The Champs and the Projections
Back in November, the Kansas City Royals were crowned champions of the baseball world, and rightfully so; they won all the necessary games! The Royals are the champions, and they’ll continue to be the champions until a new team is crowned champions in the upcoming October. Could be that the new champions are just a different Royals team, but that seems unlikely. Mostly, it seems unlikely because it’s really hard to repeat World Series titles. That hasn’t happened in 15 years. But also, it seems unlikely for another reason.
See, we’ve got player and team projections here on the site, and when looking toward the future, it’s usually better to rely on the projections than to rely on whatever subjective beliefs we can quickly work up in our own heads. The projections, by and large, are pretty darn good, and those pretty darn good projections thinks the Royals roster, as currently constructed, is the opposite of pretty darn good. Right now, at this very second, the Royals, the world champion Royals, are being given MLB’s sixth-worst team projection, a little worse than the Twins and Orioles and a little better than the Padres and the Rockies.
I know, I know. The projections didn’t much like the Royals in 2014, either, and they were one game away from being the champions. The projections didn’t much like the Royals in 2015, either, and now they are the champions. The projections have a two-year history of whiffing on the Royals, and plenty of Kansas City fans have scoffed at the forecasted 2016 numbers listed here on this site.
But this Royals roster, at this very second, is quite a bit different than the roster that won the World Series. The roster that won the World Series had a Johnny Cueto in the rotation, but this one doesn’t. The roster that won the World Series had an Alex Gordon and a Ben Zobrist in the lineup and the field, but this one doesn’t. The roster that won the World Series had a right fielder with more than 86 career games played, but this one doesn’t. The Royals have lost a lot — Cueto, Gordon and Zobrist were worth about nine wins last year (not all to the Royals, of course) — yet they’ve gained very little.
Of course, they’re going to gain some, but they’re not getting Cueto or Zobrist back, and it sure doesn’t look like they’re getting Gordon back. Looks like Omar Infante might again be the Opening Day second baseman, and the best starting pitcher they could hope to land looks like Scott Kazmir right now. Plenty of big-name outfielders are still out there, but the Royals don’t figure to be players for them. More than likely, the Royals pick up a veteran, mid-tier outfielder for one corner, and run a platoon in the other.
While the Royals seem likely to add some projected wins through the end of the offseason, it doesn’t figure to be many. Even if they were to pick up, say, five projected wins through the rest of their offseason moves, a figure that feels high, their team projection would still fall below league average, pitting them between the Rangers and the White Sox.
Point is: no matter what happens, the 2016 Royals aren’t going to project well, by the numbers we currently have, and that’s fascinating. More likely than not, the World Champions will project as something like a .500 team, at best, on Opening Day, and people aren’t sure how to feel about that, especially given the last couple years. Rightfully so. I’m not sure how to feel about it either, which brings us to the second half of this post.
I’m just interested in knowing how people feel about the individual player projections. The individual player projections make up the team projections, and knowing more about the former can help us learn about the latter. I’ve grouped nine position players, five starting pitchers and a closer below, all with some relevant statistics and a couple comments for extra information. For each player, there’s some positive facts, and some negatives facts, to allow folks to see both sides. I tried my hardest to balance the two, so as not to sway the vote too much. There’s a chance that some bias slipped through the cracks — it can be impossible to avoid — but just know, if you notice any, that it wasn’t intentional.
All you need to do is look at the statistics and the words, and then express your own opinion. Easy enough! If you think the projection looks good, with an error bar of 0.5 WAR or so in either direction, then select “About right.” If you think the projection seems off, for whatever reason, then say so in the poll. I’ll let this run for a little while, and we’ll review and discuss tomorrow!
* * *

| PA | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | WAR | |
| Career | 2148 | .279 | .306 | .431 | 100 | 2.9* |
| 3Year | 1685 | .270 | .297 | .420 | 95 | 2.6* |
| 2015 | 553 | .260 | .280 | .426 | 87 | 1.6 |
| Projection | 520 | .273 | .302 | .433 | 97 | 3.1 |
An optimist might say that regression goes both ways, and that Salvador Perez had established a level of performance prior to his career-worst 2015, and we should expect him to regress upwards a bit. The career-worst BABIP should come up, and now that the Royals have won it all, perhaps his workload gets reduced, keeping him fresher.
A pessimist would argue that Perez’s offense has been in decline for all five of his major league seasons, and that the BABIP was similarly-low last year. He’s taken quite a beating since entering the league, and perhaps the wear and tear has taken a toll on him already.

| PA | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | WAR | |
| Career | 3055 | .280 | .336 | .427 | 108 | 1.3* |
| 3Year | 1894 | .291 | .347 | .437 | 116 | 2.3* |
| 2015 | 667 | .297 | .363 | .459 | 125 | 3.5 |
| Projection | 649 | .285 | .348 | .448 | 117 | 2.4 |
An optimist might say that Hosmer is coming off his career-best season while entering his prime at 26 years old, and has looked, in two of the last three seasons, like the player he was expected to become in his top prospect days.
A pessimist would argue that Hosmer has never pieced together consecutive above-average seasons, and just one year ago was a league-average hitter who turned in a replacement-level season.

| PA | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | WAR | |
| Career | 5549 | .272 | .309 | .389 | 86 | 1.0* |
| 3Year | 1506 | .262 | .292 | .367 | 79 | 0.7* |
| 2015 | 455 | .220 | .234 | .337 | 44 | -0.9 |
| Projection | 399 | .253 | .284 | .352 | 71 | 0.2 |
An optimist might say that Infante dealt through injuries last season, and that with a clean bill of health, we should expect him to return to something close to his three-year average.
A pessimist would argue that Infante is entering his age-34 season, making it difficult to fully bounce back from injury, and that he was the worst hitter in baseball last year, so the bounceback would have to be a major one to return to his previously established level.

| PA | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | WAR | |
| Career | 2607 | .247 | .303 | .400 | 92 | 2.1* |
| 3Year | 1628 | .246 | .305 | .403 | 94 | 2.1* |
| 2015 | 614 | .284 | .348 | .470 | 124 | 3.8 |
| Projection | 599 | .262 | .322 | .435 | 106 | 3.0 |
An optimist might say that Moustakas is coming off his career-best season while entering his prime at 27 years old, and finally looked like the player he was expected to become in his top prospect days.
A pessimist would argue that Moustakas has never done anything close to last year’s production in a much larger sample throughout his career, and that we need to see him do it again before we buy in.

| PA | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | WAR | |
| Career | 3860 | .262 | .298 | .344 | 74 | 1.8* |
| 3Year | 1924 | .258 | .290 | .331 | 70 | 2.0* |
| 2015 | 662 | .257 | .293 | .377 | 67 | 1.5 |
| Projection | 641 | .262 | .296 | .345 | 74 | 1.5 |
An optimist might say that just a year ago, Escobar was nearly a league-average hitter, and that the postseason showed the kind of impact he can make at the plate.
A pessimist would argue that, in two of the last three seasons, Escobar has been among the game’s worst hitters, and that his career batting numbers are among the worst of active hitters.

| PA | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | WAR | |
| Career | 1202 | .255 | .320 | .343 | 84 | 4.4* |
| 3Year | 754 | .260 | .321 | .355 | 88 | 4.3* |
| 2015 | 225 | .250 | .311 | .380 | 88 | 1.8 |
| Projection | 546 | .250 | .309 | .341 | 79 | 1.6 |
An optimist might say that Dyson’s been nothing but productive in his still-somewhat limited career playing time, and that, given the opportunity to play every day, the numbers would translate to a well-above average starter. Also, that he’s graded as one of the game’s best defenders, worth something like +20 runs saved per season in the outfield thus far.
A pessimist would argue that Dyson’s been efficiently platooned throughout his career, and so we can’t expect his career numbers to translate in an everyday role since his struggles against lefties would be exposed. Also, that we still don’t have even three seasons worth of defensive data, so we need to regress his +20 runs saved per season a bit.

| PA | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | WAR | |
| Career | 1973 | .288 | .337 | .418 | 107 | 5.4* |
| 3Year | 1548 | .289 | .339 | .419 | 109 | 5.7* |
| 2015 | 604 | .307 | .361 | .477 | 129 | 6.6 |
| Projection | 628 | .283 | .334 | .417 | 104 | 3.7 |
An optimist might say that Cain hinted at stardom in 2014 and reached it in 2015, and has established a new true talent level, meaning we can discard what happened before then with greater certainty than usual. He’s been one of the game’s best for two years, now.
A pessimist would argue that last year was the first time Cain had ever played a full season, that the sudden power spike wasn’t real, and that we can’t reasonably project anyone to continue being a +20 run defender, especially now that Cain is entering his age-30 season.

| PA | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | WAR | |
| Career | 251 | .249 | .269 | .444 | 89 | 2.1* |
| 3Year | 251 | .249 | .269 | .444 | 89 | 2.1* |
| 2015 | 251 | .249 | .269 | .444 | 89 | 1.0 |
| Projection | 516 | .254 | .291 | .364 | 76 | -0.1 |
An optimist might say that Orlando has the type of profile shared by other successful Royals hitters, that it’s hard to project guys without much of a major league track record, and that his skillset plays well in his home park.
A pessimist would argue that Orlando didn’t crack the big leagues until his age-29 season for a reason, that his numbers were propped up by an absurd triples rate and home run power never-before showcased in the minor leagues, and that it’s very difficult to succeed with the type of plate discipline he showed last year.

| PA | AVG | OBP | SLG | wRC+ | WAR | |
| Career | 3459 | .275 | .331 | .464 | 115 | 1.4* |
| 3Year | 1697 | .268 | .331 | .436 | 113 | 0.6* |
| 2015 | 639 | .290 | .362 | .485 | 131 | 2.1 |
| Projection | 626 | .270 | .335 | .440 | 111 | 0.8 |
An optimist might say that Morales was the Royals’ very best hitter last year, and that Morales has shown the ability to play at a similarly-high level in the past. Also, that his three-year numbers are perhaps unfairly bogged down by a dreadful 2014 in which he sat out the first three months and had never had time to find his groove.
A pessimist would argue that, having sat out or not, Morales was still arguably the game’s worst player in 2014, and that at 33 years old with an injury history, we have to expect regression from his 2015 performance.

| IP | ERA | FIP | WAR | |
| Career | 361.2 | 3.61 | 3.66 | 3.2* |
| 3Year | 361.2 | 3.61 | 3.66 | 3.2* |
| 2015 | 163.1 | 4.08 | 3.57 | 2.7 |
| Projection | 195.0 | 3.51 | 3.60 | 3.5 |
An optimist might say that Ventura was excellent in the second half, and that his first half numbers were perhaps due in part to fluky sequencing. Also, that whole 100-mph fastball thing.
A pessimist would argue that Ventura has never pitched as many innings as his projection in a single season, and that the upside hinted at by his velocity isn’t matched by his swing-and-miss or strikeout totals.

| IP | ERA | FIP | WAR | |
| Career | 1243.0 | 4.29 | 4.24 | 1.5* |
| 3Year | 563.1 | 4.03 | 4.06 | 1.4* |
| 2015 | 200.1 | 3.55 | 3.82 | 3.1 |
| Projection | 185.0 | 4.27 | 4.26 | 1.8 |
An optimist might say that Volquez is coming off a career-best season, and has looked like a changed man since going to Ray Searage and the Pirates in 2014.
A pessimist would argue that Volquez’s long track record of mediocrity doesn’t bode well for future success entering his age-32 season, and that it’s difficult to bank on balls in play continuing to treat him as kindly as they have the past two years.

| IP | ERA | FIP | WAR | |
| Career | 571.0 | 3.06 | 3.32 | 3.2* |
| 3Year | 255.1 | 3.31 | 3.63 | 2.4* |
| 2015 | 58.1 | 3.55 | 3.82 | 0.5 |
| Projection | 172.0 | 4.00 | 4.22 | 2.0 |
An optimist might say that Medlen was one of the game’s best pitchers between 2012-13, and that now that he’s had some time to shake off the rust of a second Tommy John, we can expect him to look more like his former self.
A pessimist would argue that Medlen has pitched just 58 innings in the last two seasons combined, and that he didn’t look very sharp last year, coming off his second Tommy John surgery. Also, the track record on guys with two Tommy John surgeries is pretty bleak.

| IP | ERA | FIP | WAR | |
| Career | 443.1 | 3.80 | 4.22 | 2.0* |
| 3Year | 310.1 | 3.16 | 4.04 | 2.5* |
| 2015 | 136.2 | 4.08 | 4.43 | 1.6 |
| Projection | 153.0 | 4.00 | 4.22 | 1.6 |
An optimist might say that Duffy has finally stayed mostly healthy for the better part of two years now, and that just a year ago in 2014, he posted a 2.53 ERA over 149 innings.
A pessimist would argue that Duffy is projected for more innings than he’s ever thrown in a single season in his career, and that the 2.53 ERA was propped up by an unsustainable BABIP surrounded by underwhelming peripherals.

| IP | ERA | FIP | WAR | |
| Career | 1179.0 | 3.69 | 4.39 | 2.5* |
| 3Year | 288.1 | 3.40 | 4.80 | 1.9* |
| 2015 | 123.1 | 3.06 | 4.52 | 2.0 |
| Projection | 168.0 | 4.45 | 5.07 | 0.4 |
An optimist might say that the projections have no idea what to do with Young, who’s perhaps baseball’s most notorious peripheral-beater. All he’s done is get outs these last couple seasons, and he’s got the type of profile that could age well.
A pessimist would argue that Young is still 37 years old, and has never been able to stay healthy — his projected 168 innings would be his highest in nine years. All it takes is a few of those balls in play to start dropping in and you could have a disaster on your hands.

| IP | ERA | FIP | WAR | |
| Career | 733.1 | 3.63 | 3.78 | 1.0* |
| 3Year | 274.2 | 3.11 | 2.93 | 1.6* |
| 2015 | 67.1 | 0.94 | 2.29 | 2.8 |
| Projection | 65.0 | 2.75 | 3.04 | 1.1 |
An optimist might say that Davis is a cyborg who’s pitched like a cyborg lately, and that the projections unfairly factor in his mediocre days as a starter, when he wasn’t yet a cyborg.
A pessimist would argue that relievers are volatile, and that we need to expect regression, even from cyborgs.
August used to cover the Indians for MLB and ohio.com, but now he's here and thinks writing these in the third person is weird. So you can reach me on Twitter @AugustFG_ or e-mail at august.fagerstrom@fangraphs.com.
1) FG predicted 79 wins for KC last year. Only missed by 16.
2 Royals went 25-15 without Gordon, a 101-win pace.
3) Royals were way out in front of the Central before acquiring Cueto/Zobrist. (The former played poorly for them anyway down the stretch)
I’d guess the Royals will play 85ish win pace if they stay healthy and finish 2nd in the Central to 88-win Cleveland. Just a guess. Royals will be adding some pieces beyond “Scott Kazmir” because the Royals just shed $30M in payroll and have higher revenues expected this eyar.
Gosh, if they went 25-15 without Gordon, they should have benched all their stars! 162-0 baby!!
/eye roll/
I refuse to attempt to project the Royals anymore. It’s demeaning.
Why project when you can just punt and outsource?
There are several basic problems with this article:
1) First, as mentioned, the Royals played better – or at least as well – without Gordon as with him.
2) Cueto was certainly more of a liability than a benefit during his time as a Royal. He was horrible in the regular season (way below replacement level), and outside of 1 or two starts, was horrible in the post-season. One can make the point that the Royals would have won MORE games during the regular season if they did not acquire Cueto.
3) The Royals also acquired Zobrist when they had – by far – the best record in the AL. So it is very wrong to claim that he was any factor in the Royal’s regular season success. Yes, he may have helped in ultimately winning the WS, but the Royals still won 95 games basically without him.
4) Yes, Rios was a veteran. However, he was a very bad veteran. Again, the Royals were better when they had Orlando/Dyson platooning in RF than when Rios played. So his loss has no negative effect on the team.
The only thing I can conclude is that this article was written by someone who has no actual knowledge of the Royals. He assumes that the loss (or potential loss) of these players is necessarily a bad thing, failing to realize that they played no role in the Royal’s regular season, league leading, 95 wins. So there is strong evidence to show that the loss of Cueto, Zobrist and (possibly) Gordon will have no negative effect on the 2016 team.
I think you’re missing the point a bit. It’s got less to do with those guys in particular and how they impacted the 2015 Royals, and more to do with “the champions have the sixth-worst 2016 projection.” This is about the future, not the past
The article used the lack of those players to contrast the current team with past Royals teams that also outperformed their projections. This seems unfair, because those players didn’t help the team beat the projections. Yeah, they contributed nine wins, and the Royals would be better with them than without them, but they were still very, very good without them, even when the projections consistently said they weren’t good.
Of course, Alex Gordon contributed quite a bit to those good teams that beat the projections by so much, and he’s gone now.
Wrong.
In your preface, you clearly cite the loss of Zobrist, Cueto, and Gordon as key drivers of the Royals’ projected mediocrity in 2016. But let’s unpack that for a minute. The Royals sans Zobrist and Cueto had already confounded the projections in 2015, jumping out to 59-38 record the day of the Cueto acquisition. So let’s move on to Gordon. The Royals are indisputably a worse ballclub without him. But is the loss of his 3.5 WAR a legitimate rationale for projecting the team to be the sixth worst in all of baseball?
The answer is no.
Gordon’s 3.5 wins aside, this is essentially the same team as last year’s opening day squad. The same one that ran away with the AL Central. Simply put, the only logical reason one might predict the Royals’ demise in 2016 is if he believes that last year’s team was not good either. Your fallacious narrative about the loss of Zobrist, Cueto, and Gordon is a distraction from the truth of the matter — that FG is sticking to its guns on the Royals. Any rational individual can see that these projections are predicated on the belief that the Royals’ past two years of success were nothing more than a mirage.
I do not believe my own personal bullishness on the 2016 Royals to be so prescient as to be infallible. But I will certainly make my beliefs — and the rationale behind them — loud and clear. Mr. Fagerstrom: your willingness in this article to hide behind a non sequitur, to distract from your underlying argument, is nothing more than cowardly. As exemplified by the current FG projections, as well as your backhanded compliment (the Royals are the rightful champions because “they won all the necessary games”), you and your contemporaries at FG have made up your minds. This has nothing to do with losing Zobrist, Cueto, or Gordon — instead, FG is doubling down (again) on your belief that the Royals success has been nothing more than a fluke.
I suggest you own up to it. I can’t wait to see who is proven right in 2016.
What you still aren’t grasping is this: Even if the Royals out perform again…the projections aren’t thereby proven wrong.
While YOU care only about the Royals. FG is more interested in the projections themselves…which prove time and time again to be quite reliable. That the only data point you care about is an outlier, has no bearing on the validity of the projections as a whole.
FG is not as narrowly (Royals) focused as you. That you think FG is biased against the Royals says more about your Royals focus, and pro-Royals bias than it does about any FG bias. FG applies the same projections to every team. To call this equal treatment of all 30 teams an anti-Royals sentiment is just plain absurd.
Your fav team won the World Series for fuck’s sake. Why not enjoy that instead of being butthurt all the time?
@kdl
lol
Kdl: Has there been any analysis published recently on the accuracy of the steamer protections? I’d be interested in seeing whether the royals are truly an outlier. Because I do agree that this site appears to be tending towards labeling the royals a fluke and hoping to be proven right by a collapse.
SABR projections are both better than any other method out there, and not really super good. All the projection systems missed badly on 2015. Llooking to see if there’s some systematic, forward-looking tweak that would make the projections better is logical. Complaining that the computer algorithm is biased against your team? That feels like the ultimate definition of railing against the machine.
Hell no, I’m not “railing against the machine” as you suggest. I don’t really have any issue with FG’s projections for the 2016 Royals, and I don’t subscribe to any conspiracy theories suggesting that the projection systems are specifically “biased against my team,” My view is simply that the Royals’ strengths are very unique — and just so happen to align with some of FG’s soft spots (i.e., a strong high-leverage bullpen and elite team defense).
The only issue I have with this article is the narrative that accompanies it. A much more accurate version of the commentary would have been something along the lines of, “FG thought the Royals wouldn’t be particularly good last year (actual results aside). Most of their core is intact, and we don’t think they’ll be good next year either.” Instead, Fagerstrom chooses a much more convenient cop-out which belies the underlying truth. His commentary basically goes like this: FG may or may not have been wrong last year… but lookie here! The real reason we think they’ll be bad is that they’re losing Zobrist, Cueto, and Gordon.
Why does this matter? Creating a revisionist narrative on the Royals’ performance-projection gap leads to reduced urgency among the sabermetric community to develop analytical approaches to correcting the models’ imperfections. We still haven’t cracked the code on the impact that an elite defense and bullpen have on enabling a team to outperform its’ projected team WAR. Developing spurious ulterior narratives to explain away a fairly bold projection (WS champs will be 6th-worst team next season) certainly does not help.
Bottom line: we need to understand whether the Royals as currently constructed are undervalued (my view) or lucky (FG’s view). Let’s do everyone a service by making this distinction crystal clear, and not obscuring it with noise.
The Royals also acquired Zobrist when they had – by far – the best record in the AL. So it is very wrong to claim that he was any factor in the Royal’s regular season success.
This is a straightforward non sequitur.
1) Are you really, genuinely arguing the Royals are a better team without Alex Gordon? If yes, please use something other than hindsight bias based on a small sample of the team W-L stat to make your case.
2) Cueto – in half a season – contributed the 3rd most WAR among starting pitchers. He was not typical Cueto. But even disappointing Cueto was good enough to be the Royals 3rd best starter – in only 13 starts.
3) Are you really arguing the Royals are better off with Omar Infante, than they were with Zobrist? If yes, please use something other than hindsight bias based on a small sample of the team W-L stat to make your case.
4) Okay…Orlando and Dyson can platoon in RF again, and benefit from the splits. But, uh, who is going to play LF? Or they can both play, one in RF on in LF…but they each lose the platoon advantage.
I conclude you are a Royals homer. And that’s fine. But your arguments are ridiculous.
Re Cueto, how relevant is pitching WAR to a team like the royals built on defense and not worried about balls in play or fly balls. I don’t know enough about what underlies pitching WAR, but suspect it’s driven by strikeouts, groundballs, etc (I.e. The individual pitchers defense independent stats) and doesn’t necessarily capture effectiveness in the context of an elite defensive team.
They would’ve won the division last year without Cueto and Zobrist. Gordon was also out for quite a while. I think the projection system needs work. Maybe it doesn’t value defense and the bullpen as much as it should.
The system isn’t broken because the only team you care about doesn’t match the projections.
Everyone whined about the projections and the Padres last year. Projections kind of nailed it. As they did for about a third of all teams.
The system isn’t infallible because it “nailed it” for the Padres. Your selective use of data in making your argument is just as egregious as a KC fan dismissing the projections altogether because they were deadly wrong on the Royals.
Let’s put it this way. If a meteorologist correctly predicts a thunderstorm on Tuesday but misses a tornado on Wednesday, does this mean his forecasting method is perfect? Does it mean it’s fundamentally broken?
Or does it mean that it’s simply a useful — but all too imperfect — tool in helping us predict the future.
1) My comment was not based on only the Padres. Try reading the last sentence of my post again.
2) I, nor any one else, has said projections are infallible. Merely that they’re a better bet than a Royals homer, who insists that all players will improve. And that a single outlier – like the Royals – does not undermine the entire system.
3) But I guess you’re smarter than me, because you strawmanned my argument to say the exact same thing I was…that projections aren’t worthless.
Nope. It’s not a strawman; it’s simply an extrapolation of your argument. You’ve been provided with a negative result (i.e., the Royals), and you respond by emphasizing the existence of positive results (e.g., the Padres). The clear implication you are making is that the positive results (Padres) demonstrate why the negative result can be dismissed. Unfortunately, this is a non sequitur.
Until someone can put forth a convincing argument explaining why the Royals’ recent success does not expose weaknesses in the model, I don’t think it’s unreasonable to expect FG to explore future refinements to their methodology.
If the negative result was ‘being dismissed’, this article would not have been written.
Stop it.
What is the basis of this belief that the Royals will be better than their 2016 projections, aside from the fact that the projections have been wrong on them in the past 2 seasons? Which players will be better than the projections provided above? By how much? What will this do to their projected win total? Do you believe that the Royals will outperform their Pythagorean estimate? Will they outperform their baseruns estimate? If you answered yes to either of the previous two questions, please articulate the basis of this belief.
I’m not trying to be snarky, here, but rather would like to understand what specifically you think needs refinement. It sounds as though your argument is that the methodology needs to be blown up and rebuilt, and I wonder if you’re willing to put your predictions out there for consideration, rather than simply criticizing the predictions of another person.
Weren’t the Royals just fine without Gordon in a SSS? More importantly they played 1.5 seasons with largely the same team that didn’t consist of Cueto and Zobrist…Even subtracting Gordon’s 4 wins or whatever and adding a couple in free agency, this seems like it’s still gonna be a team that projects for like 81 wins and wins 85 again
There’s just so much volatility in player projections. And then you add them together to produce even more variability when you get to team projections. Plus, who knows which players on which teams will suffer season-ending injuries before July?
I like reading about the projections as much as anyone–especially in the cold, dark, winter months. But I really don’t put much stock in them. Yes, they are better than just tossing a coin a bunch of times to see which teams to bet on. And yes, they sometimes get fairly close to actual performance. Just don’t take them to the bank.
When you add random variables together the variance of the sum is less than the variance of the individual pieces (assuming no correlation).
No, if you add together uncorrelated random variables, the variance of the sum is equal to the sum of the individual variances.
The variance of the average is smaller though.
Yes, I meant to say less than the sum of the variance of the individual pieces. A better way of saying it is that the variance of summed projections for a team is smaller (compared to the total WAR sum) than it is for a player.
Like, you can punt and say the Royals will be an average team at best by the projections, but it’s interesting to look at Vegas odds and see the Royals as one of the 7 most likely teams to win the World Series next year. You can pretend this is because Vegas wants equal action on both sides (patently false btw) and that the public likes the Royals or something, or you can probably acknowledge that they have much more sophisticated models that help explain some of the discrepancy. Or at least that’s the way it seems to me. I suppose one could claim that there is a big difference between regular season games and playoff games (where the Royals might be expected to outperform other teams for the obvious reasons) and that explains some of it, but I doubt it explains all of it.
Vegas odds are a reflection of the betting public’s preferences, nothing more. To use that as evidence against the projections, you would have to posit that the betting public knows something that the projections don’t.
If it’s public preferences and nothing more, where do the initial odds come from?
From the bookies’ expectations of the betting public’s preferences. The point is that Vegas is not trying to predict the WS winner or the margin of victory in the Alabama-Michigan State or whatever they’re laying odds on. They’re trying to maximize the house’s take, that’s all.
This is just fundamentally untrue and a common misconception among people. Vegas stakes out positions ALL the time if they think they know more than the betting public. For the most part they certainly have the bankroll to withstand some variance and do so. Getting even public money on both sides is not going to be the most profitable thing to do (although it will have the lowest risk) every time. I hope I don’t have to explain why further.
I don’t think I ever said that *all* Vegas is interested in is even public money on both sides of the bet. That said, we know they are interested in evening out the action to some degree from the amount that the lines move as action comes in one side or the other.
Part of the problem with baseball’s statistical models is that they lack interaction terms. Interaction terms are used when the the whole is worth more/less than the sum of its parts. For instance, a good 2b and as might each project 3 WAR each for a total WAR between the two as 6. But suppse that through “chemistry” they add 2 defensive wins and having them protect one another in the lineup adds a win or 2. Quite often modern statistical baseball models ignor those situations which managers and scouts intuitivly know to be true.
Should say “good 2b and SS” not good 2b and as
“But suppse that through “chemistry” they add 2 defensive wins and having them protect one another in the lineup adds a win or 2.”
If you have evidence that this occurs, I will accept that boost in WAR. Until then, suppose all you want, you’re not convincing me.
This is actually fairly well documented in terms of reliever chaining, which is actually quite possibly one reason the Royals have beaten the projections the last couple years. Doubtless there are other things that could be found – off the top of my head, pitch sequencing? pitcher style contrast?(proven with Dickey, might exist with others). the role of 2B in catching base stealers? these aren’t necessarily true, but there are a lot of avenues to explore here.
This is cool. I’d love to see this done for the Mets, as another team with a heap of players where projections and optimism/pessimism interact in interesting ways (their young starters, Familia, Wright, Granderson, D’Arnaud)…
I understand why some are skeptical of the projections, given the Royals’ history the last two years.
I agree that this is a fun exercise, and it’d be great to do it not only for the Mets, but for all the other MLB teams. You get a better idea of how key players did in 2015 (and before), as well as prognosticating for 2016.
Jarrod Dyson and Christian Colon will probably replace Rios/Infante and produce 2 & 1 WAR respectively. That’s +3 in the WAR calcs right there. That puts them from 78 to 81 wins. They’ll get a 2-3 WAR starter (Gallardo, Kazmir, Chen, etc). That’ll take them to ~83ish.
That’s how I get to mid 80s wins. Even if you DO BELIEVE projections will catch up with them finally, you have to factor in their actual likely lineup. Brian Flynn will not be their 5th starter.
Just out of curiosity, what would be the projected win total for a team full of “replacement level players” i.e. total WAR of zero?
About 48
You have obviously never coached a team sport. Your “projections” add the sum of individual parts and that’s that. Didn’t the last two years teach you anything about team chemistry? How do you possible explain the Royals last TWO years?
“None are so blind as those who will not see.”
The projections aren’t broken because they got 2 teams “wrong” out of the last 60 samples.
I would suggest clicking that first link, before you start telling us the system is broken.
“None are so blind as those who will not see.”
*possibly*
You would think after consecutive years’ Royals projections that missed the mark by humiliating margins, FanGraphs would engage in a bit more inward-looking to see what aspects of their models were failing and needed adjustment. This seems to be full steam ahead with fingers crossed that the third time’s the charm, finally the Royals will be as bad as they think they should be.
Given what several commenters have pointed out that should have been blatantly obvious to the writer, that the Royals had already run away with the division and a playoff spot long before acquiring Cueto and Zobrist, it’s disturbing that so much weight is being given to their departure. If Gordon returns the roster will be almost entirely the same, and for them to suddenly become the 6th worst team in baseball would require nearly every single player regressing.
The fact that the projections are off on just a few teams on the high and low end actually shows that they are working properly. It would be just as if not more suspicious if there were no outliers at all.
Therein lies the fallacy, Matt. If you start out with the presupposition that an extreme result is simply an outlier that should be ignored, then you’ve left yourself vulnerable to dangerous confirmation bias. Instead, extreme results should prompt you to determine whether they provide new information that can refine or improve your model. In cases where you observe repetition of extreme results (e.g., 2013 Royals, 2014 Royals, 2015 Royals), this possibility must be taken all the more seriously.
When projections and reality diverge, our first inclination should *not* be to ask, “Hmm, I wonder what fluke it was this time that caused this team to overperform or underperform?” Instead, it should be, “What can this result tell us about our model?”
Sometimes, the answer is nothing. But failing to ask the question in the first place sets a dangerous precedent.
Yes. Always be checking. The guys who make the models know this better than we do. . But, also, statistical outliers are to be expected. If there were none for a couple of years, than someone upstairs must have shut off random variation, injuries, and the human element in the game of baseball. And that’s when you should get very afraid.
There’s a difference between variation from a mean projection, i.e. the 2013 Red Sox, and what’s happening with the Royals, in which we are being told by projections that a good team is actually bad.
People talk about the results like the projections have the Royals as an annual 84 win team that keeps overperfoming the mean. That would be one thing. This is not that. This is a team that was among the betting favorites in Vegas for the duration of last season that RoS projections told you to expect the other shoe to drop before the next game was played (they broke .500 in the RoS projections after — and only after — acquiring Zobrist and Cueto).
This is not about the Royals, at all really. This is entirely about how the projections are handling them.
If anybody is actually all the way down here, I’m gonna leave this gem of an article for you.
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/the-orioles-and-accepting-random-variation/
Are you being sarcastic?
No sir.
Most of FanGraphs is wonderful. It is certainly one of my favorite websites. However the column of Cameron’s that you linked to is one of their worst. It is so fundamentally flawed that they should have removed it.
In the beginning of the article you mention the 3 big roster losses–Cueto, Zobrist, and Gordon. But it’s important to note that the Royals were a first place team without Cueto and Zobrist. And Gordon was missing for 2 months, too. This doesn’t mean the Royals will play .600 ball 2016, but those losses aren’t as big as they might seem.
Whew! I thought this said “The Chimps and the Projections”
“Let’s ask the internet” is a risky game. Sometimes you get reasonable results. Other times…
Almost 9% of you said that Danny Duffy will be worse than his projection. And on his birthday no less.
I like to refer back to this gem by Jeff Sullivan:
http://www.fangraphs.com/blogs/10-years-of-team-performance-10-years-of-team-projections/
Projections tend to be quite good overall, although I am not yet convinced they are getting better. In extreme cases, they can be off in any given year by +/-15 Wins.
Well, I mean…duh. Projections are going to tend toward ventral tendencies and will rarely project extreme performances like 100-win or 100-loss seasons. When you get a lot of injuries, underperformance, and bad luck piling up together, you get a season that goes off the rails and 102 losses. Good health, good luck, and better than expected performances will similarly result in surprisingly good results. Doesn’t mean that the model is broken, you just don’t project teams to perform “at the tails” – i.e., at a 90th percentile result or a 10th percentile result.
Ventral, central. Gah.
Just want to point out a minor error in the chart for Escobar. He slugged .320 in 2015, not .377. He slugged .377 in 2014. The wRC+ and WAR are correct, however, so it probably made little or no difference in the responses. I only noticed the error because I thought it was odd that his wRC+ was projected to go up while his OBP stayed about the same and his SLG dropped by 30 points. In fact, his SLG is actually projected to go up by 25 points, so it all makes sense.
I notice that the WAR numbers for pitchers in the charts above (both projected and for past seasons) do not match those on the individual player pages. Is that because RA9-WAR was used above while FIP-based WAR was used on the player pages?
Also, the projected ERA and FIP for Duffy shown above (4.00 and 4.22) are actually the projections for Medlen. Duffy’s player page shows a projection of 3.94 ERA and 4.46 FIP. Not a whole lot different, so again probably didn’t affect the responses much.
KC has done almost nothing yet this winter, just like the Cardinals and some others. KC has 14M from Gordon, 11M from Rios, 8M from Holland and another 8M from Guthrie coming off the books. Less the buyouts, and arb raises, that’s $35M in fresh powder. They’ve spent about $12M of it.
Of course they’ll be behind some teams who signed guys. When KC signs guys (say, Gallardo and Span, etc) they’ll move up into the lower 80s.
“woodge says:
December 21, 2015 at 3:32 pm
In the beginning of the article you mention the 3 big roster losses–Cueto, Zobrist, and Gordon. But it’s important to note that the Royals were a first place team without Cueto and Zobrist. And Gordon was missing for 2 months, too. This doesn’t mean the Royals will play .600 ball 2016, but those losses aren’t as big as they might seem.”
Bingo! Also, there is a chance, albeit not gigantic, that Gordon re-signs. If that happens, I think you can chuck some of the current projections out the window. As should have been learned over the last two years, yet somehow hasn’t been, projections undervalue defense. I won’t be surprised if the Royals are near or at the top of the AL Central again in 2016.
Enjoyed the read. I don’t disagree with many of the comments about projection difficulties, but I find it interesting that wasn’t really the point. The article was about looking at individual players and having fun guessing in advance which projections specifically are off. To me, the limits of the projections specific to the Royals are relatively straightforward and very interesting.
As things stand, the Royals basically have a replacement level 2B and a replacement level OF. A second OF, the SS, and the pitching staff can contribute but not carry the team (I mean, if Wade Davis could pitch 200 dominant innings, that’s what the Royals would have him doing…). Essentially, if Cain, Hosmer, Moustakas, and Morales maintain production, the team overall beats the projections. However, if 2015 turns out to be notably better years for them than 2016 – certainly a possibility – then the Royals could easily win quite a few fewer games in 2016 than they did in 2015.
And of course, something else interesting about the projections is that it is for the regular season, but the reason people are talking about the Royals is due to the playoff runs. A defense-oriented team with a streaky offense is particularly well suited for advancing in the playoffs if they can get there (and are hot at the right time). All it takes are a couple minor changes to the 2014 AL wildcard and 2015 ALDS and no one is even talking about the Royals.
They did win the most games in the regular season in the AL last year. It wasn’t just the playoffs.
Yeah, I was using hyperbole to see if Dayton was around reading things…
Anyway, while there’s no way to assign precise percentages to each cause of attention, I think it’s useful to keep in mind the survivorship bias of the interest here. It is the playoff runs that were enormously important in getting people outside of KC interested in what exactly the Royals have been doing. And those players, like Cain and Hosmer, are exactly the players the projections seem to have the most difficulty handling.
“All it takes are a couple minor changes to the 2014 AL wildcard and 2015 ALDS and no one is even talking about the Royals.”
Which would be sad, given they’ve won 86-89-95 games the past 3 years. most wins in the AL. Even if you don’t want to talk postseason (which I thought FG says is all random anyway)
Yes, I know in a small way finishing 7th in the AL back in 2013 is something to brag about.
But the serious point you touch upon is the randomness of the postseason. That has worked to the Royals’ benefit because they have a) won some stuff, and b) kept other teams from winning some stuff. It has also worked to the Royals’ benefit because the 89 wins happened in a year when that was good enough to host the wild card game and the 95 wins happened in a year when that was good enough to be the best record in the AL.
There is also an interesting discussion about whether the strength of the Royals – team defense – gives better odds in a small sample size than some other approaches, like dominant starting pitching or power bats. Because that would mean randomness isn’t the only factor in play. Some playoff strategies could give you better odds than others. The irony there of course is that those two specific playoff games in 2014 and 2015 involved shootouts, not pitching duels.
One reason to say that the Royals are going to be somewhat better than projections is that projections based on WAR are going to underestimate the importance of great relieving, which the Royals clearly have. Typical evidence that WAR as presently calculated isn’t accurate for relief pitching was a recent Fangraphs article about relief pitchers and the Hall of Fame in which it was simply assumed that the cutoff level in terms of WAR in terms of what is necessary to get into the Hall is much lower than it is for other players–no one even argued with that, so there must be general recognition that there is a significant problem here. Another reason in terms of offense is that the Royals have had the highest Clutch rating in the major leagues two years in a row (and they were #5 in 2013). While this may be a matter of luck, there is some evidence that high Clutch ratings are correlated with low K% (the Royals are extremely low in terms of K%), and teams with high Clutch ratings will naturally outperform their WAR-based projections. Aside from this, it also seems reasonable to suspect that there is a problem in how offensive WAR is calculated in that it doesn’t give any value to having a low K%–whereas people have generally accepted the idea that K% plays a significant role in calculating pitchers’ WAR, this is not done for a hitters’ K%, even though exactly the same arguments suggest that it should be. A third reason might be (although this more speculative) that the statistics used to calculate fielding WAR generally underestimate the importance of fielding, and because the Royals have outstanding defense, this is another reason that the Royals have significantly outperformed their projections in the last few years.
So this article is basically “We were wrong in 2014. We were wrong in 2015. But we got this in 2016. No really!! Seriously, listen to us this time!!”
I think it’s interesting that the projects took three of the Royal’s starters (Hosmer, Moustakis and Escobar, entering their primes, and downgraded their projections year over year. While I think you could make a case for Moose, and maybe Esky, it seems illogical to take a player like Hosmer who has forever projected to be an MLB star and expect a downgrade in performance as he enters his prime.
The projections were really good last year. Remember when the Mariners and Nationals made the World Series?