The Indians Did It Again
Officially, now, the Indians are going to the World Series, representing the American League. When they get there, they’re going to be fully rested. Some will speculate that they might be too rested. That’s for then. For now, it’s another celebration in Cleveland, which is a weird thing to write.
So how did the Indians manage to pull this off, doing away with the Blue Jays in five games? Let’s be honest. You already know the answer.
The Indians aren’t going to the World Series because of Michael Brantley. The star outfielder has been of just about zero use this year, owing to a messed-up shoulder. They’re not going to the World Series because of Carlos Carrasco. He helped them plenty during the year, but then he got knocked out. They’re not going to the World Series because of Danny Salazar. Like Carrasco, he also helped plenty during the year, but he hasn’t pitched in over a month.
And this is important, in the little picture: They’re not going to the World Series because of the offense. The offense has been underrated this season, and in the playoffs it’s been fairly timely. But in the ALCS, in which the Indians outscored the Blue Jays just 12 to 8, the Indians had a .544 OPS, to the Blue Jays’ .534. By wOBA, the Blue Jays were actually better, by a margin of .237 to .231. The hitting in the whole series sucked. The Indians’ lineup was the offensive equivalent of Ryan Goins. The Blue Jays’ lineup was the offensive equivalent of J.B. Shuck. The teams didn’t hit. The Indians just hit at a few more of the good moments.
The pitching has carried the Indians. The bullpen has carried the Indians. We’ve already been over this, but it worked perfectly again on Wednesday.
After the Indians swept the Red Sox in the ALDS, I put up a post that included a plot almost exactly like this one:
Why did I just go to the trouble of re-making a plot I’d already made? Don’t worry about it. That right there shows how the Indians distributed their plate appearances among pitchers. I observed that, in the past, Mariano Rivera would throw about 10% of the Yankees’ innings in the playoffs. And the Yankees were never shy about using Rivera fairly aggressively. Andrew Miller handled 15% of the workload in the ALDS. Cody Allen was right behind, at 14%. The Indians were able to get the ball into the right hands.
Here is the same plot, but this time for the five-game ALCS:
Corey Kluber leads, again. Kluber is The Guy in the starting rotation. Miller, again, shows up at 15%. Allen dropped to a perfectly acceptable 9%. Bryan Shaw’s at 10%. A third of all the Blue Jays’ plate appearances came against the Indians’ three best relievers. The usage pattern here is a little less extreme than what the Indians did against Boston, but still, this is heavy bullpen usage, and now let’s put it all together!
The Indians have played eight playoff games. Kluber has handled more than a quarter of the workload. Miller is in second, tied with Josh Tomlin, and Miller, Allen, and Shaw combine here for a rate of 35%. To make the same point I made in the post after the ALDS, the Indians in August and September gave the ball to those same three relievers a combined 12.5% of the time. Their usage has nearly tripled, and with so many days off before the start of the next and final series, every arm gets to start fresh. This is something the Indians’ next opponent has to prepare for.
There’s one more thing I want to show. The distribution of playing time is interesting, but it doesn’t do anything in its raw form to account for the stakes. That’s where Leverage Index, or LI, comes in. For a given situation, an LI of 1.0 is average. If a plate appearance has an LI of 2.0, that means it’s twice as important as a normal plate appearance. So what I did for every Indians pitcher was multiply their actual batters faced by their average Leverage Index, and so I came up with an adjusted playing-time distribution:
When you adjust the numbers situationally, Allen takes over the top spot, having handled about 22% of the “effective” plate appearances. Then, in order, it’s Kluber, Miller, Tomlin, and Shaw. Focusing one more time on the top three relievers, they get a combined rate here of 49%. Basically half. In August and September, after Miller was acquired, the same three relievers in the same stat combined for a rate of 21%. So even when you take leverage into account, Terry Francona has leaned on these guys way more than twice as much as he did down the stretch. Fold in Kluber and, over the final two months, those four pitchers handled a third of the Indians’ effective playing time. In the playoffs, they’re at 69%. Kluber’s positioned to start at least two more times. Unless, you know, there’s a sweep.
Things are definitely at least a little weird here. You don’t want to say it’s been all about the bullpen, because so far in the playoffs, Josh Tomlin has a 2.53 ERA, and Ryan Merritt somehow just blanked the Blue Jays for 4.1 astonishing innings. I don’t know what to say about the bullpen’s success when Tomlin and Merritt have a combined ERA of 1.80. If it weren’t for Tomlin doing so well, this wouldn’t have gone so smoothly. And if it weren’t for Merritt doing so well, this wouldn’t have gone so smoothly. That’s a part of the picture, as the Indians haven’t badly missed their fallen star starters.
But ultimately, there’s no getting around it: The Indians have had the bullpen in lockdown mode. Francona hasn’t hesitated to get to his relievers, and he hasn’t hesitated to get to his best ones. He’s been extremely aggressive in doing so, and to this point they haven’t shown signs of wearing down. We’ve never really been that sure about how hard you can push an important reliever or two come playoff time. Francona has one more round to go, and then they all get the offseason off. There’s no real reason to go away from this formula. And this formula is trying to win the Indians a damn World Series. They don’t have much further to go.
Jeff made Lookout Landing a thing, but he does not still write there about the Mariners. He does write here, sometimes about the Mariners, but usually not.




Don’t forget, no Uribe.
What a manager Tito Francona is. The Red Sox could use a guy like that.
cough . 2011. cough
Seriously, Tito was good, but managers have a limited shelf life with the same team. Change is good
For all the flack he has received, Farrell has his own WS ring too. In fact, Tito had Farrell as his pitching coach when he won with the RS. Farrell won without Tito in 2013. Not that Francona isn’t the bomb, because he is. If he wins a WS in Cleveland he starts looking like a potential HOF’er. Go Tito!
Potential? After breaking two 50+ year championship droughts I think he’d be a lock for Cooperstown.
Well, you would expect the top RP’ers usage to increase about 50% more in the post season than the regular season due to all the off days. Injuries to the Indians rotation also dictated an increase in RP usage.
I think, to be honest, they caught the Red Sox (losers of 5 of their last 6 regular season games scoring 2.8 RPG) and Jays offense (worst in AL in Sep/Oct) at a good time. It could be argued in the pitching had something to do with this as well. I guess the next series will decide this question. If they dominate the Cubs or Dodgers hitters then I guess we have to conclude it was the pitching. If not, the debate continue
Did you not see the Blue Jays in the ALDS? They put up 22 runs in 3 games. That’s certainly a great time to catch an offense! Their September numbers are meaningless.
Why is no one willing to give the Cleveland pitching staff credit? It’s not like they were a giant turd until the Post Season came along. In the last month of the season their starters were 4th in AL WAR and 3rd in FIP. The bullpen was 3rd in WAR and 2nd in FIP. And for the season overall, they were the 3rd best staff in the AL.
the cleveland BP was great but I also think the Jays hitters just went cold at the wrong time. they didn’t score any runs against some of the mediocre reserve Starters the Indians had to use.
also the jays offense is old and probably on the downswing anyway,they are not good as last year.
Has a team ever won a 7 game series with an wOBA of less than .231?
Cleveland is close but they are also very far.
They need four wins against the NL’s best.
Kershaw/Hill or Lester/Arrieta/etc.
Bryant/Rizzo and co or Seager and associates.
No DH for at least two games which means Santana or Napoli sits or goes to left.
They’ve had a run to remember.
Now they need to step it up another notch; they’re already at 11.
Can they go to 12?
It’s baseball.
Gonna be fun.
Hey Jeff – on the LI-adjusted graph, isn’t Cody Allen’s LI just higher because he allowed the winning run to reach base in the first and third game of the Division Series? And then Miller effectively kept his LI to a minimum by his utter dominance?
I know it’s way less quantifiable in a tiny SS, but the defense seemed routinely amazing as well. Lindor and Kipnis (and Donaldson) made huge play after huge play. I think it’ll get lost to history in the discussion of the historic pitching performances and bullpen handling, but it gets way way easier to pull off the managerial tight rope act when every playable ball in play gets converted. No extra runners, no extra batters, no extra pitches, no extra stress on an Indians team stretched so thin.
The acquisition and utilization of Andrew Miller is one of the most interesting developments I’ve witnessed as a baseball fan. Kudos to the Cleveland Front Office, Terry Francona, and of course Miller himself for pitching his ass off.
It’s been awesome to watch. Maybe WAR underestimates the value of relievers after all. Or maybe Miller is a total outlier. It’s been fascinating to watch either way.
I may be missing the point, but suppose you had some push button dolt who simply used his top 3 relievers as “well, he’s my 7th inning guy,” “he’s my set up guy,” and “he’s my closer, so of course he’s pitching the 9th.” They are going to get 33% of the outs, which isn’t far off from Francona’s usage of Shaw, Miller, and Allen in the playoffs. Granted, he’s used them in above average leverage situations, as your last graph shows, but unless games are blowouts, the standard usage manager will also be using his best relievers in above average leverage situations. You count PAs rather than outs, but if the point here is that the bullpen aces are pitching a larger chunk of the game than a push button manager would have them pitch, wouldn’t counting outs make more apparent Francona’s exceptional use of his aces?