The Rise of the Offensive Catcher
You probably are well aware that offensive levels in baseball have collapsed over the last few years. We’re well past the “Year of the Pitcher” and are now at a point where run scoring is as scarce as it was back in the 1970s. It seems like no one can hit anymore, or at least, no more than one or two guys per team anyway. For various reasons, the recent trends in baseball have almost all gone in favor of the pitchers.
But not quite all. There is one place in baseball where offense is actually trending upwards, and that trend is behind the plate.
Last March, Mark Smith wrote about the improved offensive levels of catchers in recent years, but with another year of data and our new by-position split leaderboards, I think it’s worth pointing this out again. Especially because, for the first few weeks of 2014 at least, the trend seems to only be accelerating.
First, let’s start off with some data, pulled from the site using our new positional split leaderboards. The top section is hitting by players while catching from 2002 to 2014, the second section is hitting by all position players from 2002 to 2014, and the third section is the difference between the top two sections.
| Catchers | BB% | K% | AVG | OBP | SLG | ISO | BABIP | wOBA | wRC+ |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2002 | 8% | 16% | 0.253 | 0.315 | 0.383 | 0.130 | 0.285 | 0.305 | 83 |
| 2003 | 7% | 16% | 0.258 | 0.320 | 0.402 | 0.144 | 0.287 | 0.314 | 87 |
| 2004 | 8% | 16% | 0.261 | 0.324 | 0.403 | 0.143 | 0.291 | 0.316 | 87 |
| 2005 | 7% | 16% | 0.253 | 0.315 | 0.390 | 0.137 | 0.281 | 0.308 | 85 |
| 2006 | 7% | 16% | 0.269 | 0.329 | 0.416 | 0.147 | 0.300 | 0.321 | 90 |
| 2007 | 8% | 17% | 0.256 | 0.318 | 0.394 | 0.139 | 0.287 | 0.312 | 84 |
| 2008 | 8% | 17% | 0.256 | 0.325 | 0.390 | 0.133 | 0.291 | 0.315 | 88 |
| 2009 | 8% | 18% | 0.254 | 0.321 | 0.396 | 0.142 | 0.289 | 0.314 | 87 |
| 2010 | 9% | 18% | 0.249 | 0.319 | 0.381 | 0.132 | 0.285 | 0.310 | 89 |
| 2011 | 8% | 19% | 0.245 | 0.313 | 0.389 | 0.145 | 0.282 | 0.308 | 91 |
| 2012 | 9% | 20% | 0.248 | 0.318 | 0.400 | 0.152 | 0.285 | 0.313 | 95 |
| 2013 | 8% | 20% | 0.245 | 0.310 | 0.388 | 0.142 | 0.286 | 0.307 | 92 |
| 2014 | 8% | 20% | 0.253 | 0.318 | 0.398 | 0.146 | 0.293 | 0.317 | 100 |
| —– | —– | —– | —– | —– | —– | —– | —– | —– | —– |
| All Hitters | BB% | K% | AVG | OBP | SLG | ISO | BABIP | wOBA | wRC+ |
| 2002 | 9% | 16% | 0.265 | 0.336 | 0.424 | 0.159 | 0.294 | 0.331 | 100 |
| 2003 | 9% | 16% | 0.268 | 0.337 | 0.430 | 0.162 | 0.296 | 0.333 | 100 |
| 2004 | 9% | 16% | 0.270 | 0.340 | 0.436 | 0.166 | 0.299 | 0.335 | 100 |
| 2005 | 8% | 16% | 0.268 | 0.335 | 0.427 | 0.158 | 0.297 | 0.331 | 100 |
| 2006 | 9% | 16% | 0.274 | 0.342 | 0.440 | 0.166 | 0.304 | 0.337 | 100 |
| 2007 | 9% | 17% | 0.272 | 0.340 | 0.430 | 0.158 | 0.305 | 0.336 | 100 |
| 2008 | 9% | 17% | 0.268 | 0.338 | 0.424 | 0.156 | 0.302 | 0.333 | 100 |
| 2009 | 9% | 18% | 0.266 | 0.338 | 0.425 | 0.159 | 0.301 | 0.334 | 100 |
| 2010 | 9% | 18% | 0.261 | 0.330 | 0.410 | 0.149 | 0.299 | 0.326 | 100 |
| 2011 | 8% | 18% | 0.259 | 0.325 | 0.406 | 0.147 | 0.297 | 0.321 | 100 |
| 2012 | 8% | 19% | 0.259 | 0.324 | 0.413 | 0.154 | 0.299 | 0.320 | 100 |
| 2013 | 8% | 19% | 0.257 | 0.322 | 0.403 | 0.146 | 0.299 | 0.318 | 100 |
| 2014 | 9% | 21% | 0.250 | 0.319 | 0.396 | 0.145 | 0.296 | 0.316 | 100 |
| —– | —– | —– | —– | —– | —– | —– | —– | —– | —– |
| Difference | BB% | K% | AVG | OBP | SLG | ISO | BABIP | wOBA | wRC+ |
| 2002 | 1% | 0% | 0.012 | 0.021 | 0.041 | 0.029 | 0.009 | 0.026 | 17 |
| 2003 | 1% | 0% | 0.010 | 0.017 | 0.028 | 0.018 | 0.009 | 0.019 | 13 |
| 2004 | 1% | 0% | 0.009 | 0.016 | 0.033 | 0.023 | 0.008 | 0.019 | 13 |
| 2005 | 1% | 0% | 0.015 | 0.020 | 0.037 | 0.021 | 0.016 | 0.023 | 15 |
| 2006 | 1% | 0% | 0.005 | 0.013 | 0.024 | 0.019 | 0.004 | 0.016 | 10 |
| 2007 | 1% | 0% | 0.016 | 0.022 | 0.036 | 0.019 | 0.018 | 0.024 | 16 |
| 2008 | 1% | 0% | 0.012 | 0.013 | 0.034 | 0.023 | 0.011 | 0.018 | 12 |
| 2009 | 1% | 0% | 0.012 | 0.017 | 0.029 | 0.017 | 0.012 | 0.020 | 13 |
| 2010 | 0% | 1% | 0.012 | 0.011 | 0.029 | 0.017 | 0.014 | 0.016 | 11 |
| 2011 | 0% | -1% | 0.014 | 0.012 | 0.017 | 0.002 | 0.015 | 0.013 | 9 |
| 2012 | 0% | -1% | 0.011 | 0.006 | 0.013 | 0.002 | 0.014 | 0.007 | 5 |
| 2013 | 0% | -1% | 0.012 | 0.012 | 0.015 | 0.004 | 0.013 | 0.011 | 8 |
| 2014 | 1% | 0% | (0.003) | 0.001 | (0.002) | (0.001) | 0.003 | (0.001) | 0 |
A decade ago, catchers regularly posted a wRC+ about 15 points lower than league average, and this double digit deficit persisted through 2010. In 2011, the gap shrunk to nine points and has stayed in single digits for the last three years. Through the first few weeks of 2014, there has been no difference; catchers have hit at a level equal to the average of all other positions.
From the third section of the table, you can see that almost the entire change in catcher offense relative to position player offense can be explained by ISO. In graph form, here is average ISO for both catchers and all position players since 2002.
The differences between catchers and other positions have been pretty stable in BB%, K%, and BABIP, but the gap has consistently diminished in ISO since 2002. The 20-30 point gap that persisted from 2002 to 2010 basically just disappeared in 2011, and for the first few weeks of 2014, catchers actually have a very slightly higher ISO as a group (.146) than the average of all position players (.145). The downwards trend in power at other positions has intersected with an upwards trend in power from the catching position, for the last few years, there’s been little to distinguish catchers from hitters at other positions other than a 10 point BABIP gap.
A upwards fluctuation in catcher BABIP over the first few weeks of 2014 is why catchers have caught up with the league average wRC+, and that shouldn’t be expected to continue, so odds are that catchers will again finish with a below average batting line when all is said and done. However, we’re probably looking at another year of catchers posting something like a 95 wRC+ instead of the 85 wRC+ that was the old norm.
This brings up a few questions, with the obvious one looking for an explanation as to why catchers haven’t suffered from the effects that have driven down offensive levels at other positions. The easy explanation is that teams have moved towards prioritizing offense over defense behind the plate, and as Mark showed in his post last year, the rate of runners getting gunned down trying to steal supports the idea that there has been a change in catcher’s defensive skills.
The league average caught stealing rate so far this year is just 24%, which would easily go down as the lowest CS% in Major League history if it stayed that low for the entire year. And this recent era of mid-20% average caught stealing rates are historically unprecedented; runners have never gotten thrown out trying to steal as rarely as they have over the last 10 years.
However, the catcher isn’t the only variable in throwing out runners — Max Weinstein has argued here, in fact, that pitchers are the primary variable in whether a runner is thrown out or not — so we can’t simply conclude that reduced caught stealing rates mean that catchers are worse defenders now than they used to be. It seems intuitive that better hitting catchers would also be worse throwing catchers, but a reduced CS% isn’t enough to conclude that today’s catchers really are worse defensively than they used to be.
In fact, even if the total reduction in caught stealing rate was due to weaker armed/slower release catchers getting more playing time, we still couldn’t conclude that today’s catchers are overall weaker defenders simply because it is possible that the reduction in caught stealing rates is being offset by a different kind of defensive value; pitch framing.
For instance, guys like Brian McCann, Jonathan Lucroy, and Hank Conger have rated very well by framing estimates, and all have been below average at throwing out runners over the last few years. There are certainly some defensive specialists who are great at everything that has to do with receiving and throwing — Ryan Hanigan and Yadier Molina, for instance — but not every good framer is also a good thrower. And while I remain skeptical about the spread in runs saved or allowed based on current framing estimates, it is almost certainly true that the spread in framing is larger than the spread in throwing out attempted base stealers. If given a choice between a weak-armed framer and a strong-armed guy whose glove bounces all over the place, you probably want the weak-armed framer.
So the decline in caught stealing rate could be attributable, in part, to a shifting emphasis on what catcher defense actually is. And if arm strength is being de-emphasized — without a complete measure of catcher “pop times”, we can’t say for sure that it is — in favor of receiving skills, it is possible that the pool of potential catchers has grown, and some players who would have been moved off the position for low caught stealing rates are now being allowed to stay behind the plate because of their receiving value.
As Jeff noted last night, it is apparent that framing can be taught, and if that skill is as or more valuable than gunning down runners, than perhaps MLB can now select from a better hitting crop of players to stick behind the plate while teaching them to receive well enough to offset their mediocre arms.
This is heavily speculative, of course; what we’re seeing could simply be the result of baseball’s cyclical talent distributions. This could just be an extraordinarily talented group of offensive catchers, with guys like Buster Posey, Yadier Molina, and Brian McCann representing an unusual wave of good hitting backstops all playing at the same time.
Maybe in a few years, this will all reverse, and we’ll get back to catchers hitting like middle infielders, as has been the norm in baseball for a very long time. However, if the catcher profile is changing, and the pool of potential catchers has grown, there could be a shift in offense to the position away from players who would have been moved to other spots on the field. And if that’s the case, we may need to consider a new replacement level baseline for catchers. The positional adjustments that go into WAR assume that catchers can’t hit; now that they can, you could make an argument that WAR might be actually overrating catchers relative to other positions.
We don’t have enough information to make any strong conclusions here; just theories and hypotheses. But the data certainly makes it look like the catcher profile is changing, and this trend doesn’t seem to be changing any time soon.
Dave is the Managing Editor of FanGraphs.




What’s interesting is that Posey, McCann, and Molina are all also good on defense while hitting snot out of the ball. So teams haven’t had to sacrifice defense for offense, at least if they have one of these guys.
That is actually not interesting
Why did you type this?
Jerk, I offer an exquisite rebuttal in the form of an actual Jeff Sullivan Fangraphs comment, made on June 6, 2013:
“Take up yoga and maybe in time you’ll be flexible enough to satisfy yourself.”
All these thumbs down for telling the truth? It’s not interesting.
Hey buddy the jerk store called, they’re running out of you!
What’s the difference, you’re their all-time best seller!
yeah? ….well I slept with your wife!
You named yourself Jerk, so at least you’re self-aware
It’s ok everybody. I like humor- it’s not the enemy like many of you think.
I’m a little shocked that Jonathan Lucroy didn’t come up in this article.
Great framer and also a solid batter.
Apparently I’m blind, nevermind.
“For instance, guys like Brian McCann, Jonathan LuCroy, and Hank Conger have rated very well by framing estimates, and all have been below average at throwing out runners over the last few years.”
Emphasis mine.
Good thing you posted this after he realized his own mistake.
First thought upon reading the title was AJ Pierzynski
Offensive indeed
I’ll bet a good part of catchers being less successful throwing out base stealers doesn’t have to do with the catchers or pitchers at all. Teams are much less reluctant to give away outs than they used to be. Base runners are probably just staying put if they aren’t sure they are going to make it.
Stolen base attempt rates are basically even over the last decade. It could be that they’re getting more efficient about when they run, but they’re not really running less than they did a decade ago. They’re running a lot less than they did back in the 1980s, but CS% was around 40% then, so the decline in attempts can’t explain entire decline in CS%.
While its true that stolen base attempt rates are relatively level over the past decade, that still doesn’t speak to the proficiency of the base stealers. Meaning, 10 years ago, if the average player was more of a “lumbering slugger” than today, they would be far easier to throw out on a steal attempt.
I’m not sure how exactly would be the best way to quantify this aspect, other than perhaps timing how long it takes the average player to reach second base on a steal attempt. I did a brief search, but couldn’t find any type of yearly data on this. At this point it’s purely speculation without more hard data, but it seems to me that with the increased emphasis on defense over the past several years, we’re left with players who also would, on average, have faster base stealing times.
Dave,
It isn’t necessarily the case that there are less attempts, even if teams are more conservative. Perhaps, for example, fewer runners are attempting more steals now. Are fewer players attempting a greater proportion of the steals nowadays?
I favor the theory that when a position is perceived as ‘weak’ at the major league level, the best youth prospects are pressured to play that position to boost their personal marketability to big league clubs. It happened with the wave of hyper-athletic Shortstops in the 90’s, and lest we forget, Bryce Harper was a Catcher coming up.
Hasn’t it always been true that kids who played catcher, shortstop, and centerfield (at least through high school) make up the vast majority of position players drafted? Anecdotally, the best players in my high school years played those positions…
How does this “trend” hold up to normal variation over a sample size larger than 12 years? Are these things cyclical or is this really a new thing?
Also, maybe median wRC+ would be better to avoid skewing by elite hitters currently present.
It’s a little silly to show wRC+ for the entire league over the time period. By definition, wRC+ is adjusted for 100 as league average. It’d make more sense to remove catchers from the “All Hitters” table.
On that same note, looking at wOBA, it seems like the entire league’s wOBA has been decreasing, and that catcher’s wOBA is remaining steady. Should that be interpreted as “offensive catcher” or as “steady catcher, declining league”?
I noticed this as well. It seems the league started declining around 2010 while catchers remained relatively steady. I’d be interested to see a follow up showing how each other position fared compared to league average to see if catchers are the only ones not declining.
This was my exact thought as I was reading the first few paragraphs. Might it be that what ever forces are driving down hitting in the league are essentially working from the top down. Meaning that better hitters are effected more by this effect, what ever it is, and that worse hitters are escaping much of it?
I had this thought as well; If PEDs are being flushed out of the game, is there any reason to believe that catchers were less likely to take and/or benefit from them?
How much of that could be attributed to more effective platooning and fewer “true” backup catchers? Baseball teams are getting smarter, and better data is more readily available.
For teams that don’t have a Yadier, Lucroy, McCann, Posey, etc., playing/tailoring their catcher tandem due to handedness splits as opposed to the conventional “have one guy that starts 5 days a week, and one backup guy who catches the day game after the night game, and acts as a true “backup””. The A’s with Jaso/Norris would be a textbook example of that.
Could it be that catching isn’t as difficult as we like to make it seem? Evan Gattis played very little in the minors and had a much harder time playing left field than catcher. (And with SSS, isn’t a horrible catcher)
Outfield requires different skills (speed, agility, acceleration) that he lacks. Can’t really extrapolate a difficult-of-position analysis there. Frankly, I think he’s terrible at both positions defensively, just “less bad” at catcher.
Interesting you say that when it looks like he is already one of the best “framers” in the league. (SSS of course)
Posey’s rookie year was 2010, and Yadi’s first very good offensive season was 2011. I wonder how much of the increase can be from just Posey making it to the majors and Molina’s late blooming offensive skills.
In that same sense, we are losing Joe Mauer as a catcher this year.
I’m tempted to blame the entirety of this phenomenon on the retirements of Brad Ausmus and Mike Matheny.
Evan Gattis leading catchers in wOBA. The Janitor is having an effect on the catcher stats.
He’s a custodian, dick
YEAH! He holds the door for no man!
My inclination is that it’s just a coincidence that we happen to have several great hitting catchers in their prime. In the late 1990s, we saw a similar thing with offense from shortstops.
This increase in offense is happening despite JP Arencibia being included in the mix.
Rubbish, I have been in Tampa for 10 years and I have never seen any evidence of “Offensive Catchers” at the Trop… and thank goodness we didn’t draft that Posey guy, he has a .273/.333/.364 line with zero home runs here in Tampa.
You are SO good at your job
Thanks, bro.
I actually would have guessed the opposite. It seemed backing in the early-mid 2000s that catchers were some of the best offensive players. I remember Mike Piazza, Javy Lopez, and Ivan Rodriguez all being insanely good.
My thoughts are that the lower ISO and CS rates are both due to more athletic and defensive minded position players. Less power, but better at stealing. This emphasis on athletic players does not translate to catcher, who is basically immobile, therefore bigger and more powerful.
I think teams are just smarter with stolen base attempts. The new wave of sabermetrics allows teams to think about when to attempt a steal (ball strike counts, certain pitchers, various situations in games…) I think what we are seeing is an evolution in decision making process restricting stolen base attempts to high probability situations.
Perhaps most impressive about this narrowed gap is the fact that on any given day, 20% of the catchers in the starting lineup are backups.
My theory is that it has more to do with the other position players. In the past 10 years or so, we’ve developed better metrics for measuring non-catcher defense. As confidence in those numbers has grown and teams have accepted that dWAR is at least close to as valuable as oWAR, teams have been running out more defense-oriented players at non-catcher positions. Thus, the offensive levels at those positions has dropped (due to worse hitters and better fielders).
However, during that same time period catcher defense remained somewhat of a black box, so the selection process for catcher remained somewhat the same as it had been. My guess would be that as we gain a better understanding and more confidence in pitch framing and other aspects of catcher defense, we’ll see a corresponding shift in catcher selection and perhaps a similar decline in offensive production. However, I don’t expect catchers to return to their previous levels relative to the other positions because the athleticism required to be a good defender at the non-catcher positions naturally leads to players of slighter build and lesser power potential at those positions.
Totally anectdotal, but I feel the mid-00s were the last years where teams liked the 35+ year old backup catcher who can’t bat type.
Does Henry Blanco still have a job?
He recently retired, to become, wait for it… a hitting coach.
Red Sox have moved onto the 35+ year old starting catcher who can’t bat model.
Unfortunately PEDs probably play a factor. Catchers tend to be a bit smarter than other position players, on average, so they’re probably better at not getting caught. And catching is a very demanding position, so if anyone other than pitchers were to take PEDs to speed recovery time and help sustain themselves through a long season, it’d be catchers. And offense has been such a bonus from catchers for so long, no one would really look twice if a catcher who was a sub-par hitter suddenly became an average hitter, as opposed to the random center fielder or middle infielder who inexplicably bulked up between seasons and added 70 – 100 points to their SLG%.
This makes total sense, if there were any evidence undetectable magic power enhancing drugs actually existed. Since league home run rates remained sky high for nearly five years after testing started, we learned its a trivial argument over a trivial effect.
“if there were any evidence undetectable magic power enhancing drugs actually existed.”
Indeed. Sosa, Bonds, McGwire, Brady Anderson, etc etc. weren’t using any magic fairy dust. Just a good diet and lotsa situps.
Mmhmm.