The Obstacles for the Underpowered First Baseman
Last Monday, Eno Sarris published a post here examining the possibility — based on some reasonable questions regarding the positional adjustments which inform WAR — that giant, large slugger-types are more valuable than our typical assumptions about the market have previously indicated. Eno’s conclusion: they’re still probably not (more valuable, that is). For whatever benefits these sluggers might receive from a revision of those positional adjustments, it probably doesn’t compensate for the other deficits generally tied to this type of player.
Eno’s work rests largely on this thread of logic: first basemen (and designated hitters) aren’t particularly great long-term free-agent investments because power tends to age poorly. There is, one finds, an assumption embedded within this claim — i.e. that the value of first basemen is tied strongly to power. And the assumption is supported by evidence. Regard: in 2015, first basemen and designated hitters produced the highest isolated-power figure (ISO) among all position types. In 2014, first basemen and designated hitters also produced the highest ISO among all position types. The year before that, in 2013, first basers and DHs produced the highest ISOs. This is very probably the case for every other season, as well. Nor is this a surprising development: in order to compensate for the runs they’re unable to save on the defensive side of the ball, first basemen have to produce more runs on the offensive side of it. Compiling extra bases is the most expedient means of doing that.
Recording extra-base hits isn’t the only means to generating runs, however. A player can also succeed as a batter by walking more than average, or striking out less often than average, or recording an above-average number of hits per ball in play. Indeed, every year, there are a handful of batters who produce above-average batting lines despite failing to post even league-average ISO figures.
Consider: among 141 qualified hitters in 2015, 16 of them recorded both (a) an isolated-power figure below league average (which was .153 in 2015 among non-pitchers) and also (b) a park-adjusted batting mark above 100.

Name | Team | PA | ISO | BB% | K% | BABIP | wRC+ |
Jason Kipnis | CLE | 641 | .149 | 8.9% | 16.7% | .356 | 126 |
Jason Heyward | STL | 610 | .146 | 9.2% | 14.8% | .329 | 121 |
Jose Altuve | HOU | 689 | .146 | 4.8% | 9.7% | .329 | 120 |
Yunel Escobar | WAS | 591 | .101 | 7.6% | 11.8% | .347 | 120 |
Francisco Cervelli | PIT | 510 | .106 | 9.0% | 18.4% | .359 | 119 |
Adam Eaton | CHA | 689 | .144 | 8.4% | 19.0% | .345 | 118 |
Christian Yelich | MIA | 525 | .116 | 9.0% | 19.2% | .370 | 117 |
Matt Duffy | SFN | 612 | .133 | 4.9% | 15.7% | .336 | 116 |
Dee Gordon | MIA | 653 | .085 | 3.8% | 13.9% | .383 | 113 |
Ian Kinsler | DET | 675 | .131 | 6.4% | 11.9% | .323 | 111 |
Odubel Herrera | PHI | 537 | .121 | 5.2% | 24.0% | .387 | 110 |
Xander Bogaerts | BOS | 654 | .101 | 4.9% | 15.4% | .372 | 109 |
Nick Markakis | ATL | 686 | .080 | 10.2% | 12.1% | .338 | 107 |
Brett Gardner | NYA | 656 | .140 | 10.4% | 20.6% | .312 | 105 |
Jhonny Peralta | STL | 640 | .136 | 7.8% | 17.3% | .311 | 105 |
Billy Burns | OAK | 555 | .098 | 4.7% | 14.6% | .339 | 102 |
Average | — | — | .121 | 7.2% | 15.9% | .346 | 114 |
Using raw ISO figures next to park-adjusted batting indices might unfairly penalize players whose home parks inflate power while unfairly rewarding those whose home parks suppress it, but absolute precision isn’t the concern here. The point is this: not only is it possible for a player to record below-average power numbers and an above-average batting line, but also that it happened multiples times just in the past year.
Notably, however, none of the 16 players in the table above were regular first basemen or designated hitters in 2015. The list features corner outfielders and center fielders, middle infielders and third basemen, and even one catcher, but no first basemen. Why? Perhaps as a result of mere anomaly. On the other hand, perhaps… not that?
With a view to creating a “composite sketch” of the successful but also underpowered first baseman, I endeavored to locate the top seasons produced by members of that group. Starting from the start of the expansion era (i.e. since 1961), I found the top-20 seasons by prorated WAR among those players who were categorized as first basemen in the relevant season and also recorded the following:
- Sufficient plate appearances to have qualified for the batting title; and
- A positional adjustment of -7.5 or lower (to ensure that the relevant player had mostly occupied the less challenging end of the defensive spectrum that year); and
- An ISO below the relevant season’s league-average mark.
Below are the results of that search. To better represent each batter’s numbers relative to the offensive environment in which he played, I’ve presented walk rate, strikeout rate, and BABIP as index stats. A figure of 100 denotes league average and above 100 denotes a mark better than that. (Note: this is also true for strikeout rate. That is, a higher number represents fewer strikeouts relative to league average.) For reference, I’ve also included fielding runs per 600 plate appearances.

Name | Team | Year | PA | Pos/600 | ISO+ | wRC+ | BB+ | K+ | BABIP+ | Fld/600 | WAR/600 |
Keith Hernandez | NYN | 1986 | 652 | -8.2 | 97 | 146 | 160 | 128 | 116 | 8.3 | 5.3 |
John Olerud | NYN | 1999 | 723 | -7.9 | 99 | 135 | 180 | 143 | 101 | 10.0 | 4.8 |
Keith Hernandez | NYN | 1985 | 682 | -8.4 | 88 | 130 | 128 | 136 | 114 | 12.3 | 4.4 |
Daric Barton | OAK | 2010 | 686 | -10.0 | 88 | 126 | 184 | 117 | 106 | 10.3 | 4.3 |
Mark Grace | CHN | 1997 | 654 | -8.2 | 94 | 130 | 148 | 158 | 107 | 11.0 | 4.3 |
Rod Carew | LAA | 1982 | 612 | -7.8 | 65 | 123 | 130 | 137 | 121 | 17.6 | 4.2 |
Keith Hernandez | STL | 1982 | 694 | -8.2 | 88 | 126 | 171 | 123 | 113 | 10.4 | 4.1 |
Rod Carew | MIN | 1978 | 651 | -8.0 | 88 | 135 | 138 | 121 | 129 | 0.0 | 4.1 |
Joe Cunningham | CHA | 1962 | 652 | -8.1 | 93 | 131 | 170 | 129 | 111 | 7.4 | 4.0 |
Doug Mientkiewicz | MIN | 2003 | 574 | -10.6 | 93 | 125 | 148 | 140 | 107 | 9.1 | 3.9 |
Mike Hargrove | CLE | 1981 | 398 | -8.6 | 73 | 140 | 178 | 167 | 115 | 1.5 | 3.9 |
Mark Grace | CHN | 1992 | 689 | -8.4 | 99 | 128 | 120 | 163 | 108 | 7.0 | 3.8 |
Mark Grace | CHN | 1996 | 616 | -8.2 | 78 | 127 | 109 | 158 | 113 | 9.7 | 3.8 |
Rod Carew | LAA | 1981 | 421 | -8.0 | 60 | 121 | 126 | 111 | 122 | 11.4 | 3.8 |
Mike Hargrove | TEX | 1975 | 610 | -7.8 | 95 | 131 | 141 | 113 | 115 | 1.0 | 3.5 |
Kevin Seitzer | — | 1996 | 675 | -10.4 | 88 | 123 | 139 | 127 | 118 | 3.6 | 3.4 |
Scott Hatteberg | OAK | 2002 | 568 | -11.3 | 96 | 121 | 135 | 139 | 99 | 7.9 | 3.4 |
Wally Joyner | SDN | 1996 | 510 | -8.5 | 79 | 116 | 145 | 113 | 103 | 12.9 | 3.3 |
Keith Hernandez | NYN | 1987 | 676 | -8.0 | 94 | 123 | 132 | 97 | 111 | 3.6 | 3.2 |
Wes Parker | LAN | 1966 | 564 | -8.2 | 99 | 114 | 153 | 94 | 101 | 7.4 | 3.2 |
Average | — | — | 615 | -8.6 | 88 | 128 | 147 | 131 | 112 | 8.1 | 3.9 |
The observant reader will note that this table allows for at least one variable that the first did not — namely, the influence of single-season fielding metrics. While one might suppose that the variance inherent to single-season defensive numbers would render the table an exercise in chaos, it actually creates an illustrative consistency. Regard: just three players are responsible for half the seasons displayed here.
Indeed, the seasons here authored by Rod Carew, Mark Grace, and Keith Hernandez conspire to provide a helpful blueprint for the underpowered first baseman’s success. Like the other members of this table, that triumvirate almost always produced better-than-average walk and strikeout rates — and above-average BABIPs — while also saving enough runs in the field to more or less negate the influence of the penalty imposed by their positional adjustment.
At the bottom of the table above, I’ve presented the average mark for each metric among these top-20 seasons. One finds, for example, that the members of this group produced a collective walk rate 47% better than league average. And a strikeout rate 31% better (i.e. lower) than league average. And a BABIP that was collectively 12% better than league average.
Presented merely as index stats, those numbers may not signify much. So, to better ground them in the context of the present run environment, I’ve translated them to 2015 stats below.

Metric | Index | Equals in 2015 |
ISO | 88 | .134 |
BB% | 147 | 11.4% |
K% | 131 | 13.8% |
BABIP | 112 | .336 |
Def | — | -0.5 |
So, in other words, the average player from that list of top-20 underpowered first-basemen seasons from above — were he transported to the present day — would produce the numbers one finds here: a .134 ISO, an 11.4% walk rate, a 13.8% strikeout rate, etc.
Those average figures provide a clue as to the reluctance of clubs to rely on underpowered first basemen. Because, while certain of these metrics (isolated power, walk rate, strikeout rate) are likely to depict something like true talent over the course of one season, others (BABIP, defensive runs) are much more susceptible to variance in a single year. These productive but underpowered seasons are the result, in no small part, of success on balls in play and fielding runs. And while it’s entirely possible for a player to possess an actual skill that will allow him to excel by either or both measures, it’s a much greater challenge to identify those skills.
By way of illustration, consider the following table. In this case, I’ve isolated the four measures by which the successful, underpowered first basemen have excelled — and, in so doing, been able to compensate for their relative paucity of extra-base hits. For each of those four measures, I’ve also included the number of players forecast to exceed the relevant mark in 2016 according the Steamer projections. Note that the Def mark denotes players who’ve received a positional adjustment of -7.5 or worse (and therefore can be reliably expected to play mostly first base), but still received a defensive projection of -0.5 or better.

Metric | Index | Equals in 2015 | # Projected to Beat |
BB% | 147 | 11.4% | 34 |
K% | 131 | 13.8% | 104 |
BABIP | 112 | .336 | 10 |
Def | — | -0.5 | 0 |
This table summarizes the challenge of employing an underpowered first baseman: while his lack of extra-base strength requires him to compensate by means of the four categories represented here, expecting a batter to meet the necessary thresholds is unreasonable. As the Steamer projections reveal, over 100 batters can be expected to surpass the requisite strikeout-rate threshold in 2016 and 30-plus batters will do the same thing for walk rate. Only 10 batters, though, can be reasonably expected to reach the BABIP mark and literally no one can be expected both to play first base and reach the -0.5-run mark on the defensive side. The absence of even league-average power, in the end, puts considerable pressure on the player to succeed by other means. Not so much pressure that it has happened before, but enough that it doesn’t happen dependably.
Carson Cistulli has published a book of aphorisms called Spirited Ejaculations of a New Enthusiast.
The other side of the coin is that teams generally want power somewhere in their lineups, and first, DH, and the corner outfield spots are usually the places to put it. So an exceptional fielder with a high OBP (your list, basically) works at first, but you’d probably rather sacrifice some defense — it’s not like those top 20 seasons match Frank Thomas’s good years.
I think that the reality that Cistulli is getting at is that good fielders with a high OBP are rare. More importantly, Cistulli’s list involves superb fielders with a high OBP. Only 2 players in the 1b category put up a positive DWAR between 2000 and 2015. And one of them is Darren Erstad, who put in a few seasons at 1B, but who put up his DWAR numbers in the outfield. So that leaves Travis Ishikawa.
Even the dudes that show up all over that list averaged negative defensive value. Mark Grace put up -62.7 DRAR over 16 seasons. Olerud put up -45.3 in 17. Rod Carew put up -35.3 in 18. Kieth Hernandez put up +0.3 in 17, making him probably the best defensive 1B of all time. (if you want to go by DRAR, everyone ahead of him on the list was either primarily not a 1B (and put up their positive DRAR at another position) or from the 1900-1920 period of baseball being a very very different thing).
Essentially, to get on this list you have to be a world class defender in a good year. No one is predicted to have a better than -0.5 DRAR season at 1b next year, but someone probably will.
When I think of guys that fit this list too, I see some names that didn’t quite hit the cut. 2007 Kevin Youkilis and Todd Helton both put up pretty solid defense at 1B while having good offensive years without incredible power numbers. Both saw most of their value coming from OBP and defense. Both had just a hair too much ISO to make the cut (Helton only had 17 home runs, but he hit 42 doubles.)
Basically, what it comes down to is that even if you put a world class defender at 1B, the position is so meaningless defensively that he immediately has less of an impact. Darrin Erstad was a spectacular outfielder, but even he put up negative dRAR numbers in the years he played primarily first base. Essentially, you can scrape together a good year from a guy with no power at 1st. But it’s a safer bet to stick someone there who can really rip it. Or at least someone who is an above average hitter but can’t play any other positions.
Defensive WAR is positionally adjusted. So it’s not completely fair to any of these guys to say they were a massive negative defensively. It’s all relative. Mark Grace ‘scored’ a negative 62.7 dWAR but over the course of his 15.5 year career he was deducted 193.75 by virtue of the position he played.