The Road to the World Series Isn’t Paved With Intentional Walks
I don’t hate intentional walks the way some people do. Sure, it’s disappointing when a star player doesn’t get a chance to swing in a potentially game-altering situation. It’s especially unfortunate when that star player is targeted for an intentional walk because he lacks protection in the lineup; it sucks that José Ramírez and Shohei Ohtani combined for as many intentional walks as the next four hitters on the leaderboard put together.
That being said, anticlimactic moments are a necessary evil. You can’t have the highs without the lows. No one (besides Kevin Cash) wants to see Corey Seager sent to first with a runner in scoring position, only for Zach Eflin to strike out Robbie Grossman and end the threat. Yet, when the Orioles intentionally walked Seager a few days later, only for Mitch Garver and Adolis García to follow up with a double and a home run, breaking the game open and essentially putting the ALDS out of reach, it was absolutely thrilling. That’s precisely why I’ve always had a soft spot for intentional walks. When a great hitter like Freddie Freeman or Aaron Judge gets a free pass, I get to root for one of his teammates to be the hero and punish the opposing manager for his cowardice.
My passion for intentional walks burns all the brighter in October. The postseason can bring out excessive management from even the most level-headed skippers, and that includes issuing more intentional walks. Perhaps you recall last year when Scott Servais called for Yordan Alvarez to take first with the base already occupied, moving a runner up to second and into scoring position? Or how about when A.J. Hinch (then with the Astros) issued an intentional walk in the World Series after avoiding the strategy entirely all season? If you don’t remember, then you can thank Ben Clemens for writing about each instance in detail.
Intentional walks aren’t just more controversial in the playoffs, they’re much more common. Regardless of which denominator you prefer, it’s clear that managers turn to intentional walks more often in the postseason:
Dating back to 1995 (that’s the beginning of the Wild Card era, but more to point, I didn’t want to deal with skipping over the strike-cancelled 1994 postseason on the graph), there has only been one season, 2001, in which the league averaged more intentional walks per 1,000 PA in the regular season than in the playoffs. Meanwhile, 2004 was the only year in which intentional walks, as a percentage of all walks, were more common during the regular season.
So, how are things going in 2023? Not as great as usual for us intentional walk buffs. There’s still plenty of playoff baseball to go, but so far, the lack of intentional walks has been enough to catch my attention. Only five players have been intentionally walked this postseason, for a total of seven truly free passes. At this time last year, there had already been 11 intentional walks issued to nine different players.
Now, as you probably know, intentional walks have been trending down in the regular season for several years, and they dropped off even further with the introduction of the designated hitter in the National League. But I’m not so worried about the raw numbers here. In 2023, postseason intentional walks are at the lowest they’ve been in over a decade compared to regular season intentional walks.
The postseason IBB rate this year is still higher than the regular season rate, but not by much. From 1995-2022, the rate of IBB per 1,000 PA went up by an average of 3.39 IBB in the playoffs. This year, it’s only gone up by 0.69 IBB. That’s the smallest gap between the regular season and the playoffs since 2012, and it’s only the fourth time in the Wild Card era that the gap has been less than one walk:
Year | IBB/1,000 PA (Regular Season) | IBB/1,000 PA (Playoffs) | Difference |
---|---|---|---|
2023 | 2.57 | 3.26 | 0.69 |
2022 | 2.61 | 4.01 | 1.40 |
2021 | 3.87 | 6.49 | 2.62 |
2020 | 3.04 | 4.24 | 1.20 |
2019 | 4.04 | 8.24 | 4.20 |
2018 | 5.02 | 10.12 | 5.10 |
2017 | 5.23 | 8.50 | 3.26 |
2016 | 5.05 | 7.34 | 2.30 |
2015 | 5.18 | 7.78 | 2.60 |
2014 | 5.36 | 6.48 | 1.12 |
2013 | 5.51 | 10.10 | 4.59 |
2012 | 5.73 | 5.73 | 0.00 |
2011 | 6.65 | 12.67 | 6.02 |
2010 | 6.55 | 8.95 | 2.39 |
2009 | 6.30 | 9.49 | 3.18 |
2008 | 6.98 | 10.56 | 3.58 |
2007 | 7.01 | 9.73 | 2.72 |
2006 | 7.50 | 9.85 | 2.36 |
2005 | 6.53 | 10.22 | 3.69 |
2004 | 7.32 | 7.95 | 0.63 |
2003 | 7.02 | 13.44 | 6.42 |
2002 | 7.78 | 12.98 | 5.20 |
2001 | 7.40 | 7.36 | -0.04 |
2000 | 6.36 | 12.38 | 6.02 |
1999 | 5.84 | 15.22 | 9.38 |
1998 | 5.67 | 8.93 | 3.27 |
1997 | 6.66 | 8.45 | 1.79 |
1996 | 7.57 | 8.92 | 1.35 |
1995 | 7.05 | 15.56 | 8.50 |
Meanwhile, from 1995-2022, intentional walks comprised 7% of all walks in the regular season and 10.5% in the playoffs. This year, however, the difference is barely noticeable. Intentional walks accounted for 3% of walks in the regular season, and so far, they’ve made up 3.61% of all walks in the playoffs. Only twice in the Wild Card era has that gap been smaller, and this is only the fifth time it’s been less than one percent:
Year | IBB/BB (Regular Season) | IBB/BB (Playoffs) | Difference |
---|---|---|---|
2023 | 3.00% | 3.61% | 0.61% |
2022 | 3.20% | 5.26% | 2.07% |
2021 | 4.45% | 8.14% | 3.69% |
2020 | 3.32% | 4.43% | 1.11% |
2019 | 4.74% | 8.95% | 4.21% |
2018 | 5.92% | 10.08% | 4.16% |
2017 | 6.13% | 9.09% | 2.96% |
2016 | 6.18% | 9.55% | 3.37% |
2015 | 6.76% | 10.45% | 3.69% |
2014 | 7.03% | 8.51% | 1.48% |
2013 | 6.95% | 12.67% | 5.72% |
2012 | 7.17% | 7.66% | 0.48% |
2011 | 8.20% | 14.51% | 6.31% |
2010 | 7.71% | 11.86% | 4.16% |
2009 | 7.09% | 10.05% | 2.95% |
2008 | 8.02% | 10.92% | 2.91% |
2007 | 8.23% | 10.05% | 1.82% |
2006 | 8.90% | 11.70% | 2.80% |
2005 | 8.00% | 12.77% | 4.77% |
2004 | 8.51% | 8.40% | -0.12% |
2003 | 8.28% | 15.27% | 6.98% |
2002 | 8.94% | 16.04% | 7.10% |
2001 | 8.76% | 9.60% | 0.84% |
2000 | 6.63% | 12.10% | 5.46% |
1999 | 6.19% | 15.74% | 9.56% |
1998 | 6.49% | 9.30% | 2.81% |
1997 | 7.46% | 8.40% | 0.93% |
1996 | 8.33% | 9.95% | 1.62% |
1995 | 7.76% | 16.39% | 8.63% |
What’s more, four of the intentional walks issued this postseason have gone to the same two players: Seager and Bryce Harper. That means only five individual players have been gifted first base this October, with Corbin Carroll, Nick Castellanos, and Christian Walker joining Seager and Harper in the exclusive club. Last season, nine different players were intentionally walked in the playoffs; in 2020, the only other universal DH season, that number was 15 (albeit in a larger postseason field).
On top of that, all seven intentional walks thus far have been issued by different managers. We haven’t seen a single team issue more than one intentional walk in the entire postseason, let alone in a single game. This is only the third season in the Wild Card era in which no team has issued multiple intentional walks in a single playoff game, and if this trend continues, 2023 will become the first postseason since 1995 in which no team issues more than one intentional walk, period. Over the past 29 years, 155 different teams have issued multiple intentional walks in the postseason, an average of 5.5 per season from 1995-2022. Now, there are only four teams left that could possibly do it, and only two of them, the Phillies and Diamondbacks, have issued an intentional walk so far. (On a similar note: Either the Phillies or D-backs will become the first team this postseason to issue an intentional walk and still advance to the next round.)
So why might intentional walks be disappearing in the playoffs? Probably for the same reason they’ve been disappearing in the regular season: Teams are getting smarter about when to use them. At first blush, it might seem reasonable to issue more intentional walks in the postseason – the stakes are higher! – but if anything, perhaps intentional walks should be less common in October. Postseason teams are more likely to have deep lineups, which means more protection for the best hitters. Furthermore, postseason teams are more likely to be using their best pitchers, guys whose managers trust them to take on the Harpers and Seagers of the league.
Two of the seven intentional walks this year were issued mid-plate appearance, making them less risky moves: Carroll’s intentional walk from Evan Phillips in Game 2 of the NLDS, and Harper’s intentional walk from Spencer Strider in Game 4 of the NLDS. Indeed, Harper was already three-quarters of the way to a walk when Brian Snitker signaled for Strider to give up and face the next batter instead.
Three more came in moments when a great hitter had poor protection behind him: Seager’s intentional walk from Eflin in Game 2 of the Wild Card series, Castellanos’s intentional walk from Joe Mantiply in Game 2 of the NLCS, and Walker’s intentional walk from José Alvarado in Game 4 of the NLCS. It’s no wonder the right-handed Eflin chose to face Grossman (75 wRC+ vs. RHP this season) instead of Seager (183 wRC+ vs. RHP) with two outs and a runner on third. Many among us are still wondering why Grossman was batting behind Seager at all. Brandon Marsh hitting behind Castellanos makes more sense – until there’s a left-hander on the mound, that is. Castellanos crushes lefties, while Marsh falls behind Cristian Pache on the depth chart when a southpaw starts the game. Finally, Walker, the D-backs cleanup hitter, found himself hitting in front of Alek Thomas, who entered the game as a pinch runner. Thomas has been a poor hitter even with the platoon advantage, and against a lefty, the drop-off from Walker to Thomas might be even bigger than the drop-off from Seager to Grossman.
Thus, I’d argue only two intentional walks this postseason came out of genuine fear of the batter at the plate. In Game 3 of the ALDS, Dean Kremer walked Seager with Garver and García behind him and paid the price. Meanwhile, in Game 2 of the Wild Card, JT Chargois walked Harper in what felt like a scripted move; Skip Schumaker didn’t want his right-hander taking any chances against the lefty-batting superstar.
Overall, five of the seven intentional walks this postseason worked out for the defensive team. In two cases, however, the next batter continued the rally, and the defensive team ultimately found themselves in a 6-0 hole. Five out of seven is a passing grade on a math quiz, but you’ve got to be successful almost every time if you’re going to give up a free base in the postseason. Intentional walks are rarely the right decision, even if managers issue them with all the best intentions. The road to hell is paved with good intentions, and the road to the World Series isn’t paved with intentional walks.
Leo is a writer for FanGraphs and MLB Trade Rumors as well as an editor for Just Baseball. His work has also been featured at Baseball Prospectus, Pitcher List, and SB Nation. You can follow him on Twitter @morgensternmlb.
I’d IBB Yordan Alvarez every plate appearance
Yordan has been absolutely amazing this postseason with a .601 wOBA, whereas if he was walked every plate appearance his wOBA would be around .690. So the math would only check out for your strategy if (a) Alvarez is somehow expected to be significantly even better going forward or if (b) the Astros following him in the lineup were expected to be much much worse than average. Since neither of those are reasonable expectations, IBBing him every time, doesn’t check out even if tempting on an emotional level.
Does wOBA consider how he is getting on base?
He has a 1.065 slugging percentage and 1.522 OPS. Alvarez isn’t just hitting singles when he puts the ball in play and walks only drive in runs if the bases are loaded.
If he walked every at bat wouldn’t his OPS be 1.0? That is 50% lower than what it currently is.
Yes, wOBA does consider how he is getting on base.
At extremes OPS doesn’t really work for comparisons because it treats OBP and SLG as equally valuable, but they aren’t.
For example, if Player A walked half the time and made an out the other half, he would have a .500 OBP and .000 SLG = .500 OPS. If Player B hit a single a quarter of the time and made outs the other 3/4, he would have a .250 OBP and .250 SLG = .500 OPS. But Player A would be much more valuable.
Similarly, a player who walked every single time and literally never made an out, maintaining a 1.000 OBP, would be extremely valuable, even more than someone with say a .400 OBP and .600 SLG.
Even though they would only drive in a run if the bases more loaded, the next better in the lineup would literally always get to bat with at least someone on base. That itself is extremely valuable, unless of course the rest of your lineup only had Jeff Mathis’s and Martin Maldonado’s. But even with close to league average lineup protection, all those free baserunners would be extremely valuable.
Thanks for the explanation.
My understanding from that is the wOBA wouldn’t consider game specific situations.
Yordan has 13 RBIs in the post season and slugged .632 with men in and .760 with RISP. Walking him every time might be over the top, but that makes me think there were particular situations where a IBB would have been the right move and the wOBA only analysis might understate things by a few percentage points given the specific situations.