Neil Walker Is Worried About This Winter
CLEVELAND ā In early March, Neil Walker was confronted by the most bizarre of sights. At the grounds of the quiet IMG Academy baseball complex in south Bradenton, Fla., he found himself surrounded by acres of farm land, a sprawl of housing developments, and some 25 fellow free-agent ballplayers. They had all authored long, successful careers. None had a contract for the coming season.
Last winter was an unusual one, historically unusual, as readers of this Web site well know.
At the end of February, still unemployed and with little if any clear interest from major-league teams, Walker left his offseason home in the north hills of Pittsburgh and reported to the free-agent camp. The camp at IMG had enough players for three- and four-inning intrasquad games. The free agents there also competed against a Japanese minor-league team, Walker said.
āI was thinking something isnāt right,ā Walker told FanGraphs. āTypically, you think about about the consistency of the player [in free agency]. Maybe thereās factors that go into the middle tier of free agents not getting years or something along those lines, but to not get either the years or the figures… that was somewhat alarming. Iāve had a few injury things over the last couple of years, but itās nothing that they could say… is going to cause me to keel over as a 32-year-old. It was alarming, not just for myself but for a lot of people.ā
Walker represented the middle-class tier of player that has been squeezed in recent offseasons. Because of his experience, and with the beginning of the next offseason just four-plus months away, FanGraphs recently approached Walker when the Yankees visited Cleveland. Walker’s fear is that the trend for the middle tier of player like himself will only continue.
While clubs entered the winter having exhibited less and less willingness to pay for modest upgrades in free agency, preferring lower-cost pre-arbitration players, there had never been an offseason quite like this one since the repeal of the reserve clause. There had also never been a free-agent camp quite like the one in Bradenton, though Walker had heard about the existence of during a spring of labor strife in the 1980s.
Last winter and early spring, clubs operated within the rules. There is nothing forcing teams to spend. The Pirates didnāt sign a single major-league free agent. They didn’t have to. The Marlins shed most of their valuable assets, and most expensive players, in trades. They’d probably like to shed more. There’s no incentive to go from 68 to 70 wins, or 75 to 77 wins. Moreover, a stiffer luxury tax had stopped clubs like the Dodgers and Yankees from spending to reset their tax statuses. The players agreed to this system and didn’t perhaps foresee these issues as well as they should have. Walker was a player rep for the Pirates.
We know the story, but Walker lived it.
āGuys were frustrated,ā Walker said of the players at the free-agent camp. āKyle Kendrick was down there. Tyler Clippard was down there. Lot of guys that could help teams… The conversations were all the same. We hadnāt heard much from anybody [save] for coming in on a minor contract here or there. Guys were kind of baffled, and there werenāt many answers. On my side, I didnāt have much dialogue with anybody until maybe the first week of March. There were no productive conversations. There were baseline conversations early [in the offseason], and then that disappeared for a while. It was strange.ā
Moreover, teams have perhaps learned to use the spring calendar as leverage to reduce contract demands.
On March 12, he finally reached an agreement on a one-year, $4-million deal with the Yankees. On the same day, Jake Arrieta signed a three-year deal with the Phillies and Lance Lynn with the Twins. They were the three remaining unsigned free agents ranked among Dave Cameron’s top 15 last November.
FanGraphs projected Walker to post a 2.5-win season in 595 plate appearances. Dave predicted a three-year, $33-million deal. The crowd? A three-year, $39-million deal. While some back issues had begun to pop up, while he was entering his age-32 season — an age at which many players experience decline — he had posted seven consecutive seasons of at least 2.2 WAR.
In retrospect, one could argue teams did well to shy away from Walker, that they perhaps saw something in evaluations. His poor April this year might count as a point in favor of that argument. But, as Craig Edwards found, other late-signing free agents also struggled (though albeit a small population of which to study. There is probably some value in training with a team, surrounded by one’s peers. Walker said it wasn’t until weeks into the regular season that he regained his timing.
You could argue teams are simply operating efficiently, replacing marginal value added from 30-something free agents to younger more cost-effective players. Often they are, indeed. The problem, Walker says, is the institution of free agency is built upon rewarding service time. That’s how players expect wealth to be distributed. To earn market value, players must accrue experience. Teams value experience less than ever before.
While teams, populated more than ever by talented analysts, are operating rationally, the practice threatens balance, as Walker sees it.
āNow itās almost getting chopped on both sides,ā said Walker in reference to the suppression of service time on the front end of careers and the reluctance to pay for players’ 30-something years. āThe window is much smaller than it used to be.ā
āYou hope this trend with middle-tier guys doesnāt continue through this collective bargaining agreement, because there are going to be many, many more guys that are affected. Itās not the top top-tier guys. Itās not the relievers. Itās not the top-tier [starting pitchers]. Itās the guys in between. There are a lot more guys in between than the guys I just spoke about. I donāt know what the answer is, but I do know there are teams out there that didnāt spend a dime. There are teams out there that sold off most of their assets. Thatās something, when you look around the league, it makes it pretty top heavy and bottom heavy. Thatās alarming. Thatās not the greatest situation in my opinion for baseball.ā
Perhaps Walker is on to something: two million baseball fans were missing through June 15. The only AL playoff berth up for grabs is the second Wild Card.
Weāre more than halfway through the regular season and just over four months away from the beginning of the next offseason, one which will be followed closely by players. There are three more years remaining in the current collective bargaining agreement.
While Manny Machado, Bryce Harper (despite his relative modest 2018 campaign so far), and others might threaten to break contract records this coming winter, Walker and many others who lived through last offseason are curious about — and bracing for — what happens to the middle-tier of free agents. Walker will be entering the market again this coming winter.
āYou could say you need to force teams at the bottom to spend. I know itās not as simple as that,ā Walker said. āAll the signs are pointing to not very friendly conversations leading up to the new bargaining agreement. Iām on the back end of my career, but you feel for the 23-, 24-year-old player going right into this buzz saw, this new bargaining agreement. Itās going to be interesting to see how it is handled from both sides.ā
A Cleveland native, FanGraphs writer Travis Sawchik is the author of the New York Times bestselling book, Big Data Baseball. He also contributes to The Athletic Cleveland, and has written for the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, among other outlets. Follow him on Twitter @Travis_Sawchik.
Neil Walker had the 20th best WAR of second baseman in 2017. Not sure what he would expect? Why should a team pay so much for a bottom-third keystoner? With major league minimum at $500K, the Yankees are paying 8x major league minimum for a player providing (so far) negative value to the team w no upside (compared to a young player who needs seasoning).
On a rate basis, however, he was just fine. The problem with Walker was never his production on the field, but the enormous injury risk he presents.
I mean, he’s averaged like 130 games per year in his career. I wouldn’t call that enormous injury risk even sort of. And you’re sort of missing an entire point: because of the way arbitration and the league minimum and such are set up, these middle class of players are getting killed. The Yankees are worth four billion dollars, meanwhile.
I don’t think that’s GoNYGoNYGoGo’s point at all, although it is Walker’s point.
My point is that the medicals on Walker probably look awful. They usually do after back surgery. But he was pretty productive last year when his hamstring was attached.
If he’s averaged 130 games per year, that means he’s missed an average of over 30 games a year. That qualifies as an enormous injury risk in my book. And he’s in his Age-33 season now. He’s not likely to become more durable at this point.
Is he playing 130 games due to injuries, or sitting against lefties? His RHP/LHP splits seem to indicate he sits against LHP a lot.
Either way, it reduces his overall value.
You know who else has averaged like 130 games per year in his career? Troy Tulowitzki.
Kendrick, Clippard, and Walker are not the most persuasive examples to indicate that teams were wrong in waiting to sign these guys. Clippard has been the best of the lot, but still throwing 1.7HR and 3BB per 9IP. Walker has been a disaster for the Yankees, not only not producing but clogging up the roster for Drury and even Wade. Maybe teams actually know what theyāre doing?
This. Thank you. FanGraphs went off this rails this offseason – with Travis leading the charge – on this whole narrative. Which was more or less proven wrong before the season even started (Arrieta contract, eg. JDM got his money.)
And since then, it’s seemingly only been further debunked: does the author think that teams are lamenting that they didn’t give Yu Darvish or Wade Davis or Eric Hosmer or Jay Bruce or Tyler Chatwood the contracts that they received?
Alex Cobb and Lance Lynn are getting $12-14M to be ~1 win pitchers. Is this terribly unfair and off-market?
Carlos Santana was ostensibly a bargain at $60/3 – but I think it would be awfully hard to argue that there is a penny of surplus value as we sit here today.
This article is not only not contrite for past misrepresentations, it seems to want to pretend the last 4 months didn’t happen.
FanGraphs was historically a fact/data-driven website. Would love to see more of that applied to this topic.
So I quickly threw some numbers together which will be a mess if I paste in here, so I will I try to summarize.
For the top ~50 FA signed last winter, if you assume their 2018 comp is just their average comp for the course of the deal (which I think is generous, since the early years of FA contracts are typically considered the ‘bargain’ portion that the players allow for to reflect an understood over-payment in the later years AND ignores the player-friendly value of options) then I see teams getting ~45 wins this year for about $433M. Slightly over $9.5M/fWin.
I don’t think I see anything terrible out of whack there.
Moustakas is a genuine outlier (although wouldn’t be if he had accepted the QO); the market turned against him in a way he/Boras didn’t anticipate. Chacin and Moreland are bargain guys generating real club value this year. Lorenzo Cain perhaps the only bargain superstar: got paid like a 2-win guy when he was expected to be a 3-win guy and is playing like a 5-win guy. Good for him (and good for the Brewers FO for hitting on two of these).
But guys like Reed and Vargas and Shaw and Swarzak and Duensing are all guys from the mid tier who aren’t looking worth the $3M-$8M they are being paid. Logan Morrison too! His 1x$6.5 deal seemed like a steal for teh Twins in March. Less so now, with a projected 0.2 wins in the offing. As noted above, those are roles fungibly filled by clubs with”AAAA” guys at 90% less. Nobody gets terribly burned by paying Jaimie Garcia $10M for a year of ~0.3 win baseball. But is there a real asymmetry in a deal like that that disadvantages the players? I don’t see it.
And of course the real potential club-killers are things like the Hosmer deal (that deal felt bad when he was supposed to be a 2-win guy. As a replacement level guy … has to make for interesting water cooler conversation for Dave Cameron). Or perhaps Darvish. Unless you think arm-injured pitchers age well.
I certainly get why the players would like to make more money. And it’s hard to argue that minor league players have anything close to a compelling economic existence. But as noted in other comments, this labor union (like others) has chosen to prioritize tenure over merit, and clubs are responding accordingly.
The narratives of “tanking” and “collusion” and “unfairness” just don’t carry water.
I disagree about the existence of tanking. I think that it definitely does exist as a strategy, but the level of evil purpose involved by ownership is overstated. Itās really just a boogeyman term that we start using to explain the fact that suddenly owners and GMās are behaving like rational consumers, and trying to maximize utility while minimizing cost. Are an extra 5 wins a year worth paying 50 million a year for, especially when those wins directly detract from your standing in what is currently the most viable method of talent acquisition? Given the choice between what it takes to field a good team tomorrow and what it takes to field a good team in a half decade, thereās little wonder what the owners choose. The strategy does exist and is viable, and that is a problem that will probably have to be addressed at some point.
This comment (by DBA455) is probably one of the best I’ve ever read on this site.
Is Lorenzo Cain the second coming of Toriiiii ?
Neil Walker needs to be worried about this summer and the signs pointing to not very friendly conversations about his -.6 WAR (-.12/$1M).
If only the players had, I don’t know, collectively bargained for a better deal…
…or elected a union head with legal or negotiating experience…
last time walker had a post season appearance he was with one of those teams that ‘didn’t spend a dime’ just saying. ironic.
the problem is simple.. players are over paid compaired to their younger counterparts who are often as good or nearly as good as the vets. why pay walker 10m when you can some rookie prospect 500k. (especially now that walker is sucking so bad)
Right, but that is part of Walker’s point… he even knows he would be “overpaid”… but that is the “bargain” that the whole system is based on… You (teams) screw us (players) for 6-7 years, but if we survive, we get paid. I’m not arguing that that deal isn’t stupid and terrible, but that’s the foundation. The players should have seen this coming and done something about it. Now I’m not sure they have any leverage to move the owners on years of control, minimum salaries, days of service time counted as 1 year, arb payouts, etc.
I’m all for a certain amount of team control. If you draft and spend time and resources developing a player, you should have some sort of guarantee that they will play with you for a while. I think that the way that it is set up now though might be a little lopsided.
yeah a little lopsided, but if you take into account how many players never see a single mlb game while the team dumps resources (and signing bonuses) into them.. over all a little less lopsided but the individual gets a kick in the nuts some.
I was a big proponent of Neil Walker this past offseason, but hasn’t his extremely poor season vindicated the teams? It’s not just Walker either. With a few exceptions (JD, Cain, Mikolas), the performance of this years free agent class has been very poor. You can’t blame teams for having no interest in signing players that they don’t think are going to perform
Generally speaking, FA is a game where you lose more often than you win. While there are always some teams that get good production, you generally lose more than you win. This is partly because the players who hit FA are generally the players on the downslope of their career. I don’t think the deals this offseason turning out badly are much different than in prior years.
Now, if you have a chance to sign Manny Machado in his prime, I think that’s a different story, and he’ll get paid accordingly.
I think Neil bottomed out at -1.0 fWAR and has now “surged” to -0.6. Maybe the teams knew better and actually did a good job of evaluating him.
Hi Travis. Given Walker’s experience as a player rep for the Pirates, I think it would have been good to ask him about the CBA process/results as a whole. As someone directly affected by that CBA, I think he would have some unique insight into what “went wrong” or how the MLBPA could “fix” things.
It is just typical union-style wage structure, elevated for extremely valuable workers. Players are paid for time spent in the union as opposed to their value up until they become free agents.
I don’t think there’s a lot you can do for the Neil Walkers of the world, but for the guys just coming up he talks about, you just have to find a way to get more money to players earlier in their career, whether that’s radically increasing the minimum MLB salary, starting arbitration earlier, or upping the amount given out in arbitration.
This is the “solution” to me. Players biggest paydays should come when they’re a whole lot younger. Players used to perform at a high level, hit FA at the end of their prime and get paid for all the success they had in their prime and end up with “bad” contracts from a team perspective. It’s never made sense. FO’s finally found a business acumen this offseason and decided to stop paying for past production which is tough to blame them for. I think the issue was compounded because there weren’t many teams “in the hunt” in March. It felt pretty clear which teams were going to contend and which ones weren’t going to be close (and that has mostly played itself out). It made zero sense for the non-contenders to improve by 1-2 games at a high cost and block young guys who they needed to learn about.
Yeah, this past offseason was extra odd because of how was contending, what players were even available and also the fact that teams are saving for next offseason. There are still some things that teams are realizing though which are changing they dynamic for FA in general that don’t specifically have to do with the oddities of this past offseason.
Younger players should be paid better, not to even mention the embarrassing salaries of minor leaguers. Veterans have routinely sold out young players in the CBA negotiations, especially recently, so it seems a bit unfair for them suddenly be upset that the market inefficiency that they’ve helped to create has come back to bite them.
Isn’t it possible that last year’s free agent class was just particularly bad? As mentioned below, the three players noted in the article have not really been worth rostering, nor have other notable midtier free agents like Lance Lynn, Alex Cobb or Jaime Garcia.
Meanwhile players expected to provide positive value generally got paid, even if they had to wait longer than a few weeks. The notable exception is Jake Arrieta, but as this site even noted, the fact that his own (big market) team showed basically zero interest in him was probably a red flag for suitors.
That’s part of it, and part of it is that teams are saving up for next year, but part of it really also is a change in the way that teams approach roster building.
He has -.06 WAR this year, so I would be worried too….
It seems to absurd to suggest that more teams splurging on players like him would have helped competitiveness.
This past free agent class was such an outlier in so many ways, I think it would be unwise to attempt to extrapolate any future trends from it. That being said, the article does touch upon some aspects of the financial model of the game that need to be addressed.
The old system had players underpayed as they were young and and breaking into the league. The idea being that they had to take their licks, learn the game at the major league level. Once they had achieved free agency, teams would then reward them with a salary was often seen as a payoff for those cost controlled years. It was wildly inefficient, but did keep revenues split pretty fairly between owners and players.
Now, with better understanding of aging curves, teams increasingly want to focus their large spending on signing pre-arb or year 1 arb players to extensions, allowing them to control players prime playing years at the most efficient price point. The idea of rewarding a player for their cost-controlled years is pretty much dead. It is a vastly more efficient system, But, in my opinion (one shared by many on this site) it has skewed the balance of revenue distribution between players and owner and placed it increasingly in favor of the owners.
Those familiar with my posts already know where I am going next. The MLBPA has to push to reduce the years of service time to reach free agency. I know that they don’t have a lot of leverage in negotiations right now, so it would be a difficult get. But as teams continue to maximize spending efficiency, it sees to be the best path to swinging the balance between owners and players.
“The MLBPA has to push to reduce the years of service time to reach free agency.”
Every action has a reaction. Reducing service time *crushes* small-market clubs.
This is why I am a big fan of starting arbitration earlier, potentially as early as Year 2 (and overhauling arbitration as needed).
“Every action has a reaction. Reducing service time *crushes* small-market clubs.”
Increasingly cannot bring myself to care. When Oakland trades Josh Donaldson for pennies on the dollar before his first year of arbitration because they don’t want to even pay him arbitration level salary, yet are perfectly happy to continue pocketing revenue sharing money year after year, I find myself far less sympathetic to small franchises crying poor. Particularly now that there is a defacto salary cap in place, but no salary floor.
But hasn’t the defacto cap had an Oakland-ish effect on big-market clubs?
What do you think the Yanks & Dodgers are doing with the $$$ they’re “saving” by not paying the Neil Walkers of the world to get under the tax line?
They’re pocketing it, just like the A’s.
The Donaldson trade in the context of the day was an attempt to sell high for future value.
https://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/so-what-are-the-as-doing-anyways/
https://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/franklin-barreto-the-key-to-the-josh-donaldson-trade/
I agree the lack salary floor is probably going to be the biggest point of contention going into the next CBA.
For this particular problem (mid-level pay) they need a salary floor and an increase to the minimum. That would direct money away from younger players and back to the mid-level ones. It would also benefit the young players who do get a chance. Overall player spending would rise. Some young players who would otherwise be called up would get squeezed out back to the minors.
According to his player page, Walker in the 6 years that he was under team control, was paid 18M and his production was worth 113M to the team. Now that he is a free agent the argument is that at all costs teams must avoid overpaying. Baseball is is keen to make FA period a buyers market, by essentially forcing FA’s to compete with cost controllable players, while preserving the system which ensures that young players, never mind minor league players are grossly underpaid. Basically the plan is to remove money from payroll while maintaining revenues. This is the new AL arrangement. 4 teams compete and most of the rest try to make more money without really competing by lowering payroll.
“According to his player page, Walker in the 6 years that he was under team control, was paid 18M and his production was worth 113M to the team. Now that he is a free agent the argument is that at all costs teams must avoid overpaying.”
This is what Walker was referencing with his “Now itās almost getting chopped on both sides.” comment. Teams want to pay pennies on the dollar for a player’s controllable years, then not “overpay” for their free agent years. They can’t have it both ways.
Why not?
Small market teams have been doing exactly that for decades.
The teams paying the big bucks to the older players weren’t typically the same teams that employed them while “underpaid”.
The Free Agent deal runs both ways: good young players are “underpaid” for six-seven years and then get a chance to be paid “market value”. But for many of the teams, the deal often looks like: locate promising young player, develop him through the minors and their first few years in the majors and then after two-three years of productive use, they either pay big bucks or lose them and for a majority of teams “lose them” is all they can afford.
So the teams have adapted. They keep players down longer. They try to minimize arbitration eligibility. They try to sign the better players to long deals buying a year or two of free agency. They trade them a year or more before free agency hits…
Look at Lindor, for one. He is a rarity: a big producer from day one. He turned down a nine figure deal. Unless the market changes Cleveland will have him for another two years and will trade him, which is what Baltimore should have done with Machado. He’ll get paid top dollar by somebody else. Philly, most likely. Maybe t he Yankees or Red Sox or Angels. Cleveland will have to move on.
But not all players are instantly top producers.
Some are like Trevor Bauer (staying with Cleveland) or Michael Brantley, who are somewhat useful for a few years before figuring it out and growing to their potential. They might sign an extension or they might not. If they don’t then the same FA calculus ensues. How much are they worth on the open market? Can you afford it? Often the answer is no. Better to go young and restart the cycle.
What we saw this past offseason was the big market teams adopt the same calculus as the smaller budget teams. They saw no surefire talents and passed on the chance to get burned again by midmarket players.
This year there’s surefire winners baked in to the FA class which, if nothing else, will squeeze the midmarket again because the top talents will suck all the big bucks out of the market. And another glut will ensue.
The players need to move away from seniority pay and closer to performance based pay. Not sure how they can do that unless they can engineer a way to make it worth a team’s while to upgrade from 70 to 75 wins.
I can’t think of one.
Failing that they’ll have to strike for a pay floor.
Well said. Are you, by any chance, chemtorres? If you are, I’ve read your stuff and it is good.
Sorry. No. I only annoy people as FJTorres.
However, since year 6, he has been paid a little less than $32 million while producing $.5 million of “value”.
So, for his career, he’s produced $113.5M worth of value. And has been paid $50M for it.
Exactly, but since the MLB no longer seem to be willing to compensate players on the back-end during their free agent period for their past value (during which they were vastly under-payed), it isn’t particularly a radical notion to update the model so they have to pay younger players closer to what they are worth.
100% agree. If the current trend of teams unwilling to pay non-superstars in free agency continues, the current model is completely unsustainable from the player’s side.
GoNy, where are you getting these numbers from? Since year 6 (so, from 2016-2018) he has been paid $31.8 million and has produced $40.8 million of ‘value’. Where is the $.5 million coming from?
vivalajeter, apologies, made 2 big mistakes. Firstly, I was using bWAR, which on his page showed 1.4 bWAR in 2017 across 2 teams and -.8 bWAR in 2018. Combined to .6 bWAR and at $8.5 million per WAR stated the $5 million. My two errors were I meant to type 5 million, not .5 million. Secondly, taking the three lines, (2 for 2017 and 1 for 2018) shown on the other site, I left off his fine 2016 of 2.6 bWAR w the Mets. Therefore, using that measure of WAR, he has produced (2016-2018) 3.2 WAR, worth about $25 million.
While looking at how “grossly underpaid” he is, did you take into account his years in the minors where he produced no value (because he wasn’t even on a major league roster) and his team paid for training and development and stuck with him the whole way or did you only look at half the situation?
The system needs to probably change somewhat, but it isn’t as drastically unbalanced as it appears at first glance.
You mean he was paid $28M, right?
He should collect acorns in his cheek pouches and store them away for the cold days ahead.
He may be. I’m pretty sure he lived with his parents when he was with Pittsburgh.
It’s easy to get caught up in whether Walker’s poor season somehow “proves” that older players will automatically be horrible and therefor be happy with anything offered. The bigger issue is whether the CBA (as negotiated, and it’s not going anywhere) really fosters the best environment for quality baseball. It pays to tank. It pays to not look for incremental improvements to make your team a little more competitive. But indifference in fielding something that fans want to see is coming back to hurt baseball.
Maybe the whole revenue sharing/spending thing needs to be looked at again–not to renegotiate this deal, but to use the time to come up with a better system. I don’t feel bad for Walker. But a better brand of baseball would be a heck of a lot more attractive.
Your focus on competitiveness rather than player/owner revenue share (which I’m sure both sides’ teams of $2000/hr lawyers can fix in the next CBA) is correct. I don’t think fixing competitiveness means getting bad teams to spend more money on expensive, over-the-hill FA players. It may mean giving bad teams 2 picks in the 1st round of the Amateur Draft, creating an international draft and giving bad teams 2 picks in the 1st round there, or even creating an expansion draft for bad teams to draft a player off of good teams. These re-distributive methods would speed a bad team’s rise perhaps enough to counter-balance the incentive to be bad. (There are probably much better ideas out there. I throw these out to get the discussion started.)
A lot of the competitive imbalance seems to be more due to cyclical luck (how do the Indians find Lindor, Ramirez, and Kluber all at the same time?) or dogged tanking to get top 5 picks (Astros, Cubs) but also to organizational decisions such as:
1) 5 or 6 teams (RedSox, Cubs, Braves, and 2 or 3 others) dominating Latin America
2) under-investment in pro scouting (Dodgers have 20, Orioles have 5 according to Eric Longenhagen)
3) teams like the Yankees, Dodgers, and Astros somehow innovating massive improvements in player development.
If there were spending mandates on bad teams, I’d suggest it be in these areas rather than on FA spending, since these are the areas that most dramatically improve a team’s fortunes over the long-term.
Payroll seems more important to retaining players and thereby sustaining winning like the Yankees, RedSox, Nationals, Cubs, and Dodgers do successfully and the Angels, Orioles, Mariners, and Rangers do less successfully.
The Indians did it the old-fashioned way: scouting.
Each came via a different channel: Lindor was a first round pick, Ramirez a bargain international signing, and Kluber a minor leaguer in a trade. A late bloomer, much like Clevenger.
While you’re at it, they got Bauer in a three way trade because the D-backs thought he was uncoachable. Cleveland wasn’t a contender so tbey could afford to let him do his thing and take his time developing.
Ramirez was a fast riser through the minors but took some ML seasoning to bloom.
The Lindors of the world are pretty rare. I suspect he was ML-ready 14 months before he came up. Cleveland didn’t call him up because they weren’t contenders, had Ramirez up, and waiting bought them extra time during their Window.
As a fan, I don’t like the rebuilding cycle that the small market teams go through. If things work out perfectly the team is competitive for roughly 3 years out of a 5 year cycle. But that’s a best case.
There will always be an incentive for teams to spend wisely – even for the big market teams. It would be lovely for there to be an incentive for the small market teams to spend. That used to be gate revenue, but the gate is a smaller and smaller part of overall take these days. I think the idea I like most is having the draft order be changed to:
1-20) Non playoff teams, best record first, down to worst record at 20
21-30) wildcard game eliminees down to WS champ
Players in the top 10 of the draft are more valuable than the middle ten. But even then, instead of spending 3/$33 on a veteran you could just take one of the over slot guys in the draft. I think I’ve talked myself out of it.
The problem here is then you incentivize fringe playoff contenders (this year’s A’s, Dbacks, etc.) to tank the season at the last minute if they value a high draft pick over a one-and-done WC game.
You cannot create a disincentive to spend wisely, because that’s logical behavior in a healthy system. Any such disincentive would be perverse by nature.
Agreed – I should have worded it differently. There will always be an incentive to spend wisely. I’d like there to be an incentive to win as well.
People seem to forget that the system was put in place to buoy small market teams’ chances of holding onto their homegrown players and sustaining success. It wasn’t to “screw” young players.
The solution isn’t so simple as “reduce the number of team controlled years” or “pay younger players more”. Doing so would actually likely compound the current market inefficiency.
Might be time for a salary floor and cap in baseball.
In order of importance: Pay minor leaguers more. Start a pension for the ones who don’t get to be interviewed about their offseason outlook. Raise the ML minimum so every players who’s “put their time in” doesn’t feel as if he’s been cheated his whole career and now deserves a big payday to compensate. Have in- house wealth advisers teach these kids how to save for if that payday doesn’t come.
Not to be a contrarian, but I actually think the baseball middle class has been one of the strongest sources of the wage inflation up until this point. It seems like every year from 08- now you’d have to tack on another million or so to the salary of Proven ML Producer
This is the downside of taking the Qualifying Offer. Walker got paid $17.2m last year…on a one year deal. I don’t know what long term offers he had on the table, but I recall estimates being in the range of 3/33. He bet on himself, pocketing that big one year deal, hoping to sign that same deal starting this year. That was a risk, especially when you consider the way 2nd basemen seem to just disappear from the league in their early 30s.
It looked like a risk that paid off after the season he had. But he didn’t anticipate the poor market, which was really just teams behaving the way they should. They looked at aging curves and market efficiencies and acted as this site has been telling them they should for a decade. If anyone is to blame for the players being “underpaid” last offseason, it’s Fangraphs and the movement behind it. The results speak for themselves. I don’t disagree with Walker about the squeeze on each end, and I expect the players to hold out during the next labor negotiation. But we shouldn’t be naive about the cause.
Just to do the math, let’s say Walker had taken 3/30 (we’ll estimate low) in the 2017 offseason. That takes him through his age 33 season, and sure it’s not the longest deal, so I get why he took the QO risk. He got paid more than half of that deal’s total last season, you’d think you can get there with the rest.
Well, 17.2 + 4 + 2 (being extremely generous, most likely he’ll be on a minor league deal next year) doesn’t add up to 3/30. Take the years, players, in this environment most especially.
I wish the reporter would ask Walker how he thinks the union did in the CBA negotiations, and why it ended the way it did.
Also, Iād really like to see some thoughts from players on how to best deal with the upcoming CBA. Perhaps idea for another article?