The Ramifications of Possible Changes to the Posting System
According to David Lennon at Newsday, it looks like changes are coming to the posting system that allows Japanese clubs to, in effect, sell their players to American teams. Though this knowledge comes from anonymous sources, the alterations seem to fit an important facet of successful negotiations: there’s something in them for every party at the table.
The old system, in place since 1998, had teams send blind bids to the Japanese team owning the rights of a coveted young player wanting to play in America. The winning American team then had an exclusive window to negotiate with the player, and if they were not successful, the player would return to Japan and an uncomfortable situation (and the posting fee would evaporate).
The major proposed change, according to Lennon, could have “as many as three teams chosen among the top bidders, with the Japanese player then allowed to choose the club he’d prefer to play for and negotiate with.”
Since the complaints about the old system have come from most corners of the process, let’s look at how this considerable change would cost and benefit each major actor involved in your typical posting process.
The Japanese Player
The posted Japanese player benefits the most from this proposed change, as it immediately gives them leverage where they had very little in the past. The posting process can be a painful one that plays out in the media in Japan. Since the player has to request to be posted, he’s already made his decision publicly. To come back is, in essence, to admit that the process failed. And yet that is his only leverage once a team wins the bidding process: take their deal or go home. Now it looks like they may be able to play a couple teams against each other. And, since the team situation has often been important to Japanese players on their way to America, this also allows them to consider other factors. Now they can pick a team that’s closer to Japan, or plays in a city that has a strong Japanese community.
In any case, this large leverage change should allow the player to get more of total money spent in salary. As it is, the Japanese team and player split the total money spent almost 50/50, with Yu Darvish being the first high-profile signing to push that split in the player’s direction with a six year, $60 million contract after his rights were purchased with a $51.7 million posting fee.
Major League Baseball
This particular change — allowing three teams to ‘win’ the posting bid — doesn’t immediately sound like it would affect baseball’s governing body. But if the player receives more of the money allocated to the process, that means more money goes onto the books of the American team. That means more money for luxury tax calculations. And that means more money for Major League Baseball. Add to that possibility other rumored changes, and you can see why baseball’s administration is pushing for changes. According to Ben Badler at Baseball America, another possible change is that the posting fee is capped in the future, which could further push more money onto American team payrolls and into luxury tax territory.
The Japanese Team
Obviously that last change wouldn’t necessarily be one that Japanese teams would love. And, this idea that the changes would help to suppress posting fees, that isn’t something that would bring them to the table necessarily. But that doesn’t mean that the Japanese teams don’t have complaints, and that these changes couldn’t help to solve those issues. After unsuccessful postings have become slightly more common in recent years, there has been some grumbling that American teams can use the process to ‘block’ other teams from signing a player. In particular, when Hisashi Iwakuma failed to sign with the Athletics after their bid of $19.1 million was selected, his agent (Don Nomura) accused the team of not being “sincere” with their four-year $15.25 million offer. Even if Iwakuma didn’t do much better with the Mariners, it’s clear there’s some distrust in the process. And the Japanese team wants successful postings as much as the player, obviously. They might be on board with any changes that help ensure that once this difficult process is begun, it is more likely to complete with a transfer of cash to their team.
The American Team
It’s hardest to tell why the American teams would want these changes. One of the best benefits of the posting process to the big-budget teams is that they can count the posting fee against the marketing budget instead of the payroll, which helps them keep out of the luxury tax. If the posting fee goes down and the salaries go up, even if the net money is the same, the tax implications are not favorable. On the other hand, these changes might intrigue some smaller-market teams. Now it’s easier to get to the table, and once you’re at the table, anything can happen. A west-coast team with a strong Japanese community could surprise the other bidders by using a recruiting process based on non-monetary considerations. Or maybe they get to the table with a smaller posting fee and can therefore offer the player more money while spending the same overall cash outlay. If they aren’t near the luxury tax, it might make sense to them.
Though these changes look to benefit the posted Japanese players the most, there’s something in them for everyone. That makes it exceedingly likely that an agreement is made, even if teams have no choice but to act like it’s business as usual until they know the specific changes made. Masahiro Tanaka might just be the first guinea pig for a revamped posting process this offseason.
With a phone full of pictures of pitchers' fingers, strange beers, and his two toddler sons, Eno Sarris can be found at the ballpark or a brewery most days. Read him here, writing about the A's or Giants at The Athletic, or about beer at October. Follow him on Twitter @enosarris if you can handle the sandwiches and inanity.
It sounds like the smartest teams would be able to figure out the 2nd or third best posting fee, while having something to offer the player.
I can’t see how this would help a team like like the Royal’s, unless they overpay on salary
I see this as a welcome change for a team like Seattle. They have a high profile in Japan due to the successes many Japanese players have had while playing with the Mariners (Ichiro, Sasaki, Iwakuma, Johjima, etc.). They also have an attractive geographic advantage over some of the eastern or central teams. Changes like these cold make it easier, and potentially cheaper for a team like Seattle to get to the negotiating table where they may be able to use their geography/profile to their advantage.
To encourage teams to bid more, all three teams should pay the third-highest fee. This avoids underbidding to avoid overpaying.
You have a problem if something like this isn’t included. Otherwise the 3rd placed team has a potentially huge advantage.
Additionally, this sort of change only works well for the elite guys. Some of the more marginal players will struggle to get three bids at all.
Actually, the more I think about this, the more I can’t see how this would be in the Japanese clubs’ interest. However it’s done, it will result in significantly lower posting fees. For example, there were not three clubs willing to pay $50 million to negotiate with Darvish. It was speculated that the Blue Jays weren’t that far behind Texas, but that there was nobody else that was close.
Make the NPB player like any other free agent, free to negotiate with any team but with a set percentage of their American contract(s)going to their prior NPB team. MLB would have to determine if the money going to the NPB team counted towards luxury tax charges.
Good luck to all the mid-market midwest teams with a next to non-existant Japanese community who are already at a payroll disadvantage.
They already didn’t have a chance in the old system anyway. I see lower tier teams now taking a flier on guys, maybe they only bid $5M fee for Iwakuma, then is able to outbid the other team (A’s in this case, but let’s say it was a big money team in future cases) who paid $19M by giving some of the fee savings to Iwakuma in the player contract.
They still won’t have much chance for the big players still, but they might at least get some action in the lower-tier free agents by throwing out low bids and see if they catch someone.
Nice article, as usual, Enos!
Very interesting developments. It might not benefit the big money teams, but there are 30 teams voting, most of them not big money teams.
Overall, it benefits American teams in general because it enables a second or third team to sneak in with a lower bid. This was not discussed, but I assume it will be a blind bid again, so that a team can’t just see where the bids are and strategically place it low but high enough to be Top 3.
So that opens the door for two more bidders, so it is not good for the former winning bidding team, but it is good for all the other teams who are non-winners. Before, teams could make an estimate on what they want to pay, then pick an amount of that which they think would win the bid, and the rest they pay for the player. Now, it is wide open, and harder to estimate, as there are more moving parts.
Teams still start with what they think they want to pay. And they still need to pay a percentage to win the bid (or at least top 3). But then the big question mark becomes the bidding for the player. As noted, non-monetary factors might come into play. As well as outside monetary factors, like if there are marketers in certain markets willing to sign the player to endorsement contracts. So teams will need to account for that against the other bidders. And sometimes bidders don’t hold to their budget, they decide that they want to win the bid. All that would, as noted, factor into lower “marketing” fees and more salary, pushing up a team towards luxury tax time or worse.
And that is good for nearly all of the 30 MLB teams, the non-luxury tax paying ones, because it will mostly be the big teams with the big money winning these bids anyway for the best players that will yield 3 top bidders.
Now, it could end up biting the rear end of a smaller budget team like the A’s, when bidding for lesser free agents. But look at that deal they did. Lets say it switches around to $15M fee and $19M contract and (assuming that the $15M had satisfied the free agent), that’s an extra $1M per year related to the luxury tax. But even for Yu Darvish, lets say the fee gets halved, with the savings going to the player, over 6 years, that is roughly an extra $4M per year. For that extra $1-4M, that’s not really going to cause a team to tip over into luxury tax territory, most likely, the team probably was already there or was planning on going over with the original bid anyway.
So posting team wins because now it is more likely that a team will bid on a player and sign him, instead of having it revolve around one team choosing to negotiate or not. For that extra certainty, the fees should go down. Players obviously win, less likelihood of embarrassment of a non-deal plus likely bigger contracts. American teams wins overall because bigger money teams will be forced to pay more for the top talent in luxury tax terms, instead of avoiding it by categorizing as “marketing”, plus win because they can bid lower and could still get into the final 3 bidder status, and pay less for top talent (since their bid is most probably lower). Only the big money teams near or over the luxury tax come out of this bad.