The Pre-Arb Bonus Pool Is A Success

Charles LeClaire-Imagn Images

Last week, MLB announced the distribution of the pre-arbitration bonus pool. You probably saw roughly one headline from this: Paul Skenes earned a record $3,436,343 bonus for his spectacular sophomore season. That is indeed great news, in my opinion. Skenes was one of the most exciting and best players in baseball in 2025, and a compensation system that more closely aligns skill with salary is a no brainer to me. But while Skenes’ record haul drew the headlines, the vast majority of the $50 million pool was spread widely; 101 players received bonuses, with all 30 teams boasting at least one awardee.

I’m here to tell you that I think this is a wonderful development. The fund, established in the most recent collective bargaining agreement, takes in $1.67 million from each team every year to fund its $50 million payout. It hands some of that money out to award winners, from $2.5 million for Skenes’ Cy Young Award win down to $150,000 for Daylen Lile’s fifth-place Rookie of the Year finish. The rest goes to the top 100 pre-arbitration players in a WAR formula jointly calculated by MLB and the MLBPA according to a set ratio.

This didn’t feel like a huge part of the CBA at the time it was signed, but in my opinion, it’s been an incredible boon for the game. Baseball’s compensation system has always been out of whack. The service time system limits all pre-arbitration players to the minimum salary, more or less. Teams do occasionally award salaries slightly greater than the minimum ($760,000 in 2025), but generally by a de minimis amount: The Pirates paid Skenes $875,000 this year, for example.

That flat structure means that under the old system, Skenes would have earned roughly $1.6 million in 2024 and 2025, instead of the $7.2 million he’s pocketed under the new system. You can’t convince me that that’s a bad thing. Cristopher Sánchez is an even better example, because unlike Skenes, he didn’t have a huge signing bonus as an amateur — not to mention all the ancillary income the Pittsburgh superstar earns through his various endorsement deals as one of the most recognizable players in the sport. Sánchez just eclipsed three years of service time; through the end of 2024, the Phillies had paid him around $2.5 million in salary for his first two-plus major league seasons. He signed a contract extension that paid him $3.55 million in 2025, bringing his career contractual earnings up to roughly $6 million. Thanks to the bonus pool, though, he’s received an additional $3.5 million over the last three years. That’s a huge difference, and in a clearly good direction for money to flow.

You can think of the bonus pool as a subsidy to teams who play young players. By funding the bonus pool evenly across all 30 teams instead of making the club employing each player responsible for paying the bonus, teams who employ a host of great pre-arb players can have it all: They contribute a set amount, but their pre-arb contributors get paid more fairly.

Take the Brewers, for example. Though Skenes got the largest individual bonus, Milwaukee took the most bonus money home as a team. Ten Brewers received a cumulative $4,742,392 in bonuses, led by Brice Turang with $1.15 million. That was only the ninth-highest individual award; the Brewers simply had a ton of plus contributors in the pool. Here’s a list of the bonus pool broken down by team:

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2025 Pre-Arb Bonus Pool by Team
Team Players Bonus
MIL 10 $4,742,392
PIT 5 $4,362,309
ATH 4 $3,103,411
PHI 1 $2,678,437
CHC 3 $2,548,721
BOS 5 $2,303,753
HOU 1 $2,206,538
ARI 3 $2,117,416
MIA 6 $1,976,000
TBR 4 $1,963,124
DET 6 $1,914,238
KCR 4 $1,909,309
CIN 4 $1,766,368
SEA 2 $1,762,742
ATL 3 $1,732,122
STL 5 $1,527,976
NYY 5 $1,486,327
TEX 4 $1,300,082
CHW 4 $1,231,452
WAS 3 $978,527
SDP 3 $925,033
BAL 2 $874,269
CLE 3 $860,536
TOR 3 $775,998
LAA 2 $756,247
LAD 2 $761,948
SFG 1 $494,307
COL 1 $460,214
NYM 1 $270,987
MIN 1 $209,217

For the first time, all 30 teams had at least one player receive a bonus. Yet, for the most part, the bonus pool has flowed to teams who fill their roster with young productive players. Those teams are a mixed bag of small-market strivers and big-budget teams with good player development systems:

Pre-Arb Bonus Pool by Team, 2022-2025
Team 2022 2023 2024 2025 Total
BAL $3,306,145 $7,257,343 $3,838,270 $874,269 $15,276,027
SEA $3,953,499 $4,098,252 $2,842,742 $1,762,742 $12,657,235
MIL $821,328 $1,080,357 $4,465,828 $4,742,392 $11,109,905
HOU $4,714,235 $1,728,513 $1,554,930 $2,206,538 $10,204,216
CLE $3,825,033 $3,145,116 $2,057,316 $860,536 $9,888,001
ARI $2,809,839 $2,558,203 $2,127,172 $2,117,416 $9,612,630
PIT $643,435 $1,489,432 $2,882,298 $4,362,309 $9,377,474
KCR $926,241 $1,525,402 $4,948,427 $1,909,309 $9,309,379
ATL $2,915,872 $2,662,099 $632,821 $1,732,122 $7,942,914
TBR $2,455,631 $2,924,147 $0 $1,963,124 $7,342,902
ATH $439,755 $1,011,273 $2,564,069 $3,103,411 $7,118,508
DET $293,739 $2,271,815 $2,259,378 $1,914,238 $6,739,170
STL $2,811,595 $778,171 $1,433,521 $1,527,976 $6,551,263
CIN $947,108 $2,143,712 $1,390,620 $1,766,368 $6,247,808
CHC $824,606 $2,199,080 $667,851 $2,548,721 $6,240,258
BOS $245,152 $1,015,788 $2,462,659 $2,303,753 $6,027,352
TOR $4,035,334 $516,590 $487,594 $775,998 $5,815,516
NYY $1,539,831 $246,549 $2,319,056 $1,486,327 $5,591,763
PHI $304,294 $1,438,281 $1,141,671 $2,678,437 $5,562,683
TEX $855,683 $2,205,744 $702,019 $1,300,082 $5,063,528
LAD $2,459,017 $986,983 $586,051 $761,948 $4,793,999
MIN $795,132 $2,085,595 $1,564,758 $209,217 $4,654,702
CHW $2,979,410 $356,317 $0 $1,231,452 $4,567,179
MIA $622,043 $1,303,326 $653,453 $1,976,000 $4,554,822
LAA $1,657,217 $536,825 $705,665 $756,247 $3,655,954
SFG $900,540 $666,778 $1,577,638 $494,307 $3,639,263
WAS $517,840 $608,194 $1,114,321 $978,527 $3,218,882
SDP $679,340 $0 $1,191,534 $925,033 $2,795,907
COL $0 $809,831 $1,212,391 $460,214 $2,482,436
NYM $0 $350,284 $615,947 $270,987 $1,237,218

From a qualitative perspective, this bonus pool has been a huge success. It’s paying the most underpaid class of major league contributors, and the way it’s allocating the money seems broadly intuitive. Is it the right amount of money, though? To do that, I had to do a little bit of math. I took salary and WAR data for 2019-2025 and grouped players by their contractual status. I used both Cot’s Contracts and RosterResource to harmonize my sources; contract data can be difficult to come by.

The proportion of WAR created by pre-arb, arb, and post-free-agency players has been fairly constant over the past seven years. (Note: I excluded the abbreviated 2020 season from my calculations because it was just so weird.) Dividing the era into old CBA and new CBA, you can see that the overall proportion of WAR coming from players who haven’t yet reached free agency has remained roughly the same, though with more pre-arb and fewer arb players:

Share of WAR by Service Time Group, 2019-2025
Group Old CBA New CBA
Pre-Arb 38.40% 40.70%
Arb 33.44% 30.46%
Free Agent 28.16% 28.83%

In terms of contractual salaries, the share of money going to pre-arb players hasn’t increased much:

Share of Contracted Salary by Service Time Group, 2019-2025
Group Old CBA New CBA
Pre-Arb 14.20% 14.48%
Arb 25.16% 24.18%
Free Agent 60.64% 61.35%

That means that in terms of dollars paid per WAR accrued, pre-arb players have seen their salaries increase at a lower rate, relative to the WAR they rack up, than free agents. Here’s that formula turned into dollars per WAR; the pre-free-agent group combining pre-arb and arb has seen its $/WAR increase by about 19% in the new CBA, as compared to 17.9% for free agents:

Contracted Salary per WAR by Service Time Group, 2019-2025
Group Old CBA New CBA Increase%
Pre-Arb $1,500,135 $1,711,416 14.1%
Arb $3,012,109 $3,832,994 27.3%
Free Agent $8,690,899 $10,245,360 17.9%

These numbers don’t include the new bonus pool. On-field value is still measured the same way, but after adding the bonus money to pre-arb players, total outlay looks more balanced:

Share of Salary Plus Bonus by Service Time Group, 2019-2025
Group Old CBA New CBA
Pre-Arb 14.20% 15.36%
Arb 25.16% 23.93%
Free Agent 60.64% 60.71%

In terms of dollars per WAR, things look even better. With the bonus money taken into account, players who have yet to reach free agency have seen their $/WAR increase by 22% under the new CBA, much better than the 19% that they would have realized without this addition:

Salary Plus Bonus per WAR by Service Time Group, 2019-2025
Group Old CBA New CBA Increase%
Pre-Arb $1,500,135 $1,834,735 22.3%
Arb $3,012,109 $3,832,994 27.3%
Free Agent $8,690,899 $10,245,360 17.9%

In other words, the bonus pool is doing exactly what it was supposed to, increasing salaries to the players who have historically been less compensated per contribution than their tenured compatriots. I think it could be expanded even more, in fact, or broadened to include players already eligible for arbitration. The exact mechanics are open to change, and I’m not particularly tied to the WAR calculation or the structure of award compensation, but it seems clear to me from the salary data that the general goal of the pre-arbitration bonus pool is being fulfilled.





Ben is a writer at FanGraphs. He can be found on Bluesky @benclemens.

32 Comments
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Thomas BertonMember since 2020
20 days ago

Great article Ben! Side note, but this seems like soft confirmation that my assumption that the current $/war number for free agents is about $10 million, as opposed to the old $8 million number that often gets used

Thomas BertonMember since 2020
19 days ago
Reply to  Ben Clemens

Right, that’s why I soft confirmation. Obviously a full analysis would need to be more detailed.

Edit: this was meant to be in reply to sadtrombone below.

Last edited 19 days ago by Thomas Berton
sadtromboneMember since 2020
20 days ago
Reply to  Thomas Berton

Not this again. You can’t calculate the price of a win this way! The price of a win is based on expected outcome and not actual outcome. It’s what you would pay. What Ben is showing instead is the return on investment.

illardfillmoreMember since 2016
20 days ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

You can’t do this for an individual player, but would the net amount of all free agents kind of cancel out? Teams will miss on any specific player, but overall, assuming they’re making rational decisions, would expected outcome be pretty similar to actual outcome?

sadtromboneMember since 2020
20 days ago
Reply to  illardfillmore

It would need to be balanced out by an equal but opposite amount of value that teams unexpectedly get from their free agents. In other words, if pred is the prediction a team makes for player x, then some teams will have bad luck (pred – underperformance) while other teams will have good luck (pred + overperformance). If the sum of underperformance is balanced out perfectly by the sum of overperformance then adding up WAR totals would give you the true value of the sum of pred and then could calculate $/WAR.

(In reality it probably wouldn’t work out this way anyway because $/WAR is almost certainly not linear which would make this a hundred times harder to calculate, but let’s just assume it’s flat for a minute. Also, it literally costs more $ to sign a player if you’re over the tax line, good luck assigning values to specific players in specific offseasons for that one. Also, we’re assuming everyone is using a $/WAR calculation, which is probably not true for every franchise and every deal. Also, teams are frontloading the value on the contract so that almost every deal looks better two years in than it will in four, five, six, seven years in)

But let’s ignore everything in the parentheses for a minute. Even if we assume none of that matters, I think that assumption is probably very wrong. It’s one thing when a team misses by giving Teoscar Hernandez $14M to put up half a win ($/WAR here is about $28M per win). That is often balanced out somewhere by a particularly good signing, like Nick Pivetta getting $2.5M to put up about 3.5 to 4 wins ($/WAR here is about $0.67M per win). Where this really gets thrown off is injuries. Anthony Rendon alone inflates the cost of a win with his roughly $60M per win deal. Corbin Burnes probably is going to throw this year’s calculations off too. Teams simply do not get lucky enough with free agents to balance that out.

On a side note, this also highlights the problem of reversing the temporal order of events. Under this sort of a calculation, it means that when players do worse the price goes up. And when players do better the price goes down.

A Salty ScientistMember since 2024
19 days ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

Yes, that makes a lot of sense. Even the most simple models should use projected vs actual WAR.

sadtromboneMember since 2020
19 days ago

The problem is that we don’t know what the team’s internal calculations are. I think it’s probably something like 75% of the player’s value the previous year and 25% of the year before that, but it’s hard to say if I am on the right track or not.

dodgerbleu
18 days ago
Reply to  sadtrombone

Why not remove injured players? At least at a point, generally speaking, teams expect some time missed, e.g. they don’t sign a guy to play 162 games, they sign them to play 145 games. Or if you’re the Dodgers, you sign them to pitch 60 to 90 innings and the playoffs.

And then I won’t pretend to know how insurance works, but I know that teams insure both big money contracts as well as guys they might consider prone to injury.

So the signing didn’t go as planned that year, but only according to plan A. But non-Colorado teams have contingencies, and contingencies for their contingencies. Only one is Buxton where that contingency is built in and visible, for everyone else we just don’t really know.

So not knowing the insurance details for injured players, especially on multi-year contracts, why not only use qualified players and just pull out the injury noise? Leave the underperformers, the DFAs, the demotees, the overperformers, the vesting options, the awards incentives, the bonus pools, everything else, all that still happens. But remove injured players from any given year – based on a threhold – and just know that the calculation doesn’t include big injuries which are obviously more costly to the team.

It’s an imperfect macro stat anyways, as long as it’s applied evenly we’d know what the cost of a win for your on-the-field product is. It would limit the volatility that an injuries can add, as opposed to getting 0.4 WAR from three injured guys who made 80M which would significant enough to skew the calculation by up to 7 figures. Basically it’d be cost per win plus cost lost to injuries kept as a different metric. Still a lot of noise in there that would make a projection a moving target, but retroactively we know what each player was actually paid, so it seems like the injury factor is the only thing we truly can’t account for..