The Law of Tanking, Part One
Early this year, Dallas Mavericks owner and perpetually frustrated baseball-team-owner-of-the-future Mark Cuban, during a team dinner, said this:
“I’m probably not supposed to say this, but, like, I just had dinner with a bunch of our guys the other night, and here we are, you know, we weren’t competing for the playoffs. I was like, ‘Look, losing is our best option. [Commissioner] Adam [Silver] would hate hearing that, but I at least sat down and I explained it to them. And I explained what our plans were going to be this summer, that we’re not going to tank again. This was, like, a year-and-a-half tanking, and that was too brutal for me. But being transparent, I think that’s the key to being kind of a players owner and having stability.”
The National Basketball Association was, shall we say, peeved at Cuban, fining him $600,000. Why? Because of the implication that the Mavericks were intentionally losing games.
“Yes, it’s not what you want to hear as commissioner,” Silver told reporters at a news conference following a league meeting. “I will say that Mark has a long track record of being provocative, and… I think he acknowledged it was a poor choice of words.
“When we looked at what was actually happening on the floor, which is most important to me, there was no indication whatsoever that his players were intentionally losing games. And so we were satisfied with that, and again, and we moved on.”
Despite the resolution of that particular incident, tanking continues. In fact, the league’s fine of Cuban more or less confirmed that, while intentionally losing games is forbidden, intentionally losing seasons is acceptable — as long as no one talks about it. And while, for years, we talked about tanking as a uniquely NBA problem, that’s not the case anymore. In Major League Baseball, the tank is on.
That raises some interesting questions: under the MLB rules, is tanking legal? Is tanking legal under the law? And if it isn’t, what’s the redress? Believe it or not, these are not at all simple questions. And so we’ll start by asking a simpler question — namely, what is tanking, anyway? Royals Review gives this definition, which seems good for our purposes.
Tanking is actually the best, most proven way to win in Major League Baseball at the moment. For the fans it’s not so much fun, and for MLB it’s not so much fun either, but for the teams themselves, it’s the best way to build a championship ball club. Let’s break down the essential tanking blue print[:]
- Trade anyone of value on your major league roster for prospects.
- Save as much money as possible by using as many players that you can that are still on their first contacts. Sign cheap free agents only when absolutely necessary.
- Stockpile high draft picks after your team loses 100+ games for consecutive seasons and build an elite farm system.
- Allow prospects to develop in the minor leagues while you continue to run out fliers and AAAA players buying time.
- When prospects are ready, bring them up in waves and win as many games as possible until they become free agents.
The motivations for tanking are understandable. Last year, Travis Sawchik noted that we’d entered the era of the superteam. Nor does this year seem any different: the Red Sox are historically good, while the Astros, Athletics, and Yankees will all win 90-plus games. Even the Indians, who might not win 90, are waltzing to the finish a full 15 games clear of the rest of the division. The National League is weaker at the top, but we still have a Braves team cruising to an NL East victory and a Cubs team on pace for about 93-95 wins. In short, the good clubs are generally great ones… and then there’s everybody else. And whilst that does create some opportunity for borderline contenders (at least in the National League), it can also spell doom even for good teams: the Rays, who have the AL’s fifth-best record at 87-68, would lead the NL West by a half-game and occupy second place in the East, just a half-game behind Atlanta. As Neil Paine explained for Five-Thirty-Eight,
It makes sense, on paper. From a bottom-line perspective, buying wins that aren’t likely to tip a team over the threshold to making the playoffs is a poor way to maximize revenue. By concentrating instead on snagging high draft picks and rebuilding their farm systems, Houston and Chicago were able to use their picks on a procession of star prospects such as Carlos Correa, Kris Bryant, George Springer, Javier Baez, Alex Bregman … and the list goes on.
So what if a team actively tried to lose? One could argue that we’ve seen examples of that already. The 2013 Astros were the most extreme case, but teams “tank” for draft position as a natural part of rebuilding. This year’s Orioles aren’t a good example because they were trying to win (ouch), but the Marlins and White Sox held no such illusions entering the season.
On the other hand, isn’t that why Cuban was suspended — merely for observing aloud an otherwise commonplace strategy An intentional effort to maximize draft positioning requires losing, a lot, for a long period. So do the MLB rules actually allow for the intentional assembly of a subpar team for the purpose of losing a bunch of games? Or, like the NBA, do they only bar talking about it?
To answer those questions, let’s delve into that other Rulebook we like to use sometimes, the one called “Major League Rules.” If you turn to page 99, and look at Rule 21(a), you see this.
(a) MISCONDUCT IN PLAYING BASEBALL. Any player or person connected with a Club who shall promise or agree to lose, or to attempt to lose, or to fail to give his best efforts towards the winning of any baseball game with which he is or may be in any way concerned, or who shall intentionally lose or attempt to lose, or intentionally fail to give his best efforts towards the winning of any such baseball game, or who shall solicit or attempt to induce any player or person connected with a Club to lose or attempt to lose, or to fail to give his best efforts towards the winning of any baseball game with which such other player or person is or may be in any way concerned, or who, being solicited by any person, shall fail to inform the Commissioner (in the case of a player or person associated with a Major League Club) or the President of the Minor League Association (in the case of a player or person associated with an independent Minor League Club) immediately of such solicitation, and of all facts and circumstances connected therewith,
shall be declared permanently ineligible.
There’s little doubt that the players on the 2013 Astros were actively trying to win, even on their way to a 111-loss season. But that’s not all the Rule requires, because the Rule doesn’t apply only to the players. It says any player or person. To show where we’re going with this, let’s take out a few words for clarity:
(a) MISCONDUCT IN PLAYING BASEBALL. Any person connected with a Club who shall fail to give his best efforts towards the winning of any baseball game with which he is or may be in any way concerned, or who shall intentionally lose or attempt to lose, or who shall solicit or attempt to induce any player or person connected with a Club to lose or attempt to lose, shall be declared permanently ineligible.
It would seem that, according to the language used here, the front office and management of a Major League Baseball team is also bound to try its best to win games. Is a front office giving its best efforts towards the winning of a baseball game, though, if it strips it bare of major-league talent before the season begins? Or is that front office attempting to lose those games? By the plain language of the rule, it seems like tanking might actually be prohibited.
Now we come back to the question raised by the fine of Mark Cuban: is there a difference, under the rule, between trying to lose a game and trying to lose a season? On one hand, a season is just 162 individual games. On the other hand, the front office isn’t throwing games so much as intentionally creating a subpar product in order to sacrifice current wins for (at least in theory) future wins. How much of a difference does that make? We’ll find out next time.
Sheryl Ring is a litigation attorney and General Counsel at Open Communities, a non-profit legal aid agency in the Chicago suburbs. You can reach her on twitter at @Ring_Sheryl. The opinions expressed here are solely the author's. This post is intended for informational purposes only and is not intended as legal advice.


Side note: “(a) MISCONDUCT IN PLAYING BASEBALL” section is the longest run on sentence in written history (not that legal text need be concise but my word…)
It is not a run-on sentence. A run-on sentence is by definition grammatically faulty by failing to include either appropriate punctuation or appropriate connecting words. A lengthy sentence that is grammatically correct, like the one in question, is not a run-on sentence.
It’s a separate question whether a lengthy sentence, even if grammatically correct, could be clearer or easier to parse as multiple shorter sentences.
I don’t know, I think it is a run on sentence, I mean, who are you, an internet commenter, to tell me, another internet commenter, what is or is not a run off sentence, as if there was any way to verify if you or I were right, because really, what even is a run on sentence when you really think about it, and I think it is, and trust me, I know a thing or two about run on sentence, Dave.
This response made me laugh you do know something about run-on sentences so do I.
To answer the question at the end: It makes an enormous difference.
The primary motivation for teams that are “tanking” is not to lose current games, it’s to win future games. People classify that as tanking because the best way to gain future wins is to make the current team worse.
But I see a very strict difference between the MLB and NBA here. If an NBA team tries to tank, and the bad players accidentally start playing well and win a mediocre amount of games, the team will be upset because they need to high draft pick to turn the franchise around. If an MLB team tries to tank and accidentally wins a mediocre amount of games, the team will not be upset. They will be happy that they have much better prospects, they are saving money, and they didn’t make their fans upset along the way.
BIG difference between trying to lose games now and trying to win games later. MLB teams aren’t actively trying to lose.
In baseball a single top player doesn’t make as much of an impact as in the NBA. You need at least a handful of top performers and even then the spear carriers need to be competent players in their own right.
The key to winning today is to synchronize the players ‘ development curves so most peak during the same three-five year window.
That is what the Cubs and Astros did.
Ditto for the Indians, Phillies, and Braves.
Even the big budget teams like the Yankees and Dodgers are doing it.
Because it works.
Having a young phenom on the rise isn’t going to move the needle much if he’s surrounded by aging players on the decline. And since nobody will willingly trade young controllable stars that means the old guys need to go.
Preferably while they’ll still be useful to somebody else.
As Branch Rickey said: “Better to trade a player a year too early than a year too late.”
In the NBA the reason teams don’t want to win is mostly because their winning comes from veteran players with no future upside. It’s one thing to be annoyed if you’re winning because Nicola Mirotic is playing well with 2 years left on his deal and already reached his prime. It’s another to win when Victor Oladipo suddenly became a star and taking you to the playoffs.
It really is similar in baseball but we usually don’t think of it like this, but clearly seeing Jose Altuve perform well while tanking is different from seeing Zach Cozart doing the same. Pretty sure fans and teams are much more excited for the former than the latter.
This is pretty weak… the title of the subsection is “Misconduct in Playing Baseball.” It says *playing* baseball, which is something that occurs on the field during baseball games, not in front offices during the offseason.
In context, the phrase “any… person connected with a club” most logically is there to bring team employees within the rule, in order to prohibit them from “solicit[ing] or attempt[ing] to induce any player or person connected with a Club to lose or attempt to lose” — for example, Brian Cashman can’t pay Mookie Betts to throw a game. That’s a straightforward interpretation of the rule’s plain language. In contrast, it seems like a huge stretch to interpret this rule to forbid Brian Cashman from employing whichever baseball players he sees fit; to get there, you have to strain the meaning of “playing baseball” beyond recognition.
Not just solicitation. Base coaches can’t send a runner deliberately to have them thrown out or hold a runner on third when it is clear the runner could score. The manager can’t order the entire lineup to bunt with no runners on base.
Serious question: can you do those things if your team is up by 15 in the 9th inning?
I’d think the manager would just tell his guys not to swing, instead of doing some kind of more-obviously-intentional thing like bunting with the bases empty, but… I dunno, fun question. Maybe a call from Manfred telling them not to be so obvious about it next time?
That would be against the “unwritten rules”.
Standard practice is to give a decent effort but not be overly aggressive. *Both* teams.
Things like swinging at the first pitch, running at 90%, bringing in the reserves, not holding a runner, no chin music. Nothing blatant and nothing that will “show up” the other guy. Blatant free outs is “disrepecting the game” and the opponent.
I find this to be somewhat of a stretch. Put tanking aside; how about the non-contending team who shuts down a young starter in early September due to hitting an innings limit? What about an injured player who, rather than playing through pain for a few weeks or rushing back from a rehab sessions shuts it down in the final weeks of September? What about a team that pulls their ace starter from a game early in the season, preferring to save their bullets for a later, higher leverage situation? Don’t all of these situations run afoul of “trying to win any game”?
This may be a situation where the language of the rule differs from the intent of the rule-makers; teams are supposed to try to win, yes, but there are a variety of strategies that allow for broad interpretation of this rule. The 2013 Astros were trying to win in the long run, in a way that the Kansas City A’s of the 1950s clearly weren’t, and thus this type of tanking is fine in the context of this rule. Nobody expects every team to unleash all of their resources for each and every game, each and every season.
Agreed, a strictly literal interpretation of, “fail to give his best efforts towards the winning of any baseball game” would be an absurdity in the context of managing. Teams would have to use all their best relief pitching every game until their arms were so worn someone else would be better, pitching rotations would be 3 man, etc. There’s a reason playoff baseball looks different. There’s the clear implication—at least in the application—that acting in such a way that’s not immediately optimal in order to increase you chances of winning in the future is accepted and fully expected.
Bryce Harper one time didn’t run out a fly ball (or ground ball) and Papelbon tried to choke him in the dugout. Obviously what should have happened instead is Harper should have been banned from baseball for life.
This is precisely true and the article obscures the fact that the rule actually applies to the winning (or losing) of one game, not the winning or losing of multiple games or of pennants or playoff positions. But no one really expects every team to play every game as if it is a one-game playoff; that’s so unusual when it occurs that we all know it is happening. (E.g., starters are brought in to relieve when in the normal case you’d be thinking about preserving them for their next start).
Heck, playoff teams don’t play their regulars the day after they clinch; everyone KNOWS they are not putting their best foot forward to win, but that’s well accepted. Further, it has been well accepted that teams are not required to spend any minimum amount on their active rosters. It’s a common practice (though not necessary popular with everyone) that runners don’t run out ground balls or dropped third strikes; is this a “best effort” to win? I don’t see how this rule can be seen as anything more than a rule that says participants in a game, or those associated with it, are expected to give an honest effort to win.
I would argue that tanking is in full compliance with 21(a). It is merely a longer term version of the manager resting regulars on getaway day. Teams have decided that it is better (wins more games in the long term) to sacrifice perhaps one game on getaway day if it means that the superstar regulars are better rested.
Astros were extreme tanking, but if that is illegal then isn’t any trade of a veteran heading for free agency in exchange for prospects the same thing? You may have to consider time preferences. Astros traded wins in 2013 for wins in 2018. If a player were to intentionally strike out or boot a ball that’s a loss now, and something you’ll never get back. Same with a manager who pinch hits Chris Sale for J.D. Martinez in the 9th inning of a tie game. Just an example, I know Cora has not actually done that.
Exactly – this is just a much-longer-time-frame analog of a manager not bringing in his closer in a 1-run game because he’s pitched in 3 straight in May (but you might in the World Series). Just as you don’t necessarily optimize for every single game, you don’t optimize for every single season.
What about the Marlins who have (3 times now) traded current wins for nothing other than saving money?
I know the Marlins are extreme but I don’t think you can do much about that as long as baseball has unequal financial situations for teams.
The only one of their recent trades that can be pegged as close to a full salary relief trade is the trade of Stanton. Even there, given the remaining dollars on his contract and his ability to veto destinations due to his NTC, it’s tough to draw a meaningful distinction between that trade and the Marlins (or any team, especially a low-revenue one) allowing a player to leave as a free agent rather than guaranteeing him over $250 million.
The other trades – Ozuna, Yelich, Gordon – all brought back meaningful prospect returns. One can argue – and people here have – that the Marlins front office may have misevaluated several of the prospects that they received in those trades, but those were all defensible rebuilding trades in baseball terms.
I find it interesting that the misconduct clause refers to a baseball game. In the singular, not the plural.
Moves made in the offseason are too far removed in time to be a violation. “Game” implies a sense of the immediate time period surrounding the game. If the rulemakers had intended otherwise, they would have used “games” in the plural.
It becomes much more interesting with in season trades.
I think the real out here is the “best efforts” part. Given the circumstances surrounding the club, you can trade a player and still be giving your best efforts. Otherwise, any seller at the trade deadline broke this rule. Or 29 teams violated this rule by not signing JD Martinez, or a dozen other free agents.
The answer is, the team did give its best efforts – in light of budget issues and the balancing of future and present needs.
“Best effort” should also apply on every play. I say we permanently ban him from the game for not putting in his best effort that game.
This is a very weak argument (which I know you’re not necessarily making).
Taken literally, you could read “Any person connected with a Club who shall fail to give his best efforts towards the winning of any baseball game” as “An owner must spend every single penny of his money on players (or other things) which directly improve his team’s chances of winning each baseball game.”
I think we’d all agree that that’s unreasonable, but then where’s the dividing line between spending enough money to satisfy the rule, and not spending enough money?
Bottom line, I think the only reasonable interpretation is to apply the rule on a per-game basis (as in requiring that the players and on-field staff to put forth their best effort to win each game). But even that is a stretch, as others have pointed out (because managers must, in effect, sacrifice some games to some extent by giving players rest).
I don’t think Astros, Cubs, and Braves fans are too upset now about what went on several years ago. Thus I’d propose that if a rule like this were to apply to teams “tanking”, it should be over a longer time frame. That is, something like “any decision a team makes must have a realistic chance of improving the team at some point over the next N years.” (where N is 4 or 5?)
This is just spelling out what teams actually do – sacrifice the long-term for the short when it makes sense, and sacrifice the short-term for the long when *it* makes sense.
Again, I don’t think fans care (much) about their team selling off if it’s done well. What MLB should strive to avoid is prolonged periods of mediocrity (or worse). I think the cyclical nature of teams having their contention windows is a good thing.
“any decision a team makes must have a realistic chance of improving the team at some point over the next N years.”
So are you proposing to ban the Mets?
“So are you proposing to ban the Mets?”
I mean, there have been much worse suggestions.
There is a difference between “tanking” and “rebuilding.”
To me at least, tanking would be literally throwing games to improve draft position.
Rebuilding is understanding that you can not compete with your current roster and can not see a path to being a competitive team, so you are moving backwards to move closer to a championship. It is good self scouting and seeks to maximize wins over a longer time frame than today, this week, or this year. The player on the field does the best to win today, but the team does not pursue short term solutions that do them no real good this year and may minimize future potential.
If a team intentionally walked in the winning run in order to move their draft spot, or just told all the players to go up there and strike out every AB, then yeah, that would certainly be illegal.
But to me, as long as the players are putting in their full effort, and the team is not actively trying to lose games (just passively trying to lose by sending a sub-optimal roster), then that’s fine.
The counter-argument is that tanking is an attempt to win games, just not THESE games.
However, the wording of the rule would seem to disallow this argument:
“…fail to give his best efforts towards the winning of any baseball game with which he is or may be in any way concerned…”
The rule is that each person connected with “a Club” must give “his best efforts” toward winning “any baseball game”. It seems to me the only way to comply with this rule is to give maximum effort toward winning EVERY SINGLE GAME, without ever holding anything in reserve.
Modern pitcher usage breaks this rule.
There is a difference between “trying to lose” and “not trying to win”.
NBA style tanking is the former. It is incentivized by the very real gains a team can realize with the #1 overall draft pick in most years. It’s also pretty easy to flip the switch and reverse course once that superstar has been acquired.
MLB style tanking is the latter. There is no immediate payoff from losing in any given year, so there is little reason to do so. There is a longer term payoff in flipping tradable assets and developing minor league talent. There is also no quick fix. When you set the course to rebuild it’s going to be a multiyear process, even if you stumble into a franchise-changing draft in one of those years. The Nationals drafted Strasburg and Harper with back to back #1s in 09 and 10, and it was still 2012 before they pushed the chips in and went for the playoffs.
(channels extremely Herm Edwards voice): “You play to win the game!”
If you’re not trying to win, then you’re either trying to lose or tie (or you are dead and not trying to do anything).
I would be more interested if you presented this as a sort of thought experiment en route to a broader question: i.e., what does it mean to “compete” in the modern game with its complex set of incentives?
Instead (and without trying to be overly critical, this is a complaint I have with the handful of your articles I don’t like, those being the exception), you start with an unstated, moralizing assumption, subtly but persistently voiced: namely that teams are in fact “tanking,” a pejorative you use throughout for which there are many less editorializing alternatives (rebuilding, reloading, etc.) and which, as others have pointed out, actually does a poor job of describing the incentive structures and competitive timelines that are unique to baseball. “Intentionally creating a subpar product” is another needless affront to nuance and objectivity. It certainly isn’t anything like a good-faith interpretation of these teams’ “intentions” (except for the Marlins under previous ownership, maybe). Ditto “trying to lose a season.”
I mean, look, who cares, I don’t have to click (and I often don’t, especially if unquestioned moral assumptions are apparent from the title and blurb), and it’s not like I’m offended or anything. But I really like this kind of content in general, and it bums me out when a good writer on a great site writes an editorial masquerading as objective analysis. Write one or the other, and I’ll read and enjoy accordingly.
Showalter should have been fined for not trying to win, when he chose not to put Britton in during that postseason game a couple years back.
The Orioles were trying to win this year…hah!
Step 1. Only American League Teams Make Playoffs
Step 2. Reverse draft order based on NL Standings
Step 3 (Also could be step 1a). Contract the Marlins and Rays
Concepts like “what is it to compete” get absurd when parsed too finely. One bee in my bonnet, for example, is Ryan O’Hearn playing first for the Royals. He is just destroying right-handed pitching, putting up a wRC+ of 210. Almost half the balls he has hit are hard contact, and less than 10% are weak. He is basically Barry Bonds against right-handers right now. But against left-handers his wRC+ is 7. That is not a misprint. He has struck out 43% of the time. He is putting the ball on the ground nearly 60% of the time. This is the most hilarious left/right split I have ever seen.
Given what we’ve seen in his limited MLB playing time, playing O’Hearn against a left-handed pitcher is, by any measure, not maximizing the team’s attempts to win the game. It’s just not. On a game to game basis, playing him against a lefty is tanking.
On the other hand, this is his rookie year. If he is going to be a viable MLB first baseman, he has to learn how to hit them to at least a modest below-average level. How’s he gonna do that if he never plays against them? It was clear by June the Royals would be downright terrible. What do they gain by trying to get the best L/R matchups every game instead of giving their hitters chances to work on the things they struggle with? What do they gain by burying their cheap team-controlled man-mountain RHP-destroyer against lefties rather than finding out whether he can be their first baseman for the next 6-8 years?
If we’re supposed to believe it violates the rules to start O’Hearn against a lefty, the term just doesn’t mean anything anymore.
This is a very good point, and relates to the prior article about Vlad, Jr. If you have a minor leaguer who needs seasoning in some area of the game, is it “tanking” to bring him up when someone else might do better? Do you always have to play the best player in each game (assuming you can even make that decision in all scenarios)?
This can definitely become reductio ad absurdum. If the Red Sox give Mookie Betts a day off are they tanking that game? Or are they trying to win more overall games over a larger time frame than one day?
The plain language absolutely does not say that tanking teams are breaking the rules. What’s in the all-caps header of the rules:
“MISCONDUCT IN PLAYING BASEBALL”
Key word here: “Playing”
The front office is not playing baseball, they are administrating a baseball team. Even the rest of the wording of the rule suggests that the intent is geared towards the people engaged in the actual sport of baseball – meaning players and coaches involved in the playing of the game are not to throw said games.
Constructing a lousy major league team would not on its face break these rules. In fact, I think the whole premise has an issue in that the clear intent is to prohibit people from trying to lose a game, rather than prohibit people from not trying to win. If it were the latter the implication would be that putting in a position player to pitch would break the rules, or skipping your best starter’s spot in the rotation to give him rest – you are no longer putting forth your best effort to win the game – which would be absurd. Similarly, these teams aren’t trying to lose (they are not actively throwing games), they are simply not constructing their rosters to maximize their present win potential.
I think that reading ignores the rest of the language in the rule. If they only intended the rule to apply to players, they would not have made it applicable to “any player or person connected with a club,” they would have just made it applicable to players.
It’s not limited to players, it’s limited to the ‘playing’ of the game.
So why use “any person connected with the club” instead of “any player or coach?”
By definition, no one plays the game in the literal sense except the players. If we accept that “playing” is not limited only to players, I don’t think there’s a logical, factual distinction to be drawn between the front office and coaches. It sounds like the distinction you are drawing is that coaches can influence the playing of the game by calling plays and selecting players to start/pitch/relieve, is that right? If that’s so, then you can also say that a front office can influence the game by selecting players to even be at the game in the first place. As an extreme example, If I’m the GM seeking to lose, I could have even more influence on the playing and outcome of a game if I keep Ronald Acuna in the minors compared to the manager who I leave selecting between, let’s say Preston Tucker and Adam Duvall to play LF in any given game.
Another example could be that I could tip the pitches to the other team. I tell the other team ahead of time that I’ve got a guy in center field signaling the pitches and here’s where he’s sitting. That’s a pretty clear influence by a person connected with the club on the playing of the game.
It seems the language was broadly drawn to cover a wider ranger of activities than just what appears in a box score.
Your examples are exactly my point – it’s not limited to players and it doesn’t exclude front office personnel, it applies to anyone associated with the organization who is attempting to cause his/her team to lose by taking actions that affect the ‘playing’ of the game – tipping pitches affects the playing of the game even if the person doing it isn’t a player. If evidence came out that a manager took actions with the intention of causing his team to lose, that’s affecting the ‘playing’ of the game.. I don’t think it’s a mistake that word is there and the author just blew by it.
This rule is pretty clearly concerned with overt actions (note the frequent use of the word ‘intentional’), with the intention to cause your team to lose ‘any baseball game’, singular. Put shortly, it covers throwing a game – I don’t see anything in here that reads like they want all administrative decisions to maximize present competitiveness of the team, and I think the author is bending over backwards to make an argument here because she clearly started from the perspective of ‘super teams are bad for baseball’ and worked from there, rather than starting from the text of the rule. If you start from the text, at least this text, there’s not much to stand on, and you really need to go the direction of arguing for a rule change (read: draft lottery, minimum payroll, change super 2 rules).
I agree with your interpretation, except that I don’t think it has to be with the intent of causing your own team to lose. It appears it could also apply to a solicitor from another team. Hypothetical example, Beet Throse of the Reds offers to give Teddie Chiclotte of the ChiSox his immaculate 1963 Stingray to pitch poorly against the Reds tonight. Teddie says no, but does not report the incident. Beet, the solicitor, could be banned for life for attempting to cause a team to lose even though it wasn’t his own team. Unfortunately for Teddie, even though he said no to Beet, he could also be banned for life for failing to report the incident.
The rule reads: “… towards the winning of any baseball game with which he is or may be in any way concerned…”
The key words to me are “any” and “game”.
“Any”, because it weighs each and every game the same, including current games. So if winning future games comes at the expense of winning current games, then it’d be against the rule. The rule isn’t about total games in a season or total games over a five year stretch – it’s any single game.
“Game”, because I think there’s a tendency to talk of “winning” as in winning a championship. There’s no carve out in the rule for do what you have to do to win a championship. If winning a future championship comes at the expense of winning current games, then it’d be against the rule. The rule is about games.
So yeah, tanking is probably against the rules.
Sometimes I wonder if one of the overlooked ways of tanking is making intentionally bad choices of which reliever to use when. For most of this season, Bruce Bochy insisted on using Hunter Strickland as the Giants’ closer even though it was clear that at least four other relievers on the team (Smith, Watson, Moronta, and Dyson) were better. When speculating how he could possibly be so misguided, the thought that he was following orders to tank entered my mind more than once. The same thing happened last year with the A’s using Casilla as their closer for most of the year.
I thought Boone was throwing games with his lineups and pitching decisions. I realized, though, his stupidity is only outmatched by his stubbornness.
We also need to acknowledge that we were wrong about some of the teams which we assumed were tanking. The A’s, Braves and Rays were all in that boat, at least when discussing this year’s FA class and their absence from the market.
This is great. However, tanking only works if you have a great system to identify prospects and develop them. The Mets stockpiling of pitchers was great – until they realized the durability of those pitchers was erratic and the remaining cash to be spent on position players yielded far less effective value.
It seems odd that the article cites the 2018 NL as evidence that we’re (still) in an era of superteams. If the Cubs finish 4-3 and wind up with 95 wins, that would be a much lower-than-normal league-leading total. As I count it, between the first NL expansion and shift to a 162-game season in 1962 and 2017, there were 53 nonstrike years (including the 156-game 1972). In 41 of those years, one or more NL teams won more than 95 (23 times 100+), in 5 years a team led the league with exactly 95 wins, and in 7 years no team won 95. At a quick glance, the AL numbers look similar. In the AL, the last nonstrike year in which a team led the league with fewer than 95 wins was 1974.
Also, that paragraph’s implication that 90-win teams are great teams suggests a very generous definition of great, because 90-win teams are quite common throughout baseball history. Calling the Red Sox’s year historic also seems like a stretch, as two AL teams in the last 21 years won significantly more games than the Red Sox will.
That aside, I assume that the general point that we’re in an era of greater-than-usual (at least for recent decades) separation between good and bad teams is correct. Maybe looking at the standard deviation of wins would show that more clearly.
It is still theoretically possible for the Cubs and Dodgers to miss the playoffs like the Nationals, the other “surefire winner” in the NL. The separation between the “super teams” and the pack isn’t all it’s supposed to be. They’re not all that invulnerable after all.
There’s a reason for calling the RS season historic here. It’s the RS and this is Fangraphs.
Is a manager required to use all their best pitchers in tonight’s blowout? Surely not, so cam you unpack how a lawyer determines the line between that, and investing nothing in this year for better odds next year?
The GM can argue they’re “concerned in” all of these games, present and future, and they’re trying to win the best they can overall.
Seems to me this rule could stand to be written for more distinction, but can’t say I know how.
My gut says it’s one thing to trade present for future when the “currency” is in-game resources, like pitcher fatigue and availability. Or selling off a veteran for prospects. That’s got to be okay, right?
It might be different when the currency is actual money. But… if you can dump a guy and his salary, to spend the money on a winning season, that seems good to me.
Okay, try on these tests:
1) losing games has to be a side effect of how you benefit the future, not a mediating variable for it. E.g losing games for draft standing is disallowed (enforcement is left as an exercise).
2) The season is a natural unit of baseball play. You want to win the division and the World Series. Sacrificing games toward that is impossible to fault in terms of season-winning. Sacrificing one not already lost season for another can be distinguished on this, if we want it.
Everyone that goes into the game has to be trying his best to win. That basically happens. The only real exception is during blow outs sometimes guys really aren’t still trying to win (if they are losing) or are okay with a incredibly small reduction in the chance of winning (if wining by a lot). Also, a guy that throws at a hitter out of anger is not trying to win, he is just being an asshole. Taking all of this literally would be insane. This is more art than science. It is about upholding the integrity of the game (especially in regard to gambling). Using this rule to punish a team that is trying to reduce future payroll obligations and increase prospect value would be completely stupid. I can’t imagine anyone either on an MLB team or associated with the union, seriously making this case.
Cuban was fined because saying it outloud (and poorly worded) is bad PR, not because it “isn’t allowed.”
I don’t disagree with what you’re saying, but you’re only talking about players on the field. If an organization doesn’t put their best players on the field are they really doing their best to win?
Maybe not for the present, but that isn’t the purpose of the rule. You can’t do things to lose on purpose, but prioritizing future winning or the season as a whole is fine. People act like 100-loss teams are a new thing. “Tanking” is basically another positive spin (like “rebuilding”) for when you suck and there is no reason to prioritize going from 60 to 65 wins when it hurts your chances in future seasons, costs the team money, and doesn’t make the team money.
What if you aren’t trying to lose, but end up doing so because your entire organization from top to bottom is just terrible…like Baltimore?
Ring’s argument here stretches beyond recognition a rule that is clearly intended to cover overt acts to throw a game on the field, such as intentionally booting balls or striking out on purpose.
Others have made good arguments about how her overly literal interpretation of this rule would absurdly ban a variety of common practices such as resting players throughout the season, managing pitcher workloads with an eye to the full season and the post-season, shutting down young pitchers at innings limits, playing September call-ups in some games after a team has either clinched its playoff position or is eliminated from the playoffs, etc.
I’ll also add another absurdity from Ring’s overly strict interpretation of this rule: it would ban a host of common Minor League player development practices. That’s because this rule also covers minor league games! The definition of Club encompasses “any Major League or Minor League Club” (page 187 of the Major League Rules linked in the post). It’s understandable that these rules similarly ban outright throwing minor league games, but there are a host of standard minor league player development practices that would be banned under Ring’s interpretation of this rule. To name just a few: getting players experience at new defensive positions as a learning experience, aggressively promoting players to a higher minor league level and keeping up their playing time even if they struggle, encouraging pitchers to use secondary pitches for development purposes, etc.
At this point I’m torn between “she’s trolling her employers” and “she’s just really terrible at the lawyering thing”
This whole discussion is silly. Reading the rule and knowing my baseball history, it’s clear that this rule is meant to deter and punish throwing games for gambling purposes. If it ever gets applied to tanking, I’ll wear a Marlin’s hat for a year.
I think if a team straight up lost on purpose to get a better draft pick, the rule would apply there, too.
Thanks for the article, this issue must be explored and dealt with.
First, I’m not sure I’d call any of these teams super teams based on their record. These teams are literally being gifted how many wins per season by these tanking clubs? I love my brewers but we may match the 2011 win total and this teams isn’t close to that club.
Second, I don’t find it unrelated that I believe every team in mlb has a publicly funded stadium and now they tank, pocket the money from reduced salary, AND sell fools that this is optimal strategy.
Draft lottery, reduced time to be eligible for the rule 5 draft and reduction of both minimum salary years and arbitration years are solutions to this issue.
The integrity of mlb competition and its history and records are at stake.
What clearly tanking teams have the Brewers *really* fattened up on though? Yes, they drew the horrific AL Central, but they got 3/4 games against each team, not the 19 you get from having a tanking team in your division. Other than that, who in the NL clearly had no intention of competing this year, Miami? OK, 7 games against, but really not much else – Cincinnati is arguably the best 5th place team in baseball, and even San Diego made a handful of present-day moves, if not fully committing to *win now*. Everyone else in the NL came into the season with intentions of being competitive. Relative to the rest of baseball, the Brewers have not gotten all that many games against clearly non-competitive teams.
As for baseball and its integrity – dude…I think you’re buying into too many hot takes. I can name exactly one team in the past 20-30 years that has clearly pocketed the cash flow from running out a bad team with a low payroll – the Loria era Marlins. Every other bad team I’ve seen has at least had a vision and a plan to become competitive, if maybe failing to execute it (the ’90s/early ’00s Brewers & Pirates come to mind). I don’t disagree that some changes to the CBA re: player compensation (particularly minor leaguers), service time manipulation, arbitration reform, etc. are warranted, but MLB’s competitive integrity being at stake is way off the deep end for me.
Yes, there are currently a lot of bad teams in the AL, but there’s not one that I don’t see any plan whatsoever to become good again at some point in the future. Baseball’s incentive structure being what it is almost demands teams behave the way they do.
I think it all comes down to market efficiency. Tanking is routinely done in Juniors Hockey in Canada, because of short cycles of players (they load up on 16-17 year olds, trade away the 19s, and let them develop for two years).
It has now moved up to pro sports. However, it doesn’t always work (in the NHL, about a 50% rate, the other 50% remains in the bottom for years, in baseball, see the Reds or White Sox).
Furthermore, it all comes down to supply and demand. Too many teams tried to tank this year. Traded veteran/star players don’t get the returns they used to, because there are not enough suitors. Might just as well keep them. In contrast to Juniors, not all MLB teams can actually boast a Super Team once in a while due to money, and the few contending teams don’t always have a need for your own good player on the trading block. The new market inefficiency might actually be to raise the floor, and see what happens. The last two seasons by the Jays are a good example. It didn’t work, but it’s because the stars faltered, not the “average player” acquisitions. It also did not make sense to tank when both the Red Sox and Yankees are actually young Super Teams already. There were no takers anyway. The Rays also play this way, and the Orioles tried to.
There seems to be no way to prevent tanking by an organization, given that players will always attempt to play well enough to earn, and an organization’s management can always claim they’re reallocating payroll toward younger players. Unless there’s hard evidence of something like betting — Pete Rose? — I don’t see a way to punish tanking organizations without incurring some massive lawsuit or something similar.
As a side note, I feel like tanking doesn’t always work well. I’m not sure about baseball examples, but look at the current Phoenix Suns and their relative inability to select well-performing players with high draft picks (M. Chriss, D. Bender, A. Len, minus the exception of D. Booker). Also, the Orlando Magic have similarly flopped in rebuilding (E. Payton, M. Hezonja, the trade for T. Ross, etc.). Perhaps the difference in the two sports’ draft size disadvantages the NBA, but still.