The Obstacles for the Underpowered First Baseman

Last Monday, Eno Sarris published a post here examining the possibility — based on some reasonable questions regarding the positional adjustments which inform WAR — that giant, large slugger-types are more valuable than our typical assumptions about the market have previously indicated. Eno’s conclusion: they’re still probably not (more valuable, that is). For whatever benefits these sluggers might receive from a revision of those positional adjustments, it probably doesn’t compensate for the other deficits generally tied to this type of player.

Eno’s work rests largely on this thread of logic: first basemen (and designated hitters) aren’t particularly great long-term free-agent investments because power tends to age poorly. There is, one finds, an assumption embedded within this claim — i.e. that the value of first basemen is tied strongly to power. And the assumption is supported by evidence. Regard: in 2015, first basemen and designated hitters produced the highest isolated-power figure (ISO) among all position types. In 2014, first basemen and designated hitters also produced the highest ISO among all position types. The year before that, in 2013, first basers and DHs produced the highest ISOs. This is very probably the case for every other season, as well. Nor is this a surprising development: in order to compensate for the runs they’re unable to save on the defensive side of the ball, first basemen have to produce more runs on the offensive side of it. Compiling extra bases is the most expedient means of doing that.

Recording extra-base hits isn’t the only means to generating runs, however. A player can also succeed as a batter by walking more than average, or striking out less often than average, or recording an above-average number of hits per ball in play. Indeed, every year, there are a handful of batters who produce above-average batting lines despite failing to post even league-average ISO figures.

Consider: among 141 qualified hitters in 2015, 16 of them recorded both (a) an isolated-power figure below league average (which was .153 in 2015 among non-pitchers) and also (b) a park-adjusted batting mark above 100.

Below-Average Power, Above-Average Hitting in 2015

Name	Team	PA	ISO	BB%	K%	BABIP	wRC+
Jason Kipnis	CLE	641	.149	8.9%	16.7%	.356	126
Jason Heyward	STL	610	.146	9.2%	14.8%	.329	121
Jose Altuve	HOU	689	.146	4.8%	9.7%	.329	120
Yunel Escobar	WAS	591	.101	7.6%	11.8%	.347	120
Francisco Cervelli	PIT	510	.106	9.0%	18.4%	.359	119
Adam Eaton	CHA	689	.144	8.4%	19.0%	.345	118
Christian Yelich	MIA	525	.116	9.0%	19.2%	.370	117
Matt Duffy	SFN	612	.133	4.9%	15.7%	.336	116
Dee Gordon	MIA	653	.085	3.8%	13.9%	.383	113
Ian Kinsler	DET	675	.131	6.4%	11.9%	.323	111
Odubel Herrera	PHI	537	.121	5.2%	24.0%	.387	110
Xander Bogaerts	BOS	654	.101	4.9%	15.4%	.372	109
Nick Markakis	ATL	686	.080	10.2%	12.1%	.338	107
Brett Gardner	NYA	656	.140	10.4%	20.6%	.312	105
Jhonny Peralta	STL	640	.136	7.8%	17.3%	.311	105
Billy Burns	OAK	555	.098	4.7%	14.6%	.339	102
Average	—	—	.121	7.2%	15.9%	.346	114

Using raw ISO figures next to park-adjusted batting indices might unfairly penalize players whose home parks inflate power while unfairly rewarding those whose home parks suppress it, but absolute precision isn’t the concern here. The point is this: not only is it possible for a player to record below-average power numbers and an above-average batting line, but also that it happened multiples times just in the past year.

Notably, however, none of the 16 players in the table above were regular first basemen or designated hitters in 2015. The list features corner outfielders and center fielders, middle infielders and third basemen, and even one catcher, but no first basemen. Why? Perhaps as a result of mere anomaly. On the other hand, perhaps… not that?

With a view to creating a “composite sketch” of the successful but also underpowered first baseman, I endeavored to locate the top seasons produced by members of that group. Starting from the start of the expansion era (i.e. since 1961), I found the top-20 seasons by prorated WAR among those players who were categorized as first basemen in the relevant season and also recorded the following:

• Sufficient plate appearances to have qualified for the batting title; and
• A positional adjustment of -7.5 or lower (to ensure that the relevant player had mostly occupied the less challenging end of the defensive spectrum that year); and
• An ISO below the relevant season’s league-average mark.

Below are the results of that search. To better represent each batter’s numbers relative to the offensive environment in which he played, I’ve presented walk rate, strikeout rate, and BABIP as index stats. A figure of 100 denotes league average and above 100 denotes a mark better than that. (Note: this is also true for strikeout rate. That is, a higher number represents fewer strikeouts relative to league average.) For reference, I’ve also included fielding runs per 600 plate appearances.

Top-20 Underpowered First Basemen Seasons Since 1961

Name	Team	Year	PA	Pos/600	ISO+	wRC+	BB+	K+	BABIP+	Fld/600	WAR/600
Keith Hernandez	NYN	1986	652	-8.2	97	146	160	128	116	8.3	5.3
John Olerud	NYN	1999	723	-7.9	99	135	180	143	101	10.0	4.8
Keith Hernandez	NYN	1985	682	-8.4	88	130	128	136	114	12.3	4.4
Daric Barton	OAK	2010	686	-10.0	88	126	184	117	106	10.3	4.3
Mark Grace	CHN	1997	654	-8.2	94	130	148	158	107	11.0	4.3
Rod Carew	LAA	1982	612	-7.8	65	123	130	137	121	17.6	4.2
Keith Hernandez	STL	1982	694	-8.2	88	126	171	123	113	10.4	4.1
Rod Carew	MIN	1978	651	-8.0	88	135	138	121	129	0.0	4.1
Joe Cunningham	CHA	1962	652	-8.1	93	131	170	129	111	7.4	4.0
Doug Mientkiewicz	MIN	2003	574	-10.6	93	125	148	140	107	9.1	3.9
Mike Hargrove	CLE	1981	398	-8.6	73	140	178	167	115	1.5	3.9
Mark Grace	CHN	1992	689	-8.4	99	128	120	163	108	7.0	3.8
Mark Grace	CHN	1996	616	-8.2	78	127	109	158	113	9.7	3.8
Rod Carew	LAA	1981	421	-8.0	60	121	126	111	122	11.4	3.8
Mike Hargrove	TEX	1975	610	-7.8	95	131	141	113	115	1.0	3.5
Kevin Seitzer	—	1996	675	-10.4	88	123	139	127	118	3.6	3.4
Scott Hatteberg	OAK	2002	568	-11.3	96	121	135	139	99	7.9	3.4
Wally Joyner	SDN	1996	510	-8.5	79	116	145	113	103	12.9	3.3
Keith Hernandez	NYN	1987	676	-8.0	94	123	132	97	111	3.6	3.2
Wes Parker	LAN	1966	564	-8.2	99	114	153	94	101	7.4	3.2
Average	—	—	615	-8.6	88	128	147	131	112	8.1	3.9

The observant reader will note that this table allows for at least one variable that the first did not — namely, the influence of single-season fielding metrics. While one might suppose that the variance inherent to single-season defensive numbers would render the table an exercise in chaos, it actually creates an illustrative consistency. Regard: just three players are responsible for half the seasons displayed here.

Indeed, the seasons here authored by Rod Carew, Mark Grace, and Keith Hernandez conspire to provide a helpful blueprint for the underpowered first baseman’s success. Like the other members of this table, that triumvirate almost always produced better-than-average walk and strikeout rates — and above-average BABIPs — while also saving enough runs in the field to more or less negate the influence of the penalty imposed by their positional adjustment.

At the bottom of the table above, I’ve presented the average mark for each metric among these top-20 seasons. One finds, for example, that the members of this group produced a collective walk rate 47% better than league average. And a strikeout rate 31% better (i.e. lower) than league average. And a BABIP that was collectively 12% better than league average.

Presented merely as index stats, those numbers may not signify much. So, to better ground them in the context of the present run environment, I’ve translated them to 2015 stats below.

Top First-Basemen Seasons Translated to 2015 Numbers

Metric	Index	Equals in 2015
ISO	88	.134
BB%	147	11.4%
K%	131	13.8%
BABIP	112	.336
Def	—	-0.5

So, in other words, the average player from that list of top-20 underpowered first-basemen seasons from above — were he transported to the present day — would produce the numbers one finds here: a .134 ISO, an 11.4% walk rate, a 13.8% strikeout rate, etc.

Those average figures provide a clue as to the reluctance of clubs to rely on underpowered first basemen. Because, while certain of these metrics (isolated power, walk rate, strikeout rate) are likely to depict something like true talent over the course of one season, others (BABIP, defensive runs) are much more susceptible to variance in a single year. These productive but underpowered seasons are the result, in no small part, of success on balls in play and fielding runs. And while it’s entirely possible for a player to possess an actual skill that will allow him to excel by either or both measures, it’s a much greater challenge to identify those skills.

By way of illustration, consider the following table. In this case, I’ve isolated the four measures by which the successful, underpowered first basemen have excelled — and, in so doing, been able to compensate for their relative paucity of extra-base hits. For each of those four measures, I’ve also included the number of players forecast to exceed the relevant mark in 2016 according the Steamer projections. Note that the Def mark denotes players who’ve received a positional adjustment of -7.5 or worse (and therefore can be reliably expected to play mostly first base), but still received a defensive projection of -0.5 or better.

Benchmarks of Underpowered First Basemen vs. Projections

Metric	Index	Equals in 2015	# Projected to Beat
BB%	147	11.4%	34
K%	131	13.8%	104
BABIP	112	.336	10
Def	—	-0.5	0

This table summarizes the challenge of employing an underpowered first baseman: while his lack of extra-base strength requires him to compensate by means of the four categories represented here, expecting a batter to meet the necessary thresholds is unreasonable. As the Steamer projections reveal, over 100 batters can be expected to surpass the requisite strikeout-rate threshold in 2016 and 30-plus batters will do the same thing for walk rate. Only 10 batters, though, can be reasonably expected to reach the BABIP mark and literally no one can be expected both to play first base and reach the -0.5-run mark on the defensive side. The absence of even league-average power, in the end, puts considerable pressure on the player to succeed by other means. Not so much pressure that it has happened before, but enough that it doesn’t happen dependably.