Royals Get Another Ninth-Inning Guy for the Seventh Inning
If you’d made your way over to the “relief pitchers” tab of our team depth charts section lately, there’s something peculiar that may have caught your eye. It didn’t seem to get past Twitter user Brad Shapiro, operating under the moniker @Big_Hebrew:
@BtBScore HAHAHAHAHAHAHAHA, that’s hilarious. Best bullpen in baseball last 2 season means nothing, got it
— Brad Shapiro (@Big_Hebrew) December 6, 2015
To whom is Brad referring? A quick perusal of Brad’s Twitter profile reveals a Royals “Took the Crown” avatar, a “Royalty” header, and tweets like “CRYING LIKE A BABY RIGHT NOW!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!” posted minutes after the Royals won the World Series. Using these context clues, I’ve drawn the conclusion that Brad is a Royals fan, and that Brad’s tweet was in reference to the Royals bullpen being ranked 25th by our projected depth charts.
Now, I understand that sounds a little silly, given what you know about the Royals bullpen. But here’s the thing about the projections that doesn’t need repeating but probably needs repeating: the projections aren’t perfect, and under certain unique circumstances, they’re going to miss. Also: bullpens, in particular, are hard to project, because relievers are notoriously volatile.
So when you look at Wade Davis‘ Steamer projection for 2015 — the 2.74 ERA, the 3.04 FIP, the 1.4 WAR that’s the same as or lower than Brett Cecil‘s and Will Smith’s — you have to understand that these projections come with error bars. You have to understand that Wade Davis used to be a starter, a bad starter, and that the projection systems can’t make individual player exceptions. And you have to understand that the difference between 25th place and sixth place on the reliever depth chart projections is 1.0 WAR, and that if you just project Wade Davis as a 2.4 WAR reliever — still probably low — rather than a 1.4 WAR reliever, the Royals are right back near the top where they belong.
But about that Royals bullpen, which has, in fact, probably been the best in baseball the last two seasons (h/t Brad). It doesn’t have Greg Holland anymore, lost for the season to Tommy John surgery, and Holland’s been a key part those last two years. It doesn’t have Ryan Madson anymore, signed by the A’s, and Madson was a key part last year. It doesn’t have Franklin Morales anymore, currently a free agent, and Morales was a key part last year.
Even with incumbents Davis and Kelvin Herrera, the Royals bullpen, when Brad composed his tweet, looked a little vulnerable. The next-best option was Luke Hochevar, and while he’s a nice comeback story, his ERA and FIP were both near or at 4.00 last season, he’s now 32 years old, and remember that thing about relievers being notoriously volatile? No telling whether Hochevar returns to being anything more than a middle relief option at this point in his career. Teams could do worse than having Luke Hochevar throw high-leverage innings for them, but the Royals are World Champions with high expectations who have built this sort of bullpen model, and that model doesn’t include Luke Hochevar throwing high-leverage innings.
What it does include, though — and boy have I done some kind of job burying the lede here — is Joakim Soria throwing high leverage innings, because the Royals signed the 31-year-old reliever to a three-year, $25 million contract with a fourth-year mutual option.
What Soria gives the Royals is a replacement for Madson, who ended up serving as something of a replacement for Holland last year. Soria will either pitch the seventh or the eighth, usually, but the order doesn’t matter. What matters, now, is that the Royals again have a bullpen that resembles one that’s gone to the World Series each of the last two years — three guys, all of whom could close for plenty of teams across the league, coming at you back-to-back-to-back.
Soria got the same number of years and three more million dollars than Madson. Soria is four years younger than Madson, and has pitched four times as many seasons over the past four years. The projections like Soria a bit more this year, though Madson was better last year. You can take your pick. The point is, the Royals bullpen, which might have appeared somewhat vulnerable 24 hours ago, now looks quite a bit like the version that appeared in the World Series two months ago, and that version was more than fine. No one expected it to remain vulnerable. They could still use a lefty to replace Morales, but that lefty might end up being Danny Duffy, and that could easily be viewed as an upgrade.
When teams win a World Series, you start to hear about the possibility of “copycat teams,” trying to replicate whatever model of success most recently worked for that year’s winners. Last year’s Royals had a few unique characteristics, and one of them was the shutdown bullpen. Fans want their teams to replicate the Royals bullpen, and so fans clamor for their team to sign all the good relievers. The thing about the Royals bullpen these last couple years, though, is that it hasn’t been built through free agency. Holland, Herrera and Hochevar came up through the system. Davis was a failed starter who was slightly more than a throw-in piece in the James Shields/Wil Myers trade. Madson and Morales were picked up off the scrap heap on a minor league deals last season. The genius of the Royals bullpen these last couple years has been how easy they’ve made it look.
In that sense, the Soria deal is the Royals breaking character. At the same time, the Royals have money to spend, but not enough for the top-tier free agents, so it’s got to go somewhere, and you can’t bank on finding a Ryan Madson every offseason. Madsons are luxuries, not expectations.
With a Madson, you hope. With a Soria, you expect. These last couple years, Soria’s been about 20% better than average, by FIP. He’s been about 30% better than average, by ERA. Probably, he’s somewhere in the upper-third of current relievers. He’s also now the third-best reliever on his own team.
As pitchers age, they tend to lose velocity. Soria’s not old, he’s 31, but he’s at the point in his career where, if anything, the velocity should be going down. Yet, if there’s one thing you should know about Soria’s 2015, it’s this:
Biggest reliever velocity gainers, 2014-15, min. 40 IP
- Joakim Soria, +1.8 mph
- Zach Putnam, +1.8
- T.J. McFarland, +1.7
- John Axford, +1.5
- Antonio Bastardo, +1.2
Soria’s not a hard thrower — even last year, he averaged just 92 on the fastball — and the extra velocity resulted in fewer strikeouts, more walks and more homers. But with an aging pitcher, you worry about a potential loss of velocity, and how that pitcher might be forced to adjust. When you lose a couple ticks, things that used to work don’t work anymore, and effectiveness can be the next thing to go. With Soria, there’s some room for error. We’ve seen him be successful at 90 in the very recent past, and now he throws 92. He could give those two extra ticks of velocity right back this season, and he’d be right back where he was two years ago, which was still a very good reliever. Nearly three-quarters of all Soria’s pitches are fastballs, and last year, the fastball looked like it got better.
Even after the Soria signing, the Royals bullpen is still projected as the 20th-best in baseball, but we’ve been over the issues with that. What’s important is that the Royals bullpen now has Davis, Herrera and Soria, and that’s among the best trios in baseball. The Dodgers have Aroldis Chapman and Kenley Jansen now, and the Yankees still have Dellin Betances and Andrew Miller, and so maybe the Royals bullpen isn’t the clear-cut favorite anymore, but at worst, it’s right there. It doesn’t look much different than the one that helped win the World Series last year, and so that’s not a bad place to be.
August used to cover the Indians for MLB and ohio.com, but now he's here and thinks writing these in the third person is weird. So you can reach me on Twitter @AugustFG_ or e-mail at august.fagerstrom@fangraphs.com.
The way we measure bullpens seems stone age. We mix garbage PAs with high leverage PAs, equal weight them and jam it through the same funnel as all other positions (WAR.) In reality, one of the things that KC figured out before other teams is that having a shut-down bullpen in the top 3-4 guys was very powerful. Other teams are now signing up — LAD in the offseason, WAS at the deadline, NYY last offseason, etc.
I’d love to see a more thoughtful analysis which weights WAR by leverage (yes I know about WPA…) or does something in an attempt to value the high-leverage end of the bullpen to its true value.
I’m sure someone much smarter than me will chime in, but I’m fairly sure fWAR uses leverage for relievers. So your wish has been granted!
Yes, you are correct. The description could be clearer, but Fangraphs definitely includes a leverage element in its WAR formula for relief pitchers: http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/war-and-relievers/
And yet WAR still seems to undervalue high leverage relievers pretty consistently. Anecdotally it seems easy to prove that a lock down pen can be a difference maker for a team’s success, especially in the post season. And yet the WAR calculations don’t seem to reflect this “eye test” reality. The “proven closer” narrative might be a fiction perpetrated by agents looking for a payday for their clients and managers trying to deflect second guessing, but the utility of lock down relievers in high leverage situations seems both irrefutable and understated by WAR calculations alone. A conundrum best solved by sharper minds than I.
“And yet WAR still seems to undervalue high leverage relievers pretty consistently.”
This has been repeated so often that it seems to be accepted as fact. I’ve seen very little evidence to support it, however, assuming you are referring to “value” with respect to team performance, not free agent offers. I didn’t find Jeff’s recent work on the topic very convincing.
It’s a very tempting hypothesis, so I don’t dismiss it out of hand, but it’s still a hypothesis as far as I know, and I think it’s been given undue weight by the recent Royals’ success.
> Anecdotally it seems easy to prove
Perhaps you should reconsider your use of the word “prove”.
I think fWAR does in fact undervalue relievers. But not because of anything related to leverage index.
Think of it this way: In 2015 Starting pitchers threw roughly 65% of all innings. Relievers threw the other 35%.
Yet for some reason (arbitrarily assigned replacement level WP% for starters and relievers), starters received about 80% of all WAR. There is your missing reliever value.
Noah, that is an interesting observation. Worth asking Dave about in his weekly chat.
Could the reason that RP pitch 35% of the innings and get 20% of the WAR have something to do with less volatility between good relievers and bad relievers relative to SP? To make the most extreme example, imagine all teams have the exact same relievers. Then reliever WAR is 0 because everyone is replacement level. No idea if this actually explains that gap though.
I stand corrected, thanks!
I find it depressing that I was genuinely surprised how maturely you accepted being corrected on an web comment.
As noted (somewhat obliquely)… RP WAR calculation isn’t the problem. Using SP data to project RP data is the problem.
The Yankees have been building lock down bullpens since 1996. This isn’t some new thing they came up with after watching the 2014 Royals.
This isn’t exactly a new thing that the Royals invented. For example since I’m familiar with them the Yanks have had that for years with Rivera/Hughes, Rivera/Soriano, Rivera/Drob, Drob/Betances and now Betances/Miller with Wilson and Warren as solid complementary pieces.
I can’t help but point out you’re passing over Wetteland/Rivera in your examples…
Don’t forget Gordon/Rivera.
Nelson/Mendoza/Rivera
WAR uses chaining for RPs and this destroys the value of elite RP in the calculation. Chaining is stupid. But this is done because the inventors and developers of WAR think RPs aren’t worth much due to their lack of innings and so created a metric to reflect that belief.
There are also more fundamental problems with WAR–that a season aggregate statistic only maps roughly on to how W-L games are decided (through a set of discrete contests).
You’re just begging the question in the first paragraph. The value is being “destroyed” only if you assume it’s there in the first place. I’m open to alternative valuation methods for elite relief pitchers, but I haven’t seen any compelling examples. It’s certainly not true that elite bullpens (or elite tops ends of bullpens) correlate strongly with over-achieving pythag or even a simple WAR-based team W/L estimator.
As for WAR overall, yeah, I guess it’s a limitation to aggregate plate appearance outcomes, but that’s true for literally every main metric, for pitchers and hitters. Not sure how you get around that, unless you have a crystal ball. The randomness inherent to sequencing puts a limit on how well any metrics will map on to actual W/L. That doesn’t mean we can’t still improve forecasting, but that limitation is always going to be there.
Just a thought and not really sure of a solution, but is part of the problem with RP valuation, that there seems to be a multiplier effect when pairing top flight relievers together. If you swap out Davis for Chapman or Jensen, there isn’t going to be a significant difference for the Royals. It is only when you stack multiple really good relievers together, and can push that leverage down into the 7th innings do you get the impact the Royals have had.