difficult to hit a baseball in this day and age. It’s much easier to tee off a breaking ball when it hasn’t been optimized to mirror a pitcher’s fastball, or when it’s located at merely the bottom of the zone rather than beneath. But the fact that pitchers as a whole have made such an eye-raising adjustment while hitters have stayed put illustrates a rapidly widening gap. This is simply an environment geared toward pitchers. To wit, while most FanGraphs readers are aware of concepts like spin efficiency and vertical approach angle, what percentage of them are knowledgeable about a hitter’s rotational speed? I sure am not.
The solution may not be so convoluted, though. What if hitters just — wait for it — stop swinging this much? They wouldn’t necessarily need to discern the quality of incoming pitches: With such a disparity between the league-average swing rate and zone rate, swinging less often would grant even an average player access to hitter-friendly counts. A’s second baseman Tony Kemp, whom Ben Clemens wrote about last week, is an example of what’s possible. Not particularly known for his results on contact, Kemp nevertheless recorded a career-high wRC+ last season by “leaving the bat on his shoulders more frequently.” If he can do it, well, so can you!
Besides, the abundance of out-of-zone pitches has led to a subtle yet relevant phenomenon. The correlation between a hitter’s chase rate and walk rate has become stronger over time, with last season producing an all-time mark. Here’s the proof:

Two decades ago, how hitters dealt with pitches inside the zone mattered almost as much as how they dealt with pitches outside it. It makes sense; when more than half of all pitches are strikes, it isn’t enough to lay off the balls. But when pitchers are more willing to venture outside the zone, a hitter’s chase rate has emerged as an extremely reliable descriptor of his walk rate. To give that a positive spin, this is an opportune moment to cut down on bad swings. It’s more likely than ever that doing so will lead to a greater share of walks.
That doesn’t make the process any easier. Anyone who’s made a New Year’s resolution understands the difference between formulating a plan and putting it in action. There’s also the matter of timing. The math tells us that while swinging when behind in the count is bad, it’s a far better alternative to taking a potential third strike. On the flip side, swinging when ahead in the count squanders a solid chance to draw a walk. Hitters with a knack for swing decisions can figure this out, but others aren’t as adept. When instructed to swing less, the latter group could do so indiscriminately, leading to worse results than before.
So yes, “not swinging” isn’t the most plausible or nuanced strategy, but let’s imagine that it works. How would the league progress if its participants drastically cut down their swing rates? Initially, we should expect an uptick in walks. Hitters aren’t swinging like they used to, and pitchers are still sticking to a familiar blueprint. Once pitchers figure out what’s happening, though, they’ll probably counter with a barrage of strikes. This would temporarily give them the upper hand before hitters re-up their aggression. The final result is a return to an offensive environment featuring fewer strikeouts and more balls in play — in theory, at least. But it’s interesting to consider. A reluctance to swing could become a catalyst for resolving major league baseball’s supposed pace of play crisis.
Still, I should emphasize that pitchers seem to be the driving force. At some point, I do think we should either lower the mound or increase its distance from home plate. But what about a solution that isn’t disruptive? By swinging less, hitters would, in the short term, receive a jolt to their offensive numbers. In the long run, the league’s current high-whiff, low-contact environment could dissipate. As Tom Tango laid out, few hitters accumulate positive run values with their swings. What matters, fundamentally, is a penchant for taking pitches and working towards advantageous counts. It’s something even the most diabolical pitchers can’t take away. Maybe this is how the hitters fight back.
Justin is an undergraduate student at Washington University in St. Louis studying statistics and writing.
You know how to make pitchers throw more strikes and improve the product? REDUCE THE NUMBER OF PITCHERS. How much you wanna bet that Zone% would increase if the number of pitchers on a roster went from 14 to 11/12?
I would think that would just lead to even more roster churn, since every team would be shuttling pitchers between the majors and AAA to keep arms fresh like the Rays have been doing.
You could limit that too.
Yeah well, of course, you’d also have to limit the amount of times players can be optioned in a season. Do that, and guys will start throwing more strikes, we’ll see more balls in play, more ABs ending early in the count, and the pace will be much better. Not to mention the starting pitcher would have to rise from the ashes.
For real though. It’s such an easy way to fix things. Of course, the PA would never allow that.
And yet, now it is so.
At the present, does batting practices help to develop plate disciple? or does it just focus on balls in the zone?
Ugh. Shoot me now. Just what we need: Deeper counts and more walks. Yes, pitchers might eventually start throwing more strikes again, but maybe not, and in any case it will take years and years in which we lose another generation of fans. Just bite the bullet and move the mound back a few feet. No one’s even gonna notice.
I’d be really curious to know how much of a difference it would make if pitchers just threw off flat ground. This would logistically be a fairly easy change and there is historical precedent for adjusting the mound height.
Lower the mound, two expansion teams, and electronic strike zone and offense changes dramatically.
Man would the boys in the back room doing the metrics have to rejigger their spreadsheets if we did that! All the talk about attack angle would go out the window. I suspect fastball spin would get even more important but it would be very hard to throw a good slider. Would be interesting. More like cricket bowling.
I think you are right in that this is an area where hitters could add value / improve. Juan Soto is certainly a great example of a hitter that can do maximum damage and is also off the charts on plate discipline and a low swing %
IMO the fact that hitters have been doing more damage through higher LAs and EVs has had a lot to do with why pitches in the zone are down so much. Based on the data, the ‘pitchers are dominating’ narrative is false in looking at total offensive performance (i.e. runs/game). Had the ball not been changed, runs per game would likely have been at a multi-year high. So while the changes to the game may appear less hitter-friendly, it’s really just a shift in the style of offense (more damage / more swing and miss) rather than lower total offensive production.
Unfortunately, many of the strategies and styles that appear to add value in terms of wins – also result in a less attractive game to watch for casual fans.
A lot of these changes have to do with the rise of pitch tunneling. It’s made pitching outside the zone more effective
Does anyone have any cool pitch tunneling articles to recommend?
If these proposed changes are coupled with a pitch clock, a limit on how long the batter can be out of the batter’s box, and a limit on the number of pitchers, the pace of play would speed up and scoring averages would probably increase.
“pitchers as a whole have made such an eye-raising adjustment while hitters have stayed put”
Are we forgetting all the hoopla about launch angles and exit velocity already?
Basically, the hitters figured out that more strikeouts and fewer singles is a worthwhile tradeoff for more home runs and doubles.
Leaguewide ERA, which steadily decreased from 2006 to 2014 and then climbed back up, shows that by and large the hitters are correct, although the juiced balls complicates things a little.
Ultimately, the important leaguewide changes in the last 10-15 years have been (in no specific order)
increase in velocity
increase in defensive shifts (without large changes in BABIP)
increase in strikeouts
increase in launch angle
increase in exit velocity
decrease in starting pitcher innings
decrease in zone%
Most of these are correlated with each other and just taking a few of these in isolation for analysis has a high risk of being misleading.
I don’t believe that the drop in Zone% is real. For a start, if you look at the PitchInfo plate discipline stats instead of the BIS ones, the trend almost completely disappear from 2008 onwards. And before 2008, the only significant drop is the one from 2002 to 2003, which looks more like BIS refining its idea of what counts as in the zone than it does a real change – note that overall Swing% and Contact% barely change despite the 3% drop in Zone% and 4% jump in chase rate.
Choi, you should take the bat off your shoulders unlike the real players because you haven’t missed on an article yet. keep up the great work.