The Eric Hosmer Dilemma
In light both of the ask and the inconsistent performance, the prospect of signing Eric Hosmer should foster trepidation among major-league clubs — a point made by this author last week when expressing a preference for Carlos Santana among this year’s free-agent first basemen.
Scott Boras is reportedly seeking $200 million spread over eight years for a player who, in seven major-league seasons, has produced full-season WAR totals of 0.0 (2014), -0.1 (2016), and -1.7 (2012).
Boras on Eric Hosmer: “He’s Playoff-ville, Federal Express.” Scott is in prime form this year.
— Jerry Crasnick (@jcrasnick) November 15, 2017
While Hosmer is just entering his age-28 season, while he looks the part, his glove consistently rates below average according to the metrics at first base, and the real concern is whether the bat will consistently play at a star level.
The Kansas City Star’s Sam Mellinger reported that Boras is attempting to value Homer’s intangibles as part of the sales-pitch binder he’ll hand out to clubs that attend the Hosmer open house. It’s Hosmer’s intangibles that are of great interest to this author.
You could make the case that no hitter ought to begin elevating pitches more than Hosmer. After three years of Statcast data having been available to him, Hosmer keeps pounding balls into the dirt. He posted a career-high 2.5 GB/FB ratio last year. Since 2015, Hosmer’s average launch angle (4.3 degrees) ranks 379th out of 399 hitters to have put at least 300 balls in play. In 2017? Hosmer ranked 371st among hitters with at least 100 batted balls. He recorded a 3.8-degree launch angle.
Consider the following chart:

Hosmer isn’t exactly a Statcast God. He ranked 85th in average exit velocity on line drives and fly balls (94.1 mph) last season, and tied for 46th in overall exit velocity (89.6 mph). Four of the five players with whom he was tied by that measure — Cody Bellinger, Freddie Freeman, Daniel Murphy, and Justin Smoak — recorded isolated-slugging numbers superior to Hosmer’s by some margin. Translation: a batter needn’t produce elite exit velocities to benefit from launching balls into the ether.
Consider Hosmer’s radial launch-angle chart via Baseball Savant:

Notice that gray spike of death going directly into the ground?
Then consider Justin Turner’s radial chart:

Hosmer’s peak offensive periods have typically corresponded with lulls in ground-ball activity.

That Hosmer has a Dee Gordon-like launch angle isn’t news. We know this. But what I find interesting about Homer’s future, about his intangibles, is whether he could reach another level of performance simply by exhibiting a willingness to evolve. We’ve seen a number of players on the game’s biggest stage recently, from Charlie Morton to Chris Taylor and Justin Turner, show us the power of change. Players, suddenly, seem more malleable than we thought. Dave wrote about this idea with regard to Morton, and I explored something similar last month regarding Taylor.
Players proved they could change in 2017. As a club, are you willing to bet Hosmer will be willing to change? To at least explore the idea? There could be untapped upside there. But his current approach has produced incredibly inconsistent results. Giving Hosmer a nine-figure deal at the moment, with what we know, seems incredibly risky. What we don’t know is his willingness to change.
If Morton and Taylor are the faces of openness and adaptability, to date, Hosmer is the face of stubbornness to an approach, an approach that has led to mixed results. And Hosmer is aware of his turf-chewing swing. He was asked this year about the issue by Mellinger.
“You look at the averages and all that, it’s definitely better with the ball in the air,” he said. “Most guys, especially power hitters, are trying to hit the ball in the air. Our stadium is playing a little different, it’s bigger out there, but still, somebody in my spot in the lineup, and type of hitter I am, I should definitely be trying to hit the ball in the air.”
It appears from his comments that Hosmer understands the benefits of loft. But later in the story…
“It’s something that I can’t worry about,” he said. “When I’m going good with myself, there’s certain keys I focus on, and it takes care of all the other stuff. Specifically, I don’t go and look at launch angles, or this angle or that angle. Whatever little key it takes for me to get going, it takes care of all the other stats.
“I’m a guy where most of my deeper balls are going to be to center field, or even to left center. I don’t think I’m a guy who puts a lot of loft on balls.”
While Boras will try to sell clubs on Hosmer’s intangibles, what about these immeasurables: his curiosity and willingness to change.
Hosmer didn’t see much need to change in 2017 — and, to be fair, he managed to produce a career-best season in WAR (4.1) and wRC+ (135), success which might only serve to reinforce his approach. But it’s an approach that has led to a career wRC+ (111) that resided below the MLB average for the position (113) last season.
Mellinger cites Billy Butler’s apparent failed attempt to change his swing and writes, “Butler is just one example, but there are many more stories like his than [J.D.] Martinez’s.”
I have my doubts about the truth of that assertion. While we might not be as familiar with the failed cases, what we do know is that launch angle is slightly up across the game and power is way up. I suspect there are more success stories than failures.
Maybe a change organization would help. Said Royal GM Dayton Moore in Mellinger’s piece:
“Players are always making adjustments, and they should,” Royals general manager Dayton Moore said. “But it’s very hard to change swing paths. It’s hard to make major mechanical changes at the major-league level. I believe that. You work within a player’s naturalness.”
Not every player can be molded into one particular form, of course. But shouldn’t the player and organization at least have the curiosity to find out? Shouldn’t they each always be trying to improve?
If a club is willing to invest long-term in Hosmer, it might first want to explore his willingness to adapt and change, because despite his 2017 results, there are few players who could benefit more from a swing-plane change. And there are even fewer players who are going to be asking for as many years and dollars in free agency.
A Cleveland native, FanGraphs writer Travis Sawchik is the author of the New York Times bestselling book, Big Data Baseball. He also contributes to The Athletic Cleveland, and has written for the Pittsburgh Tribune-Review, among other outlets. Follow him on Twitter @Travis_Sawchik.
Anybody know where to access those launch angle charts for other players?
YES! I would love to see more of these. I could spend a entire week looking them!
Those charts are from Savant….If you do a Statcast search they will be among the visual options to explore for individual players
Baseball Savant has them.
> I have my doubts about the truth of that assertion. While we might not be as familiar with the failed cases, what we do know is that launch angle is slightly up across the game and power is way up. I suspect there are more success stories than failures.
This is a clear case of survivorship bias.
If the swing changes lead to improvement, they stay in baseball. If they fail, like Billy Butler, they leave the sample. Even if league-wide LA goes up the average player who attempts to raise his LA may see a decrease in production.
This. And success stories tend to stand out more than the failures, although the survivorship bias is a bigger deal.
The problem with pinning this is on survivorship bias is this, I think: this is a really new trend/development and I don’t think there’s evidence of a significant amount of players dropping out of ML in 2016 and 2017 because they adjusted their swings and failed. And if there were players that felt their careers had ended because of an errant practice, I suspect we’d hear from them. Even if you look at the same qualified hitters over 2016 and 2017, I believe the LA uptick trend holds. Re: Butler. There’s nothing in Butler’s batted-ball profile that even points to a change being made.
> Even if you look at the same qualified hitters over 2016 and 2017, I believe the LA uptick trend holds.
This is the same bias! If they qualified in 2017, it’s more likely that they had a successful change. If they were unsuccessful, they wouldn’t receive the PA necessary to qualify.
> Re: Butler. There’s nothing in Butler’s batted-ball profile that even points to a change being made.
I only used Butler as my example because he’s literally given as the example of a failed change in your article. I don’t know other failed changes. Maybe they aren’t as common as I suspect they are! I could be wrong! But, I think it’s more likely that they *are* common, and that writers tend to focus on success stories because they last longer and appeal to a narrative. JD Martinez has been great for years now- a guy who failed may be awful for a month, have a mediocre year in AAA, and then be cut. Who’s going to write about that?
Again, I’m not sure whether more or fewer players improve due to swing adjustments- you could be right! But this article doesn’t make a strong case.
I agree that it’s overly simple to insist that 4 in 5 players that attempt to elevate benefit, or maybe it’s only 1 in 5 and the rest just mess with their timing or whatever. Regardless of whatever that number is I think there are players that constantly tinker with their swing, guys that adjust occasionally, and some that refuse to adjust since they are in the 98th percentile of baseball players anyway.
Hosmer is squarely in the third category as far as I can tell and if a front office is willing to pay him then what they see is likely going to be what they get.
I agree with you that a whole lot of these failed changes aren’t likely to show up anywhere in MLB stats.
There are AAAA guys who try it in AAA without success, probably some MLB players who try it in spring training and then go back to their prior swings if they don’t have success, etc.
I would be interested to actually see this analysis, taking into account the survivorship bias issue. My gut instinct is that you could do this comprehensively with a fixed-effects model with individual player as the fixed effect, and a Heckman selection model to tackle survivorship. Of course, that doesn’t count people who adjusted their launch angle early in the year and then when it failed, switched back. You’d have to model that too. Maybe you could do the analysis on month-by-month basis instead of by year, which would get around some of the survivorship issues instead.
To do the Heckman equation you would need something that changes use of higher LA swing but doesn’t (otherwise) change results. Look up “Heckman exclusion restriction”.
Ah jeez, that’s gonna be tough (I don’t use Heckman models, I just deal with economists who like using it). I also didn’t account for Dave’s issue with guys who experiment with it in spring training or AAA and it doesn’t work, so they switch back.
I still think there’s a way to do this if you move the time window small enough (say, month by month) but in a fixed effects model the error will likely overwhelm the signal in windows that small, plus you still won’t get the experimenters in Spring Training/AAA.
I’m out of ideas, at least for now.
This is a clear case of talking out of your butt.
When someone says, “and I bet there’s way more” or if you’re a writer “I suspect there are more success stories than failures.” it means you have no idea. But you really want your argument to sound stronger without actually doing any work.
This article puts a lot of this at Hosmer’s feet but how much blame should the Royals get as an organization? Moore recently said something about how Hosmer is a great team player who can and will do anything the team asks him to do. Doesn’t that seem to imply that the Royals were, if not pushing for Hosmer to have this sort of approach, at least fine with him being the hitter he’s been? If the beat writers talking about Butler’s failure, what’s the team, which already isn’t progressive, saying?
Opposite of Indians’ approach with Willie Mays Hayes: “With your speed, you oughta be puttin’ ’em on the ground and leggin’ ’em out.”
I agree. It’s not just Hosmer. This is a KC approach through and through.
Lets assume Hosmer doesn’t get close to Boras’ ask, but ends up 6/130. What are you really buying for that price? The right to change his swing? This is a player who has been enormously erratic at a position that requires offensive consistency. He’s going to get paid, but I wonder if his contract doesn’t end up like Ellsbury’s–still a decent player, not worth the price.
I don’t think it is wise to give a Boras-sized contract to an inconsistent first baseman on the theory that (a) he can change, (b) he wants to change, and (c) he would be worth the contract if he did change.
Incentive-laden contract based on launch angle!
Siri, what is a “perverse incentive”?
I wouldn’t want to pay that price as a club … and I’m guessing Hosmer/Boras would reject my two-year offer (LOL)
Travis, I think if you were sincere in your interest and asked politely, maybe a two year offer, at, say $75M per might tempt Boras?
This was my first thought as well: why would a team want to invest upwards of $100 million into a player they think requires a swing change?
I feel like the way the game is now, you can potentially shuffle through free agent first basemen season to season. Like, I think Lucas Duda is a safer bet offensively and is about the same level of a defensive wart. Sign him for a year for much cheaper, then do it all over again next year, rather than dump six years and $130 million, as you suggested, into a 28-year-old player that you think needs to undergo some pretty dramatic changes.
I agree. Imagine paying Justin Turner 4/$64M BEFORE he changed his swing.
Even if you were 100% convinced Turner would be better if he changed his swing, you wouldn’t bet $64M on it.
Agreed.
Sign Duda, or see if you can find the next Logan Morrison, or sign the actual Logan Morrison if he’s available for something like the 2 years / $20 to $24 million forecast by the crowd and Dave Cameron. For all the talk that Morrison cooled off some later in the year (and who knows if that was pitchers adjusting to his new profile or just normal variation), his 2H 2017 wRC+ was 112. Hosmer’s career wRC+ is 111.
It strikes me as absolutely nuts that a player with 9.9 WAR over a 7 year major league career, who was a replacement level player playing a full season in 2016, is going to get $100 million guaranteed. Cameron’s top 50 free agents analysis talked about “someone … pay[ing] for potential from Hosmer”. The guy is 28 years old with about 4,400 career major league PA’s, and some team is going to guarantee $100 million based on his potential?
I know that Cameron is just giving his read of the market, not saying that he agrees with it, but it seems like the classic case of a player who is overrated and will be badly overpaid because the name is better than the production, due to whatever combination of post-season success and prospect pedigree from nearly a decade ago. It’s the sort of spending that we thought major league front offices had largely gotten past as they’ve pretty much universally embraced a more analytical approach to player evaluation.
[moved into Mike NMN’s comment as reply]
Aaand then there is this, from our friend Eno Sarris:
“we get paid to put barrels on balls man, what the f— is this guy talking about, walk rates, ground-ball rates, barrels dude, barrels, what’s up with this hair, must be because he’s Greek, yeah or blind, these are some stupid questions, man, I’ve never heard anything like this, dude needs to shut up, bothering us about ground-ball rates man, barrels, dude, barrels, nut sacks more like.”
Sounds more like Frenchy.
Don’t know why you’re getting downvoted, but that does indeed sound like Frenchy and in fact, Francour was actually involved in that interaction along with Hosmer and Moustakas.
Any quote with “nutsack” in it has a probability of being the Handsome Frenchman. As I recall, the Three Amigos were behind Eno at the time.
I don’t know where that French to Vietnamese google translate guy is but I’ll do my best to cover for him:
And then there is this, our friend Eno Sarris:
“We get paid to put the bin on the ball, what this guy is talking about, walking rate, ground shadows ratio, barrel guy, barrel, what’s going on with this hair, right was because he Greek, Well or Blind, these are silly questions, man, I have never heard anything like that, dude need to close, bothering us about the ball rate man, barrel, dude, barrel, seed bag“
Hosmer did try to change the first month of the ’17 season, got pull happy and tried to elevate. April had him at a .573 OPS. He then went back to up-the-middle/oppo and had a nice season. Similarly, Alcides Escobar stated in spring training that he was going to hit more home runs, then posted a .420 OPS in April, then a .467 in May before going back to his old swing and approach.
I’ld put some of the blame in both cases on management as Dayton Moore has tried to move away from traditional Royals baseball to get more power. We saw that with ruining Billy, signing Morales and Moss, and trading for Soler. Some more blame might go to the final year of contracts. HRs bring bigger money as FA.
Ahh yes, ‘traditional Royals baseball’, as if there were some objectively best way to play, and that the Royals had a legacy of doing so instead of a legacy of being terrible.
Park and available talent dictates the proper way to play. Royals legacy includes two recent pennants and a World Series win in one of the smallest markets in MLB. Perhaps you were unaware of that?
Royals Baseball isn’t going to sleep with you, Jim.
Fuck Eric Hosmer
‘gray spike of death’ — and we have next year’s fantasy baseball team name! — thanks Travis!
Baseball being a game of adjustments, I just wonder, maybe after watching Bellinger flail away in the playoffs, if pitchers will find a way to exploit players trying to elevate. I think that batters trying to elevate works best when you can get it out even when you are off a bit. I wonder if that limits the number of players who should attempt to change.
You think in 3 years its never occurred to people to throw curveballs inside ever?
Pitchers have done this for years. But just like every hitter can elevate effectively, not every pitcher can exploit every hole in a dominant swing pattern effectively. If Dallas Keuchel decided he was going to start throwing a lot of high fastballs to defeat the uppercut swing, he’d get destroyed. He’s a soft thrower with a lot of downward movement; they’d eat him up.
MLB went after pitches who threw the ball low in the zone for a decade, and the uppercut has been an effective response to that. But low-ball elevators didn’t come to dominate until after low-ball pitchers had taken over the league. It’s going to take a few years for the right pitchers to populate back through.
It seems anecdotally like we saw an increasing number of pitchers lean super heavily on their breaking stuff this year, especially on playoff teams. Maybe that’s exactly the kind of pitcher who is well-equipped to beat a hitter like this. If the latter, we’ll keep seeing more of them. And I say: hooray! A big fastball is impressive, but big breaking pitches are more fun.
Royals fans have been hoping Hosmer would hit fewer grounders for years. Eric Hosmer has known that he would make millions more dollars if he hit fewer grounders. Yet, the grounders have persisted. Hosmer has a good batting average. He did a great job running home, challenging Duda’s arm and winning the World Series. I would point out those traits if I were his agent, and that’s why I’m just some schlub who reads about baseball. Selling him as a homerun hitter with a small groundball problem is a little more believable than saying he’s Dee Grodon with a small speed issue, but it’s still misrepresenting Hosmer. It makes Boras a schlocky salesman, but if can make money doing that, then the buyers should only blame themselves.
For me Hosmer will be one of the most fascinating FA cases in recent times, if ever. Entering 2017, you could make the case that he simply wasn’t any good — 6 big league season for a total of 6 WAR and coming off a season where he was replacement level. As a FA a year ago, he’d be lucky to get a 2-year deal.
2017 was a pretty good year and changes things a bit. But I can’t believe ANY GM would ignore the previous 6 season. It’s Boras’s job to blow smoke, but 8 years is insane. 4/$100 is too much. Curious to see if any GM will bite. As others have said, you’re hoping to somehow harness good Hosmer and improve his approach.
Sounds like a sales pitch Dave Stewart might have bit on (if he didn’t have Goldschmidt already)
This reminded me of the hardball times piece in 2014 that Eno Sarris did on clubhouse conversations. Doesn’t seem Hosmer’s perspective on data has changed much in those four seasons since.
https://www.fangraphs.com/tht/learning-the-language-of-the-clubhouse/
”
I didn’t know who exactly was talking, but the tone of the stream and the intent was clear: “we get paid to put barrels on balls man, what the f— is this guy talking about, walk rates, ground-ball rates, barrels dude, barrels, what’s up with this hair, must be because he’s Greek, yeah or blind, these are some stupid questions, man, I’ve never heard anything like this, dude needs to shut up, bothering us about ground-ball rates man, barrels, dude, barrels, nut sacks more like.” The interview with Butler had been getting better, but there was one last emphatic statement from the trio behind me before they exited: “This guy’s the f—ing worst.””
“Intangibles”, aka, “good-looking, marketable, white guy”
His mother is Cuban.
yes, she’s white too.
Pardon me, but I am not understanding all the hate for a WS winner who hit ~320 with 25 HRs and scored / drove in nearly 100 runs entering his prime years. Not to mention a 385 OBP?? AND, he has got better EVERY YEAR of his career. Have any of you even played baseball? Yikes. ANY TEAM would be ecstatic to have him LMAO.
These parody posts are getting a bit tiresome. About the only cliche you didn’t include was something about people getting out of their parents’ basements. Comedy on the internet is hard; if you’re going to attempt it, you need to put in more effort at originality.
I don’t think that’s a parody. I think it’s a person who legitimately thinks Eric Hosmer is a star, and who definitely doesn’t understand that he has not gotten better “EVERY YEAR of his career”.
No Max please tell us what it’s like to play baseball
Not even the Marlins are around to be fooled now. The modern front office will not be tricked by a snake charmer.
Boras has snake-charmer skills with some owners, but I don’t think even he can convince the Nationals to jettison Ryan Zimmerman and Mike Ilitich isn’t around anymore (RIP).
He’s gonna be busy this winter with Martinez, Arrieta, Hosmer, Carlos Gomez, Greg Holland, and Mike Moustakas (and Jayson Werth too).
joey gallol
Great stuff and something the Royals continue to almost obnoxiously go against. They did prove hard contact, speed, defense and a pen can win a WS, but it’s a whole lot harder to maintain hard contact verse lofting the ball at angles where the ball leaves the park. If it wasn’t, then hitters would be adjusting to Hosmer’s approach.
It’s simple. It’s harder to consistency “hit” than it is to be patient, take some Ks, but put one on the board when it is hit hard.
I bring Hosmer into a room for an interview and I’m sure it’ll be pretty easy to tell if he’s ready to put the ball in the air more instead of rolling over to 2.